On this appeal from an order entered in a Chapter XI proceeding in the Southern District of New York, John M. Cannella, District Judge, the sole question is whether voluntary payment by a customs broker of United States customs duties due from an importer entitles the broker in the importer’s Chapter XI proceeding to the priority to which the government would be entitled for debts due the government. The district court and the bankruptcy referee answered the question in the negative. We affirm.
Appellant Taub, Hummel & Sehnall, Inc. (Taub) is a customs broker. Appellee I. C. Herman & Co., Inc. (Herman) is an importer of goods from abroad. Taub acted as customs broker for Herman. The goods without exception were imported in Herman’s name.
A bond in amount of $50,000 was executed by Herman as principal pursuant to which Herman agreed to pay to the government customs duties on its imported goods. Taub did not execute this or any other bond, either as principal or surety, for the payment of Herman’s customs duties.1
*1302During the period from March 3, 1972 through April 7, 1972, Taub voluntarily and without obligation advanced the sum of $32,048.45 in payment of Herman’s customs duties due on Herman’s imports.
On April 6, Herman filed a petition for an arrangement pursuant to Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act. 11 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (1970). In due course, Taub filed in the Chapter XI proceeding a claim for $46,779.54. Of this total claim, Taub classified as a priority claim the $32,048.45 of Herman’s customs duties which it had paid to the government.2 Upon application to the bankruptcy referee, Herman obtained an order reclassifying Taub’s $32,048.45 priority claim as a general unsecured claim.
On Taub’s petition to review, the district court affirmed the referee’s reclassification of Taub’s claim as a general unsecured claim and held that it was not entitled to priority status.
Taub argues that, as a result of discharging Herman’s obligations to the government arising from the assessment of import duties, it is entitled to the priority to which the United States would be entitled for debts due the government. Taub’s priority claim in essence is based on principles of subrogation. Having paid customs duties due from Herman to the United States, Taub says that it is entitled to succeed to the government’s rights against Herman, including the government’s priority claim in bankruptcy proceedings for unpaid customs duties.
Priority by subrogation, however, has been granted only in the limited situation provided for in 31 U.S.C. § 193 (1970):
“Whenever the principal in any bond given to the United States is insolvent . . . , and . . . any surety on the bond . . . pays to the United States the money due upon such bond, such surety . . . shall have the like priority for the recovery and receipt of the moneys out of the estate and effects of such insolvent . as is secured to the United States. . . .”
In view of this statutory provision, the question before us is whether the fact that Taub was not a surety on the bond executed by Herman for the payment of custpms duties forecloses Taub’s priority claim.
We hold, as did the district court and the bankruptcy referee below, that the rationale of our decision in R. J. Saunders & Co., Inc. v. Vincent, 309 F.2d 65 (2 Cir. 1962), aff’g 202 F.Supp. 140 (S.D.N.Y.1962), requires that Taub’s claim be treated as a general unsecured claim without priority status. In Saunders, a customs broker, in order to expedite entry of imports, see Union Brokerage Company v. Jensen, 322 U.S. 202, 204 (1944), had paid customs duties due from the bankrupt importer. We rejected the contention of the customs broker that it was entitled to succeed to the rights of the United States against the bankrupt, including the government’s right to have its claim accorded priority status in the distribution of the bankrupt’s estate. And we pointed out that “Congress has allowed subrogated priority in only one situation — that in which a surety on a bond given to the United States discharges the debt on behalf of his principal.” 309 F.2d at 67.3
We recognize that Saunders differs from the instant case in certain respects. There, unlike here, the customs broker *1303was the nominal consignee and the importer of record; and the broker also was the principal on the bond furnished to the government. Since the broker did not stand as surety for the importer, however, we refused in Saunders to extend the statute by implication to accord priority to the broker’s claim. Likewise here we decline Taub’s invitation to extend Section 193 to accord its claim subrogated priority status, thus altering the strict priority provisions of Section 64 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1970). See In Re Chicago Express, Inc., 332 F.2d 276, 278-79 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 879 (1964).
Finally, we reject as a non sequitur Taub’s argument that a holding in the instant case affirming its classification as a general unsecured creditor, read in conjunction with the Saunders holding that subrogated priority is not available when the broker is the nominal consignee and importer of record, means that there is no conceivable situation in which a broker can achieve priority status by paying the customs duties owed by an importer. The short answer to this is that all a customs broker need do to gain priority is to go surety on the importer’s customs duty bond.
Affirmed.
. In an affidavit, submitted in support of Taub’s priority claim in the instant proceeding, its president stated:
“It is clear therefore that the broker, my corporation, Taub, Hummel and Sehnall, Inc. was at no time obligated to pay any *1302part of the debtor’s duties to the United States government.”
. The $14,731.09 difference between Taub’s total claim of $40,779.54 and its asserted priority claim of $32,048.45 represented certain importing charges, other than customs duties, which Taub had advanced on behalf of Herman.
Of the $32,048.45 in customs duties claimed to have been paid by Taub on behalf of Herman prior to the latter’s filing of its Chapter XI petition, apparently $128.11 was paid on April 7, the day after the petition was filed.
. The “one situation” is 31 U.S.C. § 193 (1970), referred to above. As Judge Clark pointed out in Saunders, this statute has been in force since 1799 without amendment 1 Stat. 670 (1799).