(concurring) :
I concur in all respects in Judge Mansfield’s excellent opinion insofar as it deals with the facts of the case before us. If, however, the discussion of what a petitioner might claim or contend if the case were one of parole revocation, rather than one of granting parole, is interpreted to imply that in such a case this court would be inclined to hold that constitutional due process would require a trial-type hearing, with the right to counsel, confrontation with witnesses, the right to subpoena witnesses, etc., I am not prepared to agree. Recognition of such a right would completely alter the nature of the parole system and the functions of parole officers and the Parole Board. Until Congress by appropriate legislation changes the character and purpose of parole and the parole system, the hearing on revocation should not be turned into an adversary proceeding. This is not to say that the Board is entitled to act arbitrarily or base its decisions on careless or token investigation or on hunch or whimsey. The hearing should be fair and based upon a thorough investigation, including a searching inquiry into the parolee’s own version of the pertinent facts. See United States ex rel. McCreary v. Kenton, 190 F.Supp. 689, 691 (D.Conn.1960) ; also see United States ex rel. Buono v. Kenton, 287 F.2d 534, 536 (2 Cir. 1961); Washington v. Hagan, 287 F.2d 332, 333-334 (3 Cir. 1960).