(concurring).
The Eighth Amendment claim requires reversal. The property claim is plainly sufficient as a matter of Illinois law. Since it arises out of the same transac*1063tion as the Eighth Amendment claim, there is no reason to question the jurisdiction of the District Court to decide it. Our interest in efficient judicial administration, as well as petitioner’s interest in having his right to compensation for the loss of his ring adjudicated in a simple straightforward manner, both dictate that his property claim be tried in the same proceeding as his claim based on the conditions of his confinement. At our conference I therefore voted in favor of a simple order remanding the matter for a prompt trial.
However, in view of the decision to rely on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as the basis for holding that the property claim is sufficient, and in view of the novel interpretation of that section advanced in Judge Swygert’s concurring opinion, it seems appropriate to add some comment about this developing area of federal constitutional tort law.
There are myriad situations in which the acts of State agents cause harm to private citizens. Arguably every such harm is a deprivation of either liberty or property, and every such act is the responsibility of the agent’s principal; therefore, again arguably, in every such situation the Fourteenth Amendment is violated unless the citizen is accorded “due process of law.” And, of course, every person subjected to a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment is entitled to redress in a federal court under the Civil Rights AetNilu.S.C.' § 1983.1
The outer limits of the area of § 1983 litigation are yet to be defined. In our search for those boundaries Judge Swygert suggests that we may find helpful guidance in the concept of “substantive due process.” As applied to this case, that concept may have two different meanings. It may refer to a deprivation of the plaintiff’s property motivated by the defendants’ hostility to the plaintiff’s “race, social, political, religious and moral views”;2 alternatively, it may merely refer to any deprivation by an agent of the State which the State is unable to justify.3
There is a vast difference between these two interpretations of the concept. Most obvious is the difference in the burden of proof imposed on a plaintiff who is merely seeking the return of his ring or compensation for its loss. Under the impermissible motivation theory, he has the burden of proving not only that the defendants committed the wrong intentionally, but, in addition, that they did so for the reasons alleged in the com-' plaint; mere proof that the ring was not returned would not discharge that burden. On the other hand, under the “absence of any legitimate justification” theory, I would suppose that liability should attach whether the loss of the ring was the consequence of negligence, gross negligence, or a deliberate theft by a guard or even by another prisoner. Under the second substantive due process approach, therefore, plaintiff need merely prove that he surrendered his ring to defendants and it has not been returned; logically the burden of justification should then rest on the State even if plaintiff did not prove an intentional taking.
In legal theory there is also an important difference between the two interpretations of substantive due process. *1064Under the former approach, the Due Process Clause is merely the medium through which other constitutional protections are made applicable to the States. For it is familiar doctrine that a State cannot discriminate among its citizens on the basis of their race or, for example, their exercise of rights protected by the First Amendment.4 Under that approach, the standards for implementing the concept of substantive due process are found elsewhere in the Constitution, and not merely in the Fourteenth Amendment itself. But under the alternative view of substantive due process — that the clause is violated whenever a State’s conduct is not justified- — judicial, fiat inevitably provides the measure of acceptable or unacceptable state action. It is this latter version of substantive due process that has from time to time generated criticism that the federal judiciary is wont to arrogate to itself powers not granted by statute or by the federal Constitution.
Before we try to take direction from such an inscrutable signpost as “substantive due process,” I believe our analysis of novel § 1983 claims should focus on the precise constitutional duty which has allegedly been breached. With respect to the property claim in this case, at least three different constitutional violations may be involved. The theory of the complaint, which presumably Judge Cummings’ opinion accepts, is that the retention of the ring in response to an expression of plaintiff’s political or religious views, or as an act of racial discrimination, violated the First and Thirteenth Amendments and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. I have no doubt about the validity of that theory.5 Alternatively, the deliberate theft of the ring might be considered an unauthorized seizure violative of Kimbrough’s Fourth Amendment rights, cf., Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1975). Finally, apart from any other provision of the Constitution, there may have been a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Judge Swygert concludes that such a violation has been alleged.
Although I by no means suggest that the Due Process Clause may be understood by simply reading it, it is nevertheless appropriate to consider its text.6 The language of the clause identifies three limitations on its coverage. First, the harm suffered by the plaintiff must be a deprivation of life, liberty or property; second, the deprivation must be effected by the State; and third, it must have occurred “without due process of law.”
When a deprivation of liberty is claimed, the Supreme Court has required a showing of “grievous loss” as a predicate for holding that the claimant was entitled to due process of law. Parallel reasoning might lead to the conclusion that a harm to property is not a deprivation actionable under § 1983 unless it is sufficiently grievous to satisfy some minimum standard.7 The majority of the *1065panel in Bonner, as have other courts, assumed that any deprivation of property, no matter how trivial, would satisfy this element of the cause of action. That assumption may of course, prove to be incorrect, but the point I wish to emphasize is that the “deprivation” element of the § 1983 claim involves a consideration of the nature and the extent of the harm to the plaintiff; neither the identity nor the motivation of the perpetrator of the harm, nor the character of his misconduct, is relevant to the question whether a deprivation of liberty or property occurred.8
The focus shifts when we ask whether there is sufficient state involvement to justify § 1983 liability. That question is easily answered when, as in Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 92 S.Ct. 1113, 31 L.Ed.2d 424, the harmful conduct is expressly authorized by the State. It is more difficult when the agent’s action is not so authorized, but his office has placed him in a position to cause a harm which a private citizen might not have an opportunity to perpetrate. Thus, in Bonner, the majority of the panel had no doubt that the prison guards who ransacked the cell were acting under color of state law within the meaning of § 1983. This conclusion would seem equally valid regardless of whether the guards negligently damaged Bonner’s property or deliberately appropriated it.9 Their private motivation would hardly seem controlling on the state action issue.10
If we assume a deprivation of property by the State, or by persons acting under color of state law, we must then decide whether the deprivation was “without due process of law.” It is elementary, of course, that the phrase mandates greater safeguards in some situations than in others; generally speaking, the more grievous the loss, the more elaborate the appropriate procedure must be. Deprivations of liberty may require greater procedural safeguards than deprivations of property. Thus, for example, the rule that an adequate hearing must precede the deprivation is subject to various exceptions when only property interests are at stake.11 The Supreme Court has repeatedly held in property cases that the demands of due process may be satisfied by an appropriate hearing and award of compensation after the initial deprivation has taken place. In property cases, the timing of the hearing is merely one factor affecting the fairness of the State’s remedial process.
In the present case, the original taking of Kimbrough’s ring was unquestionably authorized by the State. At that time I suppose the State assumed a eonstitu*1066tional duty either to return the ring at the time of Kimbrough’s release or, if unable to do so, to compensate him for its loss. If we assume that no state procedure is available by which Kimbrough may obtain such compensation, regardless of how the loss may have occurred, I would readily conclude that the deprivation of property expressly authorized by the State of Illinois was without due process of law. On the other hand, if the State has provided an appropriate procedure — that is to say, “due process” • — for compensating the plaintiff for his loss, I should think the deprivation authorized by the State was surely constitutional.
Kimbrough’s complaint, however, does not question the original -taking of his ring. He challenges the unauthorized acts of the agents who may have stolen or lost, or permitted someone else to steal or to lose, his ring. Since the conduct of those agents was unauthorized, they surely did not contemplate offering plaintiff any procedural safeguards in advance of the taking or any remedial process for compensating him after the taking occurred. The State, however, does provide a remedy against the culpable agents. If we assume the adequacy of that remedy, there is no more reason to conclude that the deprivation resulting from the guard’s unauthorized conduct was “without due process of law” than that due process was lacking at the time of the original, authorized taking of the ring. In sum, if we put the allegations of discrimination to one side and focus only on the plaintiff’s due process claim, I would conclude that the deprivation of plaintiff’s property by the unauthorized acts of the prison guards, although attributable to the State because the guards were acting under color of state law, was not action taken by the State “without due process of law.”
This conclusion is not foreclosed by Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 92 S.Ct. 1113, 31 L.Ed.2d 424, which held that 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) provides federal jurisdiction of claims to vindicate property rights as well as personal rights. Just as the jurisdictional statute authorizes an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to determine whether Connecticut’s garnishment procedure provides due process to the person whose property is taken, so does it equally authorize an action to determine whether Illinois provides due process to persons, like Kimbrough, whose property may be lost or stolen while in state custody. But a holding that there is federal jurisdiction to entertain claims asserting a deprivation of property without due process of law teaches us nothing with respect to the sufficiency of any such claim.
In a variety of situations the Supreme Court has found that the Due Process Clause did not require that a hearing be held in advance of any deprivation of property. In such cases the Court has made a practical evaluation of the particular interests involved and concluded that the Constitution merely required that property not be taken without a meaningful hearing at an appropriate time.
Bonner holds that in cases involving negligent harm to property the federal interest in fair procedure is vindicated by an adequate state process to redress the wrong. Apart from violations of other constitutional safeguards such as the Fourth Amendment, I would strike the same balance in cases involving intentional trespasses against property interests. The mere fact that the plaintiff is the victim of a tort committed by a state official rather than a private party does not, in my judgment, provide an adequate basis for affording him a federal remedy. The federal interest in conserving federal judicial resources for litigation in which significant federal questions are at stake favors a construction of the Civil Rights Act which will not enlarge it to provide an alternative means of processing ordinary common law tort claims.12
*1067It is nevertheless possible to conclude that the federal interest in preventing deliberate misconduct by prison guards is greater than the federal interest in affording a remedy in negligence cases, and therefore to accept the holding in Carroll v. Sielaff, 514 F.2d 415, 417 (7th Cir. 1975), though explicable on Fourth Amendment grounds, as resting on the Fourteenth Amendment. Even so construed, however, that case does not embrace the concept of substantive due process; nor does it announce a rule that every intentional harm to property by a state agent is a violation of § 1983.
Because this area of the law has yet to develop, I think we must be cautious about extrapolating broad general rules from particular holdings. It is significant that despite the divergent analyses reflected in Judge Swygert’s concurring opinion in this case, Chief Judge Fair-child’s concurrence in Bonner, and the majority opinion in Bonner, we all agree that harms to property resulting from the mere negligence of state employees are not actionable under § 1983. Future cases will require us to define the standard of care for state agents in a variety of situations. I doubt that we will adopt a rule as simple as one which never imposes liability for mere negligence and always sustains an allegation of gross negligence, for example. On the contrary, I firmly believe that standards of care will be defined differently for different constitutional duties.13
. “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”
. See n. 1 of Judge Swygert’s concurring opinion quoting from p. 1060 of Kimbrough’s complaint.
. As Judge Swygert explains this version of the concept, “[I]f, under all the circumstances, the state could not possibly justify the action taken by its agent, the action violates due process and the agent is liable under § 1983 . See concurring opinion, supra, at p. 1062.
. See, e. g., Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972), and cases reviewed at 570-572.
. In Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 544, 92 S.Ct. 1113, 1118, 31 L.Ed.2d 424, the Court quoted the following from Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 10, 68 S.Ct. 836, 92 L.Ed. 1161:
“It cannot be doubted that among the civil rights intended to be protected from discriminatory state action by the Fourteenth Amendment are the rights to acquire, enjoy, own and dispose of property. Equality in the enjoyment of property rights was regarded by the framers of that Amendment as an essential precondition to the realization of other basic civil rights and liberties which the Amendment was intended to guarantee.”
. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in part:
“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; * *
. In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725, the Supreme Court stated at 576, 95 S.Ct. at 737:
*1065“that as long as a property deprivation is not de minimis, its gravity is irrelevant to the question whether account must be taken of the Due Process Clause. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 [89 S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed.2d 349] (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378-379 [91 S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113] (1971); Board of Regents v. Roth, supra, [408 U.S. 564] at 570 n. 8 [92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548], A 10-day suspension from school is not de minimis in our view and may not be imposed in complete disregard of the Due Process Clause.”
At the cited pages in Boddie v. Connecticut, the Court discussed the necessity for a hearing before an individual is deprived of “any significant property interest.” 401 U.S. at 378-379, 91 S.Ct. 780. Of course, the fact that “account must be taken of the Due Process Clause,” even though the amount involved is trivial, does not foreclose the possibility that the due process requirement would be satisfied by providing compensation añer the event rather than a hearing in advance of the taking.
. But see Chief Judge Fairchild’s concurrence in Bonner, supra, at 1321.
. In Bonner, supra, Chief Judge Fairchild did not accept this proposition.
. If the agent’s motivation should be controlling, it would seem more reasonable to find a sufficient state involvement in the negligent performance of an assigned task than in the deliberate theft of property in contravention of state regulations.
. See cases cited in Bonner, p. 1319 n. 25.
. There is, of course, a critical difference between using the federal judiciary to make sure that Illinois affords its prisoners an acceptable procedure for processing their property claims, *1067on the one hand, and using the federal courts to do the processing themselves.
. Compare, for example, Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1968), with Gutierrez v. Department of Public Safety, 479 F.2d 701, 719-721 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146, 94 S.Ct. 900, 39 L.Ed.2d 102.