Russell A. Kelm v. William S. Carlson

McCREE, Circuit Judge

(dissenting).

I respectfully dissent. This is not a case like Kline v. Vlandis, 346 F.Supp. 526 (D.Conn.), probable juris, noted, 409 U.S. 1036, 93 S.Ct. 521, 34 L.Ed.2d 485 (1972), in which a rule of law (or irre-buttable presumption) fails to satisfy the due process requirement that a litigant be afforded the opportunity to controvert an assumption of fact. See Hei-ner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 52 S.Ct. 358, 76 L.Ed. 772 (1932).1 Kline is a case in which a student who first enrolled as a nonresident could never during the course of his studies — regardless of a change of his circumstances — become a resident for the purpose of enjoying the lower tuition rate.

In this appeal, the State of Ohio permits a change in status, but only in certain limited circumstances. A student over 21 years of age, or an emancipated minor, may be reclassified a resident for purposes of tuition if he presents “clear and convincing evidence” that he has established a separate residence in Ohio for at least one year preceding the request for reclassification and that he has made “definite commitments to enter into gainful employment in Ohio” upon his graduation.2 The chairman of *1273the University of Toledo’s Residence Committee, in his answers to interrogatories propounded by appellant and in his testimony at trial, indicated that the Committee considers the requirements of this rule to be satisfied only if the applicant submits “a letter from the prospective employer indicating that a definite employment agreement has been reached.”

We test the constitutionality of this university regulation by the traditional equal protection test: does the regulation bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest? See Dan-dridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-487, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970); Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234, 239 (D.Minn.1970), aff’d, 401 U.S. 985, 91 S.Ct. 1231, 28 L.Ed.2d 527 (1971) (mem.). Ohio has a legitimate interest in seeing that nonresident students who want to enjoy the resident tuition rate are reasonably likely to remain in the state for some appreciable period following completion of their studies. See Starns v. Malkerson, supra, 326 F.Supp. at 240-241. I believe that there is a reasonable relationship between the certainty of gainful employment and the likelihood of remaining in the state. It is not arbitrary to treat differently persons who intend to become self-employed, because it can rationally be concluded that they are more exposed to the insecurity engendered by economic fluctuations within the state and, having fewer ties, are more likely to move to another state. Further, it would be difficult to police an exception for persons intending to become self-employed because presumably the only evidence that they could offer would be their own unsubstantiated statements of intention,3 statements with which, it is fair to say, the university’s Residence Committee would be inundated upon its agreement to consider the proposed status of self-employment as sufficient to warrant reclassification.

Our role is not to substitute our judgment for that of the state but merely to determine if the relationship posited by the state is unreasonable. Especially in view of the great importance to many of our nation’s finest institutions of higher education of this question of residency for tuition purposes,4 we should be careful in evaluating the permissibility of legislative judgments relating to purely *1274economic matters. I cannot say that the relationship borne by rule 5b, as construed, to a legitimate state purpose is an irrational one, and, because I believe that appellant was not entitled to a trial-type hearing in satisfaction of his right to procedural due process, I would affirm the judgment of the District Court.

. Indeed, appellant has not asserted, in his pleadings, proofs, or arguments before the District Court and this court, that the university’s regulations violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, except to the extent that he has been denied procedural due process because of the refusal of the university to grant him a trial-type hearing.

. The regulations are equally circumscribed for students who have not come to Ohio for the primary purpose of enrolling in an institution of higher education. Rule 2 provides:

An adult student over 21 years of age is considered to be an Ohio resident if he has resided in the state for 12 consecutive months or more immediately preceding enrollment; or if he is gainfully employed on a full-time basis and is residing in Ohio, and is pursuing a part-time program of instruction, and if there is reason to believe that he did not enter Ohio primarily in order to enroll in an Ohio institution of higher education. Teachers taking up residency in Ohio preparatory to teaching in Ohio schools and colleges shall be considered residents of the State for purposes of enrollment during the summer term immediately preceding the beginning of employment under their contract of professional service.

Unemancipated minors who are originally classified as nonresidents may be reclassified as residents if their parents “take up residence in Ohio and one of the parents is gainfully employed on a full-time basis in Ohio.” Rule 5.a. With respect to military personnel, rule 7 provides :

Persons in military service who entered such service as residents of Ohio and their dependents shall be considered residents of Ohio if they provide proof of continued Ohio domicile and of continued voting eligibility in Ohio. Persons in military service and their dependents shall be considered residents of *1273Ohio during the period of active duty assignment and actual residence in Ohio.

Aliens are treated similarly to United States citizens:

Alien students admitted to the United States on student visas or other temporary visas shall be classified as nonresident students. Aliens holding immigrant visas may establish Ohio residency in the same manner as citizens of the United States.

. For example, an undergraduate student could state his intention of becoming, after graduation, a consulting anthropologist, a practicing philosopher, or a self-employed securities speculator.

. It has been estimated by one source that the tuition losses that can be expected from large-scale judicial invalidation of regulations such as that involved in this case will be quite substantial.:

University of California ................................$12,567,000
University of Colorado ................................. 9,928,440
University of Illinois .................................. 4,003,458
Indiana University ..................................... 6,625,920
University of Michigan ................................. 11,730,864
University of Minnesota ................................ 5,655,744
University of Missouri.................................. 6,814,440
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.............. 4,141,975
Ohio State University .................................. 6,399,750
University of Texas System ............................ 6,107,832
University of Vermont ................................. 3,610,500
University of Wisconsin (five campuses) ................ 15,715,590

Data: National Assn, of State Universities & Land Grant Colleges Business Week, Oct. 14, 1972, at 29.