(dissenting).
The petition for rehearing filed by the Board requests that we clarify our resolution of certain questions in this case in order to provide necessary guidance for the District Court upon the remand.
In my dissenting opinion I specifically pointed out the parts in both majority and concurring opinions with which I disagreed. It is obvious that I agreed with the part of the majority opinion “that Deal I and II continue to have ‘vitality.’ ” Our recent decision, in which two members of the present panel participated, in Higgins v. Board of Educ. of Grand Rapids, 508 F.2d 779 (6th Cir. 1974), is further proof of that fact.
I also stated in my dissent:
The Board can be held accountable only for any new acts and conduct subsequent to the cut off date of July 16, 1965 and not authorized or approved in Deal.
This clearly agrees with the holding in the majority opinion that the District Court’s order precludes plaintiffs from attempting to prove that the Board, pri- or to the cut-off date, acted with a segregative intent or that its prior actions, inactions or policies violated the constitutional rights of minority pupils or their parents.
In my opinion, children who came into the Cincinnati School System after the cut-off date take the system as they find it, just like the other children who are *361attending the schools, and they are bound by our decisions in Deal I and Deal II.