United States v. William Hill

FAIRCHILD, Circuit Judge

(dissenting).

Cases like the present one,1 where a search invades the privacy of one who is a probationer or parolee, but is not known to the officers to be one, raise questions: (1) Whether the exclusionary rule applies in revocation proceedings if the search was unreasonable, (2) Whether the reasonableness of the search is to be tested by the usual standards, *820and (3) Was the search reasonable under appropriate standards.

I am of the opinion (1) That the exclusionary rule applies, (2) That the reasonableness of the search is to be tested by the usual standards even though such standards would be less strict as between probation officer and probationer, and (3) That this search was not reasonable.

I would prefer not to rationalize the exclusionary rule solely in terms of its expediency as a deterrent of police officers from unlawful searches. The philosophy that courts must not sanction violations of constitutional rights is as evident in the opinion which promulgated the exclusionary rule as is the more pragmatic proposition that the rule will deter the police from such activities.2 This “imperative of judicial integrity,” as it is termed in Elkins v. United States (1960), 364 U.S. 206, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669, though not as clearly and consistently enunciated in support of the exclusionary rule as the theory of its expediency as a deterrent, continues to be recognized as one of its foundations. “[A] ruling admitting evidence in a criminal trial * * * has the necessary effect of legitimizing the conduct which produced the evidence.” 3

Even limiting one’s view to the importance of the exclusionary rule as a deterrent, the fact that an independent prosecution and revocation under an old conviction are often interchangeable for a probationer 4 suggests that abrogation of the exclusionary rule for probation revocation would seriously undermine the rule’s effect as a deterrent.

It may well be that where a search is for the purpose of implementing the probation status, a broader range of search is to be accepted as reasonable. It was said in United States ex rel. Randazzo v. Follette,5

“Any search by a parole officer in good faith to determine whether a paroled prisoner is complying with the conditions of his release would in my opinion be reasonable. Such a search would become ‘unreasonable’ only if made too often or if made at an unreasonable hour or if unreasonably prolonged or for other reasons establishing arbitrary or oppressive conduct by the parole officer.”

But it is more consistent with any fundamental principle of the exclusionary rule that it be applied on the basis of what the officers knew and thought they were doing than on the basis of a fact which would have relaxed the standard, but which was unknown to them.

There are several present exceptions to the exclusionary rule, i. e., use of evidence where the unlawful seizure violated the rights of someone other than defendant,6 use to impeach a defendant’s testimony,7 use' by the court in determining *821sentence,8 and use before a grand jury.9 The broader the cumulative exceptions, the greater the probability that the fruits of an unlawful search will turn out to be useful, and the weaker the deterrence from unlawful searching engendered by the rule. The very breadth of exceptions to the exclusionary rule render it less effective than it otherwise would be, and counsels against recognition of further exceptions as long as we rely on it at all.

I do not understand that the majority holds the entry of the garage and seizure of evidence reasonable under the ordinary standards. I do not believe they were. The police observation of Hill’s conduct was a dubious basis even for his arrest. His conduct, together with finding the keys, did not make it reasonable for the police to unlock the garage door and look inside. Even if that were reasonable, the fact that the automobile parts were in "plain view” once the door was opened, did not validate the seizure. "Plain view alone is never enough to justify the warrantless seizure of evidence.” 10

I would reverse.

. See also United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick (2d Cir., 1970), 426 F.2d 1161; United States ex rel. Lombardino v. Heyd (E.D.La., 1970), 318 F.Supp. 648; and In re Martinez (1970), 1 Cal.3d 641, 83 Cal.Rptr. 382, 463 P.2d 734.

. Weeks v. United States (1914), 232 U.S. 383, 392, 34 S.Ct. 341, 344, 58 L.Ed. 652, 655: “The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain convictions by means of unlawful seizures * * * should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts, which are charged at all times with the support of the Constitution, and to which people of all conditions have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental rights.”

. Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 13, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1875, 20 L.Ed.2d 889.

. See Mr. Justice Peters’ dissent in In re Martinez (1970), 1 Cal.3d 641, 83 Cal.Rptr. 382, 463 P.2d 734, 741, 742, and R. Dawson, Sentencing, The Decision as to Type, Length, and Conditions of Sentence 153 (1969). “In practice, probation revocation is frequently used as an alternative to prosecution for serious offenses. If the probationer is clearly convictable of the new offense, there is little need both to prosecute him for it and revoke his probation. Often the choice between prosecution and revocation is a fortuitous one.”

. (S.D.N.Y., 1968), 282 F.Supp. 10, 13.

. Alderman v. United States (1968), 394 U.S. 165, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176.

. Walder v. United States (1954), 347 U.S. 62, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503, and Harris v. New York (February 24, 1971), 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1.

. United States v. Schipani (2d Cir., 1970), 435 F.2d 26.

. United States v. Blue (1966), 384 U.S. 251, 255 n. 3, 86 S.Ct. 1416, 16 L.Ed.2d 510.

. Coolidge v. New Hampshire (June 21, 1971), 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564.