On this appeal, the issue is whether a women’s health and exercise club or studio is within the coverage of the public accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, we must determine whether such an establishment is a “place of entertainment” within the meaning of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(3), and therefore subject to its provisions. It is our conclusion that the health and exercise studios here involved are “place[s] of entertainment” within the intended coverage of the Act’s public accommodations provisions.
Appellants brought a class action under the Civil Rights Act against four New Orleans area Shape Spa health clubs or studios alleging racial discrimination in the membership policies of the studios.1 The parties filed cross motions *66for partial summary judgment on the issue of whether the studios were “placefs] of entertainment” within the ■meaning of the Act and submitted a joint stipulation of fact in connection with the motions. The district court found that the prime purpose of the health studios was “the very serious one of improving physical well-being and any resultant entertainment flowing from use of the clubs’ facilities and execution of their program would be nominal and on an individual, and not public, basis.” Concluding that the generally accepted meaning of the phrase, “place of entertainment”, did not encompass the defendant health studios, the district court granted appellees’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action.2 We do not agree with the conclusion of the district court and therefore we reverse its order granting appellees’ motion for partial summary judgment.
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination or segregation on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin in places of public accommodations whose operations affect commerce. Sections 2000a(a), (b)(3), and (c)(3) of 42 U.S.C. provide:
(a) All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of- public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion or national origin.
(b) Each of the following establishments which serves the public is a place of public accommodation within the meaning of this subchapter if its operations affect commerce .
(3) any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium or other place of exhibition or entertainment
(c) The operations of an establishment affect commerce within the meaning of this title if (3) in the case of an establishment described in paragraph (3) of subsection (b) of this section, it customarily presents films, performances, athletic teams, exhibitions or other sources of entertainment which move in commerce
The facilities operated by the appellees are used by approximately 9,000 to 12,-000 members per year, some of whom are members of similar health clubs in other- states to whom the appellees make available their facilities on a reciprocal basis. The appellees regularly advertise for members on television and in large daily newspapers, solicit memberships by telephone, and generally use media which cross state lines. At least 90% of the equipment used in the health clubs of the appellees was manufactured outside of the state of Louisiana and “moved” in commerce. In our opinion the record clearly supports the conclusion that the operations of the appellees affect commerce within the meaning of the above quoted statute.3
*67One of the purposes of the public accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was to eliminate the unfairness, humiliation, and insult of racial discrimination in facilities which purport to serve the general public. H.R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 18 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1964, p. 2355. This circuit, en banc, while acknowledging that the Act was not intended to cover all establishments, has committed itself to the view that § 2000a(b)(3) must be read “with open minds attuned to the clear and strong purpose of the Act, namely, to secure for all citizens the full enjoyment of facilities described in the Act which are open to the general public.” Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 394 F.2d 342, 349 (5th Cir. 1968). In Miller this court concluded that an amusement park was a “place of entertainment,” reasoning that the phrase included “both establishments which present shows, performances and exhibitions to a passive audience and those establishments which provide recreational or other activities for the amusement or enjoyment of its patrons.” 394 F.2d at 350. The Supreme Court, in Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 89 S.Ct. 1697, 23 L.Ed.2d 318 (1969), endorsed the view of this circuit that the statutory language “place of entertainment” should be read to include recreational areas as well as places of spectator entertainment.4
In Daniel v. Paul, the Supreme Court noted that “entertainment” is defined as “the act of diverting, amusing, or causing someone’s time to pass agreeably: [synonymous with] amusement.” 395 U.S. at 306 n.7, 89 S.Ct. at 1701, 23 L.Ed.2d at 318 n.7. It is clear to us that the activities available at the health studios fall within this definition of “entertainment.” In view of the nature of the program offered by the health studios of appellees and considering the image that the studios have chosen to project through their advertisements, we feel that it is neither straining language nor expanding the definition of the word “entertainment” to. hold that the health and exercise studios are covered by the phrase “place of entertainment” as it is used in § 2000a(b)(3).
We recognize that the health and exercise studios differ from the amusement park in Miller and the lake retreat in Daniel but, nevertheless, we feel that the term “place of entertainment” includes the health and exercise studios operated by appellees. It is stipulated that the health spas offer “general programs of curative or rehabilitative treatment, including diets, physical exercises, baths and sauna treatments.” Studio facilities consist of various gymnasia equipment, thermal and whirlpool baths, inhalation rooms, solaria, and swimming pools; body massages and facial treatments are available.
As previously noted, new members are solicited through television and newspaper advertisements, through random telephone solicitations, and through offers of “complimentary visits” and “special introductory programs.” In a newspaper advertisement which shows women relaxing in lounge chairs, the studios invite participation in their weight reduction program: “The most unusual part of the process is how little effort it takes to reduce. Snooze, read, play cards, or just relax while those unwanted inches melt away.” Pleasure and relaxation are stressed as perquisites of membership in the studio programs: “ . . . Have fun with our fabulous personalized exercise program. Swim and Luxuriate in *68the Whirlpool Baths. Invigorate. Ah! Luxury! . . .” One advertisement urges: “Have fun with our introductory offer. . . . ” Another offers “the poolside lounge area for carefree lazing . .” A third advertisement entices: “Enter a Shape Spa, and you know immediately you’re in a woman’s world. Here there’s no strenuous exercise, only relaxing slimnastics— . . . everything to make your visits to Shape Spa enjoyable. Everywhere there is the air of luxury and elegance so appealing to a woman. . . . [Y]ou can use all the facilities of this complete beauty resort as frequently as you like.”
Included in the stipulated exhibits is the training manual for Shape Spa employees. It contains this introductory statement: “We sell Health, Beauty, Youth, Physical Ability, Social Recognition. Those are the things our customers want. We supply these by giving our customers a mixture of attractive club facilities, concrete programs of exercise, recreation, and diet, in which we instruct, supervise, and counsel them.” (Emphasis added.) We regard this as a further indication that appellees’ studios themselves consider their program to be of a recreational nature. However, by no means do we intend to suggest that our decision is based solely on the presence of the word recreation in the employee’s training manual.
The facilities and services provided by the health studios are similar in many respects to the health and exercise activities available at a YMCA. In Smith v. Young Men’s Christian Ass’n of Montgomery, 462 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1972), this court affirmed a district court finding that the recreational activities of the Montgomery, Alabama YMCA “come under the broad definition of entertainment expounded in Miller and espoused in Daniel.” 462 F.2d at 648. We can see nothing in the operation of the appellee health spas which would lead to a contrary result in this case.
Appellees argue that their purpose is to correct physical deficiencies and promote the physical well-being of their patrons; they maintain that they are not “places of entertainment.” While we do not doubt that appellees have properly characterized one of the purposes of their health and exercise program, we are convinced that there are sufficient entertainment and recreational aspects of the programs offered to permit the studios to be termed “place[s] of entertainment.” We concluded in United States v. DeRosier, 473 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1973), that § 2000a(b)(3) does not require that the “entertainment be of a certain variety or that a certain quantum of the establishment’s business be derived from the entertainment of its customers.” 473 F.2d at 752. Our determination that the health studios are “place[sj of entertainment” is not disturbed by the fact that they also have the serious purpose of weight reduction and figure control. Such a dual purpose will not operate to remove them from the coverage of the Civil Rights Act.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold the studios to be “place[s] of entertainment” covered by § 2000a(b)(3) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The judgment of the district court is reversed and the case is remanded for the entry of an appropriate judgment consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
. The appellees who operate the health studios involved are four separate Louisiana corporations located in or near New Orleans. Appellant Rousseve alleges that she is a black female citizen who has applied for and been refused services by the appellees because of her race. Appellant Robbins alleges that she is a white female citizen who has applied for *66and been refused services by the appellees because of her association with and concern for black women.
. The district court did make the following finding:
We recognize that there are some elements of fun, relaxation and entertainment derived from many phases of man’s daily activities and could well be experienced by some individuals in some of the exercise regimen and programs offered by the defendant clubs. On the other hand, we doubt that the rigors of the exercise and other activities in which overweight and unshapely female patrons of the clubs must participate to achieve their desired goals and the ultimate benefits offered by the clubs’ programs can be regarded as entertainment of a nature which would cause the clubs to be brought within the Act’s coverage. Surely, one who executes the exercises and performs the activities required by the program and upon completion of the course has achieved the maximum benefits possible for that individual may derive great personal satisfaction and joy, and, looking back, describe the experience as fun. But those who do not accomplish as much likely would experience disappointment and frustration and condemn the whole affair as an ordeal. (Emphasis added).
. Although the district court found that the activities of the appellees did not come within the terms of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of *671964, it did conclude that the facts disclosed by the record would support a finding that the activities of the appellees in the operation of the health clubs or studios in question did affect commerce. It felt such a finding was unnecessary in view of its conclusion that the appellees’ establishments were not “placets] of entertainment” under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Appendix p. 53.
. In Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 89 S.Ct. 1697, 23 L.Ed.2d 318 (1969), the establishment in question was the Lake Nixon Club near Little Rock, Arkansas. The club was a 232-acre amusement area with swimming, boating, sun bathing, picnicking, miniature golf, dancing facilities, and a snack bar.