(dissenting):
The majority concedes that Mrs. Murray did not exhaust her administrative ■remedies under the Civil Service Commission regulations (See 5 C.F.R. §§ 315.801-315.807 (1971)) before seeking injunctive relief in the district court. The majority opinion also recognizes the established doctrine that a court may not intervene with a decision on the merits before administrative remedies have been exhausted. See, e. g., Young *881v. Higley, 95 U.S.App.D.C. 122, 220 F. 2d 487 (1955); Green v. Baughman, 94 U.S.App.D.C. 291, 214 F.2d 878 (1954); Johnson v. Nelson, 86 U.S.App.D.C. 98, 180 F.2d 386, cert. denied, 339 U.S. 957, 70 S.Ct. 980, 94 L.Ed. 1368 (1950). The majority concludes, however, that this doctrine does not apply to a request for “injunctive relief to stay a discharge which is not yet effective at the time the relief is sought from the courts”. Such injunctive relief, says the majority, “is simply an interim form of relief to prevent irreparable damage to the parties or to the public interest while the final outcome of the administrative determination is uncertain” and “is not the interference with agency actions which the exhaustion of remedies doctrine seeks to prevent * * * ”. (Opinion, p. 875) I cannot accept this theory. In my judgment the exclusion of applications for interim judicial relief from the reach of the exhaustion of remedies rule is an unwarranted and unfortunate breach of the rule that will result in improper interference by the courts in the administration of the civil service system.
The application of the exhaustion of remedies doctrine is not limited to situations in which judicial relief on the merits is sought. See, e. g., Aircraft & Diesel Equipment Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752, 778-780, 67 S.Ct. 1493, 91 L. Ed. 1796 (1947); Osmond v. Riverdale Manor, Inc., 199 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1952); Johnson v. Postmaster General, 330 F.Supp. 1058 (D.Md.1971); K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise pt. 3, § 20.05 at 90-91 (1958). The interests served by the exhaustion doctrine are broader than those suggested by the majority, and include such other considerations as the integrity and independence of the established administrative process and the recognition of congressional intent as reflected in statutory procedures which balance public and private interests. The decision of the majority does violence to those fundamental interests upon which the exhaustion doctrine is based.
The cases cited by the majority do not justify their broad and novel holding. The issues and facts in those cases were quite different from the issues and facts presented in the case at bar, and the language quoted by the majority must be read with this in mind. Thus, ScrippsHoward Radio, Inc. v. F. C. C., 316 U.S. 4, 62 S.Ct. 875, 86 L.Ed. 1229 (1942), merely sustained the “conventional power” of this court to stay the enforcement of a final order of the FCC pending the determination of an appeal challenging its validity. F. T. C. v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 86 S.Ct. 1738, 16 L.Ed.2d 802 (1966), held only that at the instance of the Federal Trade Commission a circuit court of appeals, under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), might enjoin a merger on the ground that “an effective remedial order, once the merger was implemented, would otherwise be virtually impossible, thus rendering the enforcement of any final decree of divestiture futile” (384 U.S. at 605, 86 5. Ct. at 1743). -In other words, the Court held that injunctive relief was necessary to prevent the impairment of the effective exercise of appellate jurisdiction. Again, in West India Fruit & Steamship Co. v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 170 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1948), the Maritime Commission joined with a private party in requesting the court to enjoin rate reductions that were alleged to be unlawful. In granting the injunction the court carefully recited the extraordinary circumstances which warranted such relief. That case does not support the broad exception to the exhaustion of remedies rule expounded by the majority. See K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise pt. 3, § 20.05, at 90-91 n. 46 (1958).
The majority attempts to justify its decision by finding that unless interim relief is granted, Mrs. Murray may suffer irreparable harm from a temporary loss of wages. The flaw in this argument is that Congress by the Back Pay Act of 1966, 5 U.S.C. § 5596 (1970) (See 5 C.F.R. § 550.801), has expressly provided that administrative review by the *882Civil Service Commission shall not inflict irreparable harm upon an employee who is found to have “undergone an unjustified or unwarranted personnel action.” The Act insures that Mrs. Murray’s appeal to the Civil Service Commission can give her substantial and effective relief by way of reinstatement and reimbursement for pay lost, if she was improperly dismissed. There is therefore no need here for injunctive relief to avoid “rendering the enforcement of any final decree * * * futile”.
The opinion of the district court in Reeber v. Rossell, 91 F.Supp. 108 (S.D. N.Y.1950), upon which the majority relies, assumes that reinstatement with back pay could not have been awarded to the plaintiffs if they were successful.1 (See 91 F.Supp. at 113). In light of the Back Pay Act of 1966, which now makes such relief available, the reasoning of this 1950 decision is not persuasive.
The legislative and administrative scheme embodied in the Back Pay Act and the Commission’s regulations leads me to the conclusion that this case does not call for equitable relief prior to the exhaustion of all administrative remedies. Congress has enacted a statutory scheme to govern the dismissal and reinstatement of federal employees and has thereby struck a balance between the government’s right to hire and fire and the rights of individual employees. A court should not upset that balance by interfering before the administrative remedies provided by the statutory plan have been exhausted. Certainly a court should not substitute its judgment on the equities or the public interest for the judgment of Congress. This is particularly true here, where the injury to Mrs. Murray is no greater than that which would ordinarily flow from dismissal. My conclusion is reinforced by the statement of Senator Langer, manager of the 1948 back pay bill2 in the Senate:
MR. LANGER. Mr. President, the [conference report on the back pay bill] represents a full and complete agreement, and provides that an agency or department of the Government may remove an employee at any time, but that the employee shall then have a right of appeal. When he is removed, he is of course off the pay roll. If he wins the appeal, it is provided that he shall be paid for the time during which he was suspended. 94 Cong.Rec. 6681 (1948) (emphasis supplied).
In short, the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine is fully applicable to cases in which temporary in-junctive relief is sought, and I perceive no occasion for making an exception to its application in this case. “The very fact that Congress has [established a prescribed procedure] must be cast into the scales as against the factors which, without that fact, would or might be of sufficient weight to turn the balance in favor of allowing utilization of equity’s resources. * * * In short, the so-called general principles governing the exercise of jurisdiction in equity are not to be taken in such a case as isolated from all effect of the legislative mandate or necessarily or even readily overriding *883it.” Aircraft & Diesel Equipment Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752, 775, 67 S.Ct. 1493, 1504, 91 L.Ed. 1796 (1947). To uphold the district court’s action, in my view, is to short-circuit civil service procedures by over-extending the long arm of equity.
I respectfully dissent.
. The Reeber case involved employee claims under the Veterans’ Preference Act which arose out of demotions and dismissals pursuant to a reduction in force in the Veterans’ Administration. On these facts, Judge Kaufman’s view that back pay and reinstatement would not be available to the plaintiffs was most likely correct. See 62 Stat. 354 (1948); 39 Comp.Gen. 639 (March 14, 1960).
. The 1948 Act, 62 Stat. 354, was the predecessor to the Back Pay Act of 1966, 5 U.S.C. § 5596. The 1966 Act was intended only to fill certain gaps in the protection afforded by the earlier back pay provisions. See, e. g., note 1 supra. The legislative purpose behind both the 1948 and 1966 provisions was identical. See S. Rep. No. 1062 (March 10, 1966), in 1966 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News pp. 2097-98. Senator Ranger’s remarks related to the conference report on the 1948 amendment, 62 Stat. 354 (1948), to section 6 of the Act of August 24, 1912, 5 U.S.C. § 652 (1946).