(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. In the Sixth Circuit, as well as in other circuits, it seems established that the denial of a motion for continuance is within the discretion of the trial court, which will not be disturbed on appeal without a specific showing of prejudice. United States v. Moore, 419 F.2d 810 (6th Cir. 1969); United States v. Sisk, 411 F.2d 1192 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1018, 90 S.Ct. 584, 24 L.Ed.2d 509; United States v. Decker, 304 F.2d 702 (6th Cir. 1962); cf. United States v. Ploeger, 428 F.2d 1204 (6th Cir. 1970); accord Baker v. United States, 393 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 836, 89 S.Ct. 110, 21 L.Ed.2d 106; Warden v. United States, 391 F.2d 747 (10th Cir. 1968); McKissick v. United States, 379 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1967); Sherman v. United States, 241 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 911, 77 S.Ct. 1299, 1 L.Ed.2d 1429; United States v. Vrilium Products Company, 185 F.2d 3 (7th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 947, 71 S.Ct. 531, 95 L.Ed. 683; Adams v. United States, 128 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 632, 63 S.Ct. 61, 87 L.Ed. 510; Spevak v. United States, 158 F.2d 594, 597 (4th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 821, 67 S.Ct. 771, 91 L.Ed. 1272.
I read the majority opinion as a distinct departure from these cited precedents. A short period of time to prepare for trial is not inherently prejudicial and a denial of constitutional due process. There should be a showing that the granting of a motion for continuance would have made relevant witnesses available or have added something to ap*179pellant’s defense. United States v. Moore, supra; United States v. Sisk, supra; United States v. Decker, supra. No such showing has been made in this case. And, although in passing on a motion for continuance, the trial judge must look particularly to the reasons presented to him at the time the motion is made, Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589, 84 S.Ct. 841, 11 L.Ed.2d 921 (1964), the evidence and the record in this case do not disclose any specific prejudice sustained by appellants from the denial of their motions and are devoid of any showing or even claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
I would not abandon the present standard requiring a showing of specific prejudice before charging a trial judge with an abuse of discretion in denying a motion for continuance and substitute an inflexible rule of law that “prejudice is inherent” if the appellate court decides, without more, that a certain period of time was not allowed for trial preparation.
I would affirm the judgments of conviction.