(dissenting) :
1 would affirm the convictions on counts 1 and 2 which involved heroin but because of Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 90 S.Ct. 642, 24 L.Ed.2d 610 (1970), which was decided after this case was tried, I concur in the reversal of the conviction on count 3 which involved cocaine.
The majority opinion reverses the conviction on counts 1 and 2 on the fanciful premise that if appellant had been permitted to show that the 36 capsules of heroin found in his possession when he was arrested would be little more them a day’s supply for an addict,1 he might have persuaded the jury not to draw the statutory inferences.2 The underlying *1176premise for this contention is the claim that if a person when arrested has little more than a day’s supply of heroin in his possession it supports the inference that such narcotics were “only a personal supply.” There are at least two deficiencies in this line of reasoning. First, there is no logical relationship between the quantity of narcotics in one’s possession and the use or disposition intended by the possessor. Secondly, there is no evidence here that the accused used heroin or any other narcotic drug.3 This point alone is dis-positive of the entire theory advanced by the majority and compels affirmance.
The majority opinion also proceeds by seizing upon a single ruling by the trial court sustaining an objection to a single question directed to a plainclothesman of the Homicide Squad (with some prior experience in the Narcotics Squad) on cross-examination by appellant’s counsel. The question was:
“Based on your own experience, how long do you think it would take an addict to use the 36 capsules of her-oinV’ (Emphasis added).4
In my opinion the ruling by the trial court sustaining the objection to this question was clearly correct since it sought to elicit incompetent and irrelevant testimony.5 My first basis for this conclusion is that the underlying theory of the question was fallacious for the two reasons cited above. The court’s ruling sustaining the objection to the question was thus clearly proper because appellant had not laid any foundation to indicate that he used heroin. The question was also objectionable because it ignored the fact that the accused also had 16 capsules of cocaine (another narcotic drug) in his possession at the same time.
The trial court’s ruling is also valid because the question constituted improper cross examination. Prior to cross examination the witness had only testified to receiving the narcotics from the arresting officer, as to the nature of the container and as to the results of a field test he gave some of the 52 capsules *1177(Tr. 36-43). The question was thus objectionable as being improper cross examination because it exceeded the facts and circumstances brought out or connected with matters stated by the witness on direct examination. 58 Am.Jur. Witnesses § 629 p. 349 and cases cited. This is the Federal Rule, Wigmore, Evidence §§ 1885-1889 (3d ed. 1940), and the rule in this circuit, Baker v. United States, 131 U.S.App.D.C. 7, 36, 401 F.2d 958, 987 (1968), which two judges of a panel have no authority to overrule.
The majority opinion also indicates that the trial judge should have stated the reason for his ruling on the objection. However, if we use the standard stated in the majority opinion, the reason for the ruling was “obvious to all” and that should dispose of the matter.
There is also no logical relevance in the further claim advanced in the majority opinion that the quantity of narcotics in appellant’s possession is somehow probative with respect to whether he “purchased the drug rather than, for example, finding or stealing so small an amount.” That one possessed a small quantity of narcotics when arrested on a street does not logically tend to prove or disprove that he purchased, found or stole the narcotics.
The majority next contends that the relationship of the quantity of narcotics in one’s possession to an addict’s6 needs would be probative on the question as to whether he had knowledge of importation. While it is true that from large quantities of narcotics in one’s possession an inference might be permissible that he was a large dealer and hence would have knowledge of the importation, the contrary is not necessarily true that a smaller amount would be materially relevant to show that he did not have knowledge of importation. To the extent that this argument has any weight whatsoever its force is of such minuscule proportions that excluding it was nothing more than harmless error at the most.
So, because a defense lawyer asked an obviously improper question, a convicted felon, who appears from the evidence to have been caught red-handed on the public street blatantly pushing a choice of narcotics (heroin and cocaine),7 goes free for another trial wherein the interests of society will be hazarded more than usual by Government evidence that has grown stale with the passage of time. To term the process which leads to this result as a “search for truth” is a misnomer of a search for unsubstantial error. From the reversal of the conviction I dissent.
. The basic theory of this argument is deficient in that it fails to deal with the percentage of narcotic drug in the capsules.
. 26 U.S.C. § 4704(a) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to purchase, sell, dispense, or distribute *1176narcotic drugs except in the original stamped package or from the original stamped package; and the absence of appropriate taxpaid stamps from narcotic drugs shall be prima facie evidence of a violation of this subsection by the person in whose possession the same may be found.
21 U.S.C. § 174 provides :
* Hi H: Hi H:
Whenever on trial for a violation of this section [possession of a narcotic drug knowing the same to have been imported or brought into the United States contrary to law] the defendant is shown to have or to have had possession of the narcotic drug, such possession shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction unless the defendant explains the possession to the satisfaction of the jury.
. The majority opinion wholly fails to deal with this point.
. See note 1, supra.
. In my view this question was clearly objectionable because no proper foundation was laid and it exceeded the bounds of direct examination and the reasons were obvious to all. This is the conclusion that courts generally reach in such situations and there is no reason here to reach a reverse conclusion. Wigmore well states the rule applied to such situations as follows:
[W]hen a general objection is sustained by the trial court, it may be presumed that some valid ground was apparent to the judge without express statement; and as the exception is here to be taken by the proponent of the evidence, it is fair to insist that he should have asked for the specific ground of objection, if he did not perceive it; or should have made an offer to obviate it, if he did perceive it; or should have stated clearly the precise basis of his claim for admissibility, if he had rested on any specific ground. Hence, the general objection will suffice, on appeal by the proponent of the evidence, if on the face of the evidence and the rest of the case there appears to be any ground of objection iohich might have been valid (or, otherwise stated, if there is any purpose for which the evidence would conceivably be inadmissible) * * *
[Citing cases].
.1. Wigmore, Evidence § 18 (3d ed. 1940). I do not place this case in the category of a correct rejection for a wrong reason, but rather of a correct rejection for correct reasons obvious to all. Thus the dicta in McMahon v. Matthews, 48 App. D.C. 303 (1919), referred to by the majority opinion, are not controlling.
. There is no showing that Walker was an addict.
. The majority opinion completely ignores the clear implications that Walker was a pusher which is inferable from the fact that he had two narcotics in his possession on the street and was shaking out capsules from an envelope for another person when he was interrupted by the police officer and arrested.