(concurring and dissenting).
Since no particularized supplemental allegations were prepared for the district court, the basis for the charge in that court reasonably appeared to be that Arthur L. Abrams had issued a check for $20,000, to be used to bribe a municipal official. It was on this specific charge that the New Jersey Supreme Court had entered its judgment to suspend Abrams from the practice of law for one year.1 And this charge necessarily must have been the one that Abrams and his counsel had in mind when in the district court they elected to rest on the record that had been before the New Jersey state court.
However, the district court did not confine itself to the bribery charge. Rather, “view[ing] the matter somewhat differently” from the New Jersey Supreme Court, the district court proceeded to consider two additional issues: Abrams’ interest in his client’s enterprise, and his acceptance of a real estate commission. Concerning these, the district court said:
The acquisition [by Abrams] of an interest in the client’s enterprise was obviously a factor that interfered with the exercise of free judgment on behalf of the client.
Another factor is that Abrams accepted a share of a real estate commission paid by the City of Jersey City on the sale of property on public bid. He deposited that share in his trust account, explaining that he considered it to belong to the client, but no credible explanation was provided for the making of the payment in the first place. The commission aspect bears all the indications of a device to divert public funds into channels from which they could be repaid secretly to' the public officials. Justification for its payment is not satisfactorily shown.2
The state court had taken a substantially diverse attitude toward these two items. As to the propriety of Abrams’ association with the business venture of his client, the New Jersey Supreme Court was silent. Respecting the real estate commission, later deposited in the trust fund, the state court, on the same record had acknowledged that:
Though the original creation of the trust fund itself by the respondent was suspect, the record does not permit a finding that it was specifically designed for the illegal payment.3
If the district court determined to go beyond the scope of the charges resolved against Abrams in the state proceeding, namely, the illegal $20,000 payment, and to consider other aspects of Abrams’ conduct, it should have so advised Abrams and given him and his counsel the opportunity to introduce evidence relating to such conduct. Due process would seem to require as much.4 No justification has been forthcoming that would excuse *1108the failure to supply Abrams a full description of the charges to be considered.5
In a case presenting a situation similar to the one here, In re Ruffalo, the Supreme Court made it clear that in a disbarment case the charge against the attorney must be set forth at the outset. It said: “[disbarment] proceedings [are] of a quasi-criminal nature. The charge must be known before the proceedings commence.”6
Nor is it valid to contend that Abrams waived his right to know the charges on which the district court sanction was to be based, or his right to an opportunity to offer a defense against any and all such charges. There is nothing in the district court record which adequately demonstrates that Abrams was aware that charges respecting his relationship with his client and the $102,000 trust fund were under consideration.7 Where the duty to apprise Abrams of the full reach of a disciplinary inquiry was not discharged, it would not seem reasonable to conclude that Abrams waived his right to present evidence on the two matters that supported, at least in part, the district court’s judgment, independent of the state court conclusion.8
Accordingly, I agree with the majority that the judgment of the district court cannot stand. There is no way to determine from the record what disciplinary sanction the district court might have imposed had it confined itself — as its rule9 seems to indicate and due process requires — to the charge adjudicated in the state proceeding and the record that the parties specifically stipulated.
However, unlike the majority, I do not believe that an outright reversal is warranted. Rather, I would vacate the judgment that was entered and remand the case. This would allow the district court a further opportunity to reach its judgment regarding thé extent of the discipline, based on the issue derived from the state proceeding, or else to seek to have additional charges filed as rule 7 seems to authorize, plus the opportunity *1109afforded Abrams to meet such additional charges.10
Chief Judge SEITZ and Judge VAN DUSEN join in this opinion.
. In re Abrams, 65 N.J. 172, 320 A.2d 471 (1974).
. In re Abrams, 385 F.Supp. 1210, 1211 (D.N.J. 1974) (citation omitted).
. 320 A.2d at 475.
. The parties have not disputed that a disbarment proceeding must satisfy procedural due process requirements. Thus, the only issue confronting the Court in this regard is the nature of the procedure that must be employed. Cf., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975). See Note, Specifying the Procedures Required by Due Process: Toward Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 Harv.L.Rev. 1510 (1975).
. It is observed that local rule 7(4) for the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey seems to provide for a disciplinary procedure which — at least when it extends beyond the grounds relied upon in a state disciplinary process — calls for notice of the sort that is lacking here. See majority opinion note 7. But apparently the district court which promulgated the rule did not so interpret it, at least in the procedural context that developed here. Rather, the district court’s actions suggest that it believed its rules were implemented by the procedures followed in this case.
Because the interpretation of local rules is primarily committed to the district court that promulgates them, and because their meaning in the present context appears somewhat uncertain, I am constrained to reach the question whether constitutional due process has been satisfied.
. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 1226, 20 L.Ed.2d 117 (1968) (citation omitted). Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 19 L.Ed. 285 (1868).
In three cases subsequent to the Ruffalo decision, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed that before proceedings to withdraw a state-controlled benefit are undertaken a respondent must be given both notice of the reasons urged in support of the contemplated action and an opportunity to respond. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972) (employment termination); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) (parole revocation); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970) (welfare benefit termination).
. Some intimation of the breadth of the district court inquiry was discussed at the hearing on June 24, 1974. Transcript 6-10.
. The Supreme Court has indicated forcefully that even in a civil case involving a sophisticated corporate party, the rudiments of due process — notice of charges and a fair opportunity to be heard — are not lightly presumed waived. In Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utility Commission, 301 U.S. 292, 57 S.Ct. 724, 81 L.Ed. 1093 (1937), the Supreme Court held, “We do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.” Id. at 307, 57 S.Ct. at 731, quoted in D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 186, 92 S.Ct. 775, 31 L.Ed.2d 124 (1972). The standard for finding waiver in the case at hand, a “quasi-criminal” proceeding, should be no less.
. Note 5, supra.
. Whether it is wise or unwise for a federal district court in a situation like the present one to impose disbarment when the highest state court has imposed a temporary suspension is, of course, not before this Court. However, it should be noted that in this regard the Supreme Court has advised the federal courts respecting the considerations that govern a federal disciplinary proceeding that follows a state investigation. Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 282, 77 S.Ct. 1274, 1 L.Ed.2d 1342 (1957); Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46, 51, 37 S.Ct. 377, 61 L.Ed. 585 (1917).