concurring, joined by MATTHES, Chief Judge.
I concur fully in the majority opinion and would affirm for an additional reason not expressed therein.
This is unquestionably a close case which relies for its result upon a carefully constructed sequential application of the teachings of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (investigative stop); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925) (probable cause to search); and Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970) (subsequent station house search). The keystone in this construction is Terry, for if the initial stop of the automobile was an unreasonable intrusion, the probable cause to search supplied by Officer Jorgensen’s prompt arrival and identification of appellant Orrieer would likewise fail. And absent probable cause to search at the scene, the subsequent station house search would not be sanctioned by Chambers v. Maroney, supra, but rather would be invalid under Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216, 88 S.Ct. 1472, 20 L.Ed.2d 538 (1968). Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461-464, 91. S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971).
In Carpenter v. Sigler, 419 F.2d 169 (8th Cir. 1969), relied upon in the majority opinion, the automobile had been surveilled by the police prior to the stop. Such was not the case here, but nonetheless the totality of circumstances in this case which were known to the officer making the stop would “ ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that the action taken was appropriate[.]” Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S.Ct. at 1880.
If, however, our reliance on Terry and Carpenter is misplaced, I would nonetheless affirm the judgment of the district court, because I do not believe the Supreme Court, as presently constituted, would apply the Exclusionary Rule to this case as a “mechanically inflexible response”.1
The record reveals an otherwise fair trial by jury which has resolved doubts as to Orricer’s guilt. A careful review of the record discloses no basis to question the reliability of the fact finding process. The events complained of occurred almost twelve years ago.2
An examination of the separate dissenting opinions in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, as well as the statements of the Chief Justice in Bivens, fn. 1 supra, convinces me that the Supreme *1209Court would now either modify its holding in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), or refuse to apply the Exclusionary Rule in a § 2254 proceeding where, as here, there has been no colorable showing of innocence,3 guilt is supported by independent evidence and the intrusion was not so gross as to offend those values which are “at the core of the Fourth Amendment.” 4
. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 418, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971, Burger, C. J., dissenting).
. Chief Justice Burger, dissenting in Bivens (footnote 1, supra) observed at 403 U.S. 416 and 417, 91 S.Ct. 2014:
“Some clear demonstration of the benefits and effectiveness of the exclusionary rule is required to justify it in view of the high price it extracts from society — the release of countless guilty criminals.
“The presumed educational effect of judicial opinions is also reduced by the long time lapse — often several years— between the original police action and its final judicial evaluation. Given a policeman’s pressing responsibilities, it would be surprising if he ever becomes aware of the final result after such a delay.”
. See Friendly, “Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments”, 38 U. of Chi.L.Rev. 142, 160 (1970).
. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27, 69 S.Ct. 1359, 93 L.Ed. 1782 (1949) ; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, 443 U.S. at 491, 91 S.Ct. 2022 (Harlan, J., concurring). Cf. A.L.I. Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure §§ SS 290.2(2) (Proposed Official Draft No. 1, April 10, 1972).