(dissenting) :
I respectfully dissent.
Talisman has abandoned its migrant labor camp operation in favor of mechanical harvesting equipment for which it has spent more than a million dollars, and has not renewed its permit to import Jamaican laborers. These circumstances render extremely tenuous any supposition that the former labor camp operation will ever be renewed. Nonetheless, says the majority, the camp still stands and can be instantly resuscitated should the company require more labor. For this reason and because of asserted residual questions of damages the majority refuses to dismiss the appeal as moot. Perhaps this is correct, although the question is not without difficulty.
Assuming then that we should consider the appeal on the merits, I agree with the lower court’s conclusion that the plaintiffs had no standing to maintain this suit, and further that upon the facts and the law they were not entitled to the relief sought, either pendente lite or permanently. I would affirm the lower court’s dismissal of the complaint at the cost of and with prejudice to the plaintiffs. The unpublished order of the district court is reproduced as Appendix A to this opinion.
APPENDIX A
United States District Court Southern District of Florida Judith Ann Petersen, Franklin P. Smith and David Hernandez,
Plaintiffs,
versus No. 72-198-Civ-CF Defendants.
Talisman Sugar Corporation, etc., William D. Pawley, Miguel Cervera, Sergio De la Vega, and William Heidtman, Sheriff of Palm Beach County, Florida,
Defendants.
ORDER
This cause came before the Court upon plaintiffs’ motion for a prelimi- •' nary injunction. Although the Court was of the opinion that this cause was dismissable upon defendants’ motion to dismiss, out of an over-abundance of caution this matter was scheduled for a hearing upon plaintiffs’ application for injunction, and upon stipulation of counsel, this cause was consolidated with the hearing of the injunction application and was fully tried on its merits as to all issues, except the claim for damages, at the time of the injunction hearing. Rule 65(a)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P.
This is an action brought by an attorney, employed by the United Farm Workers, AFL-CIO, a domestic farm labor union, and two ministers, one the associate director of the National Farm Worker’s Ministry and the other a staff member of the Florida Christian Migrant Ministry, on behalf of themselves and a purported class they represent. It is claimed by the plaintiffs that their purpose is to improve the economic and social conditions of agricultural workers and that their purpose has been frustrated by the defendants who have denied them free ingress and egress to the defendant Talisman’s labor camp to visit with, meet with, and interview certain Jamaican farm laborers.
The defendant Talisman Sugar Corporation is a Florida corporation engaged in the growing, processing, and sale of sugar cane. In its business Talisman employs agricultural workers, both domestic and foreign. Because there are no domestic farm workers available to fill certain of its available positions, specifically sugar cane cutting or harvesting, defendant Talisman employes foreign laborers pursuant to various federal statutes and regulations, including but not limited to the Wagner-Peyser Act, 29 U.S.C. § 49 et seq. Defendant Pawley is the President of the defendant corporation; defendants Cervera and De la Vega are employees of Talisman. William Heidtman, Sheriff of Palm Beach County, Florida, has been joined as a defendant because he and his staff are authorized to enforce the various Florida criminal statutes, including § 821.01, trespass after warning. At this *85time, members of the United Farm Workers who operate heavy equipment and machinery at Talisman Sugar Corporation are striking Talisman. Picketing outside Talisman has been occurring for some time.
This action has been brought pursuant to a multitude of Federal Statutes and United States Constitutional provisions. The jurisdictional bases which the plaintiffs allege for this action are as follows:
1. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution, freedom of speech, religion, and assembly ;
2. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, due process clause;
3. The Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, abolition of slavery;
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1983, civil rights actions for deprivation of rights under color of law, and 28 U.S.C. § 1343, jurisdiction over civil rights actions;
5. 18 U.S.C. § 245, criminal statute dealing with threatened or forceful interference with the exercise of certain civil rights;
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal question jurisdiction;
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1337, original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under Act of Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade and commerce against restraints and monopolies;
8. 29 U.S.C. § 49 et seq., Wagner-Peyser Act, establishing United States Employment Service;
9. 20 C.F.R. §§ 602, 604, and 620, Regulations promulgated under the Wagner-Peyser Act; and
10. 7 C.F.R. 863, Regulations promulgated under the U.S. Sugar Act.
As stated, the plaintiffs claim that theirs is a charitable purpose — to aid the plight of agricultural workers, particularly, in this case, the imported, temporary Jamaican farm workers employed by Talisman, and that this purpose cannot be accomplished without the defendant Talisman permitting the plaintiff and others to freely come and go into the Talisman labor camp. It is claimed that various rights of the plaintiffs have been improperly denied by Talisman’s barring the plaintiffs’ entry upon Talisman land and by the Sheriff’s enforcement of Florida Statute § 821.01, F.S.A., trespass with warning. It is further alleged that the Jamaican workers-housed upon Talisman land are being enslaved and held in some sort of bondage or involuntary servitude by reason of Talisman’s refusal to permit entry onto Talisman land of the plaintiffs who wish to meet with the Jamaican workers.
This matter is alleged to be an emergency matter. It is alleged by the plaintiffs that they seek immediate entry into the Talisman camp so that they might “investigate” certain charges that the defendant Talisman has been utilizing the Jamaican laborers in jobs other than those for which they were brought to this country. The plaintiffs allege that it has been reported to them that the Jamaican laborers are performing jobs which were being performed by the striking farm workers — operation of farm equipment and machinery. The striking workers are members of the United Farm Workers. The plaintiffs wish to accomplish this investigation before the end of the harvesting season, because at the end thereof the foreign workers are sent back to their country. The season will end within a matter of days.
As stated, the plaintiff .Petersen is counsel for the United Farm Workers, and one of the plaintiff ministers testified that 50 to 60 per cent of his time was spent advocating and furthering the cause of this union. Furthermore, the plaintiffs testified that they have participated in the ongoing picketing at Talisman, either by carrying pickets or by giving moral support and other aid to the picketers.
*86During the trial of this cause, it rapidly became clear that the plaintiffs’ purpose was and is not to help these foreign farm laborers. The investigation which the plaintiffs wish to conduct and the information they wish to obtain therefrom could not benefit the Jamaican workers. Assuming there have been violations of law in the assignment of jobs to the Jamaicans, and that has never been proven, such information could only detriment the Jamaicans. If it was found that Jamaicans were being used in unauthorized positions, the defendant Talisman would lose the right to employ these workers, and the workers would be immediately deported. All this would be of benefit to the United Farm Workers, which apparently wishes to man these Jamaican-held positions with their own union workers — at a higher wage, of course — or, alternatively, wishes to cause the defendant Talisman, against whom the union is already on strike, further economic hardship. But this would be of no benefit to the foreign agricultural workers. Furthermore, if the plaintiffs were truly concerned about the Jamaican farm workers’ welfare, it should not be a cause for their concern that these workers may be performing tasks easier than cutting sugar cane with a machete in a burned over field filled with snakes and rats.
Obviously, this case is nothing more than a tactic utilized by the union in an ongoing and heated labor dispute. This is not a suit brought to accomplish anything more than a result favorable to the union in this dispute. There has been no evidence to the contrary.
On the basis of these facts, the first and foremost question is the standing of the plaintiffs to bring this action. This is not a suit brought by the farm workers themselves such as Gomez v. Florida State Employment Service, 417 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1969). Plaintiffs allege, as one of the bases for jurisdiction in this case, the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, abolition of slavery. But the plaintiffs are not persons affected by any sort of bondage. They have apparently asserted this Amendment only on behalf of the Jamaican workers employed by Talisman. None of the workers themselves have complained of enslavement, and there has been no showing whatsoever that these workers are serving in bondage or under conditions of involuntary servitude.
Standing has traditionally been held to mean that a party may only rely on those constitutional rights in which he has a personal interest. Tileston v. Ull-man, 318 U.S. 44, 63 S.Ct. 493, 87 L.Ed. 603 (1943). Under traditional rules of standing, there must appear a “logical nexus between the [plaintiffs’ status] and the claim sought to be adjudicated.” Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1953, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968). The party seeking relief must have a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy and concrete adverseness must be shown. Troutman v. Shriver, 417 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1962).
In this instance, it is clear that the plaintiffs have no personal stake in the rights of these Jamaican workers and may not rely on the Jamaicans’ alleged constitutional rights as a basis for this lawsuit. The plaintiffs have no standing to assert these rights.
As stated, the present objective of the plaintiffs is to gain access to these foreign workers to investigate whether these workers are performing non-authorized jobs contrary to the Wagner-Peyser Act, 29 U.S.C. § 49 et seq., and the regulations thereunder. The plaintiffs, however, are not employees of any State, Federal, or Jamaican administrative agency authorized to conduct such investigations. Testimony given at the trial of this cause indicated that there are numerous agencies which regulate the employment of foreign laborers and, according to plaintiffs’ complaint, defendant Talisman’s business is highly regulated. Apparently, charges of violations of the Wagner-Peyser Act were filed with the appropriate State and Federal agencies and an administrative hearing was held with regard to these charges, *87but there has been no finding by any investigative body, nor at the administrative hearing of any such violations. Nor were any violations proved to this Court. Furthermore, there has been no showing that the plaintiffs have any right to conduct yet another investigation into this matter.
It is also claimed by the plaintiffs that Florida Statute § 821.01, F.S.A., is not enforceable against the plaintiffs to prevent their entry into labor camp grounds. It is alleged that this is so because in 1969 the statute was amended and the words “labor camp” were deleted therefrom. Armed with this newly amended statute, the plaintiffs entered Talisman’s land, refused Talisman’s request to leave, refused repeated requests by the Sheriff to leave, and finally submitted themselves to arrest for trespassing.
The plaintiffs now seek a declaration from this Court that labor camps are no longer private property for the purposes of enforcing the Florida trespass laws. This is a Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971) situation. What the plaintiffs seek is an injunction of some sort of the state prosecution for trespass. The Court finds no reason why plaintiffs’ claim— that § 821.01 does not apply to labor camps and entry thereon — could not be asserted in State Court as a defense to the trespass charges, however. Furthermore, were the Court to rule upon this question, as requested, the plaintiffs have made no showing that the legislature intended to alter the law of property with regard to labor camps nor that trespass is not still a crime where it concerns enclosed lands in the form of labor camps.
Plaintiffs have brought this action in their own behalf and on behalf of all those similarly situated. Plaintiffs, however, have failed to make any showing under Rule 23, Fed.R.Civ.P., that the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, that there are questions of law and fact common to the ■ class, that the plaintiffs fairly and adequately represent the purported class, and that the prosecution of this action will avoid the possibility of the prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the class.
It would be difficult if not impossible to find any other parties with the same interests as these plaintiffs — being neither members of the United Farm Workers nor Jamaican laborers nor persons who truly wish to aid, comfort, and benefit the Jamaican workers. Thus, this is clearly not a proper class action nor, as stated, háve plaintiffs laid a proper predicate to make it one.
Plaintiffs allege that they were deprived of certain constitutionally guaranteed rights; however, there has been no evidence to prove such claims. This suit is nothing more nor less than a labor dispute. The plaintiffs, on behalf of the United Farm Workers, are seeking here to use the civil rights laws and the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to foster the Union’s cause. In deciding this case, the Court is not unmindful of Folgueras v. Hassel, 331 F.Supp. 615 (W.D.Mich.1971), Exhibit D to plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction. However, the facts of this case are entirely different from those presented in Folgueras. The plaintiffs in Folgueras were members of a federal program, the Economic Opportunity Act program established for the purpose of aiding farm workers. Justice and equity alone demands a different decision in this ease.
In order to afford plaintiffs an opportunity to fully present their ease and so that a complete record could be developed, the Court denied defendants’ early motion for dismissal of the complaint and reserved ruling upon defendants’ motion for involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b), F.R.Civ.P., after plaintiffs had presented their evidence. Pursuant to stipulation of counsel, approved by the Court, the cause has been tried upon the merits, except for the issue of damages.
*88The Court having found and concluded that the plaintiffs have no standing to maintain this case; and that upon the facts and the law the plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief sought, either pen-dente lite or permanently. It is thereupon
Ordered, adjudged and decreed that the complaint herein be and the same is hereby dismissed at the cost of and with prejudice to plaintiffs.
Done and ordered at West Palm Beach, Florida, this 10th day of March, 1972.
/s/ CHARLES B. FULTON Chief Judge
cc: Joseph C. Segor, Esq.
Judith Ann Petersen, Esq.
Mershon, Sawyer, Johnston, Dun-wody & Cole Charles Kelso, Esq.