OPINION OF THE COURT
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge.The narrow issue presented in this alien’s petition for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals is whether Section 245(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a),1 requires the Attorney General to make an eligibility determination before he can exercise his discretion. The Board held that the immigration judge could pretermit the eligibility issue and could deny the application for status adjustment as an exercise of discretion. We set aside the Board’s order and remand for further proceedings.
Petitioner, a native and citizen of the Philippines, entered the United States at Honolulu, Hawaii, on July 12, 1968, as a nonimmigrant visitor for pleasure. Having overstayed her visit, she applied, pursuant to § 245 for an adjustment of her status to that of a permanent resident. On February 21, 1973, the Philadelphia District Director denied her application in the exercise of *113discretion and granted her 30 days to effect her voluntary departure from the United States. Because petitioner remained in the United States beyond the 30-day period, she was ordered to show cause why she should not be deported. At the April 19, 1973, deportation hearing, petitioner renewed her application for adjustment of status, conceded deportability, and admitted she had misrepresented her occupation when she applied for her visa. She had listed her occupation as a merchant; she was a teacher. She also had represented that she had not earned a college degree when, in fact, she had received a B.S. in Medical Technology in 1966.
In her written decision, the immigration judge denied petitioner’s renewed application, reasoning that petitioner’s “material, deliberate misrepresentations” did not merit a favorable exercise of administrative discretion. It is conceded that the Immigration Service made no specific determination of petitioner’s eligibility for adjustment of status prior to denying her application as a matter of discretion.
Petitioner does not seek judicial review of the exercise of discretion. Rather, she urges that, irrespective of the discretionary denial of status adjustment, an eligibility determination is both extremely important to her and statutorily mandated.2
I.
Petitioner asserts that the importance of an eligibility determination will surface when, after departing from the United States pursuant to the Board’s order, she applies to a consular office for an immigrant visa. “Respondent’s finding of fraud . might very well indicate to a consular officer abroad, reviewing the Petitioner’s application for an immigrant visa in the future, that the Petitioner is excludable from admission . . . .” Petitioner’s Brief at 12.
An overview of the duties of consular officers and an explanation of the transfer of their duties to the Attorney General under § 245 place petitioner’s apprehension in perspective. Therefore, we now turn our attention in those directions.
If an alien seeks admission into the United States as an immigrant, he completes a visa application before a consular officer. The consular officer then has an affirmative duty to determine the alien’s eligibility for a visa. See 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g). Congress has provided that certain classes of aliens are statutorily ineligible to receive visas:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the following classes of aliens shall be ineligible to receive visas and shall be excluded from admission into the United States:
(19) Any alien who seeks to procure, or has sought to procure, or has procured a visa or other documentation, or seeks to enter the United States, by fraud, or by willfully misrepresenting a material fact .
8 U.S.C. § 1182. Thus, if the consular officer were to determine that the alien fell within this classification, no visa would issue.
We were told by government counsel at oral argument that, unlike final deportation orders of the INS, 8 U.S.C. § 1105a,3 eligibility determinations of consular officers are not subject to judicial *114review. Indeed, government counsel suggested that not even an administrative appeal to the Secretary of State lies from the consular officer’s determination.4 Therefore, the consular officer plays a significant role in the alien admission process.
If the alien, other than an alien crewman, is in the United States, he may apply to the Attorney General under § 245 for an adjustment of status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence. However, the application can be granted only if the Attorney General determines he “is eligible to receive an immigrant visa.” 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a)(2). Therefore, the statutory classifications of ineligibility, 8 U.S.C. § 1182, would apply with equal force in a § 245 proceeding. Consequently, the failure of the immigration judge to determine first whether petitioner was an alien “eligible to receive an immigrant visa”, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a)(2), is doubly important to petitioner, especially where, as here, the immigration judge characterized her misrepresentations as material and deliberate.
Petitioner’s apprehension of the practical consequences of the immigration judge’s failure to make an eligibility determination certainly is not controlling. Our task is to analyze the statute itself, and it is to this that we now turn.
II.
Section 245(a) provides in pertinent part: The status of [a nonimmigrant] alien, . who was inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States may be adjusted by the Attorney General, in his discretion and under such regulations as he may prescribe, to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if (1) the alien makes an application for such adjustment, (2) the alien is eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is admissible to the United States for permanent residence, and (3) an immigrant visa is immediately available to him at the time his application is approved.
Petitioner argues that this sub-section requires a determination by the Attorney General that the three express conditions are met before he can deny adjustment of status as a matter of discretion. Although the language of the statute is not as specific as it could be, we find much logic to the contention. Analogous case law furthers *115the argument, and the legislative history of amendments to § 245 does not detract from it.
A.
In support of her contention petitioner relies heavily on Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 76 S.Ct. 919, 100 L.Ed. 1242 (1956). There, the alien brought a habeas corpus action testing the validity of the denial of his application, under § 244(a)(5) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(5),5 for discretionary suspension of deportation. In the course of its opinion affirming the denial of discretionary suspension, the Court referred to the conditions of eligibility for discretionary relief as “the first step in the . . . procedure,” ibid, at 352, 76 S.Ct. at 924, and stated: “Eligibility for the relief here involved is governed by specific statutory standards which provide a right to a ruling on an applicant’s eligibility.” Ibid, at 353, 76 S.Ct. at 924 (emphasis added).
Although Jay was not an adjustment of status proceeding, the statutory structure of § 244 was strikingly similar to that of § 245. The government attempts to dilute the Court’s express declaration. It suggests that the regulations summarized in Jay required an eligibility determination before an exercise of discretion could take place; currently, the regulations do not require this two-step process.
In 1952 the regulations required the immigration judge to present evidence bearing on the applicant’s eligibility for relief, 8 C.F.R. Rev. § 242.53(c) (1952) and further required a “written decision” with “a discussion of the evidence relating to the alien’s eligibility for such relief and the reasons for granting or denying such application.” 8 C.F.R. Rev. § 242.61(a) (1952). Now, “the only burden on the Immigration Judge in the present case was to make a decision, written or oral, which discusses the ‘evidence and findings as to deportability’ and which contains ‘a discussion of the evidence pertinent to any application made by [the alien] under section 242.17 [e. g., § 244 and § 245 applications] and the reasons for granting or denying the request.’ 8 C.F.R. § 242.18(a). Under the newer regulations, gone is the requirement that the Immigration Judge discuss the alien’s eligibility for discretionary relief.” Respondent’s Brief at 8.
The government’s argument runs into two walls. First, the current regulation does not set forth what determinations must be made. It does not say that an immigration judge can or cannot pretermit the § 244 or § 245 conditions and deny the application as an exercise of discretion. Thus, the current regulation supplies no support to the government’s position.
Second, the government misreads the explicit language of Jay v. Boyd, supra, which states that statutory standards provided the alien’s right to a Section 244 eligibility ruling. The Court did not say that the standards were imposed by regulations of the Attorney General or that the Attorney General could pretermit such a determination.
Analogizing the statutory formulation in § 244 to that in § 245, we find much force and logic in the Court’s pronouncement in Jay. First, § 245(a) explicitly mandates the satisfaction of three conditions before the Attorney General can exercise his discretion in favor of permanent resident status. Second, there is no question that if the Attorney General does exercise favorable discretion, all three requirements must be satisfied. Third, if a point is reached where *116the Attorney General concludes that the alien should be denied relief as a matter of discretion, it would seem to follow that the applicant has the right to assume he has met all three qualifications. Otherwise, the exercise of unfavorable discretion would appear to be a meaningless, unnecessary act. See Ameeriar v. INS, supra n.2, 438 F.2d at 1040 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (“eligibility must exist before that discretion comes into operation”).
The Board disagrees. It held that the immigration judge is not required to find eligibility. Therefore, under the Board’s holding, petitioner cannot even rely on an implied finding of eligibility. We fail to see the logic of this holding. Moreover, the interest in orderly administrative and judicial review commands the Supreme Court statement. Contrasted with the procedures regulating a determination of eligibility by a consular officer,6 there is, as heretofore observed, a statutory right to administrative and judicial review of the § 245 determination.7 Thus, Jay v. Boyd, supra, supports persuasively the statutory interpretation sought by petitioner.
B.
Having unsuccessfully distinguished Jay, the government seeks comfort in Silva v. Carter, 326 F.2d 315 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 917, 84 S.Ct. 1181, 12 L.Ed.2d 186 (1964). There, a similar issue came before the court under the framework of §§ 212(g) and 249 of the Act. Like § 244 in Jay v. Boyd, supra, the provisions of §§ 212(g) and 249 in Silva v. Carter, supra, are similar in structure to those of § 245. Therefore, we will draw analogies from them.
In Carter, the acting regional commissioner denied Silva’s application on the basis that Silva did not merit the Attorney General’s favorable exercise of discretion. Explicit eligibility conditions had to be met, but the Commissioner did not determine whether Silva had satisfied the requirement that his admission not be contrary to the national welfare, safety or security of the United States. The crucial distinction between Carter and our ease lies in the reasons for exercising unfavorable discretion. In Carter the reasons for exercising unfavorable discretion had nothing to do with the national welfare requirement. Therefore, there was “nothing to indicate that discretionary relief was denied by the regional commissioner on the ground of ineligibility.” Ibid, at 320.
Here, the misrepresentations in petitioner’s visa application formed the basis for the exercise of unfavorable discretion. These identical misrepresentations could render petitioner ineligible to receive an immigrant visa. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(19), 1255(a)(2).8 Thus, unless the question of her eligibility is now determined, there is no way of knowing whether the denial of relief encompassed a tacit finding of ineligibility.
C.
The legislative history of § 245 does not support the restrictive interpretation urged by the government. Much of this history has been set forth by Judge Gibbons, dissenting in Ameeriar v. INS, supra, 438 F.2d at 1036-38.
Prior to 1952, if a person was in the United States temporarily or irregularly, but eligible for an immigration visa and quota number, there was no statutory method of obtaining such a visa without leaving the country and applying to a consulate. To alleviate hardships, the Immigration and Naturalization Service developed the practice of pre-examination, whereby under an agreement with Canada, eligible immigrants were exam*117ined by immigration officers in the United States, and when their admissibility was established, sent by prearrangement to a consul in Canada who issued a visa. A limited remedy of adjustment of status was enacted in the Act of June 27, 1952, Pub.L. No. 82-414, § 245, 66 Stat. 217, and subsequent amendments of the statute broadened its application. The administrative regulations sanctioning preexamination were revoked in 1959. 24 Fed.Reg. 6477 (1959). See Bufalino v. Holland, 277 F.2d 270, 281 (3 Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 863, 81 S.Ct. 103, 5 L.Ed.2d 85 (1960).
Ibid, at 1036.
We are persuaded that the intent of the 1958 and 1960 amendments to § 245 was to streamline this aspect of the immigration process — to provide a method for determining whether the “alien is eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is admissible to the United States for permanent residence”, without the necessity of pre-examination in the United States and subsequent physical departure to a foreign-based American consul to obtain a visa. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary described the amendment as “a procedural measure designed to ameliorate existing practices and procedures developed by way of administrative regulations”. S.Rep. No. 2133, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.(1958), 1958 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News pp. 3698, 3699.
Judge Gibbons has explained further: The reports also refer to saving of expense both by the Government and by the immigrant by eliminating the formalism of a trip to Canada. When, in 1960, the statute was amended, Act of July 14, 1960, Pub.L. No. 86-648, § 10, 74 Stat. 505, to eliminate as an eligibility requirement admission as a bona fide nonimmigrant, the Senate Report on the amending statute quoted with approval the above quoted language of S.Rep. No. 2133, repeated the ameliorating purposes of the legislation, and said:
“The Attorney General’s interpretation (of the 1958 Amendment) will not only necessitate the reinstatement of the fallacious procedure known as ‘preexamination’ and consisting of round trips to Canada for the sole purpose of obtaining an immigration visa, but will certainly greatly increase the number of private bills. The Congress has repeatedly expressed its disapproval of the ‘preexamination’ procedure and has similarly expressed its dissatisfaction with the mounting volume of private legislation.”
438 F.2d at 1037.
Under the former practice, therefore, pre-examination inquired into an alien’s statutory eligibility for admission into the United States as an immigrant alien. As we read the legislative history, the amendments to § 245 were procedural in nature. They sought “to ameliorate existing practices and procedures”. They did not, as the government would have us hold, replace the existing law with one requiring an eligibility determination only if favorable discretionary action were indicated.
III.
The finding of eligibility vel non under § 245 is extremely critical to this petitioner. If she is found to be ineligible for adjustment and thus deportable, she has a right to administrative and judicial review. The Supreme Court has said that the “finding of eligibility involves questions of fact and law”. Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217, 228-29 n.15, 84 S.Ct. 306, 313, 11 L.Ed.2d 281 (1963). Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 379-80, 82 S.Ct. 787, 794, 7 L.Ed.2d 809 (1962), teaches that, in matters arising under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, “the Court will not hold that the broadly remedial provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act are unavailable to review administrative decisions under the 1952 Act in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that Congress so intended.” (Emphasis supplied.) See also Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967).
As the government related at oral argument and as we indicated earlier, Congress has provided explicitly that there be no review of a consul’s denial of a visa for *118want of statutory eligibility. However, we cannot accept the notion that Congress would sanction procedures whereby there could be no judicial review of an adverse finding on the very important question of statutory eligibility of an immigrant for admission to the United States. Yet this is the very real practical effect of the interpretation the government urges upon us. See Part I supra. Given the Supreme Court’s direction that “only upon a showing of ‘clear and convincing evidence’ of a contrary legislative intent should the courts restrict access to judicial review,” Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, supra, 387 U.S. at 141, 87 S.Ct. at 1511, petitioner’s interpretation of § 245 emerges as the only method to insure administrative and judicial review of the question of statutory eligibility.9
IV.
Finally, we find much merit to petitioner’s contention that, under the facts of her case, it is important that there be administrative and judicial review of the effect of her prior misrepresentations. Case law and the Attorney General’s interpretation of § 1182(a)(19) distinguish among various forms of misrepresentations on visa applications. See, e. g., La Madrid-Peraza v. INS, 492 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam); Matter of S- and B-C-, supra, 9 I & N Dec. at 447. Moreover, if she is found to be eligible for a visa and discretion is exercised adversely to her, she may then reappear before a consular officer armed with whatever persuasive authority may be accorded the Attorney General’s eligibility determination.
We are not impressed by the government’s contention that, in any event, the consular officer would not be bound by the Attorney General’s determination of eligibility or by a judicial determination thereof. At this stage of the proceedings, we cannot speculate on what effect the Attorney General’s determination of eligibility would have on a representative of the State Department. Nor do we have before us a case or controversy requiring a decision on the jural implications of a consular officer’s refusal to respect a final judgment of a federal court.
We conclude that the statutory schema of § 245 requires a determination of eligibility as a prerequisite to any exercise of discretion by the Attorney General so that an alien, physically present in the United States, could avail himself of administrative and judicial review. We perceive as applying to this provision the same reasoning employed by former Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the Court in Foti v. INS, supra:
Since a special inquiry officer [immigration judge] cannot exercise his discretion to suspend deportation until he finds the alien statutorily eligible for suspension, a finding of eligibility and an exercise of (or refusal to exercise) discretion may properly be considered as distinct and separate matters.
375 U.S. at 228-29 n.15, 84 S.Ct. at 313 (emphasis added).
*119The order of the Board of Immigration Appeals will be set aside and the cause remanded for proceedings consistent with the foregoing.
. The status of an alien, other than an alien crewman, who was inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States may be adjusted by the Attorney General, in his discretion and under such regulations as he may prescribe, to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if (1) the alien makes an application for such adjustment, (2) the alien is eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is admissible to the United States for permanent residence, and (3) an immigrant visa is immediately available to him at the time his application is approved.
. In Ameeriar v. INS, 438 F.2d 1028 (3d Cir.) (in banc), petition for cert. dismissed pursuant to Sup.Ct. Rule 60,404 U.S. 801, 92 S.Ct. 21, 30 L.Ed.2d 34 (1971), the government conceded that “petitioners [had] met the statute requisite for eligibility of adjustment of status . . .” Ibid, at 1029. Recognizing that "[adjustment of status is ... a matter of administrative grace [and], not mere statutory eligibility”, ibid, at 1030, the narrow question before us was whether there was a proper exercise of unfavorable discretion by the Attorney General. Thus, Ameeriar did not present, nor did we decide, the precise question now before us.
. The rule of review of final deportation orders obtains even where the challenge to the deportation order seeks review only of a denial of the adjustment of status. Ameeriar v. INS, supra n. 2, 438 F.2d at 1035 n. 1 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). The majority opinion in Ameeriar assumed jurisdiction existed.
. 8 U.S.C. § 1104(a) provides in part:
(a) The Secretary of State shall be charged with the administration and the enforcement of the provisions of this chapter and all other immigration and nationality laws relating to (1) the powers, duties, and functions of diplomatic and consular officers of the United States, except those powers, duties, and functions conferred upon the consular officers relating to the granting or refusal of visas .
(Emphasis supplied.)
State Department regulations, 22 C.F.R. § 42.130 (1974), do permit a limited review of refusals to issue immigrant visas:
(b) Review of refusals at consular offices. If the ground of ineligibility upon which the visa was refused cannot be overcome by the presentation of additional evidence, the principal consular officer at a post, or an alternate whom he may specifically designate, shall review the case of each applicant who has been refused a visa and shall record his decision over his signature and the date on a form prescribed by the Department. If the grounds of ineligibility may be overcome by the presentation of additional evidence, and if the applicant has indicated that he intends to obtain such evidence, a review of the refusal may be deferred for a period not to exceed 120 days. If the principal consular officer, or his alternate, does not concur in the refusal, he shall (1) refer the case to the Department for an advisory opinion, or (2) assume responsibility for the case himself.
(c) Review of refusals by the Department. The Department may request a consular officer in an individual case or in specified classes of cases to submit a report if an immigrant visa has been refused. The Department will review such reports and may furnish an advisory opinion to the consular officer for his assistance in giving further consideration to such cases. If upon the receipt of the Department’s advisory opinion the consular officer contemplates taking action contrary to the advisory opinion, the case shall be resubmitted to the Department with an explanation of the proposed action. Rulings of the Department concerning an interpretation of law, as distinguished from an application of the law to the facts, shall be binding upon consular officers.
The review procedures for a refusal to issue a nonimmigrant visa are set forth in 22 C.F.R. § 41.130 (1974).
. It then provided:
As hereinafter prescribed in this section, the Attorney General may, in his discretion, suspend deportation and adjust the status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, in the case of an alien who— (5) is deportable . . has been physically present in the United States for . ten years . . . and proves that during all of such period he has been and is a person of good moral character; has not been served with a final order of deportation ... up to the time of applying ... for suspension of deportation; and is a person whose deportation would, in the opinion of the Attorney General, result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship . . ..
1952 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News pp. 166, 214-15.
. See supra at 114 n.4.
. See n.3 supra.
. Petitioner sought an administrative determination that her misrepresentations were immaterial and emphasized the standards discussed in Matter of S- and B-C-, 9 I & N Dec. 436 (1961). As her counsel argued before the Board: “Sticking out like a red flag before a red bull was the question of fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, before the consular officer abroad, at the time Miss Bagamasbad applied for her B-2 visa.” App. at 4.
. The commentators also have observed the importance of distinguishing the two-step nature of the procedure and the concomitant difference in the review available. See 2 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure § 8.14, at 8-94 — 8-95 (rev. ed. 1975) (footnotes omitted):
Some discretionary actions may have two phases. First there is a determination whether the applicant satisfies preliminary standards of eligibility prescribed by the statute. An applicant is entitled to have his eligibility determined. Generally, that determination involves issues of law and is subject to judicial review on a contention that the interpretation is erroneous. In some instances, however, the preliminary appraisal of eligibility may involve issues of fact, e. g., good moral character or hardship. Such factual determinations are subject only to limited judicial review, apparently only on a showing of arbitrariness.
Even if he satisfies the preliminary qualifications the applicant is not automatically entitled to relief. Then the second feature of the administrative consideration comes into play and involves the exercise of discretion. In most instances which are presented to the courts the administrative officers have found that the applicant is eligible under the statute but have denied relief in the exercise of discretion. Such a discretionary determination is immune from attack unless it is shown to be clearly arbitrary.