(dissenting):
The issues presented on this appeal do not raise questions of first impression. Indeed, the law in this area has long been the subject of intense judicial seru-*1320tiny and, insofar as this case is concerned, the relevant legal doctrines are now well settled. The majority, however, demonstrating a disheartening callousness to the legitimate interests of appellant children, rejects the teachings of experience and strains to revive outworn and repeatedly rejected notions of immunity to justify its result. I cannot and do not concur.
I
The first question presented for review is whether the District Court has jurisdiction of this action as it relates to the congressional appellees.1 The majority asserts that publication of the report is absolutely immune to judicial scrutiny under the speech and debate clause of the Constitution.2 Without reaching the more difficult question whether this clause protects members of Congress under these circumstances, see Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 506, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969); Stamler v. Willis, 7 Cir., 415 F.2d 1365, 1368 (1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 929, 90 S.Ct. 2231, 26 L.Ed.2d 796 (1970), I would hold that the seven congressional appellees who are not members of Congress 3 are not so protected.
The doctrine that the speech and debate clause protects only members of Congress and does not extend to their agents and employees was first enunciated by the Supreme Court in Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. (8 Otto) 168, 26 L.Ed. 377 (1880). In Kilbourn the plaintiff was arrested and imprisoned pursuant to a House resolution for refusing to testify at a committee hearing. The case arose in the context of an action for false imprisonment brought by Kilbourn against members of the committee and the sergeant-at-arms who executed the contempt warrant. The Court declared the resolution unconstitutional and, although dismissing the charges as to the congressmen, held that the sergeant-at-arms was not protected by the speech and debate clause and, further, that he was subject to liability for false imprisonment even though he had acted under orders from the House.
Any doubts as to the restricted scope of the speech and debate clause that may have remained after Kilbourn were surely erased by the Supreme Court’s more recent decisions in Dombrowski v. East-land, 387 U.S. 82, 87 S.Ct. 1425, 18 L. Ed.2d 577 (1967), and Powell v. McCor-mack, supra. In Dombrowski the Court held that the speech and debate clause did not cloak the chief counsel to the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee’ with absolute immunity in an action alleging violations of the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights.
Building upon Kilbourn and Dom-browski, the Court in Powell held that an action seeking to compel seating of a member of the House, restoration of seniority privileges, and award of back pay was properly maintainable against the employees of the House. In reaching this result, the Court noted that the purpose of legislative immunity “is not to forestall judicial review of legislative action but to insure that legislators are not distracted from or hindered in the performance of their legislative tasks by being called into court to defend their actions.” 395 U.S. at 505, 89 S.Ct. at 1955. Thus it is not enough simply to *1321argue, as does the majority, that the scope of the immunity is in some way dependent upon the validity of the underlying authorization of the employees’ conduct. In practical terms, this is a distinction without a difference, for it is now unmistakably clear that “although an action against a Congressman may be barred by the Speech or Debate Clause, legislative employees who participated in the unconstitutional activity are responsible for their acts.” 395 U.S. at 504, 89 S.Ct. at 1955. See Stamler v. Willis, supra, 415 F.2d at 1368; Hentoff v. Ichord, D.D.C., 318 F.Supp. 1175, 1180 (1970). It is therefore apparent, contrary to the majority’s conclusion, that the congressional appellees who are not members of Congress cannot assert a defense of privilege under the speech and debate clause as a bar to the instant suit.
Appellees further contend, however, that this suit is foreclosed by the doctrine of separation of powers. Our system of government is distinguished by the care that has been exercised in committing the legislative, executive and judicial functions to separate departments, and it has long been recognized that each department must avoid the temptation to encroach upon the powers and duties of the coordinate branches of government. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 59 S.Ct. 972, 83 L.Ed. 1385 (1939); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 38 S.Ct. 309, 62 L.Ed. 726 (1918); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 409, 422, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819). It is equally well established, however, that “such deference cannot yield to an unnecessary and unreasonable dissipation of precious constitutional freedoms,” Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 204, 77 S.Ct. 1173, 1188, 1 L.Ed.2d 1273 (1957), and the mere possibility of conflict cannot justify avoidance of the judiciary’s constitutional duty to protect and ensure the rights of citizens. Powell v. McCormack, supra, 395 U.S. at 548-549, 89 S.Ct. 1944; Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 112, 79 S.Ct. 1081, 3 L.Ed.2d 1115 (1959). Indeed, the federal judiciary has consistently held that the separation of powers doctrine does not, of its own force, bar judicial review of congressional investigations. See, e. g., Watkins v. United States, supra; United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 73 S.Ct. 543, 97 L. Ed. 770 (1953); Kilbourn v. Thompson, supra; Stamler v. Willis, supra; Hentoff v. Ichord, supra, 318 F.Supp. at 1181.4
The power of the judiciary to inquire into the affairs of the legislature was expressly set forth in Kilbourn v. Thompson, supra, when the Court quoted with approval from Burnham v. Mor-rissey, 14 Gray 226 (Mass.1859):
“ ‘The house of representatives is not the final judge of its own power and privileges in cases in which the rights and liberties of the subject are concerned, but the legality of its action may be examined and determined by this court. * * * Especially is it competent and proper for this court to consider whether its proceedings are in conformity with the Constitution and laws, because, living under a written Constitution, no branch or department of the government is supreme; and it is the province and duty of the judicial department to determine in cases regularly brought before them, whether the powers of any branch of the government, and even those of the legislature in the enactment of laws, have been exercised in conformity to the Constitution * * * * * * >»
*1322103 U.S. at 199. This power of review is not, of course, absolute. Thus in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962), the Supreme Court carefully delineated the permissible perimeters of the political question doctrine, a close cousin to the separation of powers concept. The Court declared that the doctrine would bar judicial scrutiny only where at least one of the following factors was present:
“a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non judicial discretion ; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of respect due coordinate branches of government ; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.”
369 U.S. at 217, 82 S.Ct. at 710.
That the present controversy does not fall within the Baker v. Carr formulation is made clear in Powell v. Mc-Cormack, supra, and Davis v. Ichord, 143 U.S.App.D.C. 183, 442 F.2d 1207 (1970). In Powell the Supreme Court applied the principles enunciated in Baker in a federal context, holding that the separation of powers doctrine did not bar judicial consideration of a challenge to the attempted exclusion of a congressman by the House of Representatives. After ruling that the right to exclude a duly elected member was not entrusted by the Constitution solely to Congress, 395 U.S. at 518-548, 89 S.Ct. 1944, the Court held that since a judicial determination of the plaintiffs’ rights required “no more than an interpretation of the Constitution,” the controversy involved neither an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non judicial discretion, nor a lack of respect due a coordinate branch of government. 395 U.S. at 548-549, 89 S.Ct. at 1978. The Court concluded:
“ * * 'l:' Our system of government requires that federal courts on occasion interpret the Constitution in a manner at variance with the construction given the document by another branch. The alleged conflict that such an adjudication may cause cannot justify the courts’ avoiding their constitutional responsibility. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 462 [85 S.Ct. 1707, 1722, 14 L. Ed.2d 484] (1965); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 613-614 [72 S.Ct. 863, 898, 96 L. Ed. 1153] (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ; Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 [47 S.Ct. 21, 84, 71 L.Ed. 160] (1926) (Brandéis, J., dissenting).”
395 U.S. at 549, 89 S.Ct. at 1978. (Footnote omitted.)
Similarly, in Davis v. Ichord, supra, this court held that invocation of the separation of powers talisman would not foreclose judicial consideration of allegations that the House Internal Security Committee maintained dossiers which were used to inhibit plaintiffs’ exercise of constitutional rights. Reiterating the teachings of Baker and Powell, we declared that judicial review of “an individual’s claim of a constitutional right, and, we may add, an individual’s claim of infringement of such a right, ‘falls within the traditional role accorded courts to interpret the law,’ ” and does not in any sense violate the separation of powers doctrine. 143 U.S.App.D.C. at 189, 442 F.2d at 1213 (quoting from Powell v. McCormack, supra, 395 U.S. at 548, 89 S.Ct. 1944).
As in Powell and Davis, the claim asserted here involves a congressional infringement of appellants’ rights under the Constitution. Thus judicial determination of this claim requires “no more than an interpretation of the Constitution,” and since none of the Baker v. *1323Carr requirements are satisfied,5 this court is not barred by the separation of powers doctrine. It is argued, however, that in spite of Powell and Davis we should refrain from deciding the instant case in order to avoid “needless friction” with a coordinate branch of government. In support of this contention, appellees cite this court’s decisions in Ansara v. Eastland, 143 U.S.App.D.C. 29, 442 F.2d 751 (1971), and Cole v. McClellan, 142 U.S.App.D.C. 24, 439 F.2d 534 (1970). These cases, however, are inapposite.
In Cole this court declined to enjoin the chairman, members and staff of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations from using information obtained from various colleges and universities through compulsory process. Although appellants in that case claimed that use of such information would violate their rights under the First Amendment, we held that judicial restraint was proper because
“the salient factors [of the case], taken in conjunction with each other, reveal (a) information delivered to the committee without objection or protest, (b) only the vaguest allegations of anticipated harm * * *, and (c) a lack of any showing of current activity by the committee staffs which constitute, as to the class of plaintiffs, an actual threat along such lines, or which otherwise give immediacy to the claim that constitutional freedoms are being infringed or jeopardized.”
142 U.S.App.D.C. at 26, 439 F.2d at 536. (Footnote omitted.) In the case presently before the court, however, appellants had no notice of the investigation or pending report and therefore had no opportunity to object or protest. Moreover, further publication of the confidential and degrading information involved in this case is likely to have a serious detrimental effect, upon the psychological makeup and education of the named children, and there is no reason to believe the Committee staff will not reprint and further distribute the report if given the opportunity to do so.6
Similarly, in Ansara v. Eastland, supra, the plaintiffs sought relief that would “precede and seek to relate to the conduct of a future legislative hearing.” 143 U.S.App.D.C. at 31, 442 F.2d at 753. (Emphasis added.) The court denied relief because
“[t]he ongoing legislative process provides opportunity for presentation of plaintiffs’ constitutional contentions. Moreover these contentions, which cannot be decided purely by reference to constitutional text, may be affected by the response within the legislative branch. We * * * note that the plaintiffs will have an opportunity to present their constitutional objections to the Subcommittee. * * * ”
Ibid. The court then specifically distinguished the present situation, where appellants were not subpoenaed and had no opportunity to claim their constitutional protections at the time of the Committee’s hearing.7 Ibid. The legislative process with regard to this report is ' now complete. Appellants have no other forum in which to assert their constitutional rights; if the judiciary fails to act, these rights will be lost forever.
Finally, appellees and, somewhat surprisingly, the majority urge that Methodist Federation for Social Action v. Eastland, D.D.C., 141 F.Supp. 729 (1956), establishes the separation of powers doctrine as an immutable bar to *1324judicial consideration of the instant case. In Methodist Federation a three-judge court dismissed a complaint seeking to enjoin publication and distribution of a government document where both the Public Printer and the Superintendent of Documents were named as defendants. In reaching this result the court apparently relied, in part, upon both the speech and debate clause and the doctrine of separation of powers, yet it failed even to discuss the implications of Kilboum. Moreover, this decision has never been followed, and in view of the Supreme Court’s subsequent decisions in Baker, Powell and Dombrowski and this court’s decisions in Davis, An-sara and Cole, it obviously is not the law today. See also Hentoff v. Ichord, supra, 318 F.Supp. at 1180.
II
Thus, although the power of Congress to conduct investigations and to publish its conclusions is broad, it is not unlimited. As the Supreme Court noted in Watkins v. United States, supra:
“ * * * we cannot simply assume * * * that every congressional investigation is justified by a public need that overbalances any private rights affected. To do so would be to abdicate the responsibility placed by the Constitution upon the judiciary to insure that the Congress does not unjustifiably encroach upon an individual’s right to privacy * *
354 U.S. at 198-199, 77 S.Ct. at 1185. Where congressional investigations and reports, no matter how laudable their objectives, encroach upon constitutionally protected liberties, an overriding interest of the state must affirmatively be shown. See Barenblatt v. United States, supra, 360 U.S. at 126-127, 79 S.Ct. 1081.
A brief examination of the nature and scope of relief sought by appellants may facilitate the search for the precise governmental interests at stake in the present controversy. The material included in the Committee report is not, as the majority contends, merely “somewhat derogatory.” One disciplinary letter, for example, alleges that a specifically named child was “involved in the loss of fifty cents” and “invited a male substitute to have sexual relations with her gapping her legs open for enticement.”8 Similar letters accused named children of disrespect, profanity, vandalism, assault and theft.9 Of the 29 test papers published in the report, 21 bore failing grades.10 Yet appellants seek only to prohibit use of the children’s names without their consent. They do not contest the propriety of the investigation generally, nor do they seek to enjoin the conclusions or text of the report. Indeed, they do not even challenge the right of Congress to examine and summarize the confidential material involved. They wish only to retain their anonymity.11 The question presented,. *1325then, is simply whether the specific identification of particular schoolchildren in a derogatory context furthers any legitimate governmental interest. Ap-pellees, however, fail even to suggest any such interest. Indeed, the invasion of the children’s privacy and use of their names without their consent seems totally unrelated to the concededly proper legislative purpose of investigating the condition of the District of Columbia school system. The majority, however, contends that publication of the names may in some obscure way enhance the credibility of the report. But even if such an interest is valid, the balance here must be struck in favor of appellants.
The right of individuals to live their lives and maintain their personalities and affairs free from undue exposure to the outside world is a central premise of our constitutional and legal framework. See Beaney, The Right to Privacy and American Law, 31 Law & Contemp. Prob. 253, 260 (1966). In the time since Warren and Brandéis first enunciated the underpinnings of the right to privacy,12 the right has matured in status and importance13 until, in 1965, it was fully recognized as a core protection of the Bill of Rights. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965). The scope of the protection is broad, and it safeguards the general “right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one’s privacy.” Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564, 89 S.Ct. 1243, 1247, 22 L. Ed.2d 542 (1969). Thus a primary thrust of the right is the freedom of the individual to control dissemination of information concerning his affairs.14
This protection is, of course, available to appellant schoolchildren, for the right to privacy, like all constitutional rights, is not “shed * * * at the schoolhouse gate.” Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 506, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969); see, e.g., Breen v. Kahl, 7 Cir., 419 F.2d 1034, 1036 (1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937, 90 S.Ct. 1836, 26 L.Ed.2d 268 (1970); Sims v. Colfax Community School District, S.D.Iowa, 307 F.Supp. 485, 487 (1970). Indeed, the inherent nature of the teacher-student relationship demands that any infringements on the student’s privacy be carefully scrutinized. The student attends school under the command of the law and, as a result, suffers a considerable diminution of his freedom. See Buss, Procedural Due Process for School Discipline: Probing the Constitutional Outline, 119 U.Pa.L.Rev. 545, 548 (1971). The educational system compels the student to reveal his abilities and personality to school authorities. As a *1326result, the school system is, in many respects, a depository of personal and often potentially embarrassing information. As a collector of such information, particularly when obtained under the aura of compulsion, the school has a responsibility to the community to act in a careful and discriminating manner, always being cognizant of the harm that can result if the information is dispersed with reckless disregard for the student’s interests.15 Thus, although the initial compelled exposure of the student’s private affairs, which in itself constitutes a severe intrusion upon his right to privacy, is clearly justified by the state’s overriding interest in educating its citizens, any further encroachments on the student’s privacy — through public dissemination of any matter revealed — must be strictly limited and must clearly be necessary to further important governmental interests.
The educational process is not, of course, grounded solely upon the compulsive nature of school attendance. It is dependent also upon its ability to foster a relationship of trust and confidence between teacher and pupil. At the heart of such a relationship is the guarantee that whatever is revealed to the teacher is disclosed in privacy. The student must have a reasonable expectation that his confidence will be preserved. See Jourard, Some Psychological Aspects of Privacy, 31 Law & Contemp. Prob. 307, 311-312 (1966); see also Fried, Privacy, 77 Yale L.J. 475 (1968). Release of confidential information by school authorities, however, can serve only to destroy the fabric of this trust. And when this breach of trust is compounded, as is contemplated here, by a public disclosure of the failures and inadequacies of specifically named children, the inevitable consequence is the creation of an atmosphere of distrust, anxiety and fear that is itself destructive of the learning process. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487, 47 S.Ct. 163, 12 L.Ed. 387 (1960); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1 L. Ed.2d 1311 (1957). As one learned educator has noted:
“* * * [M]ost children in school are scared most of the time, many of them very scared. Like good soldiers, they control their fears, live with them, and adjust themselves to them. But the trouble is, and here is a vital difference between school and war, that the adjustments children make to their fears are almost wholly bad, destructive of their intelligence and capacity. The scared fighter may be the best fighter, but the scared learner is always a poor learner.”
J. Holt, How Children Fail 75 (Dell ed. 1970).
The educational process has been described as “a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.” Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 493, 74 S.Ct. 686, 691, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954). If our schools are to achieve these goals, it is essential that they *1327present an image of a fair society to these students. We must not compound the numerous negative faces our society already reveals to our youngest citizens. Yet treatment that degrades the student, invades his privacy, and frustrates his ability to gain self-respect must inevitably lead to disillusionment with the society that permits such unfairness and destroys the very foundation upon which he can prepare for a socially productive life.
Publication of this report without excision of the children’s names would have consequences far beyond the classroom. These children are not public figures. They have in no way thrust themselves into the public spotlight and have done nothing voluntarily to attract public attention. Yet, once branded, the mark of Cain would follow them for the rest of their lives, seriously impairing their employment opportunities and future careers. A person should be allowed to live without the constant fear that previous indiscretions, particularly childhood indiscretions, will rise from the past to mark him anew. See Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal.App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931).
In light of these considerations,16 and in the absence of any overriding governmental interests, I would reverse the District Court’s dismissal of this case for lack of jurisdiction and remand for a determination whether an injunction is necessary to prevent any further publication or distribution of this report unless and until the names and addresses of the appellant children are excised.
III
In addition to appellant’s demand for an injunction against the congressional appellees, this case presents many other important and complex claims, all of which were summarily dismissed by the District Court. In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court must assume all material allegations of the complaint to be true,17 and the complaint should be dismissed only if it “appears that appellant [s] could ‘prove no set of facts in support of [their] claim which would entitle [them] to relief.’ ”18 Given these guidelines, I would hold that the District Court’s characterization of appellants’ claims as “frivolous” was improper and, therefore, that it erred in dismissing these claims without a hearing. Because of this summary dismissal, however, the record as it presently stands is so incomplete as to make it virtually impossible, as far as factual questions are concerned, for this court intelligently to pass on the merits of appellants’ claims. Although the majority did not permit this obstacle to stand in its way, I would remand this case to the District Court for a full hearing on the merits.
Appellants claim, for instance, that release of confidential information without deletion of the students’ names renders the teacher and principal of Jefferson Junior High School liable in tort for violation of appellants’ common law right of privacy.19 In defense, appellees con*1328tend that they are protected by the doctrine of official immunity, alleging that release of such information was in furtherance of a “discretionary” rather than a “ministerial” function. See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 79 S.Ct. 1335, 3 L.Ed.2d 1434 (1959); David v. Cohen, 132 U.S.App.D.C. 333, 407 F.2d 1268 (1969). Unlike the majority, I would not pass on that question, for it could not soundly be resolved on the sparse record presently before us. As we noted in Carter v. Carlson, 144 U.S.App.D.C. 388, 392, 447 F.2d 358, 362 (1971), cert. granted, 404 U.S. 1014, 92 S.Ct. 683, 30 L.Ed.2d 661 (1972):
“The distinction between discretionary and ministerial functions in this context must be drawn primarily with reference to its purpose. * * * Accordingly, in determining whether a particular government function falls within the scope of official immunity, it does not suffice to consider simply whether the officer has ‘discretion’ in the sense that he exercises judgment in choosing among alternative courses of action. The proper approach is to consider the precise function at issue, and to determine whether an officer is likely to be unduly inhibited in the performance of that function by the threat of liability for tortious conduct.”
(Footnotes omitted.) Disdaining the teaching of Carter, however, the majority here simply concludes that the conduct of these appellees was discretionary in nature. I cannot join this conclusion, for the complex factual determinations required for intelligent resolution of this issue can be made only after a full evidentiary hearing, and the majority’s attempt to decide this question in the present vacuum exemplifies the futility of appellate fact finding.20
Moreover, the majority’s disposition of this appeal fails even to consider several additional questions raised by appellants. For example, the majority simply ignores the possibility that monetary relief might lie against appellee Little, an independent consultant to the Committee who allegedly prepared the report for publication. It has never actually been decided whether Little was an “employee” of the House within the meaning of the official immunity doctrine; yet if he was not so “employed” the defense of privilege would be unavailable to him in appellants’ common law suit for invasion of privacy. In a somewhat similar vein, a question exists as to the status of ap-pellee Martin, a District of Columbia policeman who, while on loan to the United States Capitol Police, allegedly participated in transmittal of school records to the Committee. An inquiry should be made into the nature and propriety of this “loan,” for if Martin’s investigative activities were beyond the scope of his duties as an employee of the District of Columbia, but were not sufficient to render him an employee of the House, he would be precluded from asserting official immunity as a defense to appellants’ common law action for damages.
*1329Because of the District Court’s summary dismissal of this case, we are left virtually in the dark on these and other21 vital aspects of the instant controversy. An intelligent resolution of appellants’ claims demands more information than can presently be gleaned from the record in its abbreviated state. Confronted with such a dilemma, the majority’s unfortunate response is simply to usurp the fact finding function or, worse, to ignore the issues entirely. I can neither condone nor join such a decision. This case should be remanded to the District Court for preparation of a proper record so that it may test appellants’ factual allegations and pass initially upon the legal issues involved.
I respectfully dissent.
. Congressional appellees are (1) the chairman and members of the Committee on the District of Columbia of the House of Representatives; (2) the clerk, staff director, counsel and a consultant to the Committee,; (3) the Superintendent of Public Documents and the Public Printer ; and (4) the United States.
. Art. I, § 6, cl. 1 of the Constitution reads in pertinent part: “The Senators and Representatives * * for any Speech or Debate in either House * * * shall not be questioned in any other Place.”
. These include appellees Clark, Casque and Garber, who are respectively the clerk, staff director and counsel of the Committee; appellee Martin, the Committee investigator; appellee Little, the consultant to the Committee; and ap-pellees King and Spence, the two named officials of the Government Printing Office.
. While these cases primarily concerned the limits of congressional power to acquire information, it is clear that the same principles should also be applied to issues arising out of congressional utilization of information previously obtained, for use of the information, as well as the means of its acquisition, can infringe constitutionally protected freedoms. See Hentoff v. Ichord, D.D.C., 318 F.Supp. 1175, 1181 (1970); cf. Menard v. Mitchell, 139 U.S.App.D.C. 113, 430 F.2d 486 (1970).
. See text at p. 1322 supra. See also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 548-549, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969).
. Although appellees assert that the members of the Committee have no desire to reprint or further distribute the report (brief of federal appellees at 20 n. 44), they do not suggest that the other congressional appellees will refrain from further publication and distribution.
. Indeed, the court specifically distinguished Hentoff v. Ichord, supra note 4, which was substantially similar to the present case, because “there was no occasion for further legislative determination as to the matter in controversy.” 143 U.S.App.D.C. at 31 n. 3, 442 F.2d at 753 n. 3.
. Investigation and Study of the Public School System of the District of Columbia, H.R.Rep.No.91-1681, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., t 256 (Dec. 8, 1970).
. Id. at 253-258.
. Id. at 224-252.
. In terms of the injunction sought by appellants prohibiting any further publication or distribution of the report unless appellants’ names and addresses are first deleted, I note that under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970), where the right of the public to know is often in substantial conflict with an express or implied obligation of confidentiality, the solution has been precisely what appellants suggest here — to permit release of relevant documents and papers with deletion of identifying marks which might otherwise cause an invasion of privacy or breach of a confidential relationship with the individuals concerned. See Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp. v. Renegotiation Board, 138 U.S.App. D.C. 147, 149-150, 425 F.2d 578, 580-581 (1970) ; Bristol-Myers Co. v. F. T. C., 138 U.S.App.D.C. 22, 25-26, 424 F.2d 935, 938-939 (1970). Such a resolution is further buttressed by an analogy to those First Amendment cases requiring government, when it has available a variety of effective means to attain a given end, to choose the measure that least interferes with individual liberties. See, e. g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 88 S.Ct. 419, 19 L.Ed.2d 508 (1967) ; *1325Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 81 S.Ct. 247, 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (1960) ; see also Wor-muth & Mirkin, The Doctrine of the Reasonable Alternative, 9 Utah L.Rev. 254, 267-293 (1964) ; Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 Yale L.J. 464 (1969).
. Warren & Brandéis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv.L.Rev. 193 (1890).
. The right of privacy is now recognized in virtually every state, see W. Prosser, Law of Torts 636-637 (2d ed. 1955), and in the District of Columbia. See Pearson v. Dodd, 133 U.S.App.D.C. 279, 410 F.2d 701, cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947, 89 S.Ct. 2021, 23 L.Ed.2d 465 (1969) ; Afro-American Publishing Co. v. Jaffe, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 70, 366 F.2d 649 (1966) (en banc); Bernstein v. National Broadcasting Co., D.D.C., 129 F.Supp. 817 (1955), affirmed, 98 U.S.App.D.C. 112, 232 F.2d 369, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 945, 77 S.Ct. 267, 1 L.Ed.2d 239 (1956).
. The legal concept of privacy protects the individual not only against intrusions into his private affairs, but also against public disclosure of embarrassing private facts. See Mau v. Rio Grande Oil, Inc., N.D.Cal., 28 F.Supp. 845, 846 (1939) ; Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal.App. 285, 287, 297 P. 91, 92 (1931) ; Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal.L.Rev. 383, 392-398 (1960) ; Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Pros-ser, 39 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 962, 977-984 (1964). In addition, it protects the individual where there has been publicity that has placed him in a false light. See Peay v. Curtis Publishing Co., D.D.C., 78 F.Supp. 305 (1948) ; Prosser, supra, 48 Cal.L.Rev. at 398-401.
. In numerous instances the legal system offers protection to persons compelled to reveal information to government. The federal government, for example, often prohibits public disclosure of confidential information where individuals are required to reveal such information to government agencies. See, e. g., 2 Fed.Tax Reg. § 301.6103(a) (1964); 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1970). With regard to the Census Act, which forbids public dissemination of information obtained by census takers, 13 U.S.C. §§ 8, 9, 214 (1970), the courts have upheld the constitutionality of compelled disclosure in part because the information revealed is kept strictly confidential. See United States v. Little, D.Del., 321 F.Supp. 388 (1971) ; United States v. Rickenbacker, S.D.N.Y., 197 F. Supp. 924 (1961).
In the area of school records, many states restrict both the type of records that can be obtained by nonschool personnel and the persons who can obtain them. A major qualification of such statutes is that the school records can be inspected for research purposes only if no pupil will be identified by name. See, e. g., Cal.Educ.Code § 10751 (1969).
. Appellants urge further that publication of their names in a stigmatizing manner without notice or hearing violates the requirements of due process. See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 91 S.Ct. 507, 27 L.Ed.2d 515 (1971). In addition, they contend that such publication constitutes an unconstitutional bill of attainder. See Wisconsin v. Constan-tineau, supra, 400 U.S. at 444, 91 S.Ct. 507 (Mr. Justice Black, dissenting) ; Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 18 L.Ed. 356 (1866). However, I need not reach those questions here.
. Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass’n, 387 U.S. 167, 172, 87 S.Ct. 1526, 18 L.Ed.2d 704 (1967) ; Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korp., 332 U.S. 480, 482, 68 S.Ct. 174, 92 L.Ed. 88 (1947) ; 2A J. Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 12.08 (1968).
. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 422, 89 S.Ct. 1843, 1849, 23 L.Ed.2d 404 (1969). See, e. g., Dollar v. Land, 81 U.S.App.D.C. 28, 30, 154 F.2d 307, 309 (1946).
. Invasion of privacy is soundly established as a common law tort in the District of Columbia. See Pearson v. Dodd, *1328supra note 13; Afro-American Publishing Co. v. Jaffe, supra note 13; Bernstein v. National Broadcasting Co., supra note 13.
. Similarly, the majority opinion leaves open the question whether these appellees —the teacher and principal — might be liable to appellants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Civil Bights Act of 1871 § 1, B.S. § 1979, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), for deprivation of their constitutionally protected right of privacy. It should be noted that the courts have consistently held that the District of Columbia is a “State or Territory” within the meaning of this statute. See, e. g., Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 68 S.Ct. 847, 92 L.Ed. 1187 (1948) ; Talbott v. Silver Bow County, 139 U.S. 438, 11 S.Ct. 594, 35 L.Ed. 210 (1891) ; Sewell v. Pegelow, 4 Cir., 291 F.2d 196 (1961). Liability under the common law and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not necessarily coextensive, and the scope of the official immunity doctrine seems narrow under the federal statute. See, e. g., Carter v. Carlson, 144 U.S.App.D.C. 388, 447 F.2d 358 (1971), cert. granted, 404 U.S. 1014, 92 S.Ct. 683, 30 L.Ed.2d 661 (1972); McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 7 Cir., 398 F.2d 287 (1968) ; Jobson v. Henne, 2 Cir., 355 F.2d 129 (1966).
. For example, a question exists whether the District of Columbia might be vicariously liable to appellants for disclosure of confidential school information by its employees. Such liability might be predicated upon either common law principles or 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See note 20 supra. And although this issue is not resolved simply by finding that the employees themselves may assert a defense under the official immunity doctrine, see Carter v. Carlson, supra note 20, the majority fails even to consider this claim.