On this appeal from an order entered in the District of Connecticut, T. Em-met Clarie, Chief Judge, dismissing a complaint in a civil rights action which sought declaratory and injunctive relief, the sole issue is whether Public Act 821 enacted by the Connecticut General Assembly in 1971, Conn.Gen.Stat. §§ 4-124Í through 4-124p (Supp.1972), which authorizes regional councils of government, *1188denies plaintiffs the equal protection of the laws because such council in the Hartford area is not apportioned on a one man, one vote basis. The district court held that there was no denial of equal protection and dismissed the complaint. We affirm.
Plaintiffs are a non-profit Connecticut corporation organized for educational, charitable and cultural purposes, together with three individual citizens of Connecticut, two of whom reside in the City of Hartford and one in the Town of Windsor. Defendants are the Chairman of the Capitol Regional Planning Agency (CRPA), the Chairman of the Capitol Region Council of Governments (CRCOG), the Secretary of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the Regional Director of that Department and twenty-nine individuals who are the chief elected officials of the twenty-nine towns which comprise the Capitol Region (i. e. the Hartford area).
In view of the district court’s adequate statement of the facts and the controlling law, 379 F.Supp. 1160, it is sufficient for our purpose merely to state the claims asserted and the district court’s rulings thereon with which we agree.
Plaintiffs challenge on equal protection grounds Public Act 821 which provides for the restructuring of the existing CRPA and CRCOG to create a new regional council of government if approved by at least 60% of the towns within the planning region — here, the Hartford area. Each member town of the new council is entitled to one representative on the council, such representative to be the chief elected official of that town.
The gravamen of plaintiffs’ claim is that the Act’s restructuring of the present regional bodies to create a new regional council in the Hartford area will result in under-representation of the City of Hartford on the new council. In the past Hartford has had five representatives on CRPA, or 8% of that body’s membership. On the new council Hartford will have four representatives. A 1973 amendment gave Hartford four representatives on the council instead of the one initially provided,1 the three additional council members to be appointed by Hartford’s city council. Special Act No. 73-79 .(effective May 14, 1973). Hartford has a population of approximately 160,000, or about 24% of the regional population. Thus, plaintiffs argue, Hartford’s vote will be greatly diluted, as compared for example with the Town of Andover, whose population is approximately 2,000, which will have one vote. Plaintiffs’ claim in essence is that the legislature’s failure to apportion the new regional council on a one man, one vote basis denies them the equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Application of the one man, one vote principle of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964),2 to various units of government in the State of Connecticut is no stranger to the Connecticut district court. E. g., Butterworth v. Dempsey, 229 F.Supp. 754 (D.Conn.1964) (state legislature), aff’d sub nom. Pinney v. Butterworth, 378 U.S. 564 (1964), on remand, 237 F.Supp. 302 (D.Conn.1964 and 1965); Kapral v. Jepson, 271 F. Supp. 74 (D.Conn.1967) (city board of aldermen); Giordano v. Amity Regional High School District #5, 313 F.Supp. 403 (D.Conn.1970) (regional board of education).
The critical question raised by defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which *1189relief can be granted, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), is whether the proposed regional council of government for the Hartford area is subject to the one man, one vote requirement. The district court held that it is not. We agree.
The statute in question does not provide for elective bodies.3 The councils do not exercise general governmental powers, nor do they perform governmental functions, within the meaning of Hadley v. Junior College District, 397 U.S. 50 (1970), and Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968). Indeed, the councils do not have even the minimal governmental powers found insufficient to invoke the one man, one vote principle in the Supreme Court’s most recent decisions in Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water District, 410 U.S. 719, 728 n. 7, 729 (1973), and Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec District, 410 U.S. 743 (1973).
The powers and functions of the councils are essentially to acquire information, to advise, to comment and to propose.4 As Judge Clarie aptly put it:
“To the extent that the [council] is able to provide a forum for an interchange of ideas and an atmosphere conducive to the development of solutions to regional problems which know no geographic boundaries, its importance should not be minimized. But this does not' bar recognition of the fact that it would be essentially advisory and non-governmental in both purpose and function, and the type of body which need not be apportioned on a strict numerical basis. As such, the [council] represents the kind of flexible experimentation which the Supreme Court has consistently recognized as being both desirable and constitutionally permissible.”
We agree.
We affirm on the well reasoned opinion of Judge Clarie below. 379 F.Supp. 1160 (D.Conn.1973).5
Affirmed.
. The statement in the district court opinion that Hartford would have one representative on the new council referred to the i>ro-vision in the Act prior to the 1973 amendment.
. Reynolds v. Sims implemented the Supreme Court’s earlier holding in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), that an assertion of constitutional right, as impaired by malapportionment according to population of representatives in state legislatures, presented a justi-ciable issue to be determined by the federal courts.
. Tile district court did not find it necessary to determine whether members of the council are elected or appointed, since the council clearly does not exercise general governmental powers nor does it perform governmental functions.
We do note, however, that at least some members of the council do not automatically become council members by virtue of their election to office in their respective towns. The three additional members from Hartford, referred to above, are appointed by the city council under Special Act 73-79. And at least the members from West Hartford, Wethersfield and Glastonbury are selected by the respective town councils after the voters elect the councils themselves.
. We agree with the district court’s conclusion that there was no issue before that court on the present record as to whether federal statutes or regulations of IIUD require fair representation of minority groups on policymaking bodies which control or significantly affect the disposition of federal funds. The councils are not conduits of federal funds, but only of information. Since federal certification of the councils here involved has been terminated, regulatory compliance was not an issue before the district court and it is not an issue before us.
. We note that our dissenting colleague addresses himself primarily to the question of whether a three-judge court should have been convened below. Arguing that such a court should have been convened, the dissent relies heavily upon our recent decision in Rosenthal v. Board of Education, 497 F.2d 726 (2 Cir. 1974). The dissent’s reliance on Rosenthal, in our view, is misplaced. In Ros-enthal, there was no question that the body involved performed substantial governmental functions (“There seems no doubt, as recognized by the district court, that the powers of a central high school district include substantial governmental functions.” 497 F.2d at 728). Here the proposed regional councils do not have general governmental powers and do not perform governmental functions.
It is axiomatic that a single judge may dismiss a complaint which attacks the constitutionality of a state statute and seeks an injunction against its enforcement if he finds that the complaint presents no substantial constitutional issue. E. g., Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512 (1973). Here the recent decisions of the Supreme Court in Salyer and Associated Bnterprises “inescapably render the [plaintiffs’] claims frivolous.” 409 U.S. at 538. The district court therefore properly dismissed jdaintiffs’ complaint without convening a three-judge court.