(dissenting in part):
I am of the opinion that the Board has failed to support its findings of § 8 (a) (1) violations by substantial evidence.
I. Threats of Plant Closure or Removal
The evidence, unrealistically strained into a threat, is that one week before the election Foreman Torriere stated to employee Doce that “if the union ever gets into the place there will be lots of trouble and layoffs and perhaps the company would close out and will move this company. * * * I don’t know what the old man will do.” Even if this statement could be considered coercive, a single, isolated statement of personal opinion of a minor supervisor not repeated, authorized or approved by his superiors does not violate the Act. NLRB v. Mt. Clemens Metal Products Co., 287 F.2d 790 (6th Cir. 1961).
The majority opinion states that “this case points up that unless employers are prepared to have inferences adverse to them drawn from the activities of their supervisors they must take care to instruct their supervisors not to engage in idle gossip of this sort and not to act so as to feed the flames of such rumors during a representative campaign.” If the decision does give support to that view, it is in my opinion erroneous. There was no evidence in this case that the employer had started or encouraged plant moving or closure rumors, and the law is clear that an employer has not violated § 8(a) (1) simply because a supervisor is shown to have engaged “in idle gossip of this sort” on one occasion. See NLRB v. Mt. Clemens Metal Products Co., supra; Cone Bros. Contracting Co. v. NLRB, 235 F.2d 37, 41 (5th Cir. 1956).
II. Interrogation of Employees
The majority opinion states that the conversations related by these employees “barely meets the standards” of coerciveness set out in NLRB v. Firedoor Corp., 291 F.2d 328 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 368 U.S. 921, 82 S.Ct. 242, 7 L.Ed.2d 136 (1961); Bourne v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1964). I think it is clear that the conversations described were not coercive and that they do not meet the “fairly severe standards” we set out in Bourne: This is demonstrated by the factual similarity of the two cases:
“Examination of the record, interpreted in the light most favorable to the Board, indicated that the interrogation involved here did not in any realistic sense meet the tests set forth. “(1) There is very little to show any .pattern of employer hostility and discrimination.
“(2) The information sought was quite general. 'How is the union doing ?’; ‘Are the employees for the union?’ rather than specifically ‘Who are the ring leaders?’ ‘Who has joined?’, etc.
“(3) The principal interrogation was by low ranking supervisors.
“(4) The employees were interrogated informally while at work.
“(5) In general the replies were truthful, i. e., there was no evidence that the interrogation actually inspired fear.” 332 F.2d at 48.
*141The factors to be considered and the tests to be applied as set forth in Bourne were reaffirmed by this court in NLRB v. Lorben Corporation, 345 F.2d 346, 348 (1965) where enforcement was denied because the “record does not contain substantial evidence sufficient to support the Board’s conclusion that the interrogation was coercive” (p. 349). The majority states that coercion is shown by the evasive replies of the employees. I see nothing evasive in employee Cocheo answering, when asked how the election would come out, that it looked close to him. In fact that was an accurate observation. I also fail to see the impropriety of the inquiry made of employee Kuke, a recent immigrant, as to whether she knew how to vote. There was certainly nothing evasive in her reply that she did know how.
I find nothing coercive in Foreman So-beck’s conversations with Thorpe which by Thorpe’s own admission were short, at his work station, and without threat of reprisal. In any event, the.majority has ignored the rule that a few, trivial instances of possibly improper interrogation are not sufficient by themselves to make out a violation under § 8(a) (1). NLRB v. Park Edge Sheridan Meats, Inc., 341 F.2d 725 (2d Cir.1965). In my opinion, the facts relied upon by the Board do not individually or taken together constitute a violation of § 8(a) (1) of the Act. The result reached by the majority serves to place an “in terrorem” clamp upon any utterances normal between employees during periods of organizational or pre-organizational activities. Free speech and the right of both sides to express their views — a supposed constitutional right — are thus abrogated by judicial fiat.
III. Discharge of Thorpe
Thorpe’s discharge may have been because of his excessive absenteeism and his failure to call in sick or because of his Union sympathies, or both. The majority concede that “Thorpe was an absentee problem” and that in the interval between Décember 1964 and April 22, 1965, he'had been absent nine days. It is scarcely helpful to Company efficiency that his work was satisfactory “when he worked” — particularly, since he was the only cadmium plater, in the plant. However, while the evidence is thin, the timing of his discharge, the failure to give him the usual two warnings, and the fabrication of the warning slips is probably sufficient evidence that his discharge was motivated in significant part by his Union status and activities. NLRB v. D’Ar-migene, 353 F.2d 406, 409 (2d Cir. 1965).
IV. Failure to Reinstate Strikers
The Trial Examiner found that Thorpe’s discharge, an unfair labor practice, was one of the causes of the strike, and that it was therefore an unfair labor practice strike. The evidence was in sharp conflict on this point and the Trial Examiner’s findings rest to a great extent on credibility determinations. Review of such determinations is limited (NLRB v. L. E. Farrell Co., 360 F.2d 205, 207 (2d Cir. 1966)), and I think the conclusion reached is supportable.