(concurring).
To the extent that Judge Lay’s opinion might be interpreted as justifying the warrantless search in this case under the “stop and frisk” doctrine of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 5 L.Ed.2d 372 (1968), I disagree. I find nothing in Terry which permits a general warrantless search of an automobile not occupied by the person who is stopped, interrogated, and frisked. Cf. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). However, I concur in the result because the sawed-off rifle came into the plain view of the police and could be seized under the “plain view” doctrine, which applies here, notwithstanding that a flashlight provided artificial illumination. United States v. Story, 463 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1972); Fields v. Swenson, 459 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1972); Walker v. Beto, 437 F.2d 1018 (5th Cir. 1971); Marshall v. United States, 422 F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1970); Carpenter v. Sigler, 419 F.2d 169 (8th Cir. 1969). See also United States v. Harflinger, 436 F.2d 928 (8th Cir. 1970).