(dissenting) .
I respectfully dissent, as in my opinion the majority takes an unduly restrictive view as to the admissibility of evidence of other offenses in a criminal proceeding. I recognize that the law on the subject, though abundant, is far from being definitive. However, in my view the preferred rule would be as follows:
1. The general rule is that evidence of other offenses is not admissible for the purpose of showing the commission of the crime charged;
2. however, the exceptions to the rule are so numerous and of such long standing that it is difficult to determine which is more extensive, the rule or the acknowledged exceptions;
3. one of these acknowledged exceptions is that evidence of other offenses is admissible to prove the accused’s intent and in so doing negate the likelihood that the crime for which he is standing trial was the result of inadvertence, accident or mistake;
*2104. the “other” offenses must be similar to, but not necessarily the same as, the crime charged;
5. though other offenses must be similar to the one for which the accused is on trial, they may be disconnected and need not be closely related in time to the crime for which the accused is standing trial;
6. the remoteness in time of the other offense does not in and of itself render such evidence inadmissible, especially when the acts were repeated up to a comparatively recent time;
7. other offenses may be proved in a variety of ways, one of which is proof of an actual conviction of the other offense; and,
8. the trial court, if it receives evidence of other offenses, should instruct the jury as to the limited purpose for which the evidence is being received.
In the instant case, Burkhart was charged with a Dyer Act violation, namely, the transportation from Kentucky to Kansas of a stolen vehicle with knowledge that the vehicle in question was stolen. By his plea of “not guilty” and by his utterances to the Kansas Highway patrolman at the time of his arrest and later to the FBI agent, Burkhart denied guilty knowledge and thereby put in issue the matter of his knowledge and intent. Thus, guilty knowledge or criminal intent was a very material element of the crime charged and the prosecution had the burden of proving such specific intent beyond a reasonable doubt.
Some four years before the date of the commission of the crime for which Burk-hart was then on trial he had been convicted of another Dyer Act violation. And eleven years before that date he had been convicted of still another Dyer Act violation. I agree with the trial court that evidence of these two prior Dyer Act convictions was admissible as having logical bearing and probative value on the issue of Burkhart’s mental intent as he motored from Kentucky to Kansas in a stolen vehicle. Such evidence tends to negate the likelihood that his transportation of the stolen vehicle from Kentucky to Kansas was with a pure heart or was somehow the result of inadvertence, accident or misunderstanding. This is an instance where a person’s past conduct does give insight into his present actions.