The only issue before the court en banc in this appeal from a conviction of armed robbery (22 D.C.Code § 2901) is whether the District Court erred in its conclusion that, on the evidence before it, the Government had sustained its burden of establishing a knowing waiver by appellant of his right to independent legal assistance after his arrest. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602,16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
*892When the case was first before a panel of this court, a majority thought that a circumstance appearing in the prosecution’s evidence at trial raised a doubt about the state of appellant’s mind in making the seeming waiver, which warranted a remand for a supplementary inquiry. Frazier v. United States, 136 U. S.App.D.C. 180, 419 F.2d 1161 (1969), Circuit Judge (now Chief Justice) Burger, dissenting. On remand, an evidentiary hearing was held at which the Government presented testimony with respect to appellant’s capacity to understand the proper warning concededly given him; and the District Court made findings of fact from which it concluded that such capacity existed. Although none of these findings were rejected by the panel on its second consideration of the case, a majority reversed the conviction in an opinion issued February 24, 1971, from which Judge Nichols of the United States Court of Claims, sitting by designation, dissented. We granted rehearing en banc because the sharp and persisting differences within the panel suggested that the case, although something of a sport on its facts, might have important implications with respect to judicial definition of the responsibilities of law enforcement officers in the administration of the Miranda rule. On the record made on remand, we sustain the District Court and affirm the conviction.
I
At the remand hearing, Officer Sandy of the Metropolitan Police Department testified that he had arrested appellant at 4:15 P.M. on September 7, 1966, under the authority of an arrest warrant issued in respect of the robbery of a business establishment known as Mike’s Carry-Out Shop.1 The arrest was made on the street, and Sandy promptly read to appellant the Miranda warning on a card known as P.D. Form 47. Appellant’s response was to say: “You didn’t have to read it to me in the first place. I already know my rights.” Appellant was then taken to the precinct station where he was searched and booked. Sandy telephoned Detective Keahon of the Robbery Squad at police headquarters — the officer who had procured the issuance of the arrest warrant — to report appellant’s arrest. Keahon asked that appellant be brought to his office, and that was done. Sandy testified that throughout this period he had no further conversation with appellant; and that appellant was completely cooperative, in apparent command of himself, and not under the influence of alcohol or narcotics.2
And I asked Mr. Frazier: Where did this money come from? From the holdup this morning? He looked at me and said, “You are not going to believe this, but I didn’t hold that lady up.” He said, “I was in that store.” He said that when the guy held them up and he ran out, he said, “I ran out after him.” He said, “He got away.” I asked him, I said, “Did you go back and see the lady, to see if she got hurt?
And he said, “No, he got away, 'so I didn’t bother going back.”
*893Detective Keahon testified that appellant was delivered to him at 5:20 P.M. His handcuffs were removed and he sat in a chair at Keahon’s desk. Only one other police officer — engaged in other duties — was in the large Robbery Squad office, and there was no noise or other disturbance that might be distracting or interfere with hearing. After telling appellant of the warrant under which he had been arrested, Keahon read to appellant the P.D. 47 card, and also a P.D. 54 form which states the Miranda warnings and contains a consent to speak.3 Both forms were given to appellant to read, which he did. He was asked if he understood the warnings, and replied that he did. He was asked specifically if he understood his right to have a lawyer; again the answer was positive, and appellant added that he didn’t want a lawyer. It was further Keahon’s testimony that:
“I asked him if he knew that anything he said to us could be or would be used against him in court. And he stated that he did. He said, T know my rights.’ ”
Thereafter he signed the P.D. 54 consent form at 5:30 P.M.
Keahon testified that, as these procedures were completed, appellant broke in to say: “I want to clear Teddy. Teddy didn’t shoot the woman in that hold-up; I did.” This reference was to a robbery of a High’s Ice Cream store. Thereafter appellant referred in quick succession to certain other robberies, including Mike’s Carry-Out Shop and the Meridian Market. At some point in this colloquy Keahon decided that he should be taking notes of what was being said, and he reached for a pad and pencil. What happened then is described in Keahon’s testimony as follows:
A. I started to write. The defendant Frazier said, “No, don’t put anything down.” He said, “Don’t write anything.”
Q. How strenuous an objection was that, in your opinion ?
A. Well, it wasn’t — to me, it didn’t seem like an objection. He just said, “Don’t write.” So, I didn’t press it at that time.
Q. Why?
A. Well, he was admitting these hold-ups and I didn’t want to start arguing with him as long as he was talking about hold-ups. And he was apparently being very truthful, because he was telling me things about the hold-ups that I didn’t know. I didn’t want to stop him.
So, as soon as he said, “Don’t write,” I stopped writing and pushed the pad and pencil away.
There is some confusion in the record as to whether this note-taking incident occurred before or after appellant had told of his participation in the robbery of the Meridian Market. The trial court was at some pains to get this matter cleared up, because Keahon appeared to be testifying on remand that it occurred after the Meridian Market admission, whereas his testimony at trial indicated it had been before. Keahon was asked to refresh his recollection during a recess; and his final testimony on this point is as follows:
Q. Lt. Keahon, during the noon recess did you have an opportunity to read from certain portions of the *894original trial transcript in this regard?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And has that refreshed your recollection as to the events which took place in the afternoon of September 6, 1966?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. September 7, excuse me.
Going back to those events, sir, will you tell us at what point in your interview with the defendant, Mr. Frazier, did he request that you not write anything down?
A. It was when he started mentioning the High Store hold-up, after he was advised of his rights and after I had read him the arrest warrant about the robbery-hold-up that he was charged with under the warrant of Mike’s Carry-Out Shop.
Q. Well, after you read to him P.D. Form 47 and after he had executed the Form 54, what was the first topic of conversation?
A. Well, I started talking to him about the Mike’s Carry-Out Shop hold-up.
Q. At that point had you reached for a pad and pencil ?
A. No, not at that time.
Q. Had the defendant said anything to you about refraining from taking notes at that time ?
A. No, not at that time.
Q. Tell us, then, just what happened ?
A. Well, it was after that. I don’t know the exact conversation, but I was talking to him about Mike’s Carry-Out.
He did mention something about that afternoon. And then he started saying, “Well, I don’t care,” something to that effect, and he started into the High’s Store hold-up, where he said Teddy was involved and Teddy didn’t shoot the woman; “I shot the woman.”
At that time was when I did reach for the pad and started to take notes.
At that time he stated he didn’t want any notes taken. He said, “Don’t write anything down,” something to that effect.
THE COURT: Was this before he mentioned anything about the Meridian Market?
THE WITNESS: Yes, I believe it was.
Detective Keahon testified that, in all, appellant told of several hold-ups and of one occasion on which he had shot his roommate. The woman who had been shot in the High’s Store robbery was brought down to the office, and appellant reenacted the incident in such a way that he convinced her that he was her assailant and not one Teddy Moore who was being held for that robbery. A victim of one of the other robberies recounted by appellant also identified him, aided by appellant’s volunteered recital of the events of that robbery.
The interview ended around 7:30 P.M. Keahon testified that appellant had been not only cooperative but coherent, with no signs of emotional disturbance or physical discomfort of any kind. At the end, as indicated by Keahon’s testimony set forth in the margin, appellant rejected a suggestion that he write out, or sign a written version, of what he had said.4
*895Keahon was present the next morning when appellant was taken before the United States Commissioner on the Mike’s Carry-Out charge. Keahon testified — and the record of that proceeding recites — that, after full advice as to his rights, appellant “stated that he wanted a hearing now — that he wanted to get it over with and that he did not want a lawyer — of own choice or Legal Aid.” Commissioner Wertleb testified that his notes of that appearance showed that appellant “stated affirmatively that he did not want any lawyer.”
A third police witness presented by the Government was Officer Durkey. He testified that on March 23, 1966, he had arrested appellant on a charge of assault with a gun, and that he had then both read to appellant a P.D. 47 card and given him a copy of it to keep. Aside from saying that he had not been in possession of the gun, appellant made no further response to the giving of these warnings.
The Government’s first witness at the remand hearing was Dr. Stammeyer, a clinical psychologist on the staff of St. Elizabeths. Testifying from the records compiled by St. Elizabeths at the time appellant was committed for a mental examination on December 8, 1966, in the Mike’s Carry-Out case, Dr. Stammeyer testified that appellant was “a man of at least low average native abilities,” or “possibly even somewhat higher.” He said that there was “no indication of any significant impairment that would significantly interfere with his perception;” and no evidence was found of “any organic brain pathology or any acute emotional problems at that time, that would significantly interfere with his intellectual functioning.” The warnings in P.D. 47 were read to the witness, and he stated his opinion to be that appellant unquestionably “could understand and appreciate and comprehend” their meaning.
On cross-examination, Dr. Stammeyer reported that, although he had agreed with the St. Elizabeths finding that appellant was competent to stand trial, he personally had not shared the view that appellant was without mental disorder. He characterized that disorder as a passive aggressive personality, contributed to by an unsatisfactory life pattern, perhaps due in some part to recurrent medical problems, including sickle cell anemia. Although pressed closely by defense counsel in the light of these disclosures to modify his earlier opinion as to appellant’s ability to understand the warnings given him, Dr. Stammeyer’s final conclusion was that “on the basis of what I know about this man, my reviewing the psychological examination and going over the record and having participated in the staff conference, I see no reason to believe that he could not fully comprehend, did not have the capability and competency to fully comprehend that statement read to him.”
The defense offered no evidence at the remand hearing. Appellant’s counsel stated on the record that he would place appellant on the stand if the inquiry could be limited to “what his mental attitude was at the time of the alleged confession and not go into the elements of the confession or the elements of the crime.” The court indicated its doubt that such matters would be relevant in any event, but, even if they came out, the court represented its understanding of the law to be that such testimony could never be used against appellant in a trial of guilt or innocence. Although defense counsel appeared to accept this repre*896sentation, after consulting with his client he reported that appellant did not desire to testify.
The District Court found as facts that appellant had adequately and repeatedly been exposed to the requisite Miranda warnings; he was not under the influence of alcohol or narcotics at the time of his arrest; the noise level in the Robbery Squad room was not such as to interfere with his capacity to hear; the warnings unmistakably gave notice that what one says, as distinct from what one writes or signs, can and will be used in court; appellant’s mental abilities were such as to enable him to comprehend this meaning; and appellant was in no way subjected to involuntary or forced extraction of evidence.
The court characterized appellant’s admissions as having “gushed out after numerous warnings, apparently starting with an effort by [appellant] to clear a friend of his from a crime that ... he committed and his friend had not, and then continued to these other crimes, which he, apparently, decided that once he had started, he might as well make a clean breast of.” Under these circumstances, concluded the court, there could be no question of the knowing and intentional nature of appellant’s purpose to forego rights available to him.
In the panel opinion ordering remand, it was said (at p. 1169 of 419 F.2d):
“. . . Appellant’s ban on note-taking inveighs against intelligent waiver, but this inference might be overcome, for example, if Sergeant Keahon admonished him that even an oral confession would be used against him, and appellant replied that he knew that but still did not want anything written down. Absent some additional evidence, comparable in quality, of understanding waiver, however, his confession cannot stand . . . ” (Emphasis supplied.)
In his oral argument to the court for reversal at the close of the remand hearing, appellant’s counsel contented himself with simply saying that, since there was no evidence adduced that Keahon had supplemented the written warnings in the manner referred to by the panel, the Government had “failed to carry the heavy burden the Court of Appeals has placed on its shoulders. . . .”5
The burden which the Government had to carry on remand was, however, one that was placed upon it by the Supreme Court in Miranda, and not by this court. As the Supreme Court put it, an arrested person must be adequately apprised that “anything said can and will be used against the individual in court.” 384 U.S. at 469, 86 S.Ct. at 1625, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. And the Government’s burden of proof includes, in addition to the fact of such a warning a showing — if the issue is raised — -that the person warned was capable of understanding it.
There was no question in this case as to the fact of warning. The concern which prompted the panel to remand was capacity — the state of appellant’s mind and understanding with respect to the terms of the warning. Its opinion indicated that there should be further evidence taken which would shed light on *897this question; and we, unlike appellant, do not read that opinion as saying that, unless Detective Keahon testified that he had elaborated on the language of the formal warnings by putting a legal gloss upon it, the Government must fail no matter what other evidence was forthcoming.
At the remand hearing, the Government addressed itself to this task. Its principal witness in this regard was Dr. Stammeyer, who testified as an expert witness on the precise question of whether appellant had the capacity to understand the meaning of the warnings as given. That testimony was unrebutted, and the District Court surely committed no error in finding from it that appellant possessed such capacity. But even where capacity exists, it is sometimes true that understanding can be faulty or mistaken. Although fully able to understand the plain words of the warning, it may have been that appellant, through some quirk of misinformation or otherwise, did not take them at their face value.
On this issue, of course, there was only one witness who could be useful— and this was appellant himself. It seems most unlikely that any member of the remanding panel thought other than that appellant would be a critically important witness on the remand hearing. In its opinion the panel majority was at some pains to remark that “ [Ajppellant, of course, may wish to testify at that hearing,” adding citations of Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389-394, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968), and Bailey v. United States, 128 U.S.App.D.C. 354, 389 F.2d 305 (1967), for the obvious purpose of reassuring appellant that nothing he said in that testimony could be used against him to prove the commission of criminal offenses.
As it turned out, appellant chose not to testify, leaving the court with no direct evidence from appellant himself as to why he had asked that his statements not be noted down. Confronted with a similar situation in which an appellant failed to testify in a hearing on whether he had waived his Miranda, rights after warning, United States v. Hayes, 385 F. 2d 375 (1967), cert, denied, 390 U.S. 1006, 88 S.Ct. 1250, 20 L.Ed.2d 106 (1968), the Fourth Circuit, speaking through Judge Sobeloff, said (at p. 378): ’
“ . . . [Appellant] produced no witnesses putting in question his apparent intellectual endowments. Moreover, it is noteworthy that at no stage in the proceedings has the appellant ever denied that he understood the warnings given him, and while a defendant does not have the obligation to testify himself or to offer testimony, a court cannot supply evidence that is lacking . . . ”
So here, appellant has never asserted that he misunderstood or misinterpreted the words of warning.6 When given the *898opportunity to do so, under the protections of the remand hearing, he failed to take it. Contrarily, the evidence that was before the District Court supported a finding of his capacity to understand, as well as an absence of any coercive or confusing influences in his communications with the police. Under these circumstances, we do not see how the District Court can be faulted for its conclusion that the Government has sustained its burden of establishing a knowing and voluntary waiver.
In its consideration of the case after remand, a majority of the panel appeared to be of the view that, since Keahon failed to expand his testimony to include a statement that he had in fact explained to appellant that the legal rules governing the admissibility of evidence do not distinguish between oral and written confessions, there was, within the meaning of the remand opinion, no “additional evidence” relevant to waiver forthcoming. Further, the majority appears to have concluded that, absent such testimony, an element of coerciveness or at least unfair treatment by the police has entered the picture.
We think, contrarily, that Dr. Stammeyer’s testimony was a highly significant and obviously relevant piece of “additional evidence,” basing as it did a finding that appellant had the capacity to comprehend the warnings as they were given to him. That finding, certainly in the absence of testimony from appellant, remits to sheer speculation the reason why appellant spoke as he did with relation to note-taking. We do not think the District Court was required to speculate about it, nor do we. What is clear is that the interpretation which the panel majority insists in placing upon it is simply one of several speculative hypotheses which might be indulged in, by no means all of which are incompatible with a legally sufficient waiver.7
Neither do we think that this conviction should be reversed on any theory that appellant was so shabbily dealt with by the police that emanations from the Due Process Clause point towards that result. It appears clearly from the record that appellant had already confessed his most serious crime (the armed robbery of a High’s Store in which he shot a female employee) before the note-taking episode occurred. From Detective Keahon’s standpoint, the procession of admissions which began to follow were of primary interest as clearing the police records, but of secondary importance in terms of appellant’s having voluntarily put himself in the toils of the law. Keahon’s purpose in reaching for pencil and paper was, as he testified, simply to keep track of what was pouring from appellant’s mouth on the heels of the High’s Store confession. Had the interview been stopped when appellant objected to the note-taking, the utility of that confession would not have been affected. Thus, it does not seem to us that there can be any suggestion that Keahon was deliberately luring appellant into the deeper and more dangerous waters of criminal admissions. Appellant had already taken that plunge.
Moreover, we remind that one of the purposes of Miranda was to introduce into the post-arrest period more regularized procedures, eliminating the high degree of informality and variability which contributed heavily to the evils of stationhouse interrogation. Witness the care with which the Supreme Court spelled out the precise character of the words of warning to be given, and the wide extent to which law enforcement authorities have embodied such warnings in hetec verba on printed cards to be used by arresting officers. We doubt that the warmest friends of Miranda wish to see a return to the days when such officers, although not lawyers *899themselves, were free with legal advice to their prisoners.
It was not for Keahon to place a legal interpretation on the language of Miranda warnings he was directed to give, and to continue or to suspend the interview in accordance with what that interpretation might be. He had given the warnings as required; appellant had signified his understanding and his wish to talk without a lawyer present; appellant had indeed already confessed a most serious crime before he objected to Keahon’s starting to take notes. We cannot see how, under these circumstances, Keahon’s allowing appellant to pursue his evident desire to keep on talking was either an unreasonable or deceptive tactic on Keahon’s part, falling short of those concepts of ordered liberty which are at the core of the concept of due process.
Wise administration of the waiver of the Miranda rule is, of course, of central importance to the continued health of the rule itself, which was promulgated upon the explicit premise that it could be validly waived.8 When the police have, as here, faithfully followed the exact procedure prescribed by the Supreme Court, inferior courts should be slow to mandate, after the fact, enlarged responsibilities alien to the duties and the training of policemen. In any event, we see no basis in the record before us for overturning the District Court’s resolution of the issue entrusted to it upon remand.
Affirmed.
. This offense, committed on July 26, 1966, is not the source of the appeal before us, which involves rather the robbery of the Meridian Market on August 24, 1966. Appellant, initially pleaded not guilty to the crime for which he was arrested, and ultimately went to trial on that charge after having been committed to St. Elizabeths for a mental examination, which found him competent to stand trial and free of mental disease. Before the trial was finished, however, appellant sought to substitute a plea of guilty and was given leave to do so. He was sentenced to a term of two to seven years, running concurrently with the sentence of five to fifteen years imposed in this case. That judgment has not been appealed.
. Officer McGinnis, who was on patrol with Sandy at the time of the arrest, testified to the same effect. He added that, after the search at the precinct station which turned up $103.00 on appellant’s person, and while Sandy was telephoning Keahon, he [McGinnis] had the following interchange with appellant with relation to still another robbery which had occurred that morning:
. P.D. 47 and P.D. 54 contain the same language of warning and advice of rights; and there is no issue raised as to the responsiveness of that language to the Miranda requirements. The warnings included these statements relevant to the issue which is raised on this appeal:
“You have the right to remain silent. You are not required to say anything to us at any time or to answer any questions.
“Anything you say can be used against you in court.
“You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we question you and have him with you during questioning.
“If you cannot afford a lawyer and want one, a lawyer will be provided for you.”
. Q. Did you make a second effort to prepare the written statement about these events ?
A. After he had finished and told us in the Robbery Squad Office, he finished and said, “That’s it; that’s all I know and that’s all I’m going to tell you.”
I asked him, I said, “Will you give us a statement in your own handwriting, or will you repeat what you have told me and I will put it in the form of a statement, in a typewritten statement, and would you sign it?”
1-Ie said, “No.” He said, “I’m not going to sign anything.”
Then I said, “AVell, from what you have told me, I am going to write it up. AVill you read it and sign it?”
And he said, “No, I’m not going to sign anything at all.”
*895Q. Did he ever indicate that he did not want to tell you everything, though?
A. No, sir.
Q. Now, did there come a time that you reduced the substance of this conversation to writing?
A. Yes.
Q. When was that?
A. Well, I reduced some of it into writing that night before I went home. I was working the 8:00 A.M. to 4:00 tour of duty. I reduced it briefly into writing for the benefit of my superior, Inspector Sullivan, so that he would have a brief summary of what took place on his desk when he came into work in the morning.
. This approach had been foreshadowed at the very beginning of the remand hearing. When Dr. Stammeyer was presented as a witness, appellant’s counsel objected to his testifying on the ground that expert testimony as to the appellant’s capacity to comprehend would be relevant only to a defense of not guilty by reason of insanity. The following colloquy between court and counsel is indicative of the fact that counsel apparently believed that the only purpose of the remand inquiry was to determine whether Sergeant Keahon had made a further admonition of the kind referred to by the panel and that, if the Government could not prove that he had, reversal must ensue:
THE COURT: You surely interpose the defense of being unable to comprehend or understand?
MR. O’MALLEY: I disagree.
THE COURT: If you do not, the Court of Appeals did.
MR. O’MALLEY: I would object to the introduction of this testimony.
THE COURT: I will admit it.
. In United States v. McNeil, 140 U.S.App.D.C. 3, 433 F.2d 1109 (1969), the defendant testified at a pretrial suppression hearing that he had not, contrary to the arresting officer’s testimony, been given the requisite Miranda warnings at the time of his arrest. Both the police officer and defendant also testified at that hearing that the latter, after arrival at the stationhouse, refused to sign a form acknowledging that he understood the warnings. At trial, counsel renewed the motion to suppress, asserting that defendant’s refusal to sign the form indicated that he did not understand the warnings. The District Court’s rejection of that argument was affirmed by this court upon appeal. In doing so, this court stressed the fact that appellant had testified at the pretrial suppression hearing, and that “the judge could accept at face value appellant’s own testimony at the hearing that he did not sign the acknowledgement form, not for any stated reason that he did not understand the warnings, but simply because he was adverse to signing anything at all . . .” See also Pettyjohn v. United States, 136 U.S.App.D.C. 69, 419 F.2d 651 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1058, 90 S.Ct. 1383, 25 L.Ed. 2d 676 (1970), where appellant’s testimony that he had refused to sign anything was urged as establishing his lack of understanding of the warnings. This court was not persuaded by that contention.
. In McNeil, note 6 supra, this court said that “one can readily envision reasons for a declination to sign an acknowledgment of warnings that are entirely unrelated to an understanding of the warnings.” And see Judge Nichols’s dissent in this ease from the panel’s decision after remand.
. “Confessions,” said the Supreme Court in Miranda,, “remain a proper element in law enforcement;.” and any statement “given freely and voluntarily without any cornpelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence . . . ” P. 478 of 384 U.S., p. 1630 of 86 S.Ct.