UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-1036
CRC SCRAP METAL RECYCLING, LLC,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
HARTFORD CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY; WATSON INSURANCE
AGENCY; HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Spartanburg. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (7:12-cv-00146-HMH)
Submitted: June 13, 2013 Decided: June 27, 2013
Before MOTZ, AGEE, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
John E. Rogers, II, C. Reed Teague, WARD LAW FIRM, PA,
Spartanburg, South Carolina, for Appellant. Nosizi Ralephata,
John S. Wilkerson, III, TURNER, PADGET, GRAHAM & LANEY, P.A.,
Charleston, South Carolina; Hunter S. Freeman, Susan Taylor
Wall, MCNAIR LAW FIRM, P.A., Greenville, South Carolina, for
Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
CRC Scrap Metal Recycling, LLC appeals from the district
court’s grant of summary judgment for Hartford Casualty
Insurance Company, Hartford Fire Insurance Company, and Watson
Insurance Agency (collectively the “Insurers”). We affirm.
I.
CRC first appeals the district court’s determination that
the Insurers did not have a duty to defend or indemnify CRC
against a suit brought by Action Concrete seeking payment for
property damage caused by CRC’s receipt and sale of Action’s
stolen aluminum forms. CRC specifically challenges the district
court’s determination that property damage caused by its alleged
negligent conversion of the aluminum forms is not covered under
its commercial general liability policy because negligent
conversion does not constitute an “occurrence.”
South Carolina courts have yet to address whether negligent
conversion constitutes an “occurrence.” And we need not now
decide the issue. For we may affirm on any ground supported by
the record. Sloas v. CSX Transp. Inc., 616 F.3d 380, 388 n.5
(4th Cir. 2010). The record in this case demonstrates that even
assuming negligent conversion constitutes an “occurrence” under
CRC’s policy, any property damage caused by that occurrence is
excluded under the policy’s “your product” exclusion.
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Under South Carolina law, “[c]ourts interpret insurance
policy language in accordance with its plain, ordinary, and
popular meaning, except with technical language or where the
context requires another meaning.” M & M Corp. of S.C. v. Auto–
Owners Ins. Co., 701 S.E.2d 33, 35 (S.C. 2010). Ambiguities are
construed against the insurer and in favor of coverage. Id.
The policy generally covers “‘property damage’ . . . caused
by an ‘occurrence.’” J.A. 822. It excludes from coverage,
however, all “property damage to ‘[CRC’s] product,’” that is,
property damage to “any goods or products . . . manufactured,
sold, handled, distributed, or disposed of by” CRC. JA 839.
The underlying complaint alleged property damage to Action’s
stolen aluminum forms that CRC purchased, handled, and sold.
The definition of “your product” unambiguously includes these
types of actions. See Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Turbine Serv.,
Inc., 674 F.2d 401, 420 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that “handled”
as used in the “your product” exclusion means “to deal or trade
in.”). Thus, the aluminum forms, although still owned by
Action, constitute CRC’s “product” for the purposes of the
exclusion, and any property damage caused by CRC’s negligent
conversion of those forms is excluded from coverage.
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II.
CRC also challenges the district court’s determination that
it failed to offer evidence supporting its claims of negligence
and negligent misrepresentation by the Insurers. CRC asserts
that summary judgment was inappropriate because it offered
evidence that it relied, to its detriment, on the
recommendations of Watson’s employee as to the “best possible
coverage,” and accordingly purchased insurance that did not
provide coverage for the property damage at issue here. Even
assuming that CRC relied on Watson’s employee, the district
court did not err in granting summary judgment to the Insurers.
First, there is no evidence in the record that the Insurers
owed any duty to CRC. “Generally, an insurer and its agents owe
no duty to advise an insured,” but an insurer that expressly or
impliedly undertakes to advise its insured must exercise due
care. Trotter v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 377 S.E.2d
343, 347 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988). “An implied undertaking may be
shown if . . . the insured made a clear request for advice.”
Id. However, an insured’s “request for ‘full coverage,’ ‘the
best policy,’ or similar expressions does not place an [insurer]
under a duty to determine the insured's full insurance needs, to
advise the insured about coverage, or to use his discretion and
expertise to determine what coverage the insured should
purchase.” Id. In this case, there is no evidence that CRC
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asked Watson’s employee for any advice beyond suggesting the
“best and broadest insurance policy.” Thus, the Insurers owed
no duty to CRC, and CRC’s negligence claim fails.
CRC’s negligent misrepresentation claim similarly fails
because CRC offered no evidence that the Insurers or their
employees made any factual misrepresentations regarding coverage
afforded by the policy. See deBondt v. Carlton Motorcars, Inc.,
536 S.E.2d 399, 405 (S.C. Ct. App. 2000). An insurer’s vague
puffery that a policy provides the “best and broadest” available
coverage does not constitute a factual misrepresentation. Cf.
Miller v. Premier Corp., 608 F.2d 973, 981 (4th Cir. 1979).
III.
We accordingly affirm the district court’s grant of summary
judgment for the Insurers. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before this court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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