(concurring):
I agree with Judge Leventhal that the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Government must be reversed. On the basis of this record, however, I believe that the appellant is further entitled to an injunction directing the Park Service to issue a permit for the construction of appellant’s display.
This is not a case where the Government seeks to preserve the property under its control for its own exclusive use.1 On the contrary, the Government concedes that the Ellipse is an appropriate forum for public debate; the National Park Service is willing to grant appellant a permit to assemble and to picket there.2 The Service has, however, declined to allow appellant, as part of the demonstration, to construct a graphic display 20 feet long by eight feet high by six feet deep. In a series of letters to appellant, the Park Service rested its refusal solely on the ground that such a structure would not be “an appropriate use of Federal park lands.” 3
I
There can be no doubt, as Judge Leventhal notes, that pictorial expression is within the protection of the First Amendment.4 Ordinarily, of course, no permit is required for the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. Indeed, the elimination of such “prior restraints” was a central purpose of the First Amendment.5 Thus the Supreme Court has emphasized that any system of prior restraint involving permits, licenses, or even court injunctions, “comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.” Carroll v. President & Comm’rs of Town of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181, 89 S.Ct. 347, 351, 21 L.Ed.2d 325 (1968).6
*605When citizens seek to use publicly owned land for their speeches and rallies, however, their action potentially conflicts with the coordinate rights of others seeking to use the same public areas. Under these circumstances, permit systems have been approved which narrowly and precisely regulate and resolve these conflicts.7 In considering such permit systems, the Supreme Court has consistently reiterated two propositions: (1) Standards for granting or denying permits which affect free expression must be precise and must not be left to the discretion of administrative officials.8 Such standards must be announced and generally applicable so that the controls on official discretion can be quickly tested in court if the permit is denied.9 (2) Many asserted governmental interests are “insufficient” to support curtailment of various modes of expression.10 In slightly different contexts, the Court has spelled out the implications of this second requirement. It has held that only a compelling governmental interest can justify a regulation which, even though directed at conduct, “incidentally”, restricts First Amendment freedoms.11 Moreover, the incidental restriction must be no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.12
Under these standards, the Government may properly regulate demonstrations to “[prevent] serious interference with normal usage of streets and parks * * * ” Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293-294, 71 S.Ct. 312, 315 (1951). (Emphasis added.) But the burden rests upon the Government to demonstrate the compelling interest requiring the restriction of free expression and to show that the regulation serves that interest with the least restriction possible on the citizen’s ability to communicate his political dissent. In this case, the Park Service has not only failed to meet this burden, it has been unable to articulate any policy in support of its action beyond its general judgment that appellant’s display is not “appropriate.” 13
II
Timeliness is essential to effective dissent. Delay may stifle protest as effectively as outright censorship.
*606“ * * -x- ii ig vital to the operation of democratic government that the citizens have facts and ideas on important issues before them. A delay of even a day or two may be of crucial importance in some instances. $£ if if »
A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 224, 84 S.Ct. 1723, 1732, 12 L.Ed. 2d 809 (1964) (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan). Here the Park Service’s refusal to grant a permit has already resulted in two long delays of appellant’s demonstration. The Supreme Court cases, as well as those in the lower courts, clearly indicate that in the absence of a properly administered permit system, people are free to exercise their First Amendment freedoms.14 They are not required to return time and again to the licensing authority to discover whether the officials can formulate new policies which will withstand scrutiny. At the time appellant applied for a permit, the Park Service offered no policy which could constitutionally have justified denial of appellant’s application. I would order the Park Service to grant the permit.
Since neither of my colleagues agrees with this disposition of the case or with each other, in order to reach a result I reluctantly concur in the remand of this case to the District Court. A clarification of Park Service policy in this area of First Amendment freedoms may serve to encourage rather than restrict their exercise.
. See Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 87 S.Ct. 242, 17 L.Ed.2d 149 (1966).
. Appellee’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities (in the District Court) at 1; see also Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 152, 89 S.Ct. 935, 22 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 515-516, 83 S.Ct. 328 (1939).
. Letter from William It. Failor, Superintendent, National Capital Parks-Central, to Elliot C. Liehtman, May 26, 1969, attached to the complaint as appellant’s Ex-Mbit J. The National Park Service did not object to the display on the ground that the specific design contemplated was offensive, too large, etc. Since appellant has not, either in brief or at argument, produced even a sketch of the display, I would allow the Park Service to raise specific objections to the display in subsequent proceedings in the District Court.
. Judge Leventhal’s opinion at page 600 and eases cited in Note 7 thereof.
. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451-452, 58 S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949 (1938).
. The Government has contended that no issue of censorship or restriction on First Amendment freedoms is involved in this case because appellant is free to conduct its assembly and to picket on the Ellipse. But even the restriction on methods of communication must be justified by a sub*605stantial state interest. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 164, 60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155 (1939).
. See Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 73 S.Ct. 760, 97 L.Ed. 1105 (1953).
. See, e. g., Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, supra Note 2, 394 U.S. at 150-151, 89 S.Ct. 935; Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 71 S.Ct. 312, 95 L.Ed. 280 (1951).
. See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70, 83 S.Ct. 631, 639, 9 L.Ed.2d 584 (1963): “We have tolerated such a system [of prior restraint] only where it operated under judicial superintendence and assured an almost immediate judicial determination of the validity of the restraint.’’
. See Schneider v. State, supra Note 6, 308 U.S. at 162, 60 S.Ct. 146.
. N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438, 83 S.Ct. 328 (1963) ; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) ; Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524, 80 S.Ct. 412, 4 L.Ed.2d 480 (1960).
. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488, 81 S.Ct. 247, 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (1960) ; see also United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-377, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed. 2d 672 (1968).
. The Government has urged that adequate support and sufficiently precise standards for this judgment are provided by 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1964) :
“ * * * The [National Park] service * * * shall promote and regulate the use of the Federal areas known as national parks, monuments, and reservations * * * to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and. tbe wild life therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.”
Beyond its extraordinarily general terms, this statutory provision relates solely to conservation. The Park Service did not make reference to this policy in its negotiations with appellant, nor did it evince any interest in issues relevant to such a policy such as the amount of damage appellant’s structure was likely to inflict upon the park grounds.
. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that citizens, confronted with a permit system which is void on its face, “may ignore it and engage with impunity in the exercise of the right of free expression for which the law purports to require a license.” Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, supra Note 2, 394 U.S. at 151, 89 S.Ct. 77 at 939. Since the method of expression at issue here has apparently not been subject to judicial scrutiny before, appellant has chosen the more responsible course of challenging the Government in court. But the principle remains the same: to prevent a chilling effect upon expression which is constitutionally protected, appellant must be allowed to proceed without interference unless the Government acts on the basis of a constitutional permit system. See A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 210, 84 S.Ct. 1723 (1964).