Reverend Thomas B. Allen v. Rogers C. B. Morton, Secretary of the Interior

PER CURIAM:

The court is of the view that the judgment must be reversed because the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree enjoining the continuance of the Government’s current participation in the Christmas Pageant of Peace, including as it does a membership in planning and organization committees that violates the “entanglement” test of the Establishment clause of the First Amendment. On this point the opinions filed by Judges Tamm and Leventhal are in accord.

Following the reinstatement of the complaint plaintiffs will be entitled to a decree, but a question may arise as to its proper scope. No further legal question arises if the pertinent groups and officials of the Christmas Pageant of Peace conclude that the creche will be discontinued as to future Pageants. If the creche is retained, and the Government decides to terminate all sponsorship or connection with the Pageant, appropriate plaques should be ordered by the District Court, as set forth in Judge Leventhal’s opinion. If the creche is retained and the Government wishes to maintain a connection with the Pageant — say, limited to the financial aid presently provided and/or technical sponsorship — it will have to prepare new regulations or amendments to the existing regulations. These regulations or modifications would have to be grounded in neutral principles and criteria that assure non-discriminatory definition of the events that are afforded any such Government aid or technical sponsorship. It is the opinion of the -Court, however, that if the Government promulgates the regulations and the Christmas Pageant of Peace qualifies for financial aid or technical sponsorship thereunder, such Government involvement will not be constitutionally defective.* Of course, any proposal for retention of Government connection with the Pageant would *68have to be accompanied by a proposal for appropriate plaques.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Opinion filed by Circuit Judge TAMM in which Circuit Judge ROBB concurs.

TAMM, Circuit Judge.

In Women Strike for Peace v. Hickel, 137 U.S.App.D.C. 29, 420 F.2d 597, 602 (1969), a decision dealing with the right of access to Government owned property, Judge Leventhal noted that the Government’s co-sponsorship of the Cnristmes Pageant of Peace “[might] raise more questions than it answers.” One of those questions, specifically that relating to the First Amendment’s establishment and free exercise clause, has been tortuously wending its way through the courts since July 4, 1969, and today hopefully reaches final disposition. Mr. Justice Powell has recently noted that cases arising under the First Amendment clauses “Congress shall make no law respecting- an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,” have presented “some of the most perplexing questions to come before this Court.” Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 760, 93 S.Ct. 2965, 2959, 37 L.Ed 2d 948 (1973)-Thus case, we unhappily anthropomorphize, is similarly disposed to perplex, confuse, and even frustrate, so sensitive and complex are the issues it pi-,- -'<>w

We will not unduly quantify uuv opinion with a re-recitation of facts already ably and extensively set out in Judge Leventhal’s opinion herein, in the 1970 opinion of this court remanding this very action to the district court for further fact-finding, Allen v. Hickel, 138 U.S.App.D.C 31, 424 F.2d 944 (1970), and in the district- "ou, tU opinion from whLh this appeal was taken. Allen v. Morten, 333 F.Sop.', 8 'f>DC)071\ We will structure the opinion within the framework of the purpose, primary effect, and excessive entanglement tesis, reiterating only those t'im-s specifically

relevant to our analysis. The propriety of that three-part test is well established, as Mr. Justice Powell stated recently in Nyquist, supra, 413 U.S. at 772-773, 93 S.Ct. at 2965:

[T]he now well defined three-part test that has emerged from our decisions is a product of considerations derived from the full sweep of the Establish-V; Clause cases. Taken together these decisions dictate that to pass muster under the Establishment Clause the law in question, first, must reflect a clearly secular legislative purpose, e. g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 [89 S.Ct. 266, 21 L.Ed.2d 228] (1968), second, must have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, e. g., McGowan v. Maryland, [366 U.S. 420, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961)]; School District of Abmgton Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 [83 S.Ct. 1560, 10 L.Ed.2d 844] (1963), and, third, must avoid excessive government entanglement with religion, e. g., Walz v. Tax Comm’n, [397 U.S. 664, 90 S. Ct. 1409, 25 L.Ed.2d 697] (1970)] See Lemon v. Kurtzman, [403 U S. 302, 612-614, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971)]; Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678 [91 S.Ct. 2091, 29 L.Ed.2d 790] (1971). (fooinotv omitted.)

I. Purpose

i:] Wnen determining ,'pn;'po,‘-'-” n this situation we yve A end vbh ,,.n unusual problem, for ->? Judg« Levc 'tuai has pointed out in his opinion we are unable to follow “the familiar analysis of the intent of a legislature” and rather must “discern the purposes of activities of officials of the Executive Branch.” Qur de novo look at the record has convinced us when considering both the stated purposes of the Pageant and the r~n/>T,s of the Government officials involved over „iio py.°t two decades as reflecting upon flic Govermentv ~dhor•mvi, tc thus" sí.ytfd. purpures, that the C-uvc-iui^rA’s i"vo,'rmi,f-i,t in thn Pag-

*69eant of Peace “reflect [s] a clearly secular . . purpose.”

The Pageant itself is an outgrowth of the traditional National Community Christmas Tree Celebration, and as the record amply demonstrates evolved in 1954 as a vehicle for bolstering tourism in the District of Columbia.1 On a more philosophical level its continually expressed purpose has been that of manifesting this “nation’s desire for ‘Peace on Earth, Goodwill Toward Men.’ ” The Pageant is conducted each year at the approximate time of the celebration of the national legal holiday of Christmas, and is meant to serve as “a visible expression of this Nation’s aspiration to foster peace, understanding and friendship between the nations of the world and the American People.” The creche itself, while obviously a religious symbol, is part of a commemoration of “the Nation’s celebration of Christmas as a national holiday, by depicting all the traditional aspects of our national history associated with Christmas.” While the creche is utilized neither to promote nor profane any religion, it is “intended to be reverential to the religious heritage aspect of Christmas.” 2

These are the express purposes for both the existence of the pageant as a whole and the creche as one of its many integral parts, and they have been consistently stated throughout the history of the Pageant. We can find nothing in the record to convince us that the Government’s involvement, which is similar in kind to its cooperation with other national celebration events, e. g., The Cherry Blossom Festival, the President’s Cup Regatta, and the National Independence Celebration, is predicated upon any other, non-secular purpose.3 We note, however, that “the propriety of purposes may not immunize from further scrutiny a law which either has a primary effect that advances *70religion, or which fosters excessive entanglements between Church and State.” Nyquist, supra, 413 U.S. at 774, 93 S.Ct. at 2966.4

II. Primary Effect

The Government’s participation in the Pageant is twofold: (1) Various Government officials play an active role in its management and organization, occupying two of the five positions on the Executive Committee, and two of the ten positions on the important Program Committee;5 *(2) the Government “cosponsors” the Pageant and provides labor assistance in the assembly, dismantling, cleaning and restoration of the area, along with various materials and equipment for use in the Pageant. The expense involved is more than nominal —in 1968, for example, the cost to the Government for the services it expended amounted to nearly $72,000.6 Since 1968, however, the Government has refrained from supplying any assistance in the assembly, storage, or maintenance of the creche. The Christmas Pageant of Peace, Inc. bears the cost of electricity used to light the creche and is solely responsible for its use.7 As we find the former type of participation infirm under the entanglement test discussed infra, for purposes of discussion of the primary effect of the Government’s involvement we will consider only the effect of its financial assistance and nominal co-sponsorship.

The recent Nyquist opinion elucidates that Government action may have multiple “primary” effects, in the sense that the constitutional propriety of an action depends not on whether the primary effect is legitimately secular but on whether the action in any way has the “direct and immediate effect of advancing religion,” or conversely “only a ‘remote and incidental’ effect advantageous to religious institutions.” Ny-quist, supra, 413 U.S. at 784, 93 S.Ct. at 2971 n. 39. It matters not in our analysis whether this may be considered a widening of the primary effect test beyond previous precedent (although Mr. Justice Powell’s discussion should belie such a consideration, see Nyquist, supra, 784 U.S. at 413, n. 39, 93 S.Ct. 2955) for our review of the record convinces us that the Government’s limited involvement in the Pageant of Peace can have no more than a “remote and incidental” effect advantageous to religious institutions.

In Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743, 93 S.Ct. 2868, 2874, 37 L.Ed.2d 923 (1973), the Supreme Court iterated the guidelines to be followed in administering the primary effect test:

Aid normally may be thought to have a primary effect of advancing religion [1] when it flows to an institution in which religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion of its functions are subsumed in the religious mission or [2] when it funds a specifically religious activity in an otherwise substantially secular setting.

The first of these categories recognizes that religion can so permeate a specific activity that its “religious and secular . functions are in fact inseparable,” Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 680, 91 S.Ct. 2091, 2097, 29 L.Ed.2d 790 (1971), while the second recognizes that even if the religious and secular functions are separable, without proper controls (whose extensiveness vary proportionately with the degree of religious permeation, see Hunt, supra, 413 U.S. at 734, 93 S.Ct. 2868) the Government involvement may nonetheless have a primary effect of aiding religious activity. See Nyquist, supra, 413 U.S. at 774, 93 *71S.Ct. at 2966, where maintenance and repair grants for parochial elementary and secondary schools were struck down because, as the Court stated, “[n]o attempt is made to restrict payments to those expenditures related to the upkeep of facilities used exclusively for secular purposes, nor do we think it possible within the context of these religion-oriented institutions to impose such restrictions.”

The Supreme Court has yet to find aid to an institution constitutionally defective because religion so permeated the institution that the secular and sectarian functions were inseparable.8 It has noted, however, a very real distinction between the degree of permeation that exists in parochial elementary and secondary schools as compared to Church-related institutions of higher learning. See Hunt, supra, 413 U.S. at 734, 93 S.Ct. 2868; Nyquist, supra, 413 U.S. at 776 n. 32, 93 S.Ct. 2967; and Lemon v. Kurtz-man, 403 U.S. 602, 615-620, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971). Yet, even in the instance of aid to parochial elementary and secondary schools, institutions which the Court referred to in Lemon, supra, 403 U.S. at 616, 91 S.Ct. 2105, as involving “substantial religious activity and purpose,” 9 aid in the form of secular textbooks was permitted in Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 88 S.Ct. 1923, 20 L.Ed.2d 1060 (1968). In Tilton, supra, 403 U.S. at 681, 91 S.Ct. at 2097, the Court specifically took note that “[in Allen] the Court refused to assume that religiosity in. parochial elementary and secondary schools necessarily permeates the secular education that they provide.” The Court has also twice specifically rejected such a proposition with respect to Church-related institutions of higher learning, in Tilton, supra, 403 U.S. at 680-681, 91 S.Ct. 2091, and Hunt, supra, 413 U.S. at 663, 93 S.Ct. 2868. In Tilton the Court enumerated factors which might suffice to invalidate Government aid to educational institutions under this category of the effect test. Among these were religious restrictions on admissions, required attendance at religious activities, compelled obedience to the doctrines and dogmas of a particular faith, required instruction in theology and doctrine, and a general purpose of propagating a particular religion.10

While we recognize that comparisons of the situation sub judice with the aid-to-education decisions of the Supreme Court can be misleading, we do not believe that the record shows the Pageant to be the type of institution with which the Court was concerned when it spoke of one “in which religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion of its functions are subsumed in the religious mission.” The governing body *72of the Pageant, the Christmas Pageant of Peace, Inc., is a non-sectarian, nonpartisan, non-profit civic organization organized and promoted by the Washington Board of Trade; its reason for existence is not the furtherance of a religious mission, but, bluntly speaking, the furtherance of tourism in the District of Columbia; it accomplishes this through a Pageant celebrating the national legal holiday of Christmas, dedicated to peace and understanding and following the admirable theme of “Peace on Earth, Goodwill Toward Men;” the Pageant itself is not subsumed in religiosity, but rather the creche, the only religious symbol in the celebration, is one of many integral displays and is manifestly utilized only to emphasize the religious heritage aspect of the Christmas holiday; finally, although good motives cannot save impermissible actions, the Supreme Court has made clear that analysis of activities and reason for being can have a direct bearing on the permeation of religiosity in any institution.11 It would be carrying the logic of the primary effect test to an unwarranted extreme to find in this case that appellant’s proof that the creche was a patently religious symbol met its burden of showing that the Pageant is “an institution in which religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion of its functions are subsumed in the religious mission.” See Hunt, supra, 413 U.S. at 746 n. 8, 93 S.Ct. at 2876.

Such a finding does not save the Government’s involvement with the Pageant from further scrutiny, for its association with the Pageant — an activity we classify as “substantially secular” —may nevertheless be prohibited because of its contact with an ostensibly “sectarian” aspect thereof, the creche.12

The Government, of course, must comply with the mandates of the Constitution. Where it becomes involved in activities that are subject to First Amendment scrutiny it must take pains to limit its involvement in such a way that it results in no “direct and immediate” effect advantageous to religion. Failure to so limit its involvement can (as in Nyquist, supra) render such involvement constitutionally defective, and the degree of religiosity permeating the activity with which it is involved can have a direct bearing on what controls it must establish. As the Court stated in Hunt, supra, 413 U.S. at 746, 93 S.Ct. at 2875:

The Court’s opinion in Lemon and the plurality opinion in Tilton are grounded on the proposition that the degree of entanglement arising from inspection of facilities as to use varies in large measure with the extent to which religion permeates the institution.

Although that language appeared in the discussion of excessive entanglement, we find it accentuates the fact that we are involved in a balancing test, considering variables such as the degree of sectarianism in the institution or event with which the Government is involved, the extent of the Government’s involvement, and the controls placed thereon13 It is *73that balancing test which determines whether the Government involvement has more than a “remote and incidental effect beneficial to religious institutions.”

We do not agree with Judge Leventhal that the Supreme Court’s admonishment in Levitt v. Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 480, 93 S.Ct. 2814, 2819, 37 L.Ed.2d 5091 (1973), that “the State is constitutionally compelled to assure that the state-supported activity is not being used for religious indoctrination,” can somehow work to procedurally change the burden of proof as to the ultimate effect of the Government’s involvement once the appellant has offered evidence that the creche is a patently religious symbol.14 The relevance of our disagreement on that factor is minimal, however, for de novo review of the record convinces us that the evidence clearly shows, when considering the nature of the Government’s involvement and the overall effect of the creche, that the Government’s involvement is constitutionally permissible.

We do not dispute that the creche is an obvious religious symbol, nor do we consider lightly the testimony of plaintiff’s witnesses concerning its effect upon them. Yet when we engage in the inevitable “line drawing” that this and other First Amendment problems require, see United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 93 S.Ct. 2665, 37 L.Ed.2d 500 (1973), we do not find the Government’s involvement constitutionally infirm. In reaching such a conclusion we are particularly impressed by the following factors: (1) the secularized nature of the Pageant and, to a certain degree, of the Christmas holiday season itself; (2) the utilization of the creche only to manifest the religious heritage aspect of the Christmas celebration, as only one of many “traditional aspects of our national history associated with Christmas”; (3) the presence of explanatory plaques on the grounds of the Pageant which state, inter alia:

The National Park Service sponsors the Pageant on the basis that this National Celebration Event is wholly see-*74ular in character, purpose, and main effect. The illuminated creche display is intended to be reverential to the religious heritage aspect of Christmas; but that display is not meant, and should not be taken, either to promote religious worship, or profane the symbols of any religion;

(4) the fact that the Government involvement is limited to the non-creche aspects of the Pageant, and apparently is similar in kind to that regularly supplied by the Government to other national celebration events; and finally, (5) the fact that the creche should not be considered in isolation but as an integral part of the whole of the Pageant, and that the question with which this court is faced is not whether the creche, considered in isolation, has a religious effect, but whether the Government’s limited involvement in the Pageant — an admittedly secular event whose only “religious” content is that it recognizes the religious heritage aspect of Christmas by means of an admittedly religious symbol — has more than a “remote and incidental” effect advantageous to religion.

III. Excessive Entanglement

In Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 674, 90 S.Ct. 1409, 25 L.Ed.2d 697 (1970), a decision upholding the constitutionality of property tax exemptions for religious organizations, the Supreme Court enunciated an “excessive entanglement” approach to First Amendment questions. The Court noted that “the policy of neutrality” required by the First Amendment “seeks to minimize” a kind of “day-to-day” relationship between Church and government, and that the policy of tax exemptions for Church property was enhanced because it furthered the desired insulation and separation between the two. One year later in Lemon, supra, the Court elaborated on the approach and, in what has been described as a “doctrinal departure,” treated it as a distinct third test to be considered apart from either the purpose or primary effect tests.15 Lemon, basically dealt with aid to parochial elementary and secondary schools in the form of salary supplements for teachers. The Court noted, 403 U.S. at 619, 91 S.Ct. at 2114, that the religious permeation in the schools was of such a degree that “[a] comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance will inevitably be required to ensure that [the] restrictions [implemented to prevent the funds from being used for religious purposes] are obeyed and the First Amendment otherwise respected.” Noting that “we cannot ignore here the danger that pervasive modern governmental power will ultimately intrude on religion and thus conflict with the Religion Clauses,” 403 U. S. at 620, 91 S.Ct. at 2115, the Court concluded that the prophylatic administrative contacts required would “involve excessive and enduring entanglement between state and church.” 403 U.S. at 619, 91 S.Ct. at 2114. Importantly, Lemon also recognized a second branch of the entanglement test, the possibility that such Governmental action will result in intensified “[p]olitical fragmentation and divisiveness on religious lines” because of “the need for continuing annual appropriations and the likelihood of larger and larger demands as costs and populations grow.” 403 U.S. at 623, 91 S.Ct. at 2116. The entanglement test is thus concerned with both administrative and political ramifications of Government involvement, and is geared to minimize interference, monitoring, and any divisive impact among the people.16

*75While the contacts and conflicts inherent in the Government’s position on various committees of the Christmas Pageant of Peace, Inc. amount to considerably less than involvement in the everyday working affairs of a religious institution, and considerably less than the constant surveillance and interference discussed in Lemon, we must agree with Judge Leventhal that the membership of government officials on various of the committees presents entanglement difficulties.

Again, the involvement we consider here today is novel in terms of Supreme Court precedent and thus does not fit well in the pigeonholes of past decisions. The test, however, emanates from the principle that Government involvement with religion should be kept to a necessary minimum, and that there should be avoided not only the actual interference but also the potential for and appearance of interference with religion. Judge Leventhal has enumerated instances where Government officials have been placed in (at best) awkward positions because of the conflict between their roles as representatives of the Government and decision makers on the planning and other committees. Although the officials involved have maintained an admirable “even keel” and desire for fairness in dealing with the sensitive matters thrust upon them, in view of the limited purpose such membership serves and the goal of minimal contacts, and considering the conflicts of the past, possibility for conflicts in the future, and inference; some may draw from the Government membership, this type of activity should not be engaged in by representatives of the Government and is constitutionally prohibited by the First Amendment.17

Although the Government could completely put an end to any semblance of entanglement by terminating its role m the Pageant, we cannot conclude that such action is constitutionally required. When the Government disassociates itself from membership un various committees its involvement can be limited to nominal co-sponsorship in terms of labor and equipment provided for the construction and disassembly of the non-creche aspects of the Pageant. The administrative contacts would be minimal —certainly no greater than those found proper in Tilton and Hunt — for there need be only so much as is necessary to assure that the labor and equipment provided is not utilized for the creche. Political divisiveness would be minimal (especially in view of the regulations that we require to assure continued neutrality), and although continuing on a yearly basis the involvement would not be subject to pressures i v increased aid by way of continuing appropriations of the nature involved in Lemon and Ny-quist.

The Supreme Court has in the past been influenced, either when considering involvement from the standpoint of entanglement or primary effect, by the “neutrality” of a specific Governmental action. Thus, in Wain Mr. Justice Harlan in his separate opinion noted that “noninvolvement is further assured by the neutrality and breadth of the exemption,” 397 U.S. at 698, 90 S.Ct. at 1426, and in Nyquist Mr. Justice Powell, when discussing the effect of Governmental involvement, noted, 413 U.S. at 782, 93 S.Ct. at 2970 n. 38:

Allen and Everson differ from the present cace in a se.-end important respect. In both cases tne ejass oí beneficiaries included all school children, those in public as wen ■?<■' those in p-'-vate schools. See also Tilton v, Richardson, supra, in which federal aid was made available to all institutions *76of higher learning, and Walz v. Tax Commission, supra, in which tax exemptions were accorded, to all educational and charitable nonprofit institutions.

We deeply respect and adhere to Mr. Justice Douglas’ admonition in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314, 72 S.Ct. 679, 684, 96 L.Ed. 954 (1952) that “[t]he government must be neutral when it comes to competition between sects,” but we find no evidence that neutrality is violated here. The unrefuted evidence in the record is that the Government’s involvement with the Pageant is similar to the cooperation it provides “to other private organizations which sponsor the production of officially recognized national celebration events, such as the Cherry Blossom Festival, the President’s Cup Regatta, the National Independence (Fourth of July) Celebration.” This cooperation is based on a desire to further the secularized themes of these events, booster tourism, and best utilize the “park areas in the very recreational aspects to which Congress has directed their primary dedication.” See 16 U.S. C. §§ 1, 20-20g (1970). There has been no showing that the selection of the Pageant of Peace (which attracts nearly a half-million visitors a year18) as an event to support is based upon any other purpose, nor that it has any other primary effect. To assure that this neutrality continues and is not the subject of continuing controversy, we require that if the Government desires to continue its support of the Pageant it must promulgate regulations governing such involvement, as set out in the Court’s Per Curiam opinion.19

Accordingly, we remand the ease to the District Court for proper disposition in accordance with the Per Curiam opinion.

Judge Leventhal is of the view that while he does not discern in what respect a new regulation that comports with the requirement of neutral principles and non-discriminatory criteria could run afoul of the Estab-lisliment clause, he would prefer to withhold any pronouncement on that issue pending the emergence of such regulation and of any legal controversy that may take shape.

. See Allen v. Morton, 333 F.Supp. 1088, 1092 (D.D.C.1971), and the references to the record contained therein:

[T]lie basic purpose of the Pageant, however clothed, has always been admittedly secular It was to provide a colorful event during the Christmas season which would attraet visitors to Washington and thereby increase the business of local merchants.

. See The Story of the Christmas Pageant of Peace, 197Ó Program, PI. Exhibit, 2, ani the text of the plaques similarly titled and installed on the grounds of the Pageant on our recommendation, reprinted at 333 F. Supp. 1095 n.6. We agree with Judge Leventhal that caution must he taken in utilizing the language of the plaques, since they were written in light of this litigation and thus are susceptible to self-serving statements. However, we find that their message is essentially the same as that consistently given in the Programs from past years. See, e. g., the 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1970 Programs, Def. Ex. 51, 53, Pl. Ex. 15, 17, 18, 2.

. We noted in Allen v. Hickel, 138 U.S.App.D.C. 31, 424 F.2d 944, 949 (1970), following reference to printed material in an official Pageant of Peace pamphlet:

This language as to purpose of the Pageant sets forth that the creche was intended to be simply one of a group of objects assembled to show how the American people celebrate the holiday season surrounding Christmas. As such its purpose is no more objectionable than that of a postage stamp bearing a reproduction of a religious painting or a Government-sponsored museum display illustrating various religious or holiday customs.

See Affidavit of Russell Dickerson, Associate Regional Director, National Capital Region, National Park Service, Def. Ex. 1. para. 3:

The National Park Service views its official cooperation with the Christmas Pageant for Peace, Inc., in the production of the Christmas Pageant, and in making the Ellipse (President’s Park) area available to that organization, on its request, in connection with that event, as proper National Park Service functions. We similarly extend our cooperation to other private organizations which sponsor the production of officially recognized national celebration events, such as the Cherry Blossom Festival, the President’s Cup Regatta, the National Independence (Fourth of July) Celebration. We likewise cooperate in other National-Capital-Park-connected events in the Nation’s Capital. The officially recognized national celebration events in particular attract to the National Capital Park areas thousands of visitors who are thus enabled to enjoy those park areas in the very recreational aspects to which Congress has directed their primary dedication. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1, 20-20g; 36 C.F.R. § 50.19(d)(2).

. For a compact discussion of the development of purpose, primary effect, and excessive entanglement tests see Note, The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 Harv.L.Rev. 1, 171-173 (1971).

. These figures represent the breakdown for the 1970 Pageant, and are the most recent available in the record. See The 1970 Christmas Pageant of Peace Program, PI. Ex. 2.

. See Def. Ex. 1, attachment 112.

. See Def. Ex. 1, attachment E.

. Our interpretation of the “subsumed” test is one which automatically disqualifies any form of assistance or Covernmental involvement with a particular institution because the institution is so sectarian that even what would normally be considered its secular functions are subsumed in a religious mission. In Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 680, 91 S.Ct. 2091, 2097, 29 L.Ed.2d 790 (1971), the Court stated :

Under this concept appellants’ position depends on the validity of the proposition that religion so permeates the secular education provided by church-related colleges and universities that their religious and secular educational functions are in fact inseparable.

The Supreme Court has recognized that parochial elementary and secondary schools are institutions which closely approach this limit, although Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 88 S.Ct. 1923, 20 L.Ed.2d 1060 (1968), would seem to belie the proposition that separating the secular from sectarian is in all instances impossible.

. Some of the factors which the Court noted in l,eti-on in reaching such a conclusion ore the prorimity to parish churches, the religious symbols and statutory adorning the school buildings, religiously oriented extracurricular activities, and the dedicated efforts ■ of the nuns who comprised ai>proxi-mately two-thirds of the teachers to provide an atmosphere in which religious instruction and vocations are natural and proper parts of the life in such schools. These various characteristics make the schools “a powerful vehicle for transmitting the Catholic faitli to the next generation.”

. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 682, 91 S.Ct. 2091, 29 L.Ed.2d 790 (971).

. Id. See also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 616, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971).

. The second part of the primary effect test, “[a]id normally may be thought to have a primary effect of advancing religion . . . when it funds a specifically religious activity in an otherwise substantially secular setting,” Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743, 93 S.Ct. 2868, 2874, 37 L.Ed.2d 923 (1973), recognizes that unless restricted and controlled, Government involvement may advance religiosity even though the institution with which it is involved is not subsumed in a religious mission.

. The Pageant, as previously discussed, is not subsumed in a religious mission, but it cannot be ignored that the religious symbol contained in the Pageant can have a religious effect, and the degree of this effect can vary according to how it is utilized. In turn, the effect of the Government’s involvement therewith can vary according to the restrictions and controls placed thereon. A balancing of all of these factors determines if the effect of the Government’s involvement *73is more than remotely or incidentally beneficial to religious institutions.

The creche as used in the Pageant is not supposed to have a sectarian effect in the sense of advancing any religious belief. The reality of the situation — considering its status as a Christian religious symbol — leaves open for debate whether its use is susceptible to misinterpretation, and the Government’s involvement looked upon as an imprimatur of the belief that it symbolizes.

. In addition to the Levitt reference, Judge Leventhal draws support for his burden-shifting theory from Mr. Chief Justice Burger’s statement in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 2111, 29 L.Ed. 2d 745 (1971), that the State legislatures created statutory restrictions designed to guarantee that the State financial aid supported only the secular educational function “in candid recognition that these programs approached, even if they did not intrude upon, the forbidden areas under the Religion Clauses.” Our prior opinion noted that “[p]erhaps an appropriate accompanying plaque, rather than a mere explanation in pamphlets with lesser circulation, might serve ... to allay the impression of Government sponsorship of religious belief . . . . ” Allen v. Hickel, 138 U. S.App.D.C. 31, 424 F.2d 944, 949 (1970). We look upon such remarks as indicating only that the Government must recognize its burden to separate out the secular from sectarian when it becomes involved in activities that purportedly raise First Amendment difficulties. This it is constitutionally required to do. Yet, the appellant bears the procedural burden of showing that the Government has failed in its constitutional obligations. See, e. g., Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 746, n.8, 93 S.Ct. 2868, 2876, 37 L.Ed.2d 923 (1973), and Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672, 681-682, 91 S.Ct. 2091, 29 L.Ed.2d 790 (1971), where the plaintiffs’ failure to introduce sufficient evidence to convince the Court that the religious and secular educational functions of Church-related institutions were inseparable resulted in a failure on its part to carry the burden of proving that a primary effect of the Government’s involvement advanced religion. Thus, although it is the Government’s obligation to comply with the mandates of the First Amendment it is the jilaintiff’s burden to prove that the Government has failed in this obligation.

. See Note, The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 Harv.L.Rev. 1, 108 (1971).

. See id. at 172-78:

The important factors now excluded from the effect criterion — the impact of the legislation on “voluntarism in matters of religion, mutual abstention of the political and religious caretakers, and governmental neutrality toward religion and between religion and non-religion” [see Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 Ilarv.L. Rev. 1680, 1684 (1969)] — are considered during the course of the separate inquiry into entanglement. (Footnote omitted.)

. Although the creche “is exclusively the property of the Christmas Pageant of Peace, Inc.” and all activities regarding storage, maintenance, repair, erection and disas-sembly of the creche is “the responsibility of the non-Federal membership of the Pageant of Peace Committee,” See Feh Ex. 1, para. 5, attachments E and F, discontinuance of membership on these committees -will further insulate the Government from conflict producing situations regarding the creche.

. See Pl.Ex. 38.

. Mr. Justice Harlan discussed his theory of what “neutrality” requires in Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 696, 90 S.Ct. 1409, 1425, 25 L.Ed.2d 697 (1970). (Harlan, J., concurring) :

Neutrality in its application requires an equal protection mode of analysis. The Court must survey meticulously the circumstances of governmental categories to eliminate, as it were, religious gerrymanders. In any particular case the critical question is- whether the circumference of legislation encircles a-class so broad that it can be fairly'' concluded that religious institutions could be thought to fall within the natural perimeter.

The Pageant of Peace, while certainly not a religious institution, is an event which “fall[s] within the natural perimeter” of those activities to which the Government has in the past rendered support of one kind or another. It is a major tourist attraction which enhances business in the District, utilizes Park land in a recreational sense, and fosters a principle — this nation’s desire for peace and understanding — with which the Government can indeed associate itself. These “neutral principles” govern the Government’s involvement, and we cannot find in the record evidence to convince us that the one religious aspect of the Pageant gives an unwarranted and unconstitutional effect to that involvement.

Absolute neutrality is different from constitutional neutrality, and thus statements that the Government is not “absolutely” neutral — in that here it co-sponsors an event with a Christian religious symbol while it does not co-sponsor one with a non-Christian or, to the extent possible, a non-secular symbol — do not move me to automatically conclude that its action is constitutionally defective. The primary effect test itself is proof of such a distinction, for an action of the Government not “absolutely” neutral between religions or between religions and non-religion is not automatically unconstitutional — it is subject to scrutiny to determine if this lack of “absolute” neutrality has more than a remote and incidental effect beneficial to a religious organization. As Mr. Justice Douglas noted in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313, 72 S.Ct. 679, 683, 96 L.Ed. 954 (1952) : “A fastidious atheist or agnostic could even object to the supplication with which the Court opens each session: ‘God save the United States and this Honorable Court.’ ” Indeed, such a statement is not absolutely neutral, yet is it constitutionally defective?