(dissenting):
With deference to the majority, I dissent with all the vigor at my command from the order reversing this judgment. None of the three points raised, singly or collectively, warrants this action. With regard to the alleged denial of the right adequately to cross-examine the witness Gober, this is no more than a routine objection to evidence, sustained by the trial court, which the appellant seeks to raise to constitutional dimensions by referring to it as a denial of the right of cross-examination “at the instance of the prosecuting attorney”.
*334Taken in context it is clear beyond peradventure that in asking the witness Gober first as to his prior convictions and then (on three occasions) as to how many times he had been charged, defense counsel was undertaking to impeach the witness by proof of a prior criminal record. Both the district attorney and the trial judge obviously so construed the question. In sustaining the objection interposed on behalf of the state, the court was following the law of Texas, and, I believe, most other common law jurisdictions, that proof of prior conviction of a felony, or of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude is admissible for this purpose; but that proof of charges short of conviction, is not admissible. Hunter v. State, 168 Tex.Cr.R. 160, 324 S.W.2d 17 (Tex.Cr.App.1959); Tomlinson v. State, 163 Tex.Cr.R. 44, 289 S.W.2d 267 (Tex.Cr.App.1956); Rodriquez v. State, 160 Tex.Cr.R. 453, 272 S.W.2d 366 (Tex.Cr.App.1954); See 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 503 for similar cases in other jurisdictions.
If counsel desired to offer the testimony as to pending charges for a special or limited purpose — as to show that Gober had been offered police assistance with a charge then against him, by reason of which he might be inclined to testify for the prosecution — it was the duty of counsel to so advise the Court, so that the evidence might be received for that purpose alone and with a limiting instruction.1
But the defense counsel apparently had no such thought in mind. He did not make this position known to the trial court, nor were the police officers interrogated as to any promises they had made to Gober to help him with any pending charges.2
Under these circumstances I submit that there was no denial of the right to cross-examine the witness, and that the ruling of the trial judge was correct; but if not, this was a matter which could and should have been corrected on direct appeal and does not approach a question of constitutional magnitude.
The majority likewise reversed on the other two points, namely, the allegation (a) that the state knowingly permitted Gober to testify falsely, and (b) that the state knowingly suppressed evidence beneficial to Luna. This is so despite the fact that the evidence shows, and, as I understand it, the opinion concedes that neither was knowingly done (if done at all).
First, there is grave doubt that Gober’s answer that no charges were pend*335ing against him at the time of trial was known by him to be false. While admittedly he was present when the charges were filed and when he made bond before the justice of the peace, the record shows that no preliminary hearing had ever been held; that it had been twice postponed at the request of the police officers without Gober having been notified to appear; and that shortly following the trial the charges in fact were dismissed. Gober — being somewhat knowledgeable in such matters — may well have concluded after a lapse of almost four months without even a preliminary hearing, that the charges were no longer pending. But whether Gober knew, or did not know, that his answer was incorrect it is undisputed that neither the district attorney nor the police officers were aware of it. As pointed out in the majority opinion, the district attorney did not know that the charges had been filed, and the police officers, who did, were excluded from the courtroom and did not hear this testimony. I am unable to see how any member of the prosecution team may be faulted for this matter which they did not bring about and of which they had no knowledge.
To support reversal on this score the majority relies on Barbee v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 331 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1964). I have no quarrel with that opinion, holding, as it does, that the police may not sit idly by and see evidence offered tending to show that a crime was committed by the defendant and with the defendant’s pistol, when the police knew full well that the crime had not been committed with the pistol in question. But in extending that doctrine to hold that the police should have corrected a statement of the witness Gober when they were unaware of his inaccurate testimony stretches Barbee far beyond the wording or the rationale of that opinion.
If the majority opinion here correctly states the law — and I hope it does not— then in a habeas corpus proceeding, years after the trial, when petitioner secures new counsel, he may go back and relitigate every issue which could and should have been explored at the trial; despite the fact that the trial counsel had every opportunity to inquire into such issues and failed to do so. And if it appears that any government witness gave an inaccurate answer, a new trial will be ordered, whether the prosecution knew or did not know of such inaccurate testimony. This completely overlooks the concept which I believe to be fundamental to our adversary system of criminal justice, and necessary if there is ever to be an end to litigation, namely, that the trial is the place to develop the evidence and to test the credibility of the witnesses by cross-examination. As the state did not knowingly permit the witness Gober to testify falsely, and did not knowingly suppress evidence beneficial to the defendant, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.
. “[Wjhere the relevancy or admissibility of evidence offered is not apparent it may be rejected unless there is a statement of the purpose of its introduction by which the court may determine its relevancy or admissibility. Thus it is not error to exclude a question asked by a party, unless the party states the nature of the testimony that he expects to elicit thereby, and unless it further appears that such testimony is material to the issues, and unless it appears that such testimony is relevant and responsive or unless the question is excluded without giving the party an opportunity to state what he expects to prove.” 23 O. J.S. Criminal Law § 1029, pp. 1121-1123. “Where there is any doubt as to the relevancy of the evidence offering counsel must specify the purpose for which it is offered or other facts necessary to render it admissible. This is essential for an intelligent objection by opposing counsel and ruling by the trial judge. If he states a purpose for which it is inadmissible he cannot complain of the ruling of the trial judge in excluding the evidence even though there was some other purpose for which it could have been received.” 1 McCormick and Bay Texas Law of Evidence § 21 p. 19.
See also Holt v. State, 98 Tex.Cr.R. 248, 265 S.W. 394 (1924); Deaton & Son Inc. v. Miller Well Serv. Co., 231 S.W.2d 944 (Tex.Civ.App.1950).
. It is interesting to note that in the habeas corpus hearing, an extract from the record of another of the series of state cases in which Gober testified was offered and received in evidence. There the police officers were interrogated on this point, and freely admitted that they had promised to help Gober with his case in return for his part in effecting the several narcotics purchases, one of which was from the petitioner Luna.