concurring:
I agree that appellant’s conviction must be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial because the trial judge erred in excluding the testimony of the victim’s widow and the victim’s criminal record. There is, however, another serious contention relating to the ineffectiveness of defense counsel which the Court today does not discuss. Although it is not necessary to decide whether this claim alone would warrant reversal, I discuss it since it may be pertinent to any new trial in this case.
I.
Among the inadequacies in trial counsel’s representation were the following:
1. Defense counsel never sought discovery under Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(a) nor did he request the Jencks statements of government witnesses. The Jencks materials were made available only at the court’s initiative. (Tr. 45-6)
2. Defense counsel, despite the trial judge’s efforts to enlighten him, did not comprehend the difference between impeaching a witness and refreshing his recollection. (Tr. 137-49)
3. Defense counsel repeatedly evidenced his lack of knowledge as to the proper scope of cross-examination, and he seemed to have difficulty understanding that he could not introduce defense exhibits while the government was presenting its case. The trial judge finally had to explain:
But you see ... I don’t know how many cases you have tried, but you are the defendant and you offer no evidence until the defense’s case is going on. You could mark exhibits for the defendant, but you don’t offer them until the defense case is going on. (Tr. 298)
4. The defense attorney was also unfamiliar with the rules governing the introduction of character evidence, including the leading case on the subject, Michelson v. United States.1 After de*439fense counsel had demonstrated considerable ineptitude in questioning his first character witness, the court recessed to give him an opportunity to familiarize himself with the law in the area, citing Michelson and Shimon v. United States? When counsel returned to court2 3 and resumed questioning the same witness, he still exhibited a lack of understanding as to the proper means of eliciting character testimony. There were repeated objections and bench conferences. From two of his character witnesses counsel was unable to obtain any admissible evidence. The examinations of his other three character witnesses produced only one-word answers to his inquiry as to the defendant’s reputation for peace and good order in the community — two witnesses responded “good” and a third “excellent”. On the other hand, the prosecutor was able to recite the fact that appellant had previously been convicted of armed robbery to each of these witnesses; and two of the witnesses who did offer admissible character testimony conceded that they had previously been unaware of appellant’s criminal record.
Defense counsel also had some difficulty in securing the admission of evidence as to the deceased’s character. In explaining why such evidence should be admissible counsel could only cite an 1895 case.4 He explained the lack of any more recent precedent in an exchange which is revealing as to both his resources and his technical knowledge.
COUNSEL: What I want to do is get to the deceased’s character through a witness. . . . And this goes, Your Honor, to the proposition that based on the self defense theory, my client has the right to have the deceased’s character in evidence.
THE COURT: Give me some authority ....
COUNSEL: My authority . . . is Travers versus the United States, which is, I believe, is cited at Sixth Appeals, D.C., page . . .
THE COURT: Anything more recent than that?
COUNSEL: Your Honor, I tried to shephardize . . . the case, but the Shepherd . . . citator was absent from the library. (Tr. W. 64).
5. Defense counsel was similarly inept in handling the issue of marital privilege. He merely asserted to the court that the deceased’s wife’s privilege died with her husband. When asked whether he had any authority for that proposition, he responded :
I don’t have any authority for that, Your Honor. I couldn’t find any. (Tr. W. 65)
The court again recessed to allow counsel to research the pertinent law, the trial judge providing him with a citation to the D.C.Code’s marital privilege provision. On his return, counsel was able to. express a policy distinction between the two sections of the statute, but was still without authority to support any of his assertions. The judge’s erroneous exclusion of the wife’s testimony, on the basis of her marital privilege is one of the grounds for our reversal of appellant’s conviction.
6. Although defense counsel was aware of the defendant’s prior conviction, he appears to have been unfamiliar with the principles of Luck v. United States5 and did not request a Luck hearing. Since he was also unfamiliar with the provision of the D.C. Court Reorganization Act6 pursuant to which the *440appellant’s prior record was introduced as impeachment evidence, the court instructed counsel to “take a look at it” before the defendant testified. (Tr. 314).
7. The Court reverses appellant’s conviction in part because of the trial judge’s erroneous exclusion of the decedent’s criminal record. On the second day of trial defense counsel asked that the record “be brought before the Court.” Explaining that the deceased had a record of “child neglect or homicide” (Tr. 348), counsel implied that he would introduce the record through a defense witness, the deceased’s former employer. The witness was never asked about the deceased’s criminal record. The next day, defense counsel tried unsuccessfully to introduce the record through the testimony of the deceased’s wife and his sister. It was apparent that the defense attorney had never seen any such record and it soon became equally obvious that he did not even know how to find it. The judge finally inquired:
THE COURT: Actually, what you want, isn’t it, is the record of this man’s convictions ?
COUNSEL: That is right, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Well, why don’t you subpoena them?
«■ -X- -X- * -X- -X-
You have had all this time. You have had this case for some time in preparation, haven’t you?
COUNSEL: I mentioned it to Your Honor yesterday.
THE COURT: You said nothing about making an application for subpoena. You did so far as those character witnesses are concerned.
COUNSEL: Yes, I asked about it yesterday for the forthwith because the custodian would be necessary because .
THE COURT: Well, there is a piece of paper, you know, in this courthouse. You knew well enough to use it for your character witnesses. How old is this case?
COUNSEL: A year and a half, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Is it still in the courthouse ?
COUNSEL: Is what in the courthouse ?
THE COURT: The case that you want brought up here, the conviction. The file — don’t you ?
COUNSEL: No, Your Honor, it would not be in the courthouse. It would be a police record or an FBI record.
THE COURT: Well, where was he convicted ?
COUNSEL: I believe he was .convicted here.
•* * * -x- * -X-
THE COURT: Well, why wouldn’t it be in the courthouse then?
COUNSEL: I guess it would be, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Did you ever go down and look for the files?
COUNSEL: No, I did not. (Tr. W. 78-9)
The legal discussion of whether the record was admissable took place entirely between the court and the prosecutor; defense counsel demonstrated no familiarity with the cases being discussed and cited none of his own.
8. Defense counsel’s ignorance of the procedure for requesting lesser included offense instructions led to the following exchange:
THE COURT: I am just wondering if defense counsel is aware of what he’s doing. You haven’t asked for a second-degree murder, lesser included; you haven’t aked for a manslaughter, lesser included.
COUNSEL: Well, I assumed that would be given, Your Honor.
*441THE COURT: You don’t assume at all. There are two separate counts of this indictment, first-degree murder, premeditated, and second count of carrying a dangerous weapon.
COUNSEL: Well, in that case, Your Honor, I would ask for the lesser included offenses in these instructions. (Tr. W. 102)
II.
The foregoing demonstrates the defense counsel’s lack of familiarity with criminal trial practice. But the right to counsel requires a “professional advocate”,7 schooled in the law. Anything short of that contravenes the very purpose for the requirement of an attorney, as recognized in the earliest of the Supreme Court’s right to counsel decisions, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69, 53 S.Ct. 55, 64, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932):
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. . . . Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step of the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence.
No matter how well-intentioned or diligent, a layman’s representation would not satisfy the Constitutional requirement because of the layman’s lack of skill and knowledge “in the science of law.” The record in this case leaves a substantial doubt as to whether defense counsel, no matter how conscientious his efforts, satisfied the Constitutional requirement of an advocate with sufficient “skill and knowledge adequately to prepare [a] defense” to any criminal charge, to say nothing of the charge in this case — murder.
. 335 U.S. 469, 69 S.Ct. 213, 93 L.Ed. 168 (1948).
. 122 U.S.App.D.C. 152, 352 F.2d 449 (1965).
. Counsel returned to court late with no excuse other than that he had been researching the law. The trial judge held him in contempt and fined him $100. (Tr. 321-27)
. Travers v. United States, 6 App.D.C. 450 (1895).
. 121 U.S.App.D.C. 151, 348 F.2d 763 (1965).
. 14 D.C.Code § 305 (Supp. 1971). There is a constitutional issue, which we needn’t reach here, as to whether that pro*440vision is an ex post facto law as applied in this case. The same question is before this Court, sitting en banc, in United States v. Marshall, no. 71-1491 (D.C.Cir., filed June 10, 1971); United States v. Jeffries, no. 71-1356 (D.C.Cir., filed May 3, 1971).
. Johnson v. United States, 124 U.S.App. D.C. 29, 31, 360 F.2d 844, 846 (1966) (Burger, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).