(dissenting):
I would affirm the District Court. I believe that the learned trial judge acted properly in foreclosing cross examination of the identifying witness as to an event which occurred several days after that witness had reported the defendant-appellant’s conduct to the police. Testimony that tends to show bias is generally admissible. Underlying that admissibility is an inference that biased testimony will probably differ from unbiased testimony. Here, however, there was no contention that the identifying witness’ report to the police differed in any respect from his description of the events at trial. Since his allegedly biased story did not differ from his unbiased version, no purpose could have been served in allowing the contested cross examination. Also, I believe that pursual of this line of questioning would have resulted in the appellant’s furnishing information relating to his commission of another crime. This evidence would, of course, have been prejudicial to the defendant, and its disclosure would have necessitated a mistrial and retrial in the case.
There is a further but very practical justification for the trial court’s ruling on this proffered evidence. The introduction of this evidence would have brought into the case a collateral issue requiring the utilization of a substantial amount of court time in determining ultimately the truth or falsity of an issue which was most certainly res inter alias actos and of dubious value, because of the time element, as affecting credibility.