(concurring in part and dissenting in part):
I agree with the majority’s affirmance of the first summary contempt citation under Rule 42(a) and I also agree with its affirmance of the finding of contempt that occurred on August 6, 1973. However, I do not believe that the second summary contempt citation, that is, the one relating to appellant’s lack of cooperation in the selection of alternate jurors, should be affirmed. Accordingly, I feel constrained to register my partial dissent.
The refusal to answer separate successive questions of a court can undoubtedly support separate findings of contempt. However, this Court has indicated that,
“[wjhere the separate questions seek to establish but a single fact, or relate to but a single subject of inquiry, only one penalty for contempt may be imposed.”1
I feel that this rule should be applied here.
In this case, appellant’s lack of response to two separate questions formed the basis for the district court’s two summary contempt citations. While the district court phrased and rephrased the two questions in slightly varying ways, it essentially made the following inquiries: 1) Do you object to any of the prospective jurors because of their backgrounds? and 2) Do you object to any of *1131the prospective alternate jurors because of their background? The issue to be resolved is whether or not these two questions “relate to but a single subject of inquiry” ? I believe they do.
While the two questions are distinguishable as relating to different groups of prospective jurors, I do not believe that our ability to make this technical distinction should be dispositive. The more important consideration is whether the party being questioned could have reasonably viewed the two questions as related to separate subjects.2
When the issue is viewed from this perspective, I can only conclude that appellant perceived the selection of jurors and alternate jurors as part of a single process — that is, the jury selection process.3 Thus, when the questioning switched from the demand that he object to jurors, to the demand that he object to alternate jurors, he perceived no change in the “subject of the inquiry.” This new line of questioning, from appellant’s viewpoint, was but a reiteration of the original demand — that is, that he participate in the selection of jurors.4 As a result, I would hold that the questions giving rise to appellant’s two acts of defiance related to a single subject of inquiry and that the second finding of contempt cannot stand.
Moreover, I note that the same result appears to be dictated by a slightly different rule of law first enunicated in Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66, 78 S.Ct. 128, 2 L.Ed.2d 95 (1957). In that case, the court held that once a witness has “carved out” an area in which he refuses to respond to questions, the refusal to respond to further questions that are within that defined area will not support additional contempt citations.
The application of this rule here seems apparent. When asked repeatedly to participate in the selection of jurors, appellant responded by saying at various times, “[t]he clerk can do it. I have no wish to pick a jury.” (July 3, 1973, Transcript at 2); " . . . I have nothing to do with the jury. You all can pick it.” (Tr. at 5); “I am not going to pick the jury. ... I don’t think I am competent to pick a jury.” (Tr. 6). In my opinion, these statements indicate a clear intent to “carve out” as an area of nonresponse all questions that require him to participate in the jury selection process.
Furthermore, while we would be technically correct if we held that appellant’s statements failed to specifically extend his defiance to questions that related to the selection of alternate jurors, such a holding would not only ignore appellant’s intent, it would also tend to undercut the policies that form the basis for the Court’s opinion in Yates 5 Appellant is not a laywer and nothing in the record *1132indicates that he has a high degree of legal sophistication. Therefore, he should not be held to a literal reading of the words he uses when he “carves out” an area of non-response.6 Moreover, I again note that we are dealing with summary contempt proceedings so that any substantial doubts should be resolved in appellant’s favor.7 As a result this second rule of law leads me to the same conclusion — that the second summary contempt citation is improper.
Finally, I feel constrained to note that while I concur in the affirmance of the first summary contempt citation, I feel the issue is extremely close. As this court recently noted,
“summary contempt power can constitutionally reach ‘only such conduct as created “an open threat to the orderly procedure of the court and such a flagrant defiance of the person and presence of the judge before the public” that if “not instantly suppressed and punished, demoralization of the court’s authority will follow.” ’ ” Jessup v. Clark, supra, 490 F.2d at 1071.
As I read the transcript of the proceedings that occurred on July 3, 1973, I find it difficult to conclude that appellant’s conduct created such a serious threat. However, I do note that the events occurred in the presence of the prospective jurors and that the district court had the benefit of demeanor evidence in judging appellant’s intentions and his effect on the proceedings. As a result, I cannot conclude that the district court was clearly erroneous when it found that appellant intended to obstruct the proceedings or when it concluded that the behavior had to be immediately suppressed.
However, I do feel that the district court may have had an alternate route available to it. A summary contempt citation is an extreme remedy and should only be used when more moderate means fail. In this case, appellant’s responses to the court, supra at page 1131 suggest the possibility that he was merely trying to waive his right to participate in the selection of the jury.
Despite this plausible interpretation of appellant’s statements, however, no attempt was made by the district court to ascertain whether this was his true intent nor was any attempt made to lay the basis for a knowing waiver.8 I believe the district court could possibly have acted on the assumption that appellant’s responses constituted a noncontemptuous waiver and have pursued this course until its inappropriateness became clear. Only then would it have been necessary to resort to a summary contempt citation. While in fairness to the district court, I should note that it may have acted in response to circumstances that are not apparent from the record, I do urge generally that use of the summary contempt power be viewed as an extreme step, to be taken only when other more moderate methods of dealing with disruptive situations have failed.
. United States v. Orman, 207 F.2d 148, 160 (3d Cir. 1953), cited with approval in, Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66, 73, 78 S.Ct. 128, 2 L.Ed.2d 95 (1957).
. Furthermore, since a summary contempt proceeding under Rule 42(a), “dispenses with procedural safeguards ordinarily deemed essential to fair criminal trials,” its scope is “severely restricted.” Jessup v. Clark, 490 F.2d 1068, 1071 (3d Cir. 1973). As a result, I feel that any substantial doubt on the issue should be resolved in appellant’s favor. United States v. Kamin, 135 F.Supp. 382 (D.Mass.1955).
. Appellant’s underlying motive in refusing to participate in this aspect of the proceedings might have been to obstruct their progress (as the district court found), to effect a waiver of his right to challenge jurors, or to simply avoid a confusing situation. However, regardless of his underlying motive, the absence of any perception on his part of a change in subject matter when the district court’s focus shifted from the selection of jurors to the selection of alternate jurors appears plain from 'a reading of the record.
. Indeed, the district court’s phrasing of the second question at times suggests that even it did not perceive the selection of jurors and alternate jurors as separate matters of inquiry. On two occasions, the district court asked that the defendant exercise his right to object to “jurors” when, in fact, the jurors had already been selected and all that remained was the selection of alternate jurors.
. In that case, the court explained its holding as follows:
“The Government admits, pursuant to the holding of United States v. Costello, 2 Cir., 198 F.2d 200, that only one contempt would result if Mrs. Yates had flatly refused on June 26 to answer any questions and had maintained such a position. *1132We deem it a fortiori true that where a witness draws the lines of refusal in less sweeping fashion by declining to answer questions within a generally defined area of interrogation, the prosecutor cannot multiply contempts by further questions within that area. The policy of the law must he to encourage testimony; a witness willing to testify freely as to all areas of investigation hut one, should not he subject to more numerous charges of contempt than a witness unwilling to give any testimony at all.” 355 U.S. at 73. (Emphasis added.)
. I believe that the majority fails to take this into account and that this causes them to interpret appellant’s words in an overly technical and narrow way. As a result, technical legal consequences never contemplated by appellant are drawn from his specific words and actions. See majority opinion at page 1127.
. See note 3 supra.
. Moreover, the fact that it may be difficult to establish the technical requirements for a knowing waiver should in no way excuse a district court from undertaking this task when a defendant wishes to exercise his right of waiver. For this reason I disagree with any contrary conclusion that might be drawn from footnote 2 of the majority opinion.