(dissenting).
The District Judge, after trying the disputed issues of fact in this case, found that appellant insurance company had proposed the figure of $570,000 as *283the full replacement value of the property to be insured:
“This Court finds as a fact that at that time Mr. Meeker, representing and an agent of the Insurance Company of North America, and the church agreed that in fact the ‘100 percent’ valuation of those two buildings at that time was $570,000. The defendant ‘proposed that’ (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 10) and proposed that value as the full one for inclusion in a 90 percent co-policy.”
He also found as to the actual value at the time of loss:
“Now, the policy contains an arbitration clause and this matter went to arbitration for the fixation of two figures ; A, the value of the church, replacement value, total replacement value of the church at the time of the loss in June of 1965 or nine days after the renewal. The arbitrators found that to be $855,000. The replacement cost under the loss payment clause on page 4 of the policy was determined by the arbitrators to be $574,935.76, that being the replacement cost of the partial loss which actually took place.”
He then summarized the legal problem posed by the case as follows:
“So that Mr. Meeker for purposes of this policy was the Insurance Company of North America, and it was Mr. Meeker, we find as a fact, who suggested the insurable value which was acquiesced in and as a matter of contract was agreed on by the parties to this case in June of ’64 and carried over in the renewal.
“So the problem boils down to: May an insurance [20] company that agrees to the valuation on page 1 contest that valuation under a coinsurance clause on page 4 ?”
The District Judge then held that under the facts outlined above appellant insurance company was estopped from reliance upon the 90% coinsurance clause as a limitation on recovery under the policy.
On this record it is undisputed that the $570,000 valuation in the policy resulted from appellant insurance company’s appraisal and that Meeker (who was found by the District Judge to be agent of the insurance company) represented that figure as the 100% value to the plaintiff church and told the church that it could rely on that value and that the plaintiff church did so rely in signing the contract.
As the majority opinion holds, estop-pel is a doctrine which generally requires a fraudulent representation, or intentional misrepresentation with knowledge, plus reliance by the opposite party to its damage. New York Central R.R. v. General Motors Corp., 182 F.Supp. 273, 288 (N.D.Ohio 1960); 20 Ohio Jur.2d Estoppel and Waiver § 35 (1956).
What is lacking in this case, of course, is the element of willful or fraudulent misrepresentation.
The law of Ohio also recognizes a form of estoppel called “estoppel in pais” under which statements made in good faith may furnish grounds for estoppel.
In the leading case on this subject the Supreme Court of Ohio held:
“Admissions in pais, though made in good faith, may yet be made under such circumstances as to operate by way of estoppel, and preclude the party from afterward gainsaying them.” Beardsley v. Foot, 14 Ohio St. 414 (1863).
See also Union Ins. Co. of Dayton v. McGookey, 33 Ohio St. 555 (1878).
While Beardsley is an old case, it has recently been cited with approval by the Ohio Supreme Court. Mutual Finance Co. v. Politzer, 21 Ohio St.2d 177, 256 N.E.2d 606 (1970).
Where, as here, the access to information is substantially greater on the part of one party and that party both creates the mistake and urges the opposite party to rely thereon to its ultimate damage, I feel that Ohio law permits a court in equity to hold that the party basically responsible is estopped *284from taking advantage of its own mistake.
In an opinion holding an insurance company was estopped from relying upon a written condition of the policy, the Ohio Supreme Court said:
“The tendency of many courts is to apply the principles of waiver and es-toppel in a liberal manner to insurance contracts to enforce good faith and to prevent injustice and fraud where the insured has been misled by the acts of the insurer or its agents.” Pannunzio v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 168 Ohio St. 95, 106, 151 N.E.2d 545, 552 (1958).
I would affirm the judgment of the District Court.