(dissenting):
I find that I cannot concur in my brother Feinberg’s interesting opinion. I would have less difficulty comprehending the thrust of the majority’s opinion had it explained N. L. R. B. v. Fruit Packers (Tree Fruits), 377 U.S. 58, 84 S.Ct. 1063, 12 L.Ed.2d 129 (1964), as being limited to instances where the picketing publicizes a grievance in a dispute between a union and a primary employer;1 or that consumer picketing would *504be legal only if it was connected with such a dispute and did not seek to persuade potential customers to boycott the entire secondary enterprise. Such an interpretation of Tree Fruits might find some sanction in the Supreme Court’s emphasis that the picketing in Tree Fruits was merely an extension of the primary dispute — where it was clearly legal — to a secondary situs, id. at 72, 84 S.Ct. 1063 but it would not reflect the Court’s “concern that a broad ban against peaceful picketing might collide with the guarantees of the First Amendment.” Id. at 63, 84 S.Ct. at 1066. Compare Justice Black’s concurring opinion, id. at 76, 84 S.Ct. 1063. In light of the Supreme Court’s exegesis of the legislative history of section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (ii) (B), I consider it settled that the Board cannot enforce a ban against picketing that might conflict with the right of free speech unless there is the “clearest indication,” N. L. R. B. v. Drivers Local Union, 362 U.S. 274, 284, 80 S.Ct. 706, 4 L.Ed.2d 710 (1960), that the picketing was part of the “isolated evil” that Congress wished to suppress. In the absence of a more explicit Congressional policy, I can only conclude, as did the Trial Examiner in this case, that there is “no reason to hold that a union may picket to persuade the public not to buy a struck product but not to persuade it not to buy non-union made products.”2 See N. L. R. B. v. Upholsterers, Frame & Bed. Wkrs., 331 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1964) (consumer picketing to encourage the sale of locally manufactured union made products) ; cf. Big Apple Supermarkets, Inc. v. Dutto, 237 F.Supp. 774 (E.D.N.Y.1965). Indeed, the majority insists that it does not decide today that “picketing to educate consumers to buy union-label merchandise” runs afoul of the Act. But, I fear that under the familiar rubric of applying the “substantial evidence” doctrine that is precisely what the majority has done; the effect of the decision is to hold such picketing illegal where, as here, it takes place at a retailer whose primary supplier is non-union.
On their face, the signs carried by Local 140 were clearly designed to do what the majority refuses to condemn as illegal — to induce the public to purchase union made products. Nevertheless, my brothers uphold the Board’s “findings” that the object of the picketing was “to force or require a cessation of business dealings [by the retailers] with U. S. Mattress” and that the manner of picketing amounted to unlawful restraint and coercion because it was “designed to inflict injury on [the retailers’] business generally.” I find the logic of this reasoning difficult to accept.
Whatever evidence there is to support the Board’s characterization of the union’s objective is at best meagre even when considered in light of the “substantial evidence” doctrine of Universal Camera Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 340 U.S. 474, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951). There is absolutely nothing in the record to rebut the union’s contention that the challenged picketing was merely one segment of a eitywide campaign — in conjunction with allied locals of the United Furniture Workers of America, AFL-CIO — to increase the display and sale of union produced merchandise. Nor is there any response in the record to the Local’s evidence that the target stores were selected more or less at random and included department stores and furniture retailers who sold the goods of many manufacturers. Moreover, it is not of little significance that the Trial Examiner, who alone had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness and to appraise the sincerity of the union’s proclaimed objective, see N. L. R. B. v. Local 3, Bloomingdale, etc., 216 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1954), concluded that there was no evi-*505denee that the union officials did more than make clear that they wanted the stores to carry more union produced merchandise.
More basic, however, is my difficulty in acquiescing in the majority’s uncritical acceptance of the Board’s statement that:
enforcement of its [Local 140’s] union label requirements, as such, could not have been the true object of its concern. * * * the real object of its concern was with the retailers’ handling of bedding from suppliers not under contract with it, specifically U. S. Mattress, and that the target of its picketing was to force a cessation of business dealings between the picketed retailers and such “non-union” manufacturers.
The significance and purport of the Board’s language “union label requirements, as such” is obscure, but certainly it would be fatuous to argue that the union was merely seeking assurance that each item produced by a union shop bore a union label; such an objective could more easily be enforced at the manufacturer’s plant.3 The union’s mission obviously was broader. The picket signs in bold type stated “Appeal to the public, please do not buy nonunion furniture, upholstery and bedding — Look for the union label.” Although the majority professes not to hold that “picketing to educate consumers to buy union-label merchandise” is illegal, it would appear that no meaningful distinction can be drawn between such picketing and picketing whose “real object * * * [is] with the retailer’s handling of bedding from suppliers not under [union] contract.”
It seems implausible and a bit hairsplitting not to recognize that since it is a fair assumption that the public’s demand for bedding is not insatiable, requesting customers to purchase more union produced products is the practical equivalent to asking them to buy less from non-union manufacturers. In this case, Ú. S. Mattress was the only significant non-union manufacturer carried by Modern; it supplied 75 per cent of the store’s total bedding.4 Thus, when consumers were requested to purchase more union (and less non-union) products, they were in reality being asked to buy less from U. S. Mattress.5 It would seem to follow, therefore, that the Board’s characterization of the Local’s objective (to force a cessation of dealings with U. S. Mattress) does not serve to specify one objective to the exclusion of all other objectives. In this case, the union could not possibly achieve its goal to have the public purchase more union produced goods without of necessity asking it to buy less from U. S. Mattress. The effect of the court’s decision, therefore, is to put a premium on circumlocution.
The majority holds that the union’s picketing is not protected by the rationale of Tree Fruits because “[t]he Board found that U. S. Mattress was an object of the union’s activity * * * [y]et the picket signs did not specify that company or its products in the message to consumers.”6 And, while the majority *506finds the issue “close,” it decides that there is sufficient support for the Board’s conclusion that the picketing was “aimed at inducing a generalized loss of patronage” by the three retailers. The Board’s conclusion on this issue is reached by a tortuous route. It first attributed to the union an objective it denied (to force a cessation of dealings with U. S. Mattress), and then proceeded to fault the union for picketing with signs that did not reflect this alleged intent. The speciousness of the Board’s decision is apparent when one considers its willingness to assume, for purposes of this case, that the picketing would have been within the covering shade of Tree Fruits’ branches if U. S. Mattress had been specifically identified nomine on the signs. Whether or not the complex teachings of Tree Fruits had trickled down to the non-lawyers on the picket line (one may query who determines the terminology of signs in a highly organized campaign), it is odd to suggest that Local 140 went astray by stating on its signs an objective (buy more union goods) which my brothers refuse to hold violates the Act. The union is charged and faulted with attempting to accomplish by indirection that which it could have achieved directly.
In sum, I believe that in this case there is no reason to question that the picket signs correctly reflected the union’s objective — to induce consumers to purchase more union-made products. A good deal can be said against the wisdom of subjecting retailers to what must realistically be seen as the pressure brought to bear by Local 140. But, if Tree Fruits has vitality, such consumer picketing is a legitimate exercise of persuasion by the union. I would set aside the Board’s order.
. Unlike the union in Tree Fruits, Local 140 is not striking against any primary employer. Local 140 lost a representation election at U. S. Mattress in March 1962 —3% years before the picketing in this case — but the record is wholly devoid of any suggestion that it is now seeking to represent U. S. Mattress’ employees who are affiliated with another union.
. Utilizing the terminology adopted in the proceedings below, goods produced by other unions as well as those produced by non-union workers will be referred to as “non-union.”
. Local 140’s contract with the union shops that supplied the 3 retailers required the union label on all goods.
. The record does not indicate what percentage of bedding U. S. Mattress supplied to the other stores. But Sidney Wueker, a partner in Wueker Furniture Company, testified that U. S. Mattress was their “prime source.” And Nat Badelman, the president of Finkenberg’s Furniture Company, upon advice of counsel refused to state how much he purchased from U. S. Mattress. It is clear, however, that U. S. Mattress was his major supplier.
. When viewed in this context, the sparse and ambiguous references to U. S. Mattress by union officials are appropriately seen as another way of stating its case against non-union producers.
. The majority also reasons that the picketing was outside the rationale of Tree Fruits because Local 140 clearly knew, at least as to Modern, that the lack of a union label did not indicate non-union merchandise. The signs, therefore, it is argued, could only be calculated to cause a generalized loss of patronage. But any store could easily obtain union labels from *506the union manufacturers they carried. See fn. 3 supra. Indeed, that is precisely what Modern did, placing the labels in its show window to counter the effect of the picketing. I attach little significance to the fact that the signs specified “furniture, upholstery and bedding” rather than only bedding. As noted above, the picketing was part of a concerted campaign by allied locals of the United Furniture Workers of America. I know no rule of law that prevents different locals of the same union from cooperating in this fashion. In any event, I fail to see how the 3 retailers would be benefited (or how the question before us would be meaningfully different) if members of all the locals showed up, one carrying a picket specifying “bedding,” another “upholstery,” and a third “furniture.”