National Labor Relations Board v. Sucrest Corporation and Sugar Workers Council of North America, I. L. A., Afl-Cio

HAYS, Circuit Judge

(dissenting):

In determining that the Council was not a Section 9(a) bargaining representative the majority fails to give proper consideration to the power of the ILA to supervise its local unions. The constitution of the ILA gives it “supreme legislative, executive and judicial authority over all members and subordinate bodies * * Passage by the ILA of a resolution requiring its locals to affiliate with the Council therefore effected that affiliation. The locals were directed to cooperate with the Council in collective bargaining, as required by the Council’s constitution. If the membership of a local did not wish to. have this relationship with the Council, it could have withdrawn from the ILA; it was not given the option of remaining in the ILA and refusing to cooperate with the Council. The two votes against affiliation are thus without significance because they were nothing more than a vain effort to exercise an unavailable option. By retaining the affiliation with the ILA, the membership of the local must be held to have agreed to the required relationship with the Council.

The record shows to my satisfaction that the Council’s role was that of a Section 9(a) representative. The Council’s constitution requires affiliated locals to consult the Council concerning items to be negotiated and to receive approval of the items before the negotiations. Once the contract is executed, the Council is to assist in administering it and its approval is required before a local may call a strike.

The Council participated in negotiating both the Pepsi and the SuCrest contracts. Both contracts were ratified by the members of Local 1476.

Because Local 1476 accepted affiliation with the Council and because the Council’s functions were those of a Section 9(a) representative, the Council achieved Section 9(a) status. Consequently, it did not violate Sections 8(b) (2) and (1) (A) in seeking to enforce payment of dues by discharge or threat of discharge and SuCrest did not violate Sections 8(a) (3) and (1) by threatening to discharge the employees if the dues were not paid.