(dissenting).
I dissent. In my opinion, both of plaintiffs’ claims under the Bill of Rights, section 101, of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA), 73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 411, are legally sufficient.
*202I.
I believe that plaintiffs’ allegation that defendants refused, in violation of the union constitution, to call a special meeting requested by a petition signed by the required number of members of the local for the purpose of considering an attempt to vacate the arbitration award as to plaintiffs states a claim upon which relief can be granted under section 101 (a) (2) of the LMRDA, 73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2). This question, which is one of first impression, was apparently not explicitly considered either in the congressional debates leading to the enactment ofthe Bill of Rights of the LMRDA, which because of the circumstances of its introduction and adoption were very short,1 or by commentators, who concentrated their attention upon the advisability of regulating admission and expulsion of members, elections, and trusteeships.2 Absent any direct indication of congressional intent, we must determine whether section 101 (a) (2) confers a right to have held the meetings required by the union constitution and bylaws by considering the purpose of the Bill of Rights and the rights specifically protected by section 101(a) (2). This the majority, by inquiring only whether such a right is discussed in the sparse legislative history of the Bill of Rights or is safeguarded as explicitly as the right to speak at union meetings or to vote for union officers, has failed to do.
A basic purpose of the LMRDA, and particularly of its Bill of Rights, is to assure “full and active participation by the rank and file in the affairs of the union.” American Federation of Musicians v. Wittstein, 379 U.S. 171, 182-183, 85 S.Ct. 300, 307, 13 L.Ed.2d 214 (1964). That this purpose comprehends guaranteeing the rights of union members to attempt to influence the actions and policies of their union to the full extent permitted by its constitution and bylaws is made clear by section 101(a) (1), 73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 411 (a) (1), which assures each member of a labor organization
“equal rights and privileges * * * to vote in elections or referendums of the labor organization, to attend membership meetings, and to participate in the deliberations and voting upon the business of such meetings, subject to reasonable rules and regulations in such organization’s constitution and bylaws.”
This broad reading of congressional purpose is supported by the meager legislative history of the Bill of Rights. For example, Senator McClellan declared when introducing it on the floor of the Senate, “I believe that if you would give to the individual members of the union the tools with which to do it, they would pretty well clean house themselves.” 105 Cong.Rec. 5810 (daily ed. April 22, 1959), reprinted in 2 Legislative History of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, at 1102 (1959) (hereafter Leg.Hist.).3
*203In view of the broad purpose of safeguarding union democracy which underlies the Bill of Rights, the majority’s holding that section 101(a) (2) protects the right to speak at union meetings only if the union leadership chooses to hold the meetings required by the union’s constitution and bylaws is anomalous. A union leadership can stifle attempts by members to influence union policy as effectively by refusing to hold required meetings as by refusing the floor to members of opposing views. This is especially true where prompt action at a special meeting is essential, as plaintiffs allege it was here. Only by construing the right, conferred by section 101(a) (2) upon each member of a labor organization,
“to express at meetings of the labor organization his views, upon candidates in an election of the labor organization or upon any business properly before the meeting,”
as presupposing and including the right to have such meetings held when required by the organization’s constitution and bylaws can such obvious circumvention of the congressional purpose be prevented.
Such a construction would not, as the court below feared,
“sanction possible minority control or harassment and loss of the degree of safety afforded by internal union regulation to honest union officers who may technically violate such a provision in the union constitution in acting to safeguard majority interests.”
Any such possibility may be avoided by quorum and notice requirements, which would seem clearly to be “reasonable rules” permitted by the proviso of section 101(a) (2). Nor would the requirement that the meetings mandated by a union’s constitution and bylaws actually be held be difficult to apply, or involve federal courts in the technical niceties of union government. Whether a meeting was required by the union constitution or bylaws would generally be a much easier issue to determine than whether a member was improperly denied a chance to speak.4 As against these considerations, the majority fails to suggest any reason why Congress should have wished to assure the right to speak at union meetings, but to leave the right to have meetings held at all to the uncertain protection of state law. In *204particular, the majority does not suggest that the right to have union meetings held has been effectively protected by New York or any other state.5
For these reasons, I would hold that the plaintiffs’ allegation that the defendants refused to call a special meeting required by the union constitution, if substantiated, would establish a violation of section 101(a) (2).
II.
Plaintiffs’ allegation that defendants refused to allow plaintiff Yanity to speak at the regular meeting in order to seek to persuade the local to join plaintiffs’ action to vacate the arbitration award clearly states a claim upon which relief can be granted under section 101 (a) (2). Defendants argue that the complaint is insufficient because it does not specifically allege that the other plaintiffs were also prevented from speaking, or that plaintiffs’ request was not in any manner presented to the meeting. The complaint is certainly sufficient under Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) (2), which requires only “ ‘a short and plain statement of the claim’ that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 103, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); see Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319, 322-325 (2 Cir. 1957). Defendants rely upon the holding of the Seventh Circuit in Scovile v. Watson, supra note 4, which seems to me clearly distinguishable even if correct on its facts. The plaintiff in that case failed to allege that the motion she was prevented from making was in order, while plaintiffs here have alleged that Yanity attempted to speak at the proper time for the presentation of new business and defendants have not alleged that plaintiffs’ request could not have been acted on by the membership of the local.6
III.
Defendants next contend that both claims under the LMRDA Bill of Rights must be dismissed because plaintiffs’ complaint fails to allege that they exhausted all internal union remedies reasonably available within a four-month period. See Thompson v. New York Central R. Co., 250 F.Supp. 175 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d on other grounds, 361 F.2d 137, 145 (2 Cir. 1966). However, defendants have failed to allege by answer or affidavit in the record that any such remedies existed. The burden of alleging the availability of unexhausted internal remedies in an action under the LMRDA should be upon the defendant, both because the imposition of a requirement of exhaustion of internal remedies is permitted only by a proviso to the act’s general guarantee of the right to sue, section 101(a) (4), 73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (4), cf., e. g., FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 44-45, 68 S.Ct. 822, 92 L.Ed. 1196 (1948), and because the proviso states that a prospective plaintiff may be required to exhaust any “reasonable hearing procedures” available within four months, but does not require that meaningful remedies be made available. Therefore we cannot assume that any remedies existed.
*205Even if defendants had alleged that internal remedies existed which plaintiffs failed to exhaust, they would not have been entitled to summary judgment. Exhaustion is not required where “conceded facts show a serious violation of a fundamental right,” Libutti v. DiBrizzi, 337 F.2d 216, 219 (2 Cir. 1964), and defendants have not yet denied the allegation that they refused to call a special meeting required by the union constitution. Moreover, plaintiffs may not have been advised of the availability of internal remedies. See Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F.2d 75 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 929, 81 S.Ct. 1650, 6 L.Ed.2d 388 (1961). Or any available remedies may have been too cumbersome to serve as an effective review of the refusal to call a special meeting during the limited time available to plaintiffs, and may not have provided for an award of damages. See Summers, supra note 5, at 1088-89. Any such ineffectual remedies would not seem to constitute the “reasonable hearing procedures” required by the proviso of section 101(a) (4) which permits imposition of a requirement of exhaustion. Compare Vorenberg, Exhaustion of Intraunion Remedies, 2 Lab.L.J. 487, 490 (1951). For these reasons and other possible reasons, plaintiffs may well be entitled to relief despite their asserted failure to exhaust internal remedies.
IV.
Finally, defendants argue that plaintiffs’ claims under the LMRDA Bill of Rights are too speculative as a matter of law to permit an award of damages. This argument in effect seeks a summary judgment, which we should grant only with great caution, as the record does not show that summary judgment was sought below on this ground, at least as to the claim based' upon the alleged failure to call a special meeting. See Fountain v. Filson, 336 U.S. 681, 69 S.Ct. 754, 93 L.Ed. 971 (1949).
Plaintiffs assert in their brief on appeal that both union members of the tripartite arbitration panel had sought to have plaintiff Hartung expelled from the union, and that one had threatened to “get” plaintiff Yanity. If, as seems clear in retrospect, federal law governed the validity of the arbitral award, see Smith v. Evening News Ass’n, 371 U.S. 195, 83 S.Ct. 267, 9 L.Ed.2d 246 (1962), it seems likely that the award could have been vacated at least if the union violated its duty of fair representation of the plaintiffs. Cf. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 183-195, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967); Hiller v. Liquor Salesmen’s Union, 338 F.2d 778 (2 Cir. 1964). If New York law governed, I strongly doubt that the case which nearly a year after the rendition of the award in this case established the validity of tripartite arbitration under New York law, Astoria Medical Group v. Health Ins. Plan, 11 N.Y.2d 128, 227 N.Y.S.2d 401, 182 N.E.2d 85 (1962), would be extended to a case where the union arbitrator on a tripartite panel was biased against the member whose grievance was being arbitrated. Thus it cannot be held on this record that plaintiffs are foreclosed as a matter of law from recovering damages if their allegations are sustained.7
V.
Since I would hold that plaintiffs’ claims under the LMRDA Bill of Rights were improperly dismissed, I would allow the trial court to pass on whether to accept pendent jurisdiction over plain*206tiffs’ state claims. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725-727, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966). I would also permit the trial court to determine in the first instance whether to permit an amended claim relying explicitly upon the duty of fair representation.
I agree with the majority that plaintiffs’ claim of violation of the fiduciary duty imposed by section 501 of the LMRDA, 73 Stat. 535 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 501, was properly dismissed, and that the court below lacked jurisdiction of plaintiffs’ attempted class action.
. The Bill of Rights stems from an amendment introduced on the Senate floor by Senator McClellan, which was revised three days after its passage by a hastily drawn amendment introduced by Senator Kuchel, which was in turn embodied without relevant change in the Landrum-Griffin bill in the House, which could not be amended after its adoption in place of the House committee bill. See, e.g., Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58 Mich. L.Rev. 819, 831-42 (1960); Rothman, Legislative History of the “Bill of Rights” for Union Members, 45 Minn.L. Rev. 199 (1960).
. See, e.g., Cox, The Role of Law in Preserving Union Democracy, 72 Harv.L. Rev. 609 (1959); Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility in a Federal System, 67 Yale L.J. 1327, 1328 (1958).
. It is true that section 101(a) (1) as originally proposed by Senator McClellan, 105 Cong.Rec. 5810 (daily ed. April 22, 1959), 2 Leg.Hist. 1102, and as reported by the House committee, H.R. 8342, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 Leg.Hist. 696, protect*203ed all rights and privileges of union membership, and that the section as modified by the amendment introduced by Senator Kuchel, adopted by the Landrum-Griffin bill, and finally enacted limited its protection to certain specified rights, and did so advertently. See 105 Cong.Rec. 6022-23 (daily ed. April 25, 1959), 2 Leg.Hist. 1231-32 (remarks of Senator Kuchel). But the only reason that has been suggested for the adoption of this litüe-dis-eussed limitation is a fear that section 101(a) (1) might otherwise hamstring unions in negotiating and in processing grievances. See Cox, supra note 1, at 832. Moreover, the rights protected by section 101 (a) (1) as enacted cover every phase of a member’s participation in the affairs of his union. Thus the limitation of the rights protected by section 101(a) (1) does not detract from the broad purpose of the Bill of Rights to safeguard the effectiveness of every aspect of union democracy.
. The majority’s holding, on the other hand, raises difficult problems of distinction. Under that holding, does a presiding officer at a union meeting violate section 101(a) (2) by deliberately limiting the agenda so as to prevent discussion of a particular issue? or by deliberately adjourning the meeting to prevent a member from speaking? Compare Scovile v. Watson, 338 F.2d 678 (7 Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 963, 85 S.Ct. 1107, 14 L.Ed.2d 154 (1965). And how broadly are the union meetings which the majority holds are not protected by section 101(a) (2) defined? For example, under the majority’s holding, could a local union lawfully seek to prevent dissident members from meeting to appeal to higher union bodies or to seek a charter for a new local? Compare Johnson v. Local 58, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 181 F. Supp. 734 (E.D.Mich.1960).
. State courts have upon a variety of grounds invalidated expulsions or other sanctions visited upon union members for attempting to speak at union meetings. See, e. g., Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 Harv.L.Rev. 1049, 1069-71 (1951); Kovner, The Legal Protection of Civil Liberties Within Unions, 1948 Wis.L.Rev. 18. But no state case has been found which has affirmatively enforced the rights of members to have union meetings held and to speak at them, probably in part because many state courts will intervene in internal union affairs only to protect a “property right” of the plaintiff, such as union membership. See, e. g., Bires v. Barney, 203 Or. 117, 277 P.2d 751 (1954); Summers, supra at 1056-57.
. Defendants have not contended, as the majority intimates, that sections 101(a) (1) and (2) permit a local union to prevent its membership from voting on an issue which the union constitution or bylaws require to be presented to the membership of the local. Any such contention would seem to flout the congressional purpose in enacting the Bill of Rights.
. The Supreme Court held in Vaca v. Sipes, supra at 197, 87 S.Ct. at 920, that “damages attributable solely to the employer’s breach of contract” may not be recovered from a union which has violated its duty of fair representation by refusing to arbitrate a grievance. Vaca v. Sipes also strongly suggests that even if the union refuses to seek to vacate an arbitral award, a member may have it vacated if the union violated its duty to him of fair representation. But neither of these considerations justifies summary judgment for defendants at this stage, if only because plaintiffs’ action to vacate the ar-bitral award was in fact dismissed, under New York law, for failure to join the union as a party plaintiff.