(dissenting).
I respectfully submit that the majority opinion misapplies Nebraska law. In Rose v. Buffalo Air Service, 170 Neb. 806, 104 N.W.2d 431, 444 (1960), the Nebraska Supreme Court announced the rule to be followed in Nebraska relating to a manufacturer’s liability for a defective product:
“ ‘ A vendor and the manufacturer or supplier of a chattel who know or have reason to know that it is likely to be dangerous when used and which is purchased as safe for use in good faith reliance upon their professions or representations of safety, competence, and care, are subject to liability to the purchaser or to others whom they should expect to share in or be in the vicinity of its use, for damages proximately caused by their failure to exercise reasonable competence and care to supply the chattel in a condition safe for use.’ ”
The trial court correctly instructed the jury on proximate cause under Nebraska law as follows:
“ ‘Proximate Cause’ — An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act, or a failure to act, whenever it appears from the evidence in the case, that the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about the injury or damage; and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a natural or probable consequence of the act or omission.
“This does not mean that the law recognizes only one proximate cause of an injury or damage, consisting of only one factor or thing, of the conduct of only one person. On the contrary, many factors, or the conduct of two or more persons, may operate at the same time, either independently or together, to cause injury or damage; and in such a case, each may be a proximate cause.”
*164* * *
“It is not necessary that the defendant might or should have foreseen the likelihood of the particular injury or harm, the extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred, but it is only necessary that he should have anticipated that some injury or harm might result from his conduct.”
The majority opinion now holds that the actions of the plaintiff in attempting to pry the cable loose and the operator in rotating the drum constituted a superseding cause. Thus, although this case was submitted to the jury under general definitions of proximate cause, we sustain the judgment n. o. v. by applying different principles of causation. The defendant did not try its case on the theory of an intervening or superseding cause. Defendant’s motion for directed verdict did not even raise this issue. No jury instruction on this issue was requested by the defendant and no such instruction was given.
The majority opinion borrows a principle of causation from Nebraska cases which are not related to the facts before us. I have difficulty seeing a parallel with the instant facts and a plaintiff knowingly entering a dangerous fire,1 an automobile being double parked,2 a plaintiff striking a collapsed bridge which a governmental body failed to protect,3 or a pilot flying a rudderless plane.4 In each of these cases the Nebraska Supreme Court found that the alleged negligence of the original tort-feasor had come to rest and was not a substantial factor in the cause of the accident. This is not true here. In the instant case, if. the manufacturer’s negligence had not still been contributive, that is, had it •placed the protective shield around the drum containing the chain, plaintiff would not have been injured when the operator rotated the drum resulting in the chain flying loose. On the facts presented a jury could reasonably determine that the action of the operator in rotating the drum acted on and in conjunction with the absence of the shield. Apropos here is the Nebraska law overlooked by the majority reasoning:
“ ‘The doer of an original wrongful act that should reasonably cause one to anticipate an injury therefrom is not relieved from liability for an injury immediately brought about by an intervening cause, wrongful or otherwise, that is set into operation by such original wrongful act, and that alone would not have caused the injury, but which with the aid of the original wrong does cause such injury.’ See, also, Tralle v. Hartman Furniture & Carpet Co., 116 Neb. 418, 217 N.W. 952; McClelland v. Interstate Transit Lines, supra, [142 Neb. 439, 6 N.W .2d 384].” Morse v. Gray, 166 Neb. 557, 89 N.W.2d 842, 847 (1958). (My emphasis.)
The facts of Morse v. Gray, supra, are more closely akin than the cases discussed by the majority. In that case, a wife brought suit against the proprietor of a drive-in ice cream stand for injuries sustained when the car she was riding in, driven by her husband, ran into a post 24 to 34 inches in height. The post, which was set out in the open, adjacent to the building, was dark colored; the husband failed to see it as he was driving out of the parking lot. In discussing liability for a negligent act, the Nebraska court quoted with approval from Meyer v. Milwaukee, E. R. & L. Co., 116 Wis. 336, 93 N.W. 6 (1903):
“ ‘It suffices to charge a person with liability for a negligent act if some injury to another ought reasonably to have been foreseen as the probable result thereof by the ordinarily intelligent and prudent person under the same circumstances, even though the *165specific injury might not be so foreseeable.’” 89 N.W.2d at 847-848.
Shearman & Redfield on Negligence (Rev. ed.) §§ 37 and 38, p. 101, states the rules as follows:
“If the force which causes the injury is put in operation or motion by what is the negligence of the defendant, and that force or motion is still in progress or operation and has not lost its identity and continuity as such when the injury occurs, then the negligence which puts the injurious force in operation is the proximate cause. * * *
“In order to relieve the defendant of responsibility for the event, the intervening cause must be a superseding cause. It is a superseding cause if it so entirely supersedes the operation of the defendant’s negligence that it alone, without his negligence contributing thereto in the slightest degree, produces the injury.” (My emphasis.)
To hold that the negligence of the manufacturer, to-wit, the failure to safely guard the chain and drum, has come to rest, totally misconceives the events that took place. The majority’s statement that the plaintiff confuses the manufacturer’s duty to place a shield to guard against snagging one’s clothing or hands with a duty to guard against flying parts escapes me. The industry safety standards anticipate both protections.
The majority opinion stresses that the breakdown of the machine interrupts the natural and probable sequence of events because the manufacturer could not reasonably anticipate the malfunction and the events which followed. To so hold as a matter of law ignores the favorable evidential inferences to which a verdict holder is entitled. Under the evidence, the jury could consider that: (1) the defendant knew or should have known that the cable could jump the flange and wedge against the chain, with or without a rope guard; (2) the defendant could anticipate such a malfunction, since the defendant knew the rope guard is often discarded once the crane is put in actual use; 5 (3) the defendant’s own testimony reveals that once the malfunction occurs the flange could not be removed *166without unwinding the full cable drum, an impossibility here because the cable was wedged tight against the chain and the drum would not turn; (4) loosening the master link of the chain would not serve to release the chain where the chain was otherwise wedged and taut by reason of the cable; (5) alternative methods to loosen the chain, according to the testimony of defendant’s own engineer, would be to rotate the drum, pry the chain loose, or use a torch to cut the chain; (6) the breaking of a taut chain would be hazardous to people in the vicinity; (7) according to plaintiff’s expert, there existed an industry-wide practice to shield or guard the drum containing the chain in order to protect those in the vicinity from flying parts; (8) plaintiff’s expert gave an opinion that the unshielded chain on the first drum was in violation of safety codes and the industry-wide practice.
A manufacturer has the duty to reasonably anticipate harm that may arise from a foreseeable emergency. This is particularly true where the evidence demonstrates the manufacturer’s awareness of such potential emergencies. Judge Gibson, speaking for this court in Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F. 2d 495, 501 (8 Cir. 1968), said:
“Generally, as noted in 76 A.L.R.2d 93, Anno: Products Liability — Duty As To Design, the manufacturer has a duty to use reasonable care under the circumstances in the design of a product but is not an insurer that his product is incapable of producing injury, and this duty of design is met when the article is safe for its intended use and when it will fairly meet any ‘emergency of use’ which is foreseeable. [Citation omitted] This doctrine has even been extended to cover an unintended use where the injury resulting from that unintended use was foreseeable or should have been anticipated.” (My emphasis.)
See also Ford Motor Co. v. Zahn, 265 F. 2d 729, 733 (8 Cir. 1959).
We are all agreed that failure of a plaintiff to fully appreciate the risk of attempting to loosen the chain and cable was clearly an issue of fact for the jury under Nebraska comparative negligence law. Cf. Western Contracting Corp. v. Odle, 331 F.2d 38 (8 Cir. 1964); Surface v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 169 F.2d 937 (8 Cir. 1948); Hickman v. Parks Construction Co., 162 Neb. 461, 76 N.W. 2d 403 (1956); Rumsey v. Schollman Bros. Co., 156 Neb. 251, 55 N.W.2d 668 (1952).
We are also agreed that the plaintiff produced sufficient evidence of negligence, to-wit, the failure to properly guard a hazardous area. This was disputed, but the jury resolved the conflicting facts in favor of the plaintiff. In interpreting Nebraska law, Judge Van Oosterhout wrote for this court in Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. Beninger, 373 F. 2d 854, 858 (8 Cir. 1967):
“An accident may be proximately caused by separate and distinct acts of negligence of different parties which concur in producing the accident. Where negligence is established, the issue of probable cause is usually one of fact for the jury.” (My emphasis.)
I submit that the evidence here was sufficient to take the issue of proximate cause to the jury. A jury is much better equipped to offer a composite expertise to resolve issues which bear on what is a foreseeable harm and on what is a natural and probable consequence of an act or omission. Jurors bring with them community standards and understandings to resolve issues of fact in areas where judges should hesitate to pronounce doctrine. Mr. Justice Hunt observed years ago:
“It is assumed that twelve men know more of the common affairs of life than does one man, that they can draw wiser and safer conclusions from admitted facts thus occurring than can a single judge.” Railroad Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657, 664, 21 L.Ed. 745 (1873).
A judge’s role should be confined to viewing the record to ascertain whether there exists sufficient evidence to sustain a verdict. Simply because we might *167personally disagree as to what inferences may be taken from the evidence, we are not justified in setting aside a jury verdict which finds to the contrary. In Tennant v. Peoria & P. U. Ry. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 35, 64 S.Ct. 409, 412, 88 L.Ed. 520 (1944), the Supreme Court admonished :
“Courts are not free to reweigh the evidence and set aside the jury verdict merely because the jury could have drawn different inferences or conclusions or because judges feel that other results are more reasonable.”
I adhere to that principle. I would affirm the verdict of the jury below.
. Wax v. Co-operative Refinery Ass’n, 154 Neb. 42, 46 N.W.2d 769 (1951).
. Jarosh v. Van Meter, 171 Neb. 61, 105 N.W.2d 531 (1960).
. Shupe v. Antelope County, 157 Neb. 374, 59 N.W.2d 710 (1953).
. Lock v. Packard Flying Service, Inc., 185 Neb. 71, 173 N.W.2d 516 (1970).
. “Q. This rope guard that we mentioned which, of course, is not shown in that picture there, is that a removable rope guard?
“A. Yes, sir.
5|C
“Q. These maintenance men sometimes remove it when they remove the cable?
“A. Yes, they do. When they replace the cable. You will find that they have the socket down here so they can get in their and shove it in. The flange here is about this wide.
“Q. You are indicating now about four or five inches?
“A. About four or five inches, yes.
“Q. On that particular chain?
“A. On this one here. Then your flanges on your guard is about the same distance. It kind of interferes with your fingers in trying to put this bolt in there, so they normally remove it. It is easier for them to work on it.
“Q. Do they sometimes forget to put it back?
“A. I am afraid most of the time they throw it away.
“Q. Is there something else that you wanted to add?
“A. If the machine is properly operated, there is no need for that guard.
* * * * *
“Q. The purpose of the guard is what?
“A. The purpose of the guard is that if you drop a load, the load stops—
* * si; * *
“A. You have a load on that hoist line and you drop it, the operator doesn’t catch it immediately on the brake to keep that line tight, like on a fishing reel, so the cable will drop down to the floor, and all that guard does is keep that cable from going sideways.”
* * * * %
“Q. I think you have stated that when you were standing down there by Exhibit 2, that if this machine was operated properly, you don’t need that guard. What guard were you talking about?
“A. We were talking about that little half moon guard.
“Q. The rope guard?
“A. Yes, on the bottom that is connected to the floor. I would say you don’t need it. It should be there, and we put it there, hut many people operate it without it." (My emphasis.)