(dissenting) .
For me, on the sufficiency of the evidence issue, this is only a simple and routine case, hardly deserving of great scholastic labor with historical references and cases from past centuries.
I must concede that the prosecution’s case is a comparatively thin one. I must also concede that, in hindsight and in the light of what developed at the trial, the United States Attorney might have been better advised to prosecute Jones under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(c) rather than under § 2113(a) and (d). But, even with these concessions, I. cannot agree that, as a matter of law, this bank robbery conviction must be nullified and the defendant acquitted on the ground that the evidence is insufficient.
It seems to me that if, as Judge Lay argues, the inference permissible from the possession of marked currency stolen only the day before from the victimized bank required corroboration (a conclusion in which I am not yet entirely willing to participate), that corroboration is definitely present in the aggregate of facts, taking, of course, as I feel the majority fail to do, the evidence in the light favorable to the government as the prevailing party. United States v. Lodwiek, 410 F.2d 1202, 1204 (8 Cir. 1969). The facts thus measured are: (1) Jones’ arrival in Minneapolis shortly before the robbery (at one point he testified it was 11 p. m. on February 10; at another he said it was 5 or 6 a. m. on February 20). (2) His possessing and using a Kansas license plate to which he was not entitled. (3) His renting an apartment that very morning and doing so under a fictitious name. (4) His being accompanied, in that rental, by two other Negroes, one of whom was tall. (5) His further association with two other Negroes, one of whom was tall, that same morning and their joint and suspicious peering into a bank in downtown Minneapolis. (6) The departure of Jones and one of those men in the direction of the victimized bank, leaving the other man in the car, and their return to Jones’ automobile. (7) The actions of the three being strange and unusual enough to prompt a stranger in an adjacent parked car to take the trouble to write down their license number. (8) The 3 p. m. robbery of the bank by two Negroes, one of whom was tall, with lives of persons placed in jeopardy by the use of weapons. (9) Jones’ unemployment for 3% months preceding the robbery and his failure to make required payments upon his automobile. (10) His sudden affluence coincidental with the robbery. (11) His departure from Minneapolis and Minnesota within a few hours of the robbery to return to Kansas City *829on an all night drive in midwinter, despite the presence of several days yet to run on his apartment lease. (12) His rush the very next afternoon to trade in his automobile and upgrade his transportation from a 1964 Buick to a 1965 Lincoln. (13) The inconsistency in his explanations as to how he acquired the marked bills. (14) His testimony that he had $350 when he left Kansas City and hustled $100 in Minneapolis on February 20 and $250 on February 21, as contrasted with his handing salesman Grimes $500 in five dollar bills, among which were marked ones.
It seems to me that the listing of these factors discloses that it is a mistaken analysis to conclude that the facts proved by the government tend no more than equally to show a violation of § 2113(e) and a violation of § 2113(a) and (d). Instead, they tend to show more than the mere possession of money knowingly stolen from a bank, which is all that § 2113(c) requires. They tend to show aiding and abetting the armed robbery of that bank by the two other men. For me, therefore, the submission to the jury of the issue of a violation of § 2113(a) and (d) was fully justified by the evidence.
In passing, I might also say that I am disturbed by the majority’s seeming circumlocution of Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 139-140, 75 S.Ct. 127, 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954). I had thought that in that case the Supreme Court flatly rejected the theretofore often used expression that circumstantial evidence must be such as to exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than guilt, and had said, p. 140, 75 S.Ct. p. 137, that “ [circumstantial evidence in this respect is intrinsically no different from testimonial evidence.” I also thought that this court more than once had recognized the controlling character of Holland. United States v. Francisco, 410 F.2d 1283, 1286 (8 Cir. 1969); United States v. Kye, 411 F.2d 120, 122 (8 Cir. 1969); United States v. Lodwick, supra, 410 F.2d at 1204.
I therefore cannot join the majority in their reversal of this bank robbery conviction, typified by Judge Lord as “amply justified,” on the ground of insufficient evidence.