(concurring) :
As soap, now displaced by latter day detergents is the grist of Madison Avenue, I add these few comments in the style of that street to indicate my full agreement with the opinion of the Court and to keep the legal waters clear and phosphate-free.
As Proctor of this dispute between the representative of many manufacturers of household detergents and the Board of Commissioners of Metropolitan 'Dade Gounty, Florida, who have promulgated regulations which seek to control the labeling of such products sold within their jurisdiction (largely to discourage use which pollutes their waters), the Court holds that Congress has specifically preempted regulatory action by Dade County. Clearly, the decision represents a Gamble since we risk a Cascade of criticism from an increasing Tide of ecology-minded citizens. Yet, a contrary decision would most likely have precipitated a Niagara of complaints from an industry which justifiably seeks uniformity in the laws with which it must comply. Inspired by the legendary valor of Ajax, who withstood Hector’s lance, we have Boldly chosen the course of uniformity in reversing the lower Court’s decision upholding Dade County’s local labeling laws. And, having done so, we are Cheered by the thought that striking down the regulation by the local jurisdiction does not create a void which is detrimental to consumers, but rather merely acknowledges that federal legislation has preempted this field with adequate labeling rules.
Congress, of course, has the Cold Power to preempt. Of the three situations discussed by the Court, the first (direct conflict) is easy, for it is Crystal Clear that the state law must yield. The third, in which the ordinance may supplement the federal law and thereby extend or increase the degree of regulation, is more troublesome. For where Congress has chosen to fashion a regulatory scheme that is only the Head and Shoulders, but has not opted to regulate every aspect of the area, the states have implied power to flesh out the body. It is where Congress fails to clearly signify, with an appropriate preemption clause, its intent to fully occupy the area regulated that the problem arises. With some Joy, the Court finds there is such a clause.
Concerning the precautionary labeling aspect, this is SOS to consumers. If we Dash to the heart of the question, it is apparent, as the Court points out, that the 1966 Amendments to FHSA (see note 4, supra) indicate an explicit congressional purpose to preempt state regulation of the labeling of these substances. Undoubtedly, this unequivocal congressional Salvo was directed at such *329already existing regulations as those of the Fire Department of New York City relating to pressurized containers. See Chemical Specialties Manufacturers Association v. Lowery, supra. Indeed, Congress intended to wield its Arm and Hammer to Wish away such local regulations and further, to preclude the growing Trend toward this proliferation of individual community supervision. Its purpose was at least two-fold: (i) to put day-to-day responsibility in the hands of local government, but (ii) at the same time to impose detailed identical standards to eliminate confusion or overlapping.
With this clear expression of congressional intent to create some form of preemption, the only thing remaining was whether the meaning of the term “precautionary labeling” is sufficiently broad to embrace the words of the Dade County ordinance, Vel non. In making this determination, the Court is furnished with a Lever by our Brothers of the Second Circuit. Chemical Specialties Manufacturers Association v. Lowery, supra. And so we hold. This is all that need be said. It is as plain as Mr. Clean the proper Action is that the Dade County Ordinance must be superseded, as All comes out in the wash.