(dissenting).
I am constrained to dissent on several grounds. First, I adhere to the views expressed in my dissent in United States v. Battaglia et al., 394 F.2d 318 (7th Cir. Jan. 9, 1968) that there was insufficient evidence of a conspiracy engaged in by Amabile with Battaglia and Evans “to obstruct, delay and affect commerce” in the movement of materials for the construction of the Riley dwelling units in Lansing, Illinois by means of extortion.
Second, regardless of the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to show a conspiracy to extort money, there was no proof of a violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951. Although this issue was presented obliquely in the Battaglia appeal, Amabile has advanced arguments which bring the question into sharper focus.
The evidence showed that during the construction of the Lansing project, Riley obtained building materials from suppliers located outside the State of Illinois. There was no evidence, however, that there was any delay in the shipment or delivery of these materials. Moreover, there was no evidence that any extortion threat directed against Riley carried with it, express or implied, a threat that the work on the Lansing project would be stopped or hindered.
In United States v. Pranno, 385 F.2d 387, 389 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 944, 88 S.Ct. 1028, 19 L.Ed.2d 1132 (Mar. 5, 1968), we said:
The Supreme Court has made it clear that the statute is to be construed broadly and is not limited to conduct which directly and immediately obstructs a particular movement of goods in interstate commerce. Extortion by threat to disrupt a local activity the stoppage of which would in turn result in stoppage of interstate shipment of raw materials essential for that activity falls within the act. The statute seems to be read as not only prohibiting the obstruction of commerce by extortion, but also prohibiting extortion by any threat, the carrying out of which would, obstruct commerce. (Emphasis added.)
I interpret this statement to mean that a threat to extort proscribed by the Hobbs Act must have a reasonable causal relation to interstate commerce. The likelihood of an obstruction to the flow of commerce must be the result of the threat. This essential nexus is missing in the instant case.
The majority, quoting from Hulahan v. United States, 214 F.2d 441 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 856, 75 S.Ct. 81, 99 L.Ed. 675 (1954), says that “Amabile was exacting tribute from a builder ‘dependent upon interstate commerce for materials, equipment and supplies’ and was therefore within the reach of the Hobbs Act.” The facts in that case, however, were entirely different from those presented here. There the defendant, a labor union representative, conspired to extort money from local construction companies by threats of labor unrest. These companies were dependent for the continuation of work undertaken by them upon local labor represented by the defendant and upon supplies and materials shipped interstate. Thus the extortion threats, if not complied with, would in all probability have brought a cessation of work on the proj*55ect, thereby interrupting the interstate shipments of construction materials. In the instant case, however, there was no such probability that Amabile’s threats to Riley, if not complied with, would have resulted in the interruption of the shipment of construction supplies and materials for the Lansing project. (In fact, it was to Amabile’s advantage that the Lansing project proceed without interruption; for only then would Riley have authorized Carlson Construction Company to request “draws” for funds upon the Lawn Savings & Loan Association).
The majority also makes reference to the fact that the “$48,500 payment made pursuant to Amabile’s threats depleted Riley Management Corporation’s reserves.” If a depletion of reserves is all that is necessary to show the requisite affect on commerce, then a threat of any kind to extract money made to a person who happens to operate a business engaged to any extent in interstate commerce comes within the statute’s proscription. Under this rationale, a retail store owner, for example, would be afforded federal protection from extortion, regardless of the nature or the likely affect of the threat, simply because his stock of merchandise had in some measure moved in interstate commerce. I do not believe that the Hobbs Act was intended to have such a broad reach. In that connection, Judge Hastie’s statement in his dissent in United States v. Stirone, 262 F.2d 571, 578, 579 (3d Cir. 1958), rev’d on other grounds, 361 U.S. 212, 80 S.Ct. 270, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960), is pertinent:
[I]t should be considered and kept in mind that the control and punishment of local extortion is primarily the business of local or state government. The Hobbs Act is an auxiliary and partially duplicating federal superimposition on state law enforcement. In the view of Congress this is a desirable measure of federal assistance to the states in the exercise of their police power. But where state power and responsibility are thus primary and the national government is merely performing an auxiliary function, we should not be eager to stretch federal jurisdiction to cover doubtful cases offering only a tenuous or speculative theory of federal jurisdiction.1
Third, an error which alone would require reversal (presented rather cursorily in the Battaglia and Evans appeals) relates to the district judge’s restriction of Amabile’s cross-examination of William J. Riley. Counsel for Amabile attempted to bring before the jury the facts that Riley was under indictment for theft in the state court, that he was under investigation by the Internal Revenue Service for tax evasion, and that his testimony was given in the hope' of securing favorable treatment from local and federal law enforcement officers concerning his allegedly illegal conduct. The district judge refused to permit cross-examination on these subjects.2
*56The majority concedes that when “viewed in isolation” defense counsel’s “effort to explore Riley’s motives for testifying in the Government’s favor might be proper.” The majority goes on to say, however, that a defendant’s *57right to show that a prosecution witness expects favorable treatment from the Government in return for his testimony must be balanced against the rule that the credibility of a witness may not be impeached by showing that he has been indicted or is under investigation, and that the balancing of these conflicting rules entitled the district judge to use his discretion in deciding whether to permit cross-examination on Riley’s expectation of favorable treatment.
I do not believe that a conflict between these evidentiary rules, such as the one the majority attempts to erect, exists. The right of a defendant in a criminal prosecution to cross-examine witnesses testifying against him is guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the Constitution. Courts have not been grudging in their protection of this right. As the Supreme Court recently stated in Pointer v. State of Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 1068, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965) :
There are few subjects, perhaps, upon which this Court and other courts have been more nearly unanimous than in their expressions of belief that the right of * * * cross-examination is an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this country’s constitutional goal.
Both the treatises and the ease law recognize the propriety of the kind of cross-examination in which Amabile’s counsel sought to engage. Thus Professor McCormick says:
The law recognizes the slanting effect upon human testimony, of the * * self-interest of the witness in the outcome of the case. Any such partiality, proceeding from any acts, relationships or motives, may be proven to impeach credibility * * [One such instance is] in a criminal case when the witness testifies for the state and it is shown that an indictment is pending against him, * * C. McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 40, at 82, 83, 84 (1954).
See Harris v. United States, 371 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1967); Wheeler v. United States, 351 F.2d 946 (1st Cir. 1965); United States v. Masino, 275 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1960). As the Second Circuit observed in Masino:
Cross-examination is proper when its purpose is to reveal bias or interest on the part of the witness being examined. * * * It was highly relevant and material to bring out that the state court charge * * * had been quashed upon the intercession of the Assistant United States Attorney as was claimed by the defense and not denied by the government.3 This is the kind of situation where the widest possible cross-examination should be permitted. The appellant was entitled to have the jury know what had happened with respect to the charge, including any part which representatives of the government had played, so that the jury could draw its own conclusions with respect to possible motives for Brown’s testimony. 275 F.2d at 132.
It is apparent from the record that the district judge perceived no “collision” of the kind suggested by the majority. Moreover, any attempt to show the bias of a witness by evidence that he is under indictment or investigation would create the same “collision.” Thus the rule enunciated by the majority might preclude cross-examination of this kind in every case, a result contrary to the general rule permitting such inquiry. I believe that Amabile’s efforts to question the credibility of Riley by showing his relationship to the Government and the reward he hoped to gain by reason of his testimony was entirely proper and should have been permitted. »
*58Finally, the prejudicial trial errors discussed in my dissent in Battaglia, other than the exclusion of the testimony of character witnesses on behalf of Evans, have equal applicability to the instant ease. These errors additionally and cumulatively require a reversal.
. The majority quotes from Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 85 S.Ct. 1377, 13 L.Ed.2d 290 (1964), to support the proposition that, “Since Congress has used all its ‘broad and sweeping’ commerce power in enacting the Hobbs Act, the courts have rightly attributed great scope to the statute.” I respectfully submit that the abstract language quoted from McClung has no application to the instant case. A decision upholding the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 under the commerce power can hardly have pertinency to the intended scope of the Hobbs Act.
. The relevant portion of the transcript reads:
[Mr. Bellows, Amabile’s counsel:]
Are you the same William G. Riley who was indicted by the Criminal Court of Cook County for thievery in 1966 in the month of February.
Mr. Lamendella: [Assistant United States Attorney] I will object to that, your Honor.
The Court: I will sustain the objection. Mr. Bellows, you know better than that.
Mr. Bellows: I will connect it up, your Honor.
*56The Court: Mr. Bellows, you know better than that and I direct the jury to disregard that question.
By Mr. Bellows:
Q. Are you under indictment in the Criminal Court Cook County?
Mr. Lamendella: I will object to that.
The Court: I sustain the objection and I direct counsel, Mr. Bellows, to refrain from asking that kind of question. I direct the jury to disregard that question.
Mr. Bellows: May I have a sidebar conference, your Honor, with reference to this?
The Court: No, no side-bar conference after those questions, sir.
Mr. Bellows: May I be permitted to make an offer of proof outside of the presence of the jury?
The Court: In respect to that last question, you may.
Í¡S sfc s>e *
Mr. Bellows: Your Honor, my offer of proof is as follows: I expect to show by cross examination and it may be verified, if you choose to do so, if he denies the fact, that he was indicted in the month of February, 1966, for the crime of theft which is a felony; that the matter has been pending now over a year and that the reason for the extraordinary delay in bringing this matter to justice for a crime of theft —actually it was forgery, but under our new statute, your Honor, it is considered to be theft — is that he expects to get consideration, your Honor, from the court and the prosecution in Cook County for his cooperation with the government in this case and for his testimony in this case.
For that reason, your Honor, I think it is extremely important to show motive and reason for his testimony in this case.
The Court: What is the government’s position in respect to the offer of proof of the defendant Amabile?
Mr. Lamendella: May we have just a moment?
The Court: Yes.
Mr. Lamendella: If this offer is being made, your Honor, to impeach the witness on the basis of an indictment, we object.
The Court: Do you object to the offer?
Mr. Lamendella: Yes, we do.
The Court: I sustain the objection. Bring in the jury.
Mr. Bellows: May I add one more point, your Honor?
The Court: I have ruled on your offer. You can’t add to an offer once it is made, sir.
Mr. Bellows: I want to explain the position of Lamendella to be inconsistent with my offer. He says he objects to the indictment. This is beyond the indictment.
The Court: He said he objected to the offer.
Mr. Bellows: Well, he said to the indictment.
The Court: You object to the offer of proof?
Mr. Lamendella: I do, your Honor.
* sfc * * $
The Court: You may continue, Mr. Bellows, with the cross examination of this witness.
By Mr. Bellows:
Q. Mr. Riley, are you presently under investigation by the Internal Revenue for evasion of taxes?
Mr. Lamendella: I will object to that, your Honor.
The Court: I sustain the objection.
Mr. Bellows: May I make another offer of proof?
The Court: Yes.
* S(« * s¡c sfc
Mr. Bellows: My offer of proof, your Honor, is that Mr. Riley, the witness on the stand, is presently under investigation by the Internal Revenue; that he has two lawyers prominent in the tax field in criminal cases representing him, and that if he were cross examined, your Honor, he would admit, I am sure, that he knows that his financial affairs are under investigation by the Internal Revenue for failure to account for taxes and for the evasion of taxes, and that his books are in the hands of the Internal Revenue agents, and that he expects to get consideration, your Honor, from the government for his cooperation with them in this case and for his testimony in this case.
The Court: What is the position of the government in respect to the offer of proof of the defendant Amabile?
Mr. Lamendella: We object, your Honor.
The Court: I sustain the objection.
* * * * *
. The majority says, “As to the state court criminal action, the United States Attorney was of course not empowered to accord any consideration.” This observation ignores the possibility that the United States Attorney might have interceded with the local authorities on behalf of Riley, a situation similar to that occurring in Masino.