(dissenting):
I respectfully but firmly dissent. The majority opinion, it might be said, “goes through the motions” of respecting the trial court’s conclusion that the evidence discloses a reasonable search (p. 13), and even purports to examine the evidence “in the light most favorable to the Government, as we are obliged to do” (p. 13) and then immediately proceeds to do neither. It does this by quoting at length the self-serving language of the defendant, and finding any contradictory testimony “palpably unworthy of belief.” (p. 13).
It is actually impossible for me to recognize the facts, the conduct, and even certain physical objects described in the majority opinion when I compare its language with the transcript of testimony heard by the trial court. Florid, argumentative, and dramatic language is used to color judgment and to emphasize certain facts, and to de-emphasize others.1
*385I therefore prefer to draw my own statement of facts which I sincerely believe is more accurate, and decidedly more fair, than that appearing in the majority opinion.
Appellant Huguez (with a codefendant alleged to have aided and abetted him) was charged in two counts of a four-count indictment with knowingly smuggling four ounces of heroin into this country from Mexico, and with transporting and concealing the same heroin in this country. 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1964). After a trial in the District Court for the Southern District of California, appellant was convicted on both counts. The third and fourth counts, which charged the codefendant and the appellant with failing to register as narcotics addicts or users upon entry into the United States, were dismissed as to appellant by the trial court. The sentences imposed upon appellant relating to the two counts upon which he was convicted were ordered to be served concurrently.
Jurisdiction below rested on 18 U.S.C. §§ 1407, 3231 (1964), and 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1964). Our jurisdiction over this appeal is established by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1294 (1964).
The only error urged by appellant concerns the failure of the trial court to grant his motion to suppress the heroin, which was introduced as evidence by the Government. Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(e). Suppression was allegedly called for because:
(a) the heroin was seized without a search warrant;
(b) there was no probable cause to believe that the search by means of which *386the heroin was discovered would yield any contraband; and
(c) the heroin was procured through the unconscionable use of force.
I. FACTS
In view of the judgment below, the record must of course be considered in the light most favorable to the Government. With this point in mind, I feel that the following facts are established:
Appellant entered the United States by automobile from Mexico on March 13, 1966, with one companion. The entry was made at San Ysidro, San Diego County, California. The two men declared no narcotics to the United States Customs Inspector Thomas N. Teela, who met them at the primary inspection point.
Inspector Teela, who had been a customs inspector at San Ysidro for eight years and had had experience observing narcotics violators during that period, observed that appellant’s eyes, as well as those of his companion, seemed to be pinpointed and glassy. Appellant “appeared to be under the influence of narcotics.” R.T. 77-78, 81.
Appellant was searched in a secondary area search room. To Inspector Teela, who with the assistance of an Inspector Lasher conducted the search, a greasy substance was “plainly apparent” on appellant’s buttocks, near the anus. R.T. 79, 82-83. Appellant was then taken across the street to an examination room, where Dr. Paul R. Salerno examined him. R.T. 28, 31, 39. Dr. Salerno was licensed to practice medicine in the state of California and had had considerable experience in examining and identifying drug addicts.1a
An examination of appellant’s arms disclosed to the doctor (a) small needle-puncture marks on the right arm, at the base of the thumb, and over the superficial vein of the lateral wrist; and (b) a two-inch scarred “tract” of superficial vein over the left lower forearm. Three of the marks were recent, and there was a hematoma formation. R.T. 31. A careful examination of appellant’s eyes showed an incomplete and sluggish reaction of the pupils to darkness. The pupillary diameter was three millimeters in the darkness. The deep tendon reflexes of appellant’s lower extremity (sic) were hyperactive, and his pulse was accelerated (130 per minte). R.T. 32.
On the basis of his examination, Dr. Salerno reached the opinion that appellant was a user of narcotic drugs who was then under the influence of such a drug. R.T. 31-32. After this opinion was reached, but without obtaining a search warrant, the doctor conducted a rectal examination to determine whether any material was concealed in the rectal *387cavity. Using a lubricated glove finger, he located four packets of heroin, which were then similarly extricated. The probe was similar to the rectal examination that is part of any complete physical examination for an adult male, and was made — as was the removal of the packets —in a medically approved manner. Appellant began to resist only when the material was palpated, after which time it was necessary for agents forcibly to restrain him while the packets were removed. No blows were struck and there was no bleeding.
Dr. Salerno testified that in the absence of voluntary resistance by contraction of the external sphincter of the anus, the sensation accompanying removal of the packets “would not be expected to be any more uncomfortable than that experienced with a constipated or hard bowel movement.” R.T. 39. In his opinion, the introduction of such packets into the rectal cavity would involve greater discomfort than their removal, provided that resistance was not offered in either case.
The doctor further testified that there would be a mechanical or chemical attack upon the rubber containers in the rectum over a period of time; that the release of the heroin into the rectum could result in death; that leaving the packets in the rectum for more than six to eight hours “would certainly be hazardous,” (R.T. 43); that a man in a prison cell might possibly hold similar (though somewhat smaller) objects in his rectum for several days; that it would take approximately eight to ten hours for an oral laxative to achieve effective results; that there are sometimes health hazards involved in the use of laxatives; that an X-ray machine or a fluoroscope would not distinguish between the packaged material and normal fecal contents; that at any rate X-ray machines and fluoroscopes should be operated only by radiologists; and that no radiologist was available.
After the packets were removed, appellant admitted that he had been sent from Los Angeles to pick up the heroin and that he had secreted it in his rectum; insertion of the packets was, he later testified, accomplished by the use of soap and water, which acted as lubricants. Appellant suffered a slight abrasion on one wrist, caused by handcuffs employed during the rectal search; when he made this fact known, the handcuffs were loosened. R.T. 90, 103-04. He did not complain of any other injuries.
Between July 1, 1965, and May 26, 1966, customs officials at San Ysidro reported twenty instances in which narcotics had been recovered from body cavities. R.T. 100-01, 122.
II. THE UNIQUE NATURE OF A BORDER SEARCH
In considering the propriety of the search thus made of appellant, I first note that it was a border search, made within a few feet of an international boundary of the United States. Such searches constitute, in terms of the application of the fourth amendment to the Constitution, a unique category. They do not require a showing of probable cause. Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1966); King v. United States, 348 F.2d 814, 817 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 382 U.S. 926, 86 S.Ct. 314, 15 L.Ed.2d 339 (1965); Witt v. United States, 287 F.2d 389, 391 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 950, 81 S.Ct. 1904, 6 L.Ed.2d 1242 (1961);2 Murgia *388v. United States, 285 F.2d 14, 17 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 977, 81 S.Ct. 1946, 6 L.Ed.2d 1265 (1961); Decca v. United States, 346 F.2d 158 (5th Cir. 1965) (per curiam); Mansfield v. United States, 308 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1962). 3 “The mere crossing of the border is sufficient cause for such a search.” Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1967). Such border checks are also excepted — along with those incident to a lawful arrest or justified by the “exigent circumstances” or “emergency” principle, see Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-771, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) — from the general requirement that searches be made pursuant to judicially issued warrants; nor is consent or a “reliable informant” or a supporting arrest required in order for such a search to be sanctioned. Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379, 382 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 977, 87 S.Ct. 519, 17 L.Ed.2d 439 (1966), and cases cited therein; Thomas v. United States, 372 F.2d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 1967); Valadez v. United States, 358 F.2d 721, 722 (5th Cir. 1966).
This extremely flexible application of the fourth amendment finds both illustration and support in federal, border control legislation, which grants to border officials authority of the “broadest possible scope.” United States v. Rodriguez, 195 F.Supp. 513, 515 (S.D.Tex. 1960) , aff’d, 292 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1961) ; cf. King v. United States, 348 F.2d 814 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 926, 86 S.Ct. 314, 15 L.Ed.2d 339 (1965); Denton v. United States, 310 F.2d 129, 132 (9th Cir. 1962); Witt v. United States, 287 F.2d 389, 391 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 366 U.S. 950, 81 S.Ct. 1904, 6 L.Ed.2d 1242 (1961); Morales v. United States, 378 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1967); Thomas v. United States, 372 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1967); Marsh v. United States, 344 F.2d 317, 324 (5th Cir. 1965); Kelly v. United States, 197 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1952); Landau v. United States Attorney, 82 F.2d 285, 286 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 665, 56 S.Ct. 747, 80 L.Ed. 1389 (1936); United States v. Yee Ngee How, 105 F.Supp. 517, 519-520 (N.D.Cal.1952). Customs officials are authorized by 19 U.S.C. § 482 (1964) to: “stop, search, and examine * * * any vehicle, beast, or person, on which 'or whom * * * they shall suspect there is merchandise which is subject to duty * * (Emphasis added.) And 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1964) authorizes such officials to “examine, inspect and search * * * any person” on board a vessel or in any vehicle within a customs-enforcement area. See also 19 U.S.C. § 1582 (1964), and, as to immigration officials, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(c) (1964). The extraordinary extent of these powers has been justified by reference to traditional principles of sovereignty and to the paramount interest of any country in “national self preservation.” Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925); Fernandez v. United States, 321 F.2d 283, 285 (9th Cir. 1963), and embodies congressional authorization of long standing. As the Supreme Court has recognized, the same Congress which “proposed for adoption the original amendments to the constitution” enacted the first statute giving broad authority to customs agents to search for and seize contraband, thus indicating that “the members of that body did not regard searches and seizures of this kind as ‘unreasonable’ * * Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886).
What has been said does not mean, however, that every border search, no matter what its justification, scope, or methods, is totally exempt from the re*389quirements of the fourth amendment. Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1967); Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703, 710-712 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945, 87 S.Ct. 980,17 L.Ed.2d 875 (1967); Thomas v. United States, 372 F.2d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 1967); Marsh v. United States, 344 F.2d 317, 324 (5th Cir. 1965). Practical considerations, of course, properly play a large part in any determination whether, in particular circumstances, a search meets that amendment’s requirements. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949); Hernandez v. United States, 353 F.2d 624, 628 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1008, 86 S.Ct. 1972, 16 L.Ed.2d 1021 (1966).
III. THE REASONABLENESS OF THE SEARCH IN LIGHT OF THE INFORMATION KNOWN BY THE OFFICERS
In making his argument that the search to which he was subjected was unreasonable, appellant of course emphasizes the fact that the heroin was taken from a body cavity. This factor, he contends, renders inapplicable the rules governing “routine” border searches.
In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) the Supreme Court outlined its position with regard to searches below the surface of the body in a situation analogous to that involved here. In Sehmerber there had been a lawful arrest, a circumstance which ordinarily makes proper a thorough search of an individual arrested, even though there exists neither a warrant nor probable cause to believe that contraband, weapons, or relevant evidence will be found. In that sense, a search pursuant to a proper arrest is similar to a border search. The extraction of a blood sample that was involved in Sehmerber was held, however, to be governed by a somewhat more restrictive rule:
“We begin with the assumption that once the privilege against self-incrimination has been found not to bar compelled intrusions into the body * * * the Fourth Amendment’s proper function is to constrain, not against all intrusions as such, but intrusions which are not justified in the circumstances, or which are made in an improper manner. * * *
“ * * -X- * * *
“ * * * The interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects forbid any such (bodily) intrusions on the mere chance that desired evidence might be obtained. In the absence of a clear indication that in fact such evidence will be found, these fundamental human interests require law officers to suffer the risk that such evidence may disappear unless there is an immediate search.”
384 U.S. at 768-770, 86 S.Ct. at 1834 (emphasis added).
In Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703, 710-712 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945, 87 S.Ct. 980, 17 L.Ed.2d 875 (1967), and Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1967), while admitting the difficulty of defining such a “clear indication” standard precisely, we interpreted that language to mean that something less than “probable cause,” yet more than “mere suspicion,” is required to justify a body cavity search; and we held that rule to apply even to searches made at an international border.
The trial court concluded that there was evidence in the record sufficient to constitute such a “clear indication.” I agree.
Appellant argues that Inspector Teela’s observation of a greasy substance on appellant’s buttocks cannot be attributed to the officer who apparently ordered the rectal probe, see R.T. 41, 70, 89-90, and that that information therefore cannot be considered as a part of the evidence with reference to which the “clear indication” standard is to be applied. I may adopt this position arguendo, without passing upon the reasoning urged in sup*390port of it,4 since I feel that even apart from this observation made by Teela a reasonable man could conclude there existed a clear indication that appellant was hiding narcotics within his body — and, therefore, that the resulting rectal search was a reasonable one.
First: appellant’s arms bore the telltale needle marks that characterize the veins of an addict, or a habitual user of narcotics.
Second: there was every indication that appellant and his companion were under the influence of narcotics when they crossed the border. The informed lay opinion of Inspector Teela and other officers to this effect was confirmed by Dr. Salerno’s diagnosis, which was based on much substantiating data. In particular, three fresh needle marks were observed, indicating that an injection had recently been made — “within hours.” Third: appellant presented no certificate of registration under 18 U.S.C. § 1407 (1964) as a narcotics user or addict. R.T. 77.5
Fourth: as the experienced trial judge indicated, once the conclusion is reached that an American citizen crossing into this country at San Ysidro is a user of narcotic- drugs — particularly when he has not registered under 18 U.S.C. § 1407 and when he is then under the influence of narcotics — there is a reasonable basis for the inference that he is “carrying narcotics somewhere, because the supply is easy to get in Tijuana, it is cheap,” R.T. 132-33, and the value of such drugs is much greater in this country than in Mexico.
*391Fifth: appellant’s car, R.T. 79, as well as his clothes and his person, had been searched, so that the possibility of his carrying narcotics anywhere other than within his body — either in his stomach or in his rectum — was negligible.
Bearing in mind that the “clear indication” standard of Rivas and Henderson is somewhat less stringent than that of “probable cause,” I believe that these factors in combination provide a clear indication that appellant was hiding contraband narcotics in either his stomach or his rectum; and this conclusion justifies the rectal probe conducted by Dr. Salerno, rendering it in that respect “reasonable.” The possibility that appellant had swallowed narcotics, intending to regurgitate them later was much less likely than that he had hidden them in his rectum. The testimony of Dr. Salerno, R.T. 38, suggests what is undoubtedly common knowledge among persons who traffic in narcotics — that the rectum is a considerably safer repository for such drugs than the stomach; the acidic nature of the gastric juices in the latter organ makes the swallowing of almost any flexible container of narcotics quite dangerous. Cf. Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870, 873, 873-874 (9th Cir. 1966). It is perhaps for this reason that — insofar as the cases we have had before us over the past decade provide a basis for judgment — by far the majority of those persons who utilize body cavities in attempting to bring narcotics into this country hide the contraband drugs in their rectums (or, in the case of women, in their vaginas). Compare Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1967) (vagina); Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945, 87 S.Ct. 980, 17 L.Ed.2d 875 (1967) (rectum); Denton v. United States, 310 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1962) (rectum); Murgia v. United States, 285 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 977, 81 S.Ct. 1946, 6 L.Ed.2d 1265 (1961) (rectum); and Blackford v. United States, 247 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1957); cert. denied, 356 U.S. 914, 78 S.Ct. 672, 2 L.Ed.2d 586 (1958) (rectum), with Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1966) (stomach).6
It is true that our opinion in Rivas makes some mention that it would be “better” if findings of “clear indication” were made by the judiciary rather than by law enforcement authorities. 368 F.2d at 711. However, it is not clear how much weight should properly be given to this language, for its premise would seem to be in conflict with the holding in that case, since endorsed in Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1967), to the effect that the “clear indication” standard is less stringent than that of probable cause. According to the fourth amendment, a warrant may issue only on a showing which meets the latter standard. In any case, I believe that the threat to appellant’s health caused by the danger that the hidden narcotics would be absorbed by his body constituted an “emergency”- — similar to those relied on in Rivas and Schmerber — justifying a warrantless search.
Appellant’s first two allegations of error must thus be rejected, and the only remaining question concerns whether there was an unconscionable use of force in the search.
IV. THE REASONABLENESS OF THE METHODS USED IN THE SEARCH
Even when initiation of a body cavity search is justified, of course, excessive or unreasonable techniques may not be used in carrying out such a search. The evidence cited in part I of this opinion indicates clearly, I believe, that the search was not improper in terms of the methods used. Of prime significance is the fact that, as was the case with respect to the blood sample in Schmerber, removal of the heroin was made by a *392doctor using medically accepted methods. Moreover, a rectal probe is a relatively ordinary and uncomplicated procedure. It may well be that appellant experienced some pain during the extraction. However, it seems clear that to a considerable extent such pain was a direct result of his own resistance — a circumstance which certainly lessens the significance of that fact. Although the analogy is not exact, it may be noted that there are many ways in which individuals can cause normal law enforcement procedures to have painful consequences for themselves: it would not, for instance, necessarily be improper for police to refuse to remove handcuffs from a prisoner who, by vigorously twisting his hands and arms, managed intentionally to lacerate his wrists. Furthermore, although it relates primarily to the justification for continuing the probe, the fact that the appellant began to resist physically only after Dr. Salerno had palpated the packets in his rectum is not entirely irrelevant to the reasonableness of the methods used. Finally, the possibility that heroin left in appellant’s rectum would seriously threaten his life — certainly bears on the reasonableness of the methods used; and the impact of this possibility is only diminished, not destroyed, by the fact that belief regarding the heroin’s presence was based on inference rather than actual knowledge. Cf. Schmerber v. State of California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-771, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), with respect to the foreseeable effects of time on the alcohol content of the arrestee’s blood in that case.
The abrasion on appellant’s wrist is of relatively minor significance. It cannot be inferred that the “redness” testified to by several witnesses was serious, or that it was anything but the incidental result of the chafing of appellant’s handcuffs. Indeed, as soon as the attention of the officers was drawn to the matter, the handcuffs were loosened.
In view of these considerations, then, I cannot possibly categorize the officers’ course of action here, as did Mr. Justice Frankfurter with respect to the police conduct involved in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172, 72 S.Ct. 205, 210, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952), as “too close to the rack and the screw” to be permitted. The search to which appellant was subjected is quite different from those extreme measures which might be thought to “shock the conscience.” Cf. Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870, (9th Cir. 1966); Blackford v. United States, 247 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 914, 78 S.Ct. 672, 2 L.Ed.2d 586 (1958) ; D. McIntyre & N. Chabraja, The Intensive Search of a Subject’s Body and Clothing, 58 J. Crim.L.C.&P.S. 18, 22-23 (1967).'7
*393V. CONCLUSION
Since the search was not unreasonable either with respect to its justification or in the methods used, the judgment of conviction should be affirmed.
. As examples: (a) the original examination room is always described as “windowless.” I see no reason why that adds anything to the opinion. Being windowless, there would be no opportunity for a suspect to dispose of smuggled narcotics, or other incriminating evidence during or prior to examination. This, I would say, serves a valuable purpose.
(b) The border station room in which the defendant was medically examined repeatedly becomes, for apparent purposes of persuasion, “only a bare baggage room with ‘an examination table’ in it.” (p.
6) The majority, in footnote 28, tell us that although the doctor described this room as an “examination room,” (R.T. 31), and an agent called it “a-doctor’s office” (R.T. 49), “it was still nothing more than a bare room in the baggage area with an ‘examination table as the only medical equipment,’ ” citing R.T. 49. But R.T. 49 does not support such a statement of “fact”:
“Q. And insofar as medical equipment consists of, you had the examination table; is that my understanding?
“A. Tes, sir.
“Q. And that is the extent of your medical facility down there; is that my understanding?
“A. Well, there were other medical facilities there. For the purpose of rectal examination, this is all that is needed. The individual bends over, flexes the body at the trunk at a ninety-degree angle and rests the upper torso or body on the examination table, supports his lower, lower body with his feet.” (emphasis added.)
Being “in the baggage area” does not make the room a baggage room.
*385(c) Again, according to the majority, Dr. Salerno “took it upon himself to conduct tlie forcible and intensive rectal cavity search.” This statement simply flies in the face of reality. Why was the defendant Huguez taken to the doctor’s office if not because of a prior decision that he should be rectally examined?
(d) Again, the rectal search is always referred to as “brutal” and generally as “painful.” The defendant is “thrown on tlie table,” the handcuffs “bit in his flesh” and “his skin was peeled.” The physician and the United States Government employees “laughed at the defendant,” and examined him “amid laughter and jokes”! The use of such language detrends on the rejection of all prosecution testimony— a matter peculiarly within the discretion of the trial court, who heard the testimony given and could judge the credibility of the various witnesses. The majority, to improve their factual position, accept only the non-government version.
(e) Even when the record discloses a simple answer “no,” (when the doctor was asked if he had used “Nalline or urine tests,” R.T. 7), this becomes, in tlie opinion, not Nalline or urine tests, but “ordinary and easily given ‘Nalline or urine tests’ ” — a medical characterization nowhere appearing in the record. Thus, going beyond the record, tlie majority purports to be experts on medical questions.
(f) Nowhere does the majority opinion touch upon the two inch scar tract on the left forearm, indicating appellant was an addict; or at the very least, that he had been a frequent user of narcotics. This damning information is simply disregarded; and reference made only to the “small needle-puncture marks” at the base of the right thumb and wrist.
(g) Finally, not content with resting on the defendant’s conflicting testimony alone, the majority assumes certain facts exist. The opinion relies on this pure assumption of fact with not the slightest basis for it in the record — namely that the rectal insertion of the heroin was “made immediately prior to tlie border crossing.” (note 62)
The concurring opinion of my Brother Ely states that the majority opinion rests upon “the basis of a study which has been essentially factual.” I am not sure I understand what “essentially factual” means in this context, but if I do understand it, it means “almost factual.” I can not agree it comes that close. Judge Ely’s note points out that there is evidence to support the “existence of a greasy substance” on appellant’s buttocks when he was first examined, but then dismisses this factual evidence by saying that only “expert opinion” will suffice to prove the existence of such substance. No case law or statute is cited in support of this strange theory, and I know of none that can be. Further, the possibility of a suspect in custody removing the telltale indicium of the rectum’s use as a repository during the time between the original lay examination and the subsequent medical examination is not even mentioned, nor explained.
. Dr. Salerno testified concerning his academic training and subsequent experience in the examination of suspected narcotics violators as follows:
“I received the Doctor of Medicine, or M.D. degree from Western Reserve University in Cleveland in 1955. I also have had training in pharmacology and earned a Ph.D. or doctorate in pharmacology from the University of Chicago in 1949.
«:¡e % *
“I have been engaged in both the research and the teaching of pharmacology or the mechanism of action of drugs and the biochemical aspects of drug action in the body.
“In addition to the, to the (sic) routine activities as associated with the practice of medicine in San Diego, I have for the past three and a half years been called upon from time to time to examine individuals for the customs office ; examination has been requested to ascertain whether needle max’ks were present on individuals; also request for examination as to the nature of the needle marks; whether the individual was under the influence of a narcotic drug or some other drug at the time of the examination; request has also been made to establish an opinion with respect to whether the individual appears to be a user of narcotic drugs.
“Q. Over what period of time, Doctor, have you been making these examinations of persons to determine whether they are using or addicted to narcotic drugs ?
“A. For approximately three and one half years. The number of individuals examined is, has been approximately 700 to 800 such individuals.” R.T. 28-30.
. The Witt decision states that:
“there is reason and probable cause to search every person entering the United States from a foreign country, by reason of such entry alone.” 287 F.2d at 391.
Although the question may be to some extent one merely of semantics, I feel that this formulation of the principle is somewhat less accurate as a matter of logic than one which recognizes that “probable cause” (to believe that a suspect possesses contraband) is not required in order for a border search to be “reasonable.” The mere crossing of a border clearly does not constitute “facts and circumstances * * * sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that” the individual in question possesses contraband. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162, 45 S.Ct. 280, 288, 69 L.Ed. 543 *388(1925). But the practical difficulties connected with operating an effective customs check do create a “reason” for and justify searches of entrants on the basis of “mere suspicion,” or even at random. Thus, the “reason” exists without “probable cause.”
. “The right of a border search does not depend on probable cause and is in a separate category from searches generally. Detention and searches are the essence of the enforcement of laws governing the detection and punishment of smuggling.” 308 F.2d at 222-223.
. I prefer to avoid deciding this question largely because of deficiencies in the record. Were I to consider the issue, the Government might well cite the fact that Teela was “assisted” in his original search of appellant by Inspector Lasher, R.T. 79, who was also present in the examination room at the time of the rectal probe. R.T. 92. And, although Agent Walter A. Gates seems to have ordered the probe, this conclusion is not clear from the record, nor even if Gates did in fact authorize the search, is it clear what information he had before him at the time. Thus, Lasher, who did not testify, may have had knowledge of the substance Teela saw on appellant’s buttocks, and may have participated to some extent in the decision to order the rectal probe.
Alternately, the Government might argue that Teela’s decision (made jointly with Lasher) to suggest further action after his examination of appellant, R.T. 79, should be viewed as an implied communication of his general conclusions concerning appellant (if not his specific knowledge) to those who in fact took such action. True, Gates testified that no one suggested the physical examination to him. R.T. 90. Teela (and Lasher) clearly did exercise some discretion, however, in “advising the Agency” and holding appellant for further proceedings of some sort. Conceivably such action contemplated as a general matter that a thorough physical examination would be made, so that Teela may have played some part in bringing about the search.
I note those possibilities, of course, without endorsing either their factual or their legal aspects. I seek merely to put into context my decision, considering the state of the record before me, not to pass upon them.
. It is true that only Inspector Teela testified as to appellant’s failure to present such a certificate. I feel that this information may properly be viewed as having been conveyed by implication, however, to Agent Gates. Gates testified that he was told “only” of the needle marks on appellant’s arms. R.T. 89. But it is a fair assumption that registration under 18 U.S.C. § 1407 would be reported as a matter of course by customs inspectors, so that individuals not thus specified to be registrants would be presumed by officials making further inquiry not to have registered. It is therefore likely that, not having been told that appellant had so registered, Gates believed —correctly and with justification — that he had not. A similar analysis is justified with respect to Teela’s failure, referred to below, to find narcotics hidden in appellant’s car. Any such discovery certainly would have been reported; indeed, appellant would in such circumstances probably have been immediately arrested. These questions are in this respect quite different from that of Teela’s observation of the greasy substance on appellant’s buttocks — knowledge of which it would be difficult to attribute to Gates in the absence of a specific communication of it to him.
. It should be clear that I offer no conclusion regarding the reasonableness of a hypothetical “stomach search” (involving, for instance, tlie use of an emetic) undertaken in circumstances similar to those present here.
. “Several considerations may help explain why the courts are less offended by a rectal probe or enema than by stomach pumping or the administration of an emetic. As to the element of pain that may be involved, the courts weigh this aspect of a cavity search against the overall conduct of the suspect. While characterizing a rectal probe as a ‘disgusting sequence’, courts have no great difficulty, apparently, attributing the necessity for it to the defendant’s choice of an equally disgusting repository in the first place. Conventional morality may thus supply the formally missing premise of distinction. This attitude appears to extend also to the suspect who resists a rectal probe, causing some degree of pain and the possibility of physical injury. The courts are not willing to place a premium on the suspect’s violent resistance, especially if he is in all other respects treated civilly. Pain in such ciroum-stances indeed has been termed ‘self-inflicted’. In further support of this position, the courts point out that a rectal probe ‘is an uncomplicated and nonhazardous procedure’; with regard to the administration of an enema, courts have indicated that it is ‘a very normal and natural thing to do.’
“Emphasis has been placed, moreover, on the fact that the contraband in the body cavity may cause serious injury to the suspect unless promptly removed. Testimony by medical experts as to the likelihood of this eventuality has been used to ‘ substantiate the use of force. A final point of emphasis is the court’s willingness to analogize a cavity probe to forcing a suspect ‘with narcotics in a clenched fist to open his hand’ or cutting the stitches of a defendant’s clothing to recover the contraband contained therein.” (Footnotes omitted.)
See also 58 Colum.L.Rev. 565 (1958).