(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I find myself in disagreement not only with the decision reached by the majority, but also with the reasoning behind that decision.
As I read the majority opinion, it does not appear to question the board’s interpretation of the counts as requiring that the load effect which the resilient means imposes on the clutch be attained by means which do not involve the side gears. Rather, it seems to base its reversal solely on disagreement with the board’s view that the McAninch application does not disclose a structure which operates in conformity with that requirement. To me, this is a question of fact, purely and simply. This court has said on a number of occasions that findings of fact made by the board in interpreting a disclosure are not to be set aside lightly or in the absence of cogent evidence of mistake. See Rodli v. Phillips, 154 F.2d 139, 33 CCPA 865 (1946); Harris v. Clifford, 363 F.2d 922, 53 CCPA 1463 (1966). Compare In re Denny, 397 F.2d 1020, 55 CCPA 1315 (1968). In this case, it seems to me, the majority has overturned the board’s finding as to the operation of the Mc-Aninch structure without even pointing out any substantial evidence of error in that finding. I believe there is no such evidence in the record and, accordingly, I would affirm the board’s decision.
Finding of fact No. 8, made by the board in Interference No. 95,056 and quoted in the majority opinion, explains clearly why tjie board held McAninch to disclose that, in his assembled structure, it is the side gear 32 rather than the slip ring 63 that is engaged by the block 49 for cooperation with the spring 57 to load the clutch. The majority appears to find the McAninch drawing and an excerpt from the specification, also set out in the opinion, to demonstrate that the snap ring 63 and not the side gear 32 engages the block 49 to provide the loading. In my opinion, the McAninch drawing by itself provides no significant indication either way on this issue. As to the aforementioned excerpt from the specification, it is my view that that statement actually supports the view of the board, rather than indicate error in that view (the board did, in fact, rely on such statement as well as others in the application).
Appellants’ contention, that the O’Brien application in Interference No. 95,268 is so similar to the McAninch application that if the former supports the counts the latter also does, was rejected by the board, which found the O’Brien structure to operate in a different manner and provide preloading independently of the side gear. I do not think that finding has been shown to be erroneous. Moreover, the asserted similarity is hardly pertinent to Interference No. 95,056, which involves appellee’s reissue patent on a structure decidedly different from that of either application.