(dissenting in part):
I disagree with the opinion of the court on three issues.
1. I would deny enforcement of that part of the order which found that A & S had violated § 8(a) (1) and (2) of the Act through “the soliciting” by Klein and Loeb on behalf of Local 106. In my view, the unrepeated statements of Klein and Loeb fell far short of constituting a pattern of coercion of A & S employees and thus should be regarded as protected by § 8(c) of the Act.
Recent cases in this circuit and elsewhere seem to have stanched an earlier flow of judicial pronouncements tending to ignore employers’ First Amendment rights. This flood was and at least occasionally still is encouraged by decisions of the Board tending to condemn virtually any and all anti-union expression by an employer without giving sufficient weight to § 8(c).1 As I understand the current case law in this circuit, however,. § 8(c) must be read to permit the employer a certain degree of latitude in expressing his point of view when faced *223with unionization. NLRB v. Golub Corporation, 388 F.2d 921 (2 Cir. 1967); accord, Schwarzenbach-Huber Company v. NLRB, 408 F.2d 236, 252-255 (2 Cir. 1969). By the terms of that section, to constitute a violation of § 8(a) (1) or (2), statements made by or on behalf of an employer must contain some “threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.” I believe that the majority opinion effectively vitiates this principle.
True, there is undisputed evidence that Klein and Loeb, as supervisory agents acting for Solmsen, made it known to various other employees that Solmsen considered Local 106 to be a good union and was not opposed to it. Significantly, as I see the problem, most of this comparatively mild activity occurred during a single afternoon. Nobody was pressured or even exhorted to any appreciable extent. Hence, taking the evidence in the best light for the Board, I am at a loss .to understand how this expression of management opinion by Klein and Loeb amounted to a “general pattern or course of conduct which constituted] coercion and deprive[d] employees of their free choice.” Irving Air Chute Company v. NLRB, 350 F.2d 176, 180 (2 Cir. 1965); cf. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618, 89 S.Ct. 1918, 23 L.Ed.2d 547 (1969).2
2. A similar view, it seems to me, is justified in respect to the issue of Solmsen’s conversations with Geller. These conversations took place in a general office with a number of non-management people nearby; they were certainly informal.3 Solmsen, of course, intended to influence Geller and in effect manifested his disapproval of Geller’s association with District 65. But these conversations amounted to nothing more than the natural and, under the circumstances, remarkably temperate reaction of a small businessman faced for the first time with the unionization of his business. Absent threats or coercion, § 8(c) permits an employer to make known his argument or opinions on a matter by which he is so directly affected. As I read the record, there were no threats, overt or implied, by Solmsen (Appendix 55-57); indeed, Geller admitted that Solmsen promised him that his, Geller’s, position would not suffer or change if by chance Local 106 “were to get in” despite Geller's refusal to sign with that union. Arguably, of course, one could construe Solmsen’s remarks (Appendix 57) as a veiled threat of dire consequences to Geller if 106 did not get in, but I cannot believe that either this court or the Board has meant to rely on such morbid conjecture.
3. Finally, I would deny enforcement of the order respecting the allowance of lost overtime to Reynolds, a driver, as well as to Cruz. Essentially, the trial examiner based the allowance to Reynolds on the following simplistic rationale: (1) Reynolds signed with the Teamsters; (2) driver Sojourner did not; (3) subsequently Reynolds’ overtime fell off but Sojourner’s increased; (4) it follows as day from night that the sole cause of (3) was the employer’s desire to penalize Reynolds for his Teamsters affiliation. But there are other facts in the record. Reynolds earned $201 for overtime work during the first quarter of 1967; he earned $48.58 for overtime work during the second quarter; he earned $8.33 for overtime work from July 1 through 26 when he left the company. For overtime work, Sojourner earned $874 during the first quarter of 1967, $916 during the second quarter and $1,107 during the third quarter. There is no evidence, *224however, of the kind of overtime work done by either Reynolds or Sojourner.
As the foregoing recital indicates, there was an increase of $42 in Sojourner’s overtime pay during the second quarter, but his large increase in overtime, $233, came not until the third quarter — i. e. after Reynolds had quit and during the period of Cruz’s frequent absences. In sum, .there is nothing to indicate that Reynolds’ loss was in any way related to Sojourner’s gain during the relevant period — except bald speculation that Reynolds’ Teamsters affiliation compelled Solmsen to discriminate. Balancing such speculation against the known facts, I would hold that there is insufficient evidence to justify award of the allowance to Reynolds as well as to Cruz.
. “(c) The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, painted, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this subchapter, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.”
. “[A]n employer is free to communicate to his employees any of his general views about unionism or any of his specific views about a particular union, so long as the communications do not contain a ‘threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.’ ” At p. 618, 89 S.Ct. at p. 1942.
. Of considerable importance is the fact that A & S in 1967 was a small “one-man” enterprise with relatively few employees. The record plainly shows that there was a significant blurring of the line between management and labor. Informality was the rule. Thus, a favorable climate for oppression and coercion was notably absent.