(concurring in part and dissenting in part):
With one exception, I concur in the judgment of the Court and in the able majority opinion of Judge Smith.
With the utmost deference to and respect for my colleagues, however, I am constrained to dissent from the judgment of the Court and the majority opinion to the extent that they modify the injunctive relief found necessary by the district court to protect Jacqueline Onas-
*1000sis and her children, Caroline B. and John F. Kennedy, Jr., from the continued predatory conduct of the self-proclaimed paparazzo Galella.
We start with what I take to be common ground that “a district court has broad discretion to enjoin possible future violations of law where past violations have been shown”; that “the court’s determination [that permanent injunctive relief is required] should not be disturbed on appeal unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion”; and that “the party seeking to overturn the district court’s exercise of discretion has the burden of showing that the court abused that discretion, and the burden necessarily is a heavy one.” SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1100 (2 Cir. 1972). That certainly is the settled law in this Circuit. And it is the command of Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a).
In the instant case, after a six week trial at which 25 witnesses testified, hundreds of exhibits were received and a 4,714 page record was compiled,- Judge Cooper filed a careful, comprehensive 40 page opinion, 353 F.Supp. 194, which meticulously sets forth detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. As for the provisions of the injunction requiring Galella -to keep certain distances away from Mrs. Onassis and her children (from the modification of which I dissent), Judge Cooper stated his reasons for these provisions as follows:
“For practical reasons, the injunction cannot be couched in terms of prohibitions upon Galella’s leaping, blocking, taunting, grunting, hiding and the like. Nor have abstract concepts — harassing, endangering— proved workable. No effective relief seems possible without the fixing of proscribed distances.
We must moreover make certain plaintiff keeps sufficiently far enough away to avoid problems as to compliance with the injunction and injurious disobedience. Disputes concerning his compliance may be frequent, thereby necessitating repeated application to the Court. Hence, the restraint must be clear, simple and effective so that Galella’s substantial compliance cannot seriously be disputed unless a violation occurs.
Of major importance in determining the scope of the relief to be afforded here is the attitude which Galella has demonstrated toward the process of this Court in the past. Galella blatantly violated our restraining orders of October 8 and December 2, 1971. He did so deliberately and in full knowledge of the fact of his violation. His deliberate disobedience to the subpoena and his attempts to obstruct justice with respect to Exhibit G, together with the perjury that infected his testimony, do not warrant mere token relief.
In light of Galella’s repeated misbehavior, it is clear that only a strong restraint — an injunction which will clearly protect Mrs. Onassis’ rights and leave no room for quibbling about compliance and no room for evasion or circumvention — is appropriate in this case.
-X- * -X-
As for the actual distance to be proscribed, we must bear in mind that plaintiff never moved to modify the distances heretofore imposed by our restraining order, even after the Court had clearly and explicitly invited him to do so if he could prove it was too harsh. (Minutes, Proceedings January 19, 1972, p. 31).” 353 F.Supp. at 237.
I have set forth the foregoing explanation by Judge Cooper of his reasons for the critical distance provisions of the injunction because they are weighty findings by the trial judge who had the benefit of seeing the parties before him and who obviously was in a better position than we to judge their demeanor. I feel very strongly that such findings should not be set aside or drastically modified by our Court unless *1001they are clearly erroneous; and I do not understand the majority to suggest that they are.
But here is what the majority’s modification of the critical distance provisions of the injunction has done:
DISTANCES GALELLA AS PROVIDED IN AS MODIFIED BY IS REQUIRED TO DISTRICT COURT COURT OF APPEALS MAINTAIN INJUNCTION MAJORITY
From home of Mrs. Onassis and her children 100 yards No restriction
From children’s schools 100 yards Restricted only from entering schools or play areas *
From Mrs. Onassis personally 50 yards 25 feet and not to touch her
From children personally 75 yards 30 feet *
In addition to modifying the distance restrictions of the injunction, the majority also has directed that Galella be prohibited from blocking Mrs. Onassis’ movement in public places and thoroughfares ; from any act “foreseeably or reasonably calculated” to place Mrs. Onassis’ life and safety in jeopardy (and similarly with respect to her children); and from any conduct which would “reasonably be foreseen” to harass, alarm or frighten Mrs. Onassis (and similarly with respect to her children).
With deference, I believe the majority’s modification of the injunction in the respects indicated above to be unwarranted and unworkable. Briefly summarized, the following are the reasons for my dissent from the modification of the injunction:
(1) The majority ignores the weighty findings of the district court. Without holding them clearly erroneous,
Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a), the majority simply sets them aside and substitutes its own perimeters for those carefully and wisely drawn by the district court.
(2) This results, for example, in a wholly unexplained and anomalous 84% reduction of the distance Galella is required to keep away from Mrs. Onassis (from. 50 yards to 25 feet), and an equally implausible 87% reduction of the distance he is required to keep away from the children (from 75 yards to 30 feet). -
(3) It further results in no restriction whatsoever against Galella’s hovering at the entrance to the home of Mrs. Onassis and her children (where he has caused such agonizing humiliation in the past), or at the schools attended 'by the children —just so he does not physically en*1002ter their schools or play areas. This strikes me as an invitation for trouble.
(4) The majority, in substituting its own injunctive provisions for those of the district court, has couched its prohibitions in terms of conduct “foreseeably or reasonably calculated” to endanger the life or safety of Mrs. Onassis or her children, or conduct which would “reasonably be foreseen” to harass, alarm or frighten them, (emphasis added). These are just the sort of abstract concepts which the district court found to be unworkable and ineffective. 353 F. Supp. at 237. They do not comply with the specificity requirement of Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(d) (“Every order granting an injunction shall be specific in terms. . . ."). This has been construed by our Court to require that “the party enjoined must be able to ascertain from the four corners of the order precisely what acts are forbidden.” Sanders v. Air Line Pilots Association, 473 F.2d 244, 247 (2 Cir. 1972). See International Longshoremen’s Association v. Philadelphia Marine Trade Association, 389 U.S. 64, 76 (1967); Brumby Metals, Inc. v. Bargen, 275 F.2d 46, 49 (7 Cir. 1960). The district court was justifiably concerned — in view of Galel-la’s record of outrageous disregard of the court’s previous restraining orders — that it would be confronted with repeated compliance applications in the future. The majority’s substitution of such abstract concepts as “reasonably foreseen” and “foreseeably calculated” for the clear, simple and effective distance restrictions in the district court injunction seems to me virtually to assure the compliance disputes that the district court wisely sought to avert.
(5) In modifying the injunctive relief granted by the district court, I fear that the majority has overlooked the fact that the record shows that Ga-lella in the past has jeopardized the lives and safety of Mrs. Onassis and her children and has done so in the teeth of previous restraining orders of the district court. One of the particularly weighty findings of the district court in support of the scope of injunctive relief granted was that “Galella blatantly violated our restraining orders of October 8 and December 2, 1971. He did so deliberately and in full knowledge of the fact of his violation.” 353 F.Supp. at 237. Our Court has been particularly adamant against disturbing a district court’s grant of injunctive relief when the parties enjoined “continued to violate the . laws even after a consent decree had been entered enjoining them from such conduct” and when “[t]hey have persisted in their contention that their past conduct was not improper . . . .” SEC v. Koenig, 469 F.2d 198, 202 (2 Cir. 1972), citing SEC v. MacElvain, 417 F.2d 1134, 1137 (5 Cir. 1969), cert, denied, 397 U.S. 972 (1970), and SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., supra.
(6) All else aside, the wisdom and fairness of the distance restrictions which the district court provided for in its permanent injunction— which are substantially identical to those in its temporary restraining order of December 2, 1971 and which were in effect until July 20, 1972 — appear to be borne out by the failure of Galella ever to request the district court to modify such restrictions, despite the express invitation-of the district court to Galella to do so: “As for the actual distance to be proscribed, we must bear in mind that plaintiff never moved to modify the distances heretofore imposed by our restraining order, even after the Court had clearly and explicitly invited him to do so if he could prove it was too harsh.” 353 F. Supp. at 237. Pursuant to the district court’s decision of July 5, 1972 *1003requesting that the form of injunction be settled on three days notice, both sides submitted proposed judgments which were identical in all respects here material; neither in his proposed form of judgment nor in his memorandum accompanying it did Galella interpose any objection whatsoever to the distance restrictions on the ground that they were too harsh or onerous. Since the district court never was afforded an opportunity to pass upon such questions which are raised for the first time on appeal, I see no compelling reason for departing from the long settled rule in this Circuit that such matters should not be reached by us on appeal. Ring v. Authors’ League of America, 186 F.2d 637, 641 (2 Cir.) (L. Hand, C. J.: “If a party’s sensibilities are so tender, the least we must demand is that he make known his complaint at a time when it can be remedied.”), cert, denied sub nom. Ring v. Spina, 341 U.S. 935 (1951); United States v. Five Cases, 179 F.2d 519, 523-24 (2 Cir.) (Swan, C. J., aff’g judgment entered on jury verdict after trial before Hincks, D. J.), cert, denied, 339 U.S. 963 (1950). At the very least, if there is to be any modification of the injunction with respect to the distance provisions (and I believe none is warranted), then the case should be remanded to the district court which obviously is in a far better position to make such determinations after a hearing than are we. After all, what possible basis is there in this record for us as appellate judges to say that Galella should keep 25 feet, rather than 50 yards, away from Mrs. Onassis; or that he should remain 30 feet, rather than 75 yards, away from the children?
(7) Finally, I am utterly unable to find any basis in the record or any justification as a matter of law for the majority’s modification of the injunction so as to limit the protection provided for the children to the “grant of injunctive relief to the government modified to prohibit any action interfering with Secret Service agents’ protective duties.” (emphasis added). Supra at p. 999. Just two paragraphs before this, the majority has modified the injunction to prohibit Galella from engaging in four types of conduct directed at “defendant Jacqueline Onassis”, with no mention of the children. Id. And yet the claim for injunctive relief sought in the counterclaim filed March 8, 1971 was explicitly “for the personal safety of defendant [Mrs. Onassis] and of her infant children”. The judgment entered July 20, 1972 provided, in paragraph 4, for injunctive relief for the protection of Mrs. Onassis and both of her children; the only reference to the government in the injunctive provisions of the judgment is in subparagraph (viii) of paragraph 4 where Galella is enjoined from “otherwise interfering with any agent of the United States of America in the performance of protective duties relating to Caroline B. Kennedy or John F. Kennedy, Jr.” As I read the majority’s modification of the injunction, to the extent that it distinguishes between protection for Mrs. Onassis and that for the children, limiting the latter to the grant of injunctive relief to the government, the net effect is to strip the children of any protection under the injunction after they reach age 16 when their protection by the Secret Service ceases. 18 U.S.C. § 3056 (1970). For Caroline, who was born November 27, 1957, this means that one of her birthday presents — less than two months away— will be exposure to the resumed predatory conduct of the paparazzo Galella who will be totally unrestrained with respect to her by the injunction as modified by the majority. For John, who was born November 25, 1960, he has only three *1004years to wait for similar exposure. To strip these children, before they reach their majority, of the protection of the injunction of the United States District Court below, is to deny to them and to their mother the very least to which they are entitled under the law.
I most respectfully dissent.
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
A petition for a rehearing having been filed herein by counsel for appellee Jacqueline Onassis,
Upon consideration thereof, it is Ordered that said petition be and it hereby is denied.
As pointed out below, the majority appears further to have modified the injunction, by limiting the protection of the children to the “grant of injunctive relief to the government modified to prohibit any action interfering with Secret Service agents’ protective duties.” (emphasis added). The district court injunction was not so limited. It granted injunc-tive relief for the protection of the children as specifically prayed for by Mrs. Onassis. The distinction introduced by the majority, as indicated below, substantially reduces the protection provided for the children.