OPINION
Before ELY and CHOY, Circuit Judges, and WEIGEL, District Judge.* WEIGEL, District Judge:The Arizona Innkeeper’s Lien Statute authorizes the keeper of a hotel or lodging house to seize, without notice or judicial procedure, the personal property of a lodger who fails to pay rent. This appeal presents the question whether a private person acting under the authority of the statute does so under color of state law within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
In September 1972, Helen and Charles Culbertson moved into a room in the New Windsor Hotel in Phoenix, Arizona, for which they agreed to pay twenty dollars per week. For several weeks they paid their rent on time, but in November they fell one week in arrears and were evicted by the hotel manager, Alice Leland. At eviction, she seized, as security for the unpaid rent, personal possessions of the Culbertsons which remained in the room. Leland was at no time an official of the State of Arizona. She sought no help from state officials and received none, except that a member of the Phoenix police department told her she had the right to hold her tenants’ belongings.
The Culbertsons sued in federal district court for the return of their possessions; for declaratory and injunctive relief against the provisions of the Arizona Innkeeper’s Lien Statute (set forth in full in the margin) 1; and for damages *428under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the claim that the seizure of their property was made under color of state law and, in the absence of notice and hearing, violated their constitutional right to due process of law. After suit was filed, Leland abandoned her claimed lien and returned the Culbertsons’ belongings to them. She and her two co-defendants, the record owner and the beneficial owner of the New Windsor Hotel, then moved to dismiss. The court granted the motion on the ostensible ground that since Leland no longer asserted a lien, any challenge to the Innkeeper’s Lien Statute was moot, and that the court lacked jurisdiction. Clerk’s Record at 128-29. Subsequently the court also denied a motion to vacate its dismissal order. C.R. at 157. The Culbertsons appeal in forma pauperis.
The jurisdictional issue presented by the appeal is easily resolved. If appellants’ demand for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 survives, so too does federal jurisdiction. Lidie v. California, 478 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir. 1973). In their complaint the Culbertsons sought $10,000 compensatory damages for the period for which they were deprived of their medicines and other belongings. That claim is cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Donovan v. Reinbold, 433 F.2d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 1970), and it remains a live issue despite Leland’s renunciation of the claimed lien. It was error to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. See C.R. at 129, lines 12-14.
However, if the ground of dismissal was failure to state a cause of action, and if there was such a failure, the dismissal should be affirmed. Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public Service Co., 341 U.S. 246, 249-50, 71 S.Ct. 692, 95 L.Ed. 912 (1951). In this case the district court was concerned with, and requested briefs on, the effects of Ouzts v. Maryland National Insurance Co., 470 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1972). See Reporter’s Transcript at 6-7; Appellees’ Brief at 3. (Ouzts has subsequently been reheard en banc and has been reaffirmed. 505 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1974).) The central issue in Ouzts was whether defendants who were not state officials had acted under color of state law. From the emphasis in the briefs below, from the interpretation of appellees (Appellees’ Brief at 5-6), and from the district court’s oral statements (R.T. at 6-7), it is apparent that what underlay the dismissal here was the conclusion that Leland’s actions were not, as a matter of law, taken under color of state law, and thus did not give rise to a federal cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We therefore take up that issue.
It is settled that § 1983 covers some actions taken by private citizens. The principle established by the Supreme Court, and often repeated, is that
Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken “under color of” state law. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 325-26, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 1043, 85 L.Ed. 1368 (1941).
In factual settings very similar to the present one, one circuit has found state action in a landlord’s exercise of a lien *429against the possessions of a tenant, Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970), and one circuit has found no state action. Davis v. Richmond, 512 F.2d 201 (1st Cir. 1975).
The leading case in our circuit is Adams v. Southern California First National Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973), rehearing en banc denied, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006, 95 S.Ct. 325, 42 L.Ed.2d 282 (1974). In Adams — the facts of which are outlined below — we held that a private person’s use of the self-help repossession provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, as adopted by the state of California, did not amount to action “under color” of state law, and that therefore a due process challenged to the repossession statutes failed to state a federal cause of action. 492 F.2d at 329. The opinion warned that “[statutes and laws regulate many forms of purely private activity, such as contractual relations and gifts, and subjecting all behavior that conforms to state law to the .Fourteenth Amendment would emasculate the state action concept.” 492 F.2d at 330-31. The existence of a state statute authorizing certain private action “is not the final answer to the touchstone of state action.” 492 F.2d at 330. Equating the “under color” requirement of § 1983 with the state action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, Adams gauged the repossession activity by the “significant state involvement” test derived from Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 81 S.Ct. 856, 6 L.Ed.2d 45 (1961), and Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 92 S.Ct. 1965, 32 L.Ed.2d 627 (1972). 492 F.2d at 330-31. Because the statute in Adams merely codified a right already present in the common law, 492 F.2d at 330, and because the right involved, arising from a written contract, was essentially “a private remedy rather than a [delegated] state power,” 492 F.2d at 336, the involvement of the state in enacting the statute was found not significant. On the latter ground Hall v. Garson, supra, was distinguished; the authority exercised under the Texas landlord’s lien statute was found to be of a type which “was normally exercised by the State and had historically been a function of the State of Texas.” 492 F.2d at 336. It is worth noting that when this court sat en banc to reconsider the state action issue in Ouzts, it followed the same approach as Adams, focusing on common law antecedents and private contractual rights. See 505 F.2d at 550-54.
The transactions in Adams were installment purchases of automobiles. The purchasers signed written security agreements which explicitly set forth the sellers’ right to repossess on default; and title remained with the sellers. 492 F.2d at 328. The eventual repossessions were only of the chattels covered by the security agreements — the automobiles — and they were performed by the title holders. They were thus as much a matter of private contractual law as of state statute.
The Adams holding is limited to repossession of a chattel subject to a specific security agreement. When a creditor, acting solely on the authority of statute, takes possession of a debtor’s property which is unrelated to the debt and which is not subject to prior contractual agreement, we cannot say that Adams dictates the conclusion that no state action is involved. As in Adams, therefore, we must look to the elements of the case to determine whether Arizona has significantly involved itself in the actions of appellee Leland.
A. Rights at Common Law
It is apparent that, as in Davis v. Richmond, supra, the lien statute here gave Leland a right which she would not have had at common law. At common law only innkeepers — and not hotel, boarding house and lodging house keepers — had a lien on the belongings of their guests.
Beginning in medieval times, an innkeeper had the nearly absolute duty at common law to take in all travelers and to accept their belongings for safekeeping. With minor exceptions he was absolutely liable to his guests for the full *430value of those belongings. At the same time, the common law gave him a lien on such property until the bill of its owner was paid. See generally Klim v. Jones, D.C., 315 F.Supp. 109, 118-20 and authorities cited. The leading English case is Mulliner v. Florence, [1878] 3 Q.B. 484.
Historians debate whether the innkeeper’s lien arose in the common law to compensate for the innkeeper’s strict duty and liability, or whether it had its origins in a separate, equally venerable custom of the realm. See, e. g., Hogan, The Innkeeper’s Lien at Common Law, 8 Hastings L.J. 33 (1956). Nevertheless, what passed into American common law with surprising unanimity was the former theory. The Harvard Law Review explained in 1895 that
As the innkeeper’s lien is grounded . on the extraordinary liability imposed on him by law, it seems only just that on all goods which he is bound to receive he should have his lien . . Note, 9 Harvard L.Rev. 216 (1895).
See also 43 C.J.S. Innkeepers § 26i2)(b): 40 Am.Jur.2d Hotels, Motels, and Restaurants § 187. Under that interpretation of the common law, it was clear to American courts that where the extraordinary liability did not exist, neither did the common law lien. The crux of the matter was the relationship between the guest and the owner of the premises, Cedar Rapids Investment Co. v. Commodore Hotel Co., 205 Iowa 736, 218 N.W. 510, 511 (1928), Dixon v. Robbins, 246 N.Y. 169, 158 N.E. 63, 53 A.L.R. 986 (1927); and the innkeeper-guest relationship with its particular duties was an “essential” predicate for the existence of the common law lien. Brams v. Briggs, 272 Mich. 38, 260 N.W. 785 (1935). Hotel, boarding house and lodging house keepers had no absolute duty to accept all transient guests and keep their belongings safe; therefore they had no common law lien against those belongings. See, e. g., Turner v. Priest, 48 Ga.App. 109, 171 S.E. 881, 882 (1933); Nicholas v. Baldwin Piano Co., 71 Ind. App. 209, 123 N.E. 226 (1919); Halsey v. Svitak, 163 Minn. 253, 203 N.W. 968, 969 (1925); Jackson v. Engert, 453 S.W.2d 615, 618 (Mo.App.1970). Several states including Arizona gave them statutory liens to protect them from fraud (cf. Nance v. O. K. Houck Piano Co., 128 Tenn. 1, 155 S.W. 1172, 1173 (1913)), but courts have narrowly construed such statutes and have carefully distinguished between common law and statutory liens. In Turner v. Priest, supra, for example, the court explained:
At common law a boarding house keeper had none of the privileges of an innkeeper, and could not detain the baggage and effects of a delinquent boarder which were in the boarding house. This state and the several states of the Union have passed laws placing boarding house keepers upon the same footing as to the privileges of an innkeeper in detaining the baggage and effects of a delinquent guest to pay for his charges. The lien gave to such innkeepers and boarding house keepers is not created by contract, but by law. Statutes giving to boarding house keepers a lien on the goods of their boarders and the means to enforce the same are in derogation of the common law, and should be strictly construed. [Citations omitted.] 171 S.
E. at 882.
The courts of Arizona itself are silent on the common law rights of hotel, boarding house and rooming house keepers. But Arizona has adopted common law rules of decision. Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 1 — 201; Howell v. War Finance Corp., 71 F.2d 237, 242-43 (9th Cir. 1934); John W. Masury & Son v. Bisbee Lumber Co., 49 Ariz. 443, 68 P.2d 679, 687-88 (1937); Valley National Bank of Ariz. v. Avco Development Co., 14 Ariz.App. 56, 480 P.2d 671 (1971). It has consistently held to the common law since the first legislature of the Arizona territory passed the Howell Code of 1864. See Boquillas Land & Cattle Co. v. Curtis, 213 U.S. 339, 345, 29 S.Ct. 493, 53 L.Ed. 822 (1909); John W. Masury & Son, supra, 68 P.2d at 686. Following the usual *431practice, Arizona looks to the law of sister states where necessary to determine common law principles. See, e. g., Shulansky v. Michaels, 14 Ariz.App. 402, 484 P.2d 14, 17 (1971). We must therefore conclude that, in accord with the American rule, hotel and rooming house keepers have no common law lien against the belongings of their guests in Arizona. Whatever lien exists is purely statutory.
From the facts of this case, it is clear that appellee Leland did not enjoy the status of innkeeper.
At common law an innkeeper entitled to a lien was one who held out his place as one for the entertainment of all respectable transient persons who chose to come to him. The lien was given largely because of his so holding himself out and his consequent duty to entertain all transients or travelers who offered themselves as guests. [Citation omitted.] It was the transient nature of the entertainment contracted for that distinguished the innkeeper from the lodging house or boarding house keeper. [Citations omitted.] Cedar Rapids Inv. Co. v. Commodore Hotel Co., supra, 218 N.W. at 511.
There is no evidence that appellee held herself out to transients, and appellants were not transients; the rented room was their permanent residence. Appellee offered nothing but lodging; “[A] place where travelers could obtain lodging only, without other entertainment, was not an inn.” Dixon v. Robbins, supra, 246 N.Y. at 172, 158 N.E. at 64, 53 A.L.R. at 987. See also Cochrane v. Schryver, 12 Daly (N.Y.) 174 (1883), Hardin v. State, 47 Tex.Cr.Rep. 493, 84 S.W. 591 (1905). By the common law standard, appellee was a hotel or lodging house keeper and not an innkeeper. See generally Annot., 53 A.L.R. 988; Annot. 19 A.L.R. 517.
Adams appears to call for the foregoing investigation of the common law, and it suggests that state action is more likely found where the common law did not permit the action in question. However the common law analysis cannot, by itself, be dispositive. To rely on it alone might, in some cases, be to induce anomalous, technical or outdated results. Cf. Davis v. Richmond, supra, 512 F.2d at 203-04. Rather than resting solely on history, we must therefore consider other indicia of state action as well.
B. Relationship of Property to Debt
The Adams holding is limited to re possession, and in that context it has been broadly accepted. See, e. g., Turner v. Impala Motors, 503 F.2d 607 (6th Cir. 1974), James v. Pinnix, 495 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974), Bichel Optical Laboratories v. Marquette Nat’l Bank, 487 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1974). In adopting it the Fifth Circuit did not see fit to alter its ruling in Hall v. Garson, supra; instead it left Hall intact and distinguished the Adams -type situation on the ground that there “the property seized was the property whose purchase had created the debt and in which the seizor had a security interest.” Calderon v. United Furniture Co., 505 F.2d 950, 951 (5th Cir. 1974). The same distinction is appropriate in this case. Special interests of the conditional seller attach to the specific goods which serve as his collateral, interests which are not present in the case of a general debt and indiscriminate seizure of property as collateral. Cf. Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 607-08, 94 S.Ct. 1895, 40 L.Ed.2d 406 (1974). Moreover, repossession of the specific chattel giving rise to a debt is an activity much more narrowly confined than general seizures of collateral. The former, particularly where a written instrument defines the rights of the parties, can be left and has traditionally been left to private hands. See Adams, supra, 492 F.2d at 336. The latter, because its extent is broad and undefined and because its impact is potentially much more severe, is the type of activity which is a function of the state and over which, ordinarily, the state has a monopoly. Cf. Shirley v. State National Bank, 493 F.2d 739, 745-47 (2d Cir. 1974) (Kaufman, C. J., dissenting).
*432C. Prívate Contractual Remedies
Finally, appellants and appellees here had no contractual relationship covering appellants’ property, nor does the record show that appellants had any notice or knowledge at the time of renting that appellee Leland could seize their belongings on eviction. Nothing in the dealings of the parties permits the conclusion that appellants agreed or consented in advance to the seizure, either explicitly or by implication. In Adams the written agreement of the parties set forth their respective rights and liabilities; the statute there merely reiterated and confirmed their arrangement. Thus, entirely apart from the statute, the repossession did no violence to the expectations of the debtor, nor did it deprive him of any rights which he had not already yielded voluntarily and for consideration. In that context the involvement of the state, through its statute, was nearly superfluous.
In the present case, the statute was appellee Leland’s sole authority for the seizure, which would not otherwise have been even colorably legal.2 And since the statute was the sine qua non for the activity in question, the state’s involvement through that statute is not insignificant.
For the above reasons, we find that the State of Arizona has significantly involved itself in appellee Leland’s seizure of appellants’ property, under the standards set forth in Adams v. Southern California First National Bank, supra.
We recognize that our decision puts us squarely in conflict with the First Circuit. The facts in Davis v. Richmond, supra, could hardly be closer to the ones in this case. We agree with the court in Davis that “The focus for state action purposes should always be on the impact of the law upon private ordering.” 512 F.2d at 204, quoting Burke and Reber, State Action, Congressional Power and Creditors Rights: An Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 S.Cal.L.Rev. 1, 47 (1973). But we disagree with the proposition that lien statutes which create new rights in favor of creditor landlords have only a minimal impact on private ordering, especially when the parties themselves have failed to agree on a like ordering in the particular case.
Davis seems to turn on the judgment of the court that a landlord’s seizure of the belongings of an evicted tenant was something to be expected in the ordinary course of private affairs, statute or no; the court described that action as “an obvious and not surprising course.” 512 F.2d at 203. In the circumstances of this case, we find ourselves unable to agree, since we cannot say with confidence that appellants should have expected appellee Leland to do what she did.
The dismissal below is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
. Arizona Revised Statutes (1956):
§ 33-951. Lien on baggage and property of guests
Hotel, inn, boarding house, lodging house, apartment house and auto camp keepers shall have a lien upon the baggage and other property of their guests, boarders or lodgers, brought therein by their guests, boarders or lodgers, for charges due for accommodation, board, lodging or room rent and things furnished at the request of such guests, boarders or lodgers, with the right to possession of the baggage or other property until the charges are paid.
§ 33-952. Sale of property; notice
A. When baggage or other property comes into the possession of a person entitled to a lien as provided by § 33-951 and remains unclaimed, or the charges remain unpaid for a period of four months, the per*428son may proceed to sell the baggage or property at public auction, and from the proceeds retain the charges, storage and expense of advertising the sale.
B. The sale shall not be made until the expiration of four weeks from the first publication of notice of the sale, published in a newspaper once a week for four consecutive weeks. The notice shall contain a description of each piece of property, the name of the owner, if known, the name of the person holding the property, and the time and place of sale. If the indebtedness does not exceed sixty dollars, the notice may be given by posting at not less than three public places located at the place where the hotel, inn, boarding house, lodging house, apartment house or auto camp is located.
C. Any balance from the sale not claimed by the rightful owner within one month from the day of the sale shall be paid into the treasury of the county in which the sale took place, and if not claimed by the owner within one year thereafter, the money shall be paid into the general fund of the county.
. See section A., “Rights at Common Law”, supra.