Arnold Cornman v. The United States

COLLINS, Judge

(dissenting):

I respectfully differ with the decision of the court on the ground that the language of 19 U.S.C. § 1619 — the only re*235liable guide in this instance — demands, in my opinion, a contrary result.

The cornerstone of the court’s opinion as I read it is the prior administrative construction of the statute. This construction would limit plaintiff to a $50,000 maximum reward for information given at any one time, irrespective of the number of companies or the number of violations involved. Under the doctrine of contemporaneous administrative construction, as the court holds, the agency’s interpretive practice here is entitled to great respect and, apparently, presumptive validity. See, e. g., Schellfeffer v. United States, 170 Ct.Cl. 178, 343 F.2d 936 (1965); H. B. Zachry Co. v. United States, 170 Ct.Cl. 115, 344 F.2d 352 (1965). Although I completely accept the viability of this doctrine (see DeLano v. United States, 183 Ct.Cl. 379, 388, 393 F.2d 517, 521 (1968)), I do not believe this is an appropriate case for its application.

There are, it seems to me, two major reasons why the consistently maintained construction of a statute by the agency charged with its enforcement is given great weight by a court. First, as a particular reading of a statute is repeated and solidifies into doctrine, those whose activities are affected by the statute come to rely upon the given construction. 2 J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction 521 (3d ed. 1943). An analogous consideration is the judicial recognition (1) that the practical construction of the statute is an aid to determining the meaning of the act and (2) that adherence to that construction makes for certainty in the law and justifies reliance upon public officials. 2 J. Sutherland, supra at 513.

The second reason is the judicial deference paid to precedent. When an agency has been faced over a number of years with deciding a goodly number of factually dissimilar cases involving the same legal issue and has consistently reached the same result, the probability that the administrative construction is correct is far greater than it is when only a few isolated cases have been decided. The parallel to the comparative judicial treatment as authority of one or two cases in point, as distinguished from a long line of cases, is obvious.

In the instant case, only one administrative determination is cited to ús, and that case was decided in 1917 under the predecessor of the current statute. We are told by affidavit that the policy expressed in that decision has been consistently maintained. Yet, defendant’s counsel at oral argument admitted to knowing of only one or two subsequent applications of the rule, apparently in a purely executive fashion. Nothing in the affidavit is inconsistent with this statement. In light of the fact that the informer-compensation statute, in one form or another, has been in existence for nearly 100 years, I have great difficulty in according to so few isolated agency determinations the label of “consistent administrative practice.”

In the first place, the agency has not been faced with a variety of factual situations involving the same issue. There has been no oft-repeated application of a well-known rule on a day-to-day, or even a year-to-year, basis. Apparently, there has been only one formal quasi-judicial consideration of the issue. It is therefore much truer to say that the policy has been consistently maintained in theory rather than in practice. Because of this limited application of the ruling in random instances scattered over a considerable period of time, it is difficult to see how those affected by the act can be said to have generally accepted and relied upon a “practical interpretation” of the law. See 2 J. Sutherland, supra at 515. There is no established line of administrative cases here, the overturning of which would create uncertainty in the law or destroy faith in public officials.

Because the instant administrative practice has not been consistently and repeatedly maintained within the meaning of the contemporaneous construction doctrine as I understand it, I would not *236accord to the lone decision of the Comptroller any presumptive correctness. The administrative policy here is more properly treated simply as evidence bearing upon the meaning of the statute. However, as explained below, I believe that the agency interpretation tends to defeat the underlying purposes of the statute and is accordingly less than reasonable. See Henneberger v. United States, 185 Ct.Cl. 614, 627-628, 403 F.2d 237, 244 (1968) (dissenting opinion); Tasker v. United States, 178 Ct.Cl. 56 (1967).1

The court also attempts to find a resolution of the statute’s possible ambiguity in the legislative history, a clearly proper investigation. Akerson v. United States, 175 Ct.Cl. 551, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 946, 87 S.Ct. 320, 17 L.Ed.2d 226 (1966); Thermo King Corp. v. United States, 173 Ct.Cl. 860, 354 F.2d 242 (1965). The court interprets the portion it quotes of H.R.Rep. No. 1207 as indicating that Congress intended the change from $5,000 to $50,000 to establish an absolute limit. However, because it is at least clear that the limit has always been absolute as applied to any one violation, the report could also be read just as easily as evidencing an intent to increase the limit on an informer’s compensation for reporting each violation, as distinguished from several violations by several companies. Where the legislative history itself is ambiguous, it is at best hazardous to rely upon it to govern judicial construction of a statute. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 348-349, 83 S.Ct. 1715, 10 L.Ed.2d 915 (1963); Crawford v. United States, 179 Ct.Cl. 128, 144, 376 F.2d 266, 275 (1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1041, 88 S.Ct. 781, 19 L.Ed.2d 831 (1968). Unfortunately, the language and legislative history of the other Federal informer statutes is likewise unhelpful.

Therefore, it is in the statute itself that we must find its meaning. As the court notes, the statute’s terms are written in the singular. However, because of the variety of possible meanings of the statutory phrase “in any case” and relying on the administrative ruling, the court declines to accept plaintiff’s reading of the statute.

In the first place, it seems to me that the meaning of the word “case” is an issue secondary to the resolution of whether recovery can be had in each “case,” whatever the term means. Defendant argues that the phrase “in any case” is the common colloquialism meaning “under any circumstances” or “in any event,” such that the $50,000 limitation would apply to the total informer service rendered, irrespective of other considerations.

Even assuming that defendant’s interpretation of the phrase is correct, it by no means follows that the limitation was intended to apply to the total recovery. No language in the statute supports this conclusion. On the contrary, when the statute is read as a whole, as is proper (see Jamerson v. United States, 185 Ct. Cl. 471, 475, 401 F.2d 808, 810 (1968); cf. General Motors Corp. v. United States, 151 Ct.Cl. 366, 370, 283 F.2d 699, 701 (1960)), the phrase “in any ease” must be viewed as referring to, modifying, and being modified by the singular *237fine, penalty, or other recovery described. Plaintiff readily admits — in fact argues — that the $50,000 limitation does apply to the recovery for any one violation.

The court otherwise refuses to accept plaintiff’s reading of the statute in the singular primarily because of the administrative ruling previously mentioned. As stated above, I would not attribute to the agency’s policy more than indicative weight. If my position on this point is accepted, it seems to me that plaintiff’s construction of the specific language of the statute is more plausible than and outweighs the agency’s interpretation.

Whether the limitation applies to the individual recovery for each violation or to the total amount recovered for all violations simultaneously reported remains in question. As mentioned above, I see nothing in the statute to indicate that the limitation applies to the entire recovery, as the court suggests. On the other hand, the singular language of the statute clearly tends to substantiate plaintiff’s argument. Logically, however, as the court recognizes, “each particular shipment could be broken down into its components. However, in actuality, each illegal shipment as a whole would constitute one violation, in the same way that the simultaneous theft of 1,000 individual dollars would constitute one count of larceny. The fine, penalty, or duties contemplated by the statute are assessed by virtue of each violation. Accordingly, plaintiff could conceivably seek 25 percent of each recovery for each violation by each of the several companies here involved, subject always to the limitation applied to each such recovery and the prerequisite of originality.

However, in recognition of the administrative treatment of the violations of one company as one case file, plaintiff seeks only 25 percent of the total recovery from each company, not to exceed $50,000 in any instance. In my opinion, plaintiff’s construction of “case” in this fashion, even if less generous than the statute contemplates, is nonetheless entirely consistent with the other terms of the statute, and I would find for plaintiff despite problems which might arise in other cases regarding the meaning of “company.”

It is eminently clear that 19 U.S.C. § 1619 is designed to encourage the disclosure of customs violations to enable the Government to recover at least a portion of the duties it would otherwise lose. The statute must be construed to best effectuate this policy. The court’s decision, in my opinion, could seriously thwart the congressional aim. As a practical matter, someone who has knowledge of extensive customs violations is not likely to gratuitously give the Government more original information than necessary to recover the maximum allowed by the court’s ruling.2 To do so would be to expose himself to the wrath and, in some cases, retribution of those against whom he has informed without any offsetting compensation. The court’s apparent belief that its decision will not seriously affect the receipt of information is, in my opinion, unrealistic.

There is one further reason why I believe the majority opinion and the administrative ruling are incorrect. I assume that no one would seriously dispute that an informer who gave information for which he received $50,000 on one occasion, and who later returned with original information regarding entirely different violations by other persons, would not be precluded by virtue of his first recovery from receiving his fee for the later information. Why then should an informant be limited to only $50,000 if he is in a position to give *238at one time the same distinct original information about separate violators? The only variable in the two hypotheticals is the time factor. I see no justification in the statute for distinguishing between the two eases.

Accordingly, I would grant plaintiff the relief sought.

. I do not understand the court to rely upon the principle that subsequent reenactment of a statute with congressional knowledge of the administrative practice • is an implied ratification of such practice. See DeLano v. United States, 183 Ct.Cl. 379, 393 F.2d 517 (1968); Ware Knitters, Inc. v. United States, 144 Ct. Cl. 141, 168 F.Supp. 208 (1958). There is no evidence here that Congress knew of the Comptroller’s decision when it reenacted the instant statute. Moreover, this court has been rightly hesitant to fully rely upon the implied-ratification doctrine in the absence of a clear showing of congressional awareness of the agency practice. See Fox v. United States, 145 Ct.Cl. 186, 188, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 887, 80 S.Ct. 160, 4 L.Ed.2d 122 (1959); Ware Knitters, Inc. v. United States, supra; cf. A. P. Green Export Co. v. United States, 151 Ct.Cl. 628, 284 F.2d 383 (1960). But cf. Crawford v. United States, 179 Ct.Cl. 128, 376 F.2d 266 (1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1041, 88 S.Ct. 781, 19 L.Ed.2d 831 (1968).

. Once the informer has met the prerequisites of the statute, the Secretary is without discretion to refuse to pay the appropriate amount. Wilson v. United States, 135 F.2d 1005 (3d Cir. 1943); Tyson v. United States, 91 Ct.Cl. 139, 32 F.Supp. 135 (1940).