The sole issue on this habeas corpus appeal is whether James Stidham’s confession that he participated in the brutal slaying of a fellow inmate during a riot at the Missouri State Penitentiary was properly received in evidence at his state trial for murder. The state trial court held that the confession was voluntary and properly received in evidence. This ruling was affirmed by the Missouri Supreme Court. State v. Stidham, 305 S.W.2d 7 (Mo.1957), denial of motion to vacate sentence affirmed, 403 S.W.2d 616 (Mo.1966). The voluntariness of the confession was again sustained in a state post-conviction proceeding and the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed in State v. Stidham, 449 S.W.2d 634 (Mo. 1970). The United States District Court, Western District of Missouri, subsequently denied Stidham’s habeas corpus petition without an evidentiary hearing. It too found that Stidham’s confession was voluntary. Stidham v. Swenson, 328 F.Supp. 1291 (W.D.Mo. 1970). This Court reversed the District Court, holding that the state court had failed to comply with the requirements of Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964), in determining the voluntariness of the confession. We remanded to the District Court. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed, holding that the post-conviction determination was procedurally adequate and substantially acceptable under the due process clause. Swenson v. Stidham, 409 U.S. 224, 93 S.Ct. 359, 34 L.Ed.2d 431 (1972), modified, 410 U.S. 904, 93 S.Ct. 955, 35 L.Ed.2d 266 (1973). The Supreme Court remanded the matter to this Court with instructions to determine whether Stidham’s confession “was involuntary and inadmissible as a matter of law.” Swenson v. Stidham, supra at 409 U.S. 231, 93 S.Ct. at 363.
In making this determination, we must consider the totality of the circumstances and cannot override the state court’s determination unless it is established by “ * * * convincing evidence that the state courts’ determination [is] erroneous.” LaVallee v. Rose, 410 U.S. 690, 695, 93 S.Ct. 1203, 1206. 35 L.Ed.2d 637 (1973); Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 708, 87 S.Ct. 1338, 18 L.Ed.2d 423 (1967); Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 86 S.Ct. 1761, 16 L.Ed.2d 895 (1966).
An independent examination of the record convinces us that the state erred in finding the confession to be voluntary. This record, as that in Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S. 413, 88 S.Ct. 541, 19 L.Ed.2d 643 (1967), documents a shocking display of barbarism which should not escape remedial action.
The undisputed evidence is that James Stidham was confined to the Missouri State Penitentiary in May, 1952, pursuant to a twenty-five year sentence for robbery. In January, 1953, he was placed in solitary confinement for an attempted escape. The cell to which he was confined was fiye feet by seven feet. It had a wash basin, a toilet and a steel bunk with a straw tick as a mattress. It was infested with cockroaches, rodents and pigeons. It was poorly ventilated. He remained in the cell until July 12, 1954, when he was transferred to another cell where the conditions were substantially the same as those in the cell which he had just left, other than the new cell had no bunk on which to place the straw tick. Throughout the entire period, Stidham was not permitted to visit with family or friends. He left his cell on only one occasion, that for a court appearance.
At 6:30 P.M. on September 22, 1954, a riot occurred in the prison. About one hour later, Stidham was released from his cell by other rioters. At 10:00 P.M., the severely mutilated body of inmate *480Walter Donnell was found in a cell near the one in which Stidham had been confined. The riot was quelled in the early morning hours of September 23. On that day, several prisoners signed statements implicating Stidham as one of those participating in Donnell’s murder. Stidham was returned to his cell on death row immediately after the riot was brought under control. At that time, the floor was covered with water and his straw tick was soaked. He slept in a sitting position on the commode.
On September 23, 24, 25 and 26, Stidham was questioned about twenty-five times in his cell and once in the classification room by prison guards and state patrolmen with respect to his part in the Donnell murder. He consistently denied that he was guilty. He was given little or no food or water during the four-day period. He wrote a letter to his family on one of the days asking them to get him counsel. He delivered the letter to prison authorities, but they failed to mail it.
On September 27, Stidham was taken from his cell and removed to the prison field house. He was again interrogated in a small hot room with his hands handcuffed behind his back in the presence of at least two armed highway patrolmen and four armed St. Louis police officers.1 The questioning was persistent, but he continued to assert his innocence for about one-half hour. He then broke down and admitted that he had participated in Donnell’s murder. He followed this oral admission with a written statement of guilt.
Stidham was then returned to another cell and held there for two more days with little or no food or water and without opportunity to see anyone from outside the prison. He was arraigned two days later without the benefit of counsel even though he requested one in open court.
Stidham was at no time advised of his right to remain silent or to have the assistance of counsel.2
The state argues on appeal that Stidham’s claim for relief must be denied unless we accept his testimony that he was hung by his wrists and beaten. It cites Stidham’s testimony that he confessed only after he was beaten for the proposition that no other conduct was *481coercive. We reject this reasoning. It is for this Court to determine whether under the totality of the circumstances the confession was an involuntary one, and we hold they were. See Brooks v. Florida, supra; Clewis v. Texas, supra; Davis v. North Carolina, supra; Townsend v. Henderson, 405 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1968).
If a confession
* * * is the product of sustained pressure by the police it does not issue from a free choice. When a suspect speaks because he is overborne, it is immaterial whether he has been subjected to a physical or a mental ordeal. Eventual yielding to questioning under such circumstances is plainly the product of the suction process of interrogation and therefore the reverse of voluntary. * * *
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 53, 69 S.Ct. 1347, 1350, 93 L.Ed. 1801 (1949).
Here, the pressure on Stidham was sustained and unyielding. It included eighteen months of solitary confinement in subhuman conditions; persistent questioning by armed guards over a four-day period; deprivation of food and water over the same period; denial of an opportunity to have contact with counsel, family or friends; failure to advise as to the right to remain silent and the right to assistance of counsel; and a final interrogation by six heavily armed law officers in a remote field house. Contrary to the statement of the Missouri Supreme Court in State v. Stidham, supra at 449 S.W.2d at 643, there is not a scintilla of evidence that state witnesses had “categorically or implicitly refuted” Stidham’s claims as outlined in this paragraph. We have scoured the record from beginning to end, as we are sure that Judge Collinson did before us, and are thoroughly satisfied that the circumstances were as stated. What we have then is not a question of credibility but a dispute over whether the actual circumstances considered in their totality were such as to render the confession an involuntary one. Judge Collinson believed they were not. We believe they were.
We recognize that Stidham had been in solitary confinement for twenty months before the riot, and that conditions in the cell were probably not much worse after the riot than before. But this neither changes the fact that these conditions were at all times subhuman nor excuses the failure of prison officials to give him adequate food and water and an opportunity to contact someone from the outside after he was put back in solitary confinement In the light of all of the circumstances and in view of the persistent questioning in the face of his repeated denials, it must have become painfully evident to Stidham that he must either confess or continue to be treated as an animal. The state’s ease in no way explains why a hardened criminal such as Stidham would figuratively sign his own death warrant by confessing to a murder committed in a prison, save through the testimony of the law enforcement officers who conducted the confrontation in the prison field house and who, as we have noted, testified that they did not beat Stidham or hang him by the arms. This testimony does not refute the evidence of motive as introduced by Stidham, showing the confession as bottomed upon coercion.
The state also argues that some of the testimony relied upon by Stidham to establish the involuntariness of his confession was not alluded to at his initial trial and was brought forth as an after thought for the first time in the post-conviction proceeding. The best answer to this contention is that the state had a clear opportunity to refute any new testimony and failed to do so.
As we read the record, the testimony at the post-conviction hearing developed more thoroughly the fact that the defendant had been deprived of nourishment during the four-day period prior to his confession. The state’s only answer to this testimony was that the defendant did not complain of the absence of food or drink when he was brought to the *482field house, and that he appeared to be in good health. It offered no direct testimony that Stidham was, in fact, given food or water during this period.
Stidham did testify for the first time at his post-conviction hearing that he wrote a letter to his family which the prison authorities failed to deliver. The state did not deny that a letter had been delivered to it, nor did it offer any testimony which would tend to show that the passage of years had made it impossible for it to adduce evidence on the point.
The question of Stidham’s guilt or innocence is not now before us. We repeat that the issue is one of the voluntariness of a confession and we are unable to reach any conclusion other than that the defendant’s confession was coerced.
The record would indicate that Stidham was not a model prisoner, and there is substantial testimony in the record indicating that he participated in the brutal killings; but these facts do not excuse the use of an extorted confession. We remain a government of laws, and those charged with law enforcement have a special responsibility to see that the guilty as well as the innocent are given the protection of the Constitution. If we depart from this principle, we deal the administration of justice a heavy blow.
The judgment of the District Court denying the petition for writ of habeas corpus is vacated and the case is remanded. On remand, the District Court will enter appropriate orders consistent with this opinion, allowing the state reasonable time in which to retry the appellant if it desires to do so.
. Stidham testified at trial that he was hung by his wrists to the ceiling and beaten by his interrogators. The interrogators testified to the contrary. We accept the fact-finder’s determination that Stidham was neither beaten nor hung even though there is independent evidence in the record to support Stidham’s version.
. This statement of the undisputed facts is essentially the same as that adopted by the United States District Court. It found :
It is necessary to review the uncontroverted facts in order to determine this issue. Tiie murder was committed on September 22, 1954 and Stidham confessed on September 27, 1954. I-Ie was questioned intermittently up until that time concerning his part in the murder. He had very little food and very little sleep. At no time during this period was he informed of his right to counsel or to remain silent. In fact, he asserts that an attempt to get an attorney was thwarted when the prison authorities refused to allow a letter to be mailed. On the 27th, Stidham was taken to the Athletic Building and questioned by a number of officers who had hand guns and riot guns in their possession. Stidham asserts that he was physically abused and rendered unconscious at this time, and these acts resulted in Ids confession. Before and after the interrogations Stidham was in solitary confinement and no visitors, including parents or priest were allowed to see him. Other uncontradicted facts indicated that Stidham was deprived of food for two days after his confession and that he lost 25 pounds during the period of interrogation.
He had consistently denied all involvement in the murder up until the time of his confession.
Stidham v. Swenson, supra at 328 F.Supp. 1295-1296.
A careful review of the record convinces us that there is a doubt as to whether Stidham lost twenty-five pounds during the period of interrogation. We, therefore, reject that finding. The additional facts that we find to be relevant to the question of voluntariness of the confession are the size and condition of tire cell before and after the riot. Stidham’s testimony on these matters was easily refutable by available government witnesses if not true.