(dissenting):
In my opinion, there was no constitutional defect in the stop of Ogilvie’s car, and, therefore, I would reverse the order of suppression.
Ogilvie left the freeway within view of the checkpoint but before coming to it. This conduct was perhaps not as blatantly suspicious as that of the defendant in United States v. Garcia, 516 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1975), who, having been stopped at the checkpoint, sped away at high speed. But in my view, the timing of Ogilvie’s exit from the highway — occurring as it did right before the checkpoint — was suspicious enough to justify a stop for questioning. Every driver has at one time or another missed his or her proper exit or suddenly remembered an item that was inadvertently left behind and for one of those reasons found it necessary to reverse the direction of travel on a highway. However, what under some circumstances may be routine behavior ceases to appear to be such when a coincidence of events makes it look as though the person is intentionally trying to avoid a possible confrontation with the police. Ogilvie’s conduct in this case had this earmark. Although, contrary to subsequent developments, the stop for questioning might have revealed an entirely innocent explanation for Ogilvie’s action, upon seeing her exit right before the checkpoint, the police had reason to believe that she was attempting to conceal criminal activity and therefore had reason to investigate.1 Courts, fortunately not charged with the responsibility of apprehending narcotics violators, should not be unmindful that experienced border patrol agents often have acquired a fair amount of accumulated knowledge as to suspicious acts — hence their judgment as to what constitutes such acts should be given weight.2
Had the police stopped and searched Ogilvie’s car at the checkpoint, such action admittedly would have been illegal under this court’s decision in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 514 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3661 (U.S. June 17, 1975) (No. 74-1560). However, this is not what occurred here, and in my judgment the existence of the checkpoint, which apparently caused Ogilvie to turn off the freeway, did not taint the subsequent stop *333under Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). The police have the right to slow and divert traffic so that they may observe vehicles as they pass. United States v. Evans, 507 F.2d 879, 880 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Garcia, supra. And the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 95 S.Ct. 2585, 45 L.Ed.2d 623 (1975) (invalidating the warrantless search of an automobile at a traffic checkpoint), expressly recognized that “[n]ot every aspect of a routine automobile ‘inspection’ constitutes a ‘search’ for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.” Id., 95 S.Ct. at 2589, n. 3. For all that Ogilvie knew, whatever the police would do at the checkpoint would be entirely legal. I also would not assume otherwise.
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.
. As the Supreme Court recently noted in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975):
The driver’s behavior may be relevant, as erratic driving or obvious attempts to evade officers can support a reasonable suspicion.
. The Court in Brignoni-Ponce, supra, stressed the importance of an officer’s experience in assessing the existence of reasonable suspicion for a stop:
In all situations the officer is entitled to assess the facts in light of his experience detecting illegal entry and smuggling.
95 S.Ct. 2574, citing, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).