I concur in reversal, and in the conclusion that the (Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, which prohibits government measures “respecting an establishing of religion,” is violated by the regulations of the various Service Academies requiring Sunday attendance at church or chapel services by cadets (a term used broadly to include midshipmen).
Although I reach the same conclusion as Chief Judge Bazelon on violation of the Establishment Clause, I do not follow the same path. As I understand it, his view is that the compulsory chapel-church attendance requirement is per se a violation of the Establishment Clause, and the justification brought forward by the Service officers and Defense Department officials is not material. Whether the chapel-church attendance regulation would be valid if it were indispensable for officer training and military survival is, for me, a more difficult question than this case requires be answered. It suffices, in my view, that an Academy regulation requiring chapel-church attendance is, at the very least, presumptively invalid as a measure respecting an establishment of religion, and that there is no showing that such an infringement of First Amendment liberties is unavoidably required on ground of military necessity. In view of this conclusion, I find it unnecessary to consider whether these regulations violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment independently of their violation of the Establishment Clause. I now amplify my reasoning, with references to the record.
1. The First Amendment provides: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” The First Amendment respects religion as a great and important moral force in society. The religious liberty guaranteed by the Constitution embraces two interrelated freedoms: every person is assured the free exercise of his own religion (Free Exercise Clause); and every person is assured freedom from participation by the state concerning his decisions as to exercise of his religion (Establishment Clause). The Establishment Clause assures that the exercise of religion will be truly free — will be voluntary, and not imposed.
The essential requirement of voluntarism is breached by the compulsory Academy regulations.1 Violations of these, like other, regulations are punished by reprimands, demerits, marching tours, confinement to quarters, and, for repeated violations, expulsion.
*298The Supreme Court’s opinions have explicitly and pointedly reiterated:
The “establishment of religion” clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government . . . can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. "No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance.2
It is the Government’s premise that these judicial expressions, albeit stated in plenary generality, are subject to qualification for particular instances. Accepting that hypothesis for purpose of discussion, the Supreme Court opinions establish at the very least that a government regulation requiring church attendance is prima facie invalid, a badge of religious establishment, and that it would require the strongest kind of demonstration of secularity and necessity in terms of a compelling state interest to establish its validity. Such a showing is not before us in this case.
2. To confine and define the issues of compulsory church attendance, it is important to begin with the proposition, which to me at least seems clear, that the Establishment Clause does not prohibit the Academies from providing property, facilities, and personnel in order to permit chapel and church attendance by cadets on a voluntary basis. In this voluntary context, the scope of the Establishment Clause is affected by the special position of the military and needs of its often isolated personnel, and such expenditures do not constitute an “excessive entanglement” with religion, cf. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 90 S.Ct. 1409, 25 L.Ed.2d 697 (1970). This conclusion is borne out by Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 10 L.Ed.2d 844 (1962). Justice Clark’s opinion for the Court, prohibiting a school requirement of Bible readings, reiterates the recognition in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313, 72 S.Ct. 679, 684, 96 L.Ed. 954 (1952), that we “are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being,” notes various religious manifestations in our society, and comments (374 U.S. at p. 213, 83 S.Ct. at p. 1566):
Again, there are such manifestations in our military forces, where those of our citizens who are under the restrictions of military service wish to engage in voluntary worship.” (Emphasis added.)
Seven justices expressly joined in this opinion, some adding their own. Insofar as the other opinions refer to the matter, they confirm that the special case of the military permits Government aid for religious worship — assuming the core element of voluntarism on the part of the attending military personnel. See 374 U.S. at 296, 83 S.Ct. 1560 (Brennan, J., concurring); at 306, 83 S.Ct. 1560 (Goldberg and Harlan, JJ., concurring) (recognizing the propriety of allowing cadets to receive exposure to religion); at 309, 83 S.Ct. 1560 (Stewart, J., dissenting). These references focus on military chaplaincies, but I think the same considerations justify any other aid involved in making Sunday chapel available on a voluntary basis.
3. The Government, however, contends that the purpose-effect test set forth in Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, supra, at 222, 83 S.Ct. 1560, *299establishes the validity of the compulsory chapel regulations because they have a secular purpose and primarily secular effect. The Government puts it that the purpose of compulsory chapel-church attendance is wholly secular, as a training program. “The sole purpose of chapel attendance is to develop in the cadets, through observation of the impact of religion on the lives of others during actual worship services, that sensitivity to religious emotion which is required of a military leader.” (Br. 27).
The amicus curiae submission in behalf of religious groups terms the assertion a “shocking” claim to debase and manipulate religious worship as a mere instructional tool, and “trusts that this is but a recently derived contention to seek to avoid the thrust of the First Amendment.” 3
It would be difficult on this record to sustain the conclusion that the purpose of the regulations is wholly secular. We have been asked to look at history, by the Government and the District Court (“tradition cannot be lightly discarded”). The regulations begin with an unmistakable religious premise. The 1970 affidavit of Admiral Calvert, Superintendent of the Naval Academy, sets forth:
“1. Naval Academy records show that since the year 1853 Naval Academy Regulations have included a provision for Sunday chapel attendance by midshipmen as a regular part of the Naval Academy program for training of future naval officers. The articles for the government of the United States Navy in effect at that time charged commanding officers with the responsibility, ‘to take care that divine services were performed . . . and that they cause all, or as many of the ship’s company as can be spared from duty, to attend at every performance of worship of Almighty God.’ Act of April 23, 1800. 6th Congress, 1st Session, 2 Stat. 45.
“The present Naval Academy Regulations are based upon Title 10 US Code, Section 6031, which states, in part, ‘ . . . commanders of vessels and naval activities to which chaplains are attached shall cause divine service to be performed on Sunday . . .; and it is earnestly recommended to all officers, seamen, and others in the naval service diligently to attend at every performance of the worship of Almighty God.’
“This statute is also implemented by U.S. Navy Regulations, Article 0711, which states, in part, ‘ . . . the religious tendencies of individuals shall be recognized and encouraged.’ ”
There is likewise an unmistakable religious premise in the 1821 General Regulations for the Army which contains an Academy chapel requirement as an act of legislation.4
*300A practice is not necessarily frozen in its religious roots, as appears from the decisions upholding the Sunday closing legislation as “having undergone extensive changes from the earliest forms” and not retaining a “religious character.” McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 431, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 1108 (1966).
In the case of compulsory chapel, however, we do not have the kind of longstanding transfer to secular objectives which characterized the Sunday closing legislation.
To some extent there have been changes that reflect a shift from compulsory to voluntary worship, as appears in the shift from the 1800 legislation, 2 Stat. 45, to the current version, 10 U.S.C. § 6031; and see Navy Regs. art. 0711. There is no point in pausing for the problem that the current provisions contain an outright encouragement of religious worship. The fact is that as to the compulsion, that still plainly survives, for chapel-church attendance by Academy cadets, there are references and justifications that plainly retain a religious premise, even in Academy regulations, catalogs and policy statements, issued shortly prior to the filing of this litigation in 1970.5
In this litigation, the Government stands on the Chapel Attendance Statement adopted in 1969 by the Superintendents of the four Service Academies, which focuses on the requirement in training terms.6 As for the mixture of *301religious and training premises, the Government has developed an alternative position on the appeal, that the primary purpose of the chapel attendance requirement is secular, even if that is not the sole purpose, as stated by the District Court, and that this suffices for validity, assuming the effect as well as the purpose is primarily secular.
4. Accepting, for purpose of discussion, that the Superintendents’ subjective purpose is now primarily secular, the objective appearance and effect of the regulations are critical in appraisal of validity, and it can hardly be gainsaid that they have substantial religious impact and consequences.
It is inescapable that compulsory chapel operates to encourage religious tendencies of cadets. Admiral Moorer conceded in his testimony (Tr. 267-271) that chapel attendance tends “to strengthen a man’s religious ties” in most cases, and specifically that the requirement of attendance — over and above the course of merely making a chapel available — has “the effect of encouraging his religious tendencies.” 7
The adverse effect of compulsory chapel on religious sentiment was also the subject of evidence. The General Commission on Chaplains lauds voluntary attendance, by those who come to learn as well as participate, but opposes compelled attendance as a hindrance and inhibition of religious worship by those seeking a meaningful and devout relationship with their God and fellow believers. This was the thrust of testimony at the trial by various ministers.8 The testimony of cadets and chaplains presents in the record the development of resentment, hostility and synicism toward religion engendered in cadets subject to the chapel requirement. The position of the General Commission on Chaplains is before us not only in amicus curiae memorandum (swpra, note 3), but in the testimony of its deputy secretary, Reverend A. Ray Applequist. He testified that in 1964 the Commission considered the subject of compulsory chapel attendance, because of growing opposition and concern from cadets and church leaders, and the adverse effect on recruitment of Protestant chaplains. The Commission prepared on behalf of its 35 member denominations a position paper against mandatory attendance, and petitioned the Defense Department to drop the mandatory requirement. Reverend Applequist further testified, from his experience as an Army Chaplain, concerning Academy officers who declined to attend chapel after graduation, explicitly stating they had been adversely affected by the experience, as characterized by one, of “having religion rammed down my throat for my four years at the Point.” However the Government’s witnesses, like Admiral Moorer, were not familiar with any such problem of weakening of religious ties.
The District Court acknowledged the “forceful testimony” adduced by plaintiffs as to the generally negative effects of compulsory attendance at worship services, and the testimony that manda*302tory attendance will have some religious effect on some of the cadets, but stated that “plaintiffs failed ... to demonstrate that the effect is anything but slight, insubstantial, and non-extensive.” The District Court cited that the regulations provided that a cadet may be excused from attendance for sincerely held reasons or beliefs. Such excuse, even if readily available, would not negative the existence of a religious practice forbidden by the Establishment Clause, see Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, supra, 374 U.S. at 224-225, 83 S.Ct. 1560.
Moreover, it is plain that the excuse provision does not in fact mitigate the rigidity of the compulsory requirement. It is available only to a cadet able to prove “beyond any reasonable question of doubt” that chapel attendance would be “counterproductive,” as interfering with his awareness of the effect of religion on others. (Tr. 79; Assistant Secretary of Defense Roger Kelley.) It is not sufficient that the cadet does not believe in a Supreme Being, or that he feels that mandatory chapel attendance violates his conscience or inhibits his moral development. No cadet has ever been excused at West Point, and four cadets who sought to be excused in 1969 were called “troublemakers.” At the Naval Academy, there were three excusáis in the past 40 years. The rigidity of the attendance requirement is underscored by the policy concerning transfer from one church or chapel service to another: the cadet must get the permission of both chaplains, and the permission of his parents, at least if he is under 21, and must demonstrate a sincere desire to affiliate with the stated denomination.
5. When a practice, like compelled church attendance, is religious in general significance, as well as origin, and the defense is put that a particular context marks an exception where the practice is secular, the conclusion that the particular compulsion is permissible requires an extraordinary showing. No such showing has been made as to compulsory chapel at the Academies. The badge of religious establishment has not been swept away; the religious characteristic has not been shown to be a mere “vestige,” or a mere “ceremonial” feature devoid of any meaningful religious impact.
The conclusion that compelled chapel attendance must be considered as retaining a substantial religious character does not necessarily end the case. The question arises whether the government’s use of a practice that bears a religious impress is saved from unconstitutionality because of an overriding state interest in effective training of its military officers. That is the nub of this case, as I see it. For the government to invoke this possibility of justification it must show the clearest kind of imperative, and lack of alternative, for the “government may not employ religious means to serve secular interests, however legitimate they may be, at least without the clearest demonstration that nonreligious means will not suffice.” 9 The burden on the government is at least as great as when it offers a secular justification to deny a claim under the First Amendment right of free exercise of religion, and there the Court has insisted that there must be more than a showing by the Government of a rational relationship to a state interest, there must be a showing that the governmental interest is “compelling”, and “that no alternative” measures are available that could be used “without infringing First Amendment rights.” Sherbert v. Yerner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-407, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963); cf. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487-490, 81 S.Ct. 247, 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (1960). The government action is unconstitutional unless it is “necessary” to promote a compelling governmental interest.10 That burden persists under the formulation that there must be *303no “excessive” entanglement with religion.11
The government simply has not made the required showing that its interference with religious freedoms is compelled by, and goes no further than what is compelled by, the effective training of military officers needed for survival.
a. The concept of government necessity is undercut by the fact that approximately 95%- of the Service officers do not graduate from the Academies,12 and have never been subject to this compulsory chapel requirement.
The District Court made reference to the interest in the training of “the key reservoir of officer talent” as effective combat leaders. Apart from generalities, the only specific testimony in the record on this point was Admiral Calvert’s reference (Tr. 7-8), from experience, to the occasional need for commanding officers to conduct religious exercises, on the eve of battle. The official position is not premised on this need for a surrogate-chaplain, notwithstanding its emotional tug, presumably in recognition that it proves too much, and ultimately calls for the service of someone steeped in religion. Only a limited training would be needed to ensure a relatively simple service by a secular commanding officer; secular judges have been able, with general experience and without special training, to conduct often eloquent marriage services.
If we move toward a religious-type comfort to men under stress, or to “sensitivity” awareness, as a compelling imperative, neither judicial notice nor the record establishes how this can be at the same time required for Academy graduates and not for the bulk of the officers, including those closest to the men. In certain respects, Academy graduates can set the standards for the entire officer corps. But if there is truly an imperative need for Academy officers to obtain sensitivity training through personal observation of worship, they could not pass it along to non-Academy officers who have not had such observation.
The long-standing restriction of the chapel attendance obligation to Academy graduates seems to me a powerful demonstration that it is not a necessity in the making of an officer. And constitutional doctrine will not support an infringement of religious liberty except on a showing of unquestioned and imperative necessity.
b. The church leaders and groups opposing compulsory chapel made it clear to the Defense Department that they shared its objectives of enhancing officer sensitivity to the religious wellsprings of servicemen, but believed these did not require the overriding of the voluntarism essential to the vitality of religious life, and could best be achieved by focusing on strong programs encouraging voluntary attendance at chapel and church services and by providing a regular place in the training schedule, including formal instruction, for the overall achievement of the “vital concerns” of the training objectives.13 The significance of this viewpoint is underscored by the fact that it does not reflect an attitude of implacable opposition to any and all involvement of the military in religious matters; these groups approved the military’s maintenance of chaplaincies and places of worship as necessary to provide religious services sought by military personnel on a voluntary basis.
*304The deciding officers did not accept that suggestion. Admiral Moorer testified on direct that he felt that classroom instruction in comparative religion, religious beliefs and moral values, would be “artificial.” The record discloses, however, that such courses have been given at the Air Academy, and that the Superintendent of the Naval Academy testified that in his view coursework “might be more effective in some ways.” 14 But the officers concluded, to quote Admiral Moorer’s testimony, that it was preferable to permit observation “in a real world, so to speak.” . While the District Court did not discredit the testimony and views of church leaders and groups, it stood them on a lower rung. “As moralists the Court must accord them due deference, but in matters military the Court feels constrained to look to the military experts. ... To accomplish the end involved — the complete training of future military leaders — it is the judgment of military experts that secular means would not suffice.”
The fact that the judgment of the District Court is couched in terms of a finding cannot be determinative of the outcome of a constitutional litigation requiring an appraisal of fundamental values. That is demonstrated by the decision declining to sustain a district court determination that the Sunday closing law reflected no secular interest. Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, 366 U.S. 617, 81 S.Ct. 1122, 6 L.Ed.2d 536 (1961).
The District Court failed to take into account that what is involved is necessarily a composite, and not a purely military judgment. Concerning the training of men to understand the religious sentiments of others, educators, psychologists and church men would seem to have significant standing. In essence, all that is shown on the record are conclusory opinions of military officers. These simply do not suffice for the extraordinary showing of military necessity that is required for justification to override religious freedoms.15
c. If a practice is to be upheld as secular, it must be confined, under strict safeguards, so as to insure wholehearted secularity of purpose and thrust. That is plainly not the case of the regulations brought before us.
Thus, there is no substantial justification of the necessity of what may be characterized as the “intensity” requirement of the regulation — which prohibits the cadet from attending the services of more than one religious group. This *305structure is particularly hard to comprehend in view of the claim that the purpose of the regulation is to inculate awareness of the sentiments of others, the men they will command, rather than to inculcate religious feeling in the cadets themselves.16 In the absence of necessity, this insistence on attendance at a single church is an “excessive entanglement” with an established religion. This point is underscored by the testimony of Assistant Secretary of Defense Roger Kelley, who was asked why cadets should not go to services of all three religions or more. He replied that this was a good question, and he tended to believe the greater exposure would enhance a cadet’s understanding, but this was not administratively feasible.17 There may be elements of administrative convenience in denying leave to attend different places of worship, but administrative convenience does not loom large as an imperative requiring such intensity of church requirement.18
The approach of the military officials seems permeated with a sense of tradition, which is laudable, but not a justification for disregarding First Amendment considerations, and by an attitude that the cadets have no “right” to attend the Academy, a view which fails to appreciate that they do have a right to be free of unconstitutional requirements, and to be entitled to attend the service academies, assuming they are qualified and duly selected, without being subject to unconstitutional conditions.
The Government asks us to engage in a kind of repair carpentry, to sever out any particular aspects of the regulation deemed constitutionally objectionable. The problem is deeper than that. The court must take the regulations and practice as they are, not as they might have been. As they stand, they are marked by religious character and impact not shown to be unavoidable and imperative. They are a violation of the Establishment Clause.
. There are variations in the respective Academy Regulations concerning alternative worship services available. West Point is not located in any town, and thus cadets must choose to attend either the Catholic, Protestant or Jewish services which are made available at the Academy.
At the Naval Academy, midshipmen are permitted to attend a denominational service in Annapolis in lieu of the Academy church or chapel service. Admiral Calvert testified that at Annapolis “there are twenty-one different church parties of eighteen different denominations” which go into the city each Sunday. One of them “involves two midshipmen who simply go to a man’s house for meditation and it is not a regular church service.”
As to the Air Force Academy, when the litigation started, chapel was waived only if a cadet attended a church in Colorado Springs approved by the Senior Chaplain. Plaintiffs assailed this approval requirement. As of May 4, 1971, the policy was stated thus, that cadets may fulfill attendance obligations either by attendance at the cadet chapel or by attending civilian churches of their choice, see fn. 5.
. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16, 67 S.Ct. 504, 511, 91 L.Ed.2d 711 (1946) ; Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 210, 68 S.Ct. 461, 92 L.Ed. 469 (1948) ; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 443, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961) ; Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 492-493, 81 S.Ct. 1680, 6 L.Ed.2d 982 (1961).
See also, e. g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314, 72 S.Ct. 679, 684, 96 L.Ed. 954 (1952), where the Court said: “It [the government] may not coerce anyone to attend church, to observe a religious holiday, or to take religious instruction.”
. P. 14 of brief of the General Commission on Chaplains and Armed Forces Personnel. The Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs takes a similar view. The General Commission sets forth its interest as follows, brief p. 2:
The Commission was organized in 1917 by the major Protestant denominations supplying chaplains for the Armed Forces and was incorporated under the laws of the District of Columbia in 1955. The Commission is presently comprised of 35 member denominations and five additional consultative and contributing religious bodies with an aggregate membership of 60,000,000 in the United States. The Commission and its related bodies currently recruit about 95% of the Protestant clergy who volunteer for duty with the military and in veterans hospitals. The Commission functions as a delegated, permanent conference on the chaplaincy of the Armed Forces and the Veterans Administration, and on the moral and religious welfare of armed forces personnel and hospitalized veterans.
. See Art. 78 of 2 Stat. 45. See, also, art. 100:
Any cadet, who shall behave indecently or irreverently while attending divine service, or shall use any profane oath or execration, or who shall profane the Sabbath, shall be dismissed or otherwise less severely punished, according to the nature of his offense.
. See Cadet Chapel Service, Statement of Policy, H.Q. U.S. Military Academy, 23 December 1957:
The United States Military Academy accepts responsibility for the total development of a cadet: mental, physical, moral and spiritual. In recognition of this responsibility, the fact that biblical faith is the foundation stone of honor and integrity, and the necessity for every officer to have a first hand knowledge of one of the three great religious traditions of our country, the Academy requires all cadets to attend Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish chapel on Sunday.
The West Point catalog for the 1968-69 academic year assures that “all cadets are provided a sound basic religious atmosphere. Each cadet must attend one of the weekly chapel services — Protestant, Catholic or Jewish.”
The Naval Academy catalog for 1968-69 states:
Because we are “one nation, under God,” it is most appropriate that the midshipmen who will some day become the leaders of our Navy should regularly attend Divine Worship Services.
The Air Force Cadet Regulation No. 265-1, promulgated on February 15, 1968 relates to Religious Program, and provides (I,b) :
b. Because a genuine sense of honor, devotion to duty, and absolute integrity are qualities demanded of an officer, and because these qualities are fostered in religious principles and traditions, the Academy requires cadets to attend Catholic, Jewish, or Protestant religious services — expressions of the three great faiths of western civilization. The Academy’s religious program fosters an atmosphere and provides instruction which together help develop the moral strength and integrity of the future officer. Further, the program provides the cadet opportunities for growth in the faith in which he was reared, and it leads him to understand the religious responsibilities of an officer who will command men of many faiths.
(1) Attendance at scheduled chapel services is considered an essential part of cadet training.
Appellants’ motion to supplement the Appendix presents to us the statement of the Air Force Academy superintendent, accompanying an announcement (release of May 4, 1971) that all cadets may fulfill the chapel attendance obligation by attending civilian churches of their choice: “We’re convinced of the need to expose our future Air Force leaders to religion. The power of faith and the spiritual dimensions of leadership have played no small part in the history of our country. And one is hard put to name a successful American military leader in our history who has not also at the same time been a man of deep faith.”
. J.A. 133:
CHAPEL ATTENDANCE
1. It is the consensus of the four Superintendents that the purpose of regular attendance at religious services is to instill a sense of respect for religion as a factor in the daily lives and activities of the vast majority of mankind. It is through this respect that officers of the Armed Services can come to understand problems within their future com*301mands which may be motivated by moral, spiritual, or ethical considerations. Regular attendance at religious services is an important part of the development and training of prospective officers of the Armed Services. It is, therefore, the general policy of the Superintendents of the Service Academies of the United States of America that cadets and midshipmen will attend regularly scheduled religious services. It is understood that intelligent provisions must be made for bona fide cases where attendance would be in conflict with sincerely held convictions of individual cadets or midshipmen.
. Admiral Moorer instanced “a midshipman who attends, initially, and who has been raised by a family who did not require their children to go to church, might receive from the service, some inspiration, some motivation of his belief that would create in him a desire to be more active in the church.” (Tr. 268).
. Reverend Glyn Jones, Baptist minister with over 23 years of service as a Navy chaplain ; Father Robert Drinan; Rabbi Eugene Lipman; Reverend Dean Kelly, of the National Council of Churches.
. See Justice Brennan concurring in Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, supra, 374 U.S. at 265, 83 S.Ct. at 1594.
. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed. 600 (1969).
. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 674, 90 S.Ct. 1409, 25 L.Ed.2d 697 (1970).
. The essence of this conclusion is not negatived by the fact that the 95% figure requires adjustment because Academy graduates account for a disproportionate percentage of combat officers and stay in service longer.
. E. g., the Oct. 1964 statement authorized by the Executive Committee of the General Commission on Chaplains (Plf. Exh. 36) and the United Presbyterian Report on the Military Cliajdaincy May 1965, adopted by the 177th General Assembly of the United Presbyterian Church, U.S.A., reprinted in Church, State and Chaplaincy (ed. A.R. Applequist, 1969), Plf. Exh. 38, at 44.
. See Tr. 9:
“It is my opinion, based on my experience which I have had over some 30 years of experience in the Navy, that [compulsory chapel attendance] is the best way to produce an understanding of the Judeao-Christian principles that really are at the basis of much of Western Civilization as well as American.
“Now, it is true that teaching these things at the Naval Academy in regular courses might be more effective in some ways, but I am sure the Court realizes the objections that might be raised to the teaching of religious courses at the Naval Academy as such.”
He clarified that he was not referring to constitutional questions, but to what might be “approved by higher authority as part of our curriculum” (Tr. 10).
. The record does not indicate either that the military officers gave any consideration to the concern that they might be unwittingly perpetuating the leaning of a system religious in origin, a system that might tend and have tended to attract officers of a religious turn of mind; or that, prior to adopting the imperative of a chapel attendance requirement of the duration, rigidity and intensity reflected in this record, they made a full-scale inquiry, and obtained the insight of, inter alia, educators and psychologists. The limited input preceding the “educational” reorientation of the chapel program is suggested by the testimony of Admiral Calvert of the Naval Academy indicating he was not even aware of the existence or values of the comparative religion course given at the Air Academy (Tr. 132). A broader inquiry and perspective may well have developed significant indications that such educational benefit as is available from personal observation would be enhanced by abandoning the kind of chapel requirement in effect, and by structuring a curtailed observation program in the context of a patently secular course.
. The standard that prohibits a cadet from changing from the church of his youtli unless he desires sincere affiliation relegates his knowledge of other religions to hours plucked from holiday or free time, since he is not permitted to attend regular Sunday services. The requirement that the cadet obtain the consent of both ministers and his parents (at least as to cadets under 21) contrasts with the government argument that the cadet may be subject to greater compulsion than school children because of his maturity.
. See Tr. 89-90. He focused on the constraints of time. He did not specifically indicate why freedom to attend more than one place of worship could not be permitted in lieu of, or as part of, some compulsory chapel.
. While administrative considerations may loom larger for officers and men not affiliated with the three primary religions, it is not without significance that the Academy regulations seem to be oblivious to their problem. Even creeds like Humanism or Rationalism, which profess no belief in a Supreme Being but represent a set of firmly held moral and ethical convictions, are an important part of the moral fabric of our pluralistic society. Compare United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). There is no indication in the record of an approach to the problems of officers’ training that takes into account the needs of soldiers who must face times of stress without the support of the doctrines of the three most prominent religions.