Gunnell Construction Company, Inc., appellant, subcontracted to Greene & Dyer Contracting Corporation a part of the work called for by appellant’s prime contract with the District of Columbia to construct certain facilities. The construction work is referred to as the Blue Plains project. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, appellee, as surety, bonded Greene & Dyer to Gunnell, the condition for recovery on the bond reading as follows:
Now, Therefore, the condition of this obligation is such that, if the Principal shall faithfully perform the contract on his part, and shall fully indemnify and save harmless the Obligee from all costs and damage which the Obligee may suffer by reason of failure so to do and shall fully reimburse and repay the Obligee all outlay and expense which the Obligee may incur in making good any such default, and shall pay all persons who have contracts directly with the Principal for labor or materials, then this obligation shall be null and void, otherwise it shall remain in full force and effect.
When Greene & Dyer did not complete the work under the subcontract, a dispute arose as to who was in breach, and Greene & Dyer brought suit in our District Court against Gunnell. Pending that litigation Greene & Dyer was adjudicated to be bankrupt. Gunnell moved the District Court to dismiss Greene & Dyer’s suit and this was done with leave to aménd. Greene & Dyer then filed an amended complaint, and Gunnell filed a suggestion of bankruptcy with the District Court and subsequently answered Greene & Dyer’s complaint, alleging that it was the latter who breached the contract. Thereafter Gunnell also filed a claim in the bankruptcy proceedings. The respective claims in those proceedings included but were not limited to those which grew out of the Blue Plains project. A compromise of all the claims between Gunnell and the bankrupt estate was reached and approved by the referee. In the compromise Gunnell reserved any right it might have against Hartford as surety for Greene & Dyer, and on its part Hartford lodged an objection to approval by the referee of the compromise.1 Following this compromise a praecipe, signed by the respective attorneys of Greene & Dyer and Gunnell, was filed in the District Court action between these two parties. The praecipe reads as follows:
The Clerk of said Court will please enter this cause as settled by compromise and dismissed with prejudice as to all claims, setoffs, and counterclaims.
Although Gunnell had filed no counterclaim any it might have had against Greene & Dyer was thus disposed of, for it would be a compulsory counterclaim required to be pursued in the action thus settled. Rule 13(a), Fed. R.Civ.P. The disposition of the litigation pursuant to the praecipe was a mutual discharge of the claims of the parties growing out of the Blue Plains project. As stated by the District Court *280in its opinion filed in granting summary judgment for Hartford:
[T]he dismissal “with prejudice as to all claims, setoffs and counterclaims” was an adjudication on the merits of all matters that were or could have been contested there,9 pre-
9- The praecipe was a “stipulation of dismissal” within F.R.Civ.P. 41(a) (1). Burns v. Fincke, 90 U.S.App.D.C. 381, 382, 197 F.2d 165, 166 (1952), and the provisions of that rule extend to counterclaims. F.R.Civ.P. 41(c). * * * See also * * * Broder v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 106 F.Supp. 343, 346 (D.D.C.1952).
eluding forever their relitigation between the parties — the principal on the bond in suit and its obligee.
On the undisputed facts, outlined above, we affirm the order of the District Court in granting Hartford’s motion for summary judgment. Simpson, Suretyship, 296 (1950); Stearns, Surety-ship, 146 (4th ed. 1934). The compromise in the bankruptcy proceedings does not stand alone in determining the relationship between Gunnell and Hartford. The compromise was followed by the unconditioned praecipe filed in the District Court action, which unqualifiedly discharged Greene & Dyer in respect of the Blue Plains project, thus by operation of law discharging its surety in connection with the same matter.2 In directing the clerk to enter the cause “as settled by compromise” the praecipe to no degree detracted from the legal effect of its unconditioned dismissal “with prejudice as to all claims, setoffs, and counterclaims.”
Affirmed.
. The intention of the principal, Greene & Dyer, and of the obligee, Gunnell, in making an agreement to which Hartford, the surety, was not a party, is not a controlling factor in determining the legal rights of Gunnell against Hartford. The reservation by Gunnell, in its compromise with Greene & Dyer, of such rights as Gunnell might have against Hartford, does not create rights. The steps Gunnell deemed it wise to take on its own behalf in its compromise with Greene & Dyer left Gunnell with no rights against Hartford insofar as the Blue Plains project is concerned.
. Appellant requests us to apply the “joint contractors” provisions of D.O.Oode § 16-901 (1961) so as to find that Hartford was in effect a co-principal with Greene & Dyer, and Gunnell accordingly could bring an independent action against Hartford without reference to its action against Greene & Dyer. Section 16-901 provides that contracts “entered into by two or more persons * * * shall for the purposes of suit thereupon be deemed joint and several.” Appellant reads § 16-901 with § 16-906, which provides generally that a compromise against one joint debtor does not discharge another joint debtor. The statute refers, however, to “two or more persons” entering into a contract. Although the construction contract of Greene & Dyer was incorporated by reference into the Hartford bond, Hartford was not a signatory to the original contract. Even though the surety bonds both payment and performance by the principal, we are unable to accept appellant’s argument that the statute was intended to make a co-principal out of a surety.