(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent.
I am of opinion that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has failed to observe its own rules and procedures in determining that there was reasonable cause to believe that General Electric discriminated on the basis of sex. Whether, in fact, the EEOC’s conclusion in this regard is correct is of no moment, for the only question before us is whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of GE on the ground that “no complaint based upon sex [was] filed against the [appellee] * * 1
The EEOC’s published regulations provide that “[t]he Commission will receive information concerning alleged violations from any person,” and that a charge may be filed by any person claiming to be aggrieved, as well as any member of the Commission itself.2 Any such charge so filed must be submitted “in writing and [be] signed, and . . . sworn to before a notary public, designated representative of the Commission, or other person duly authorized by law to administer oaths, and take acknowledgments.”3 Notice of the alleged discriminatory acts must thereafter be forwarded to the employer within ten days and include “the date, place and circumstances” of the alleged unlawful employment practice.4 The EEOC is then required to investigate the complaint, at which time the employer “shall be offered an opportunity to submit a statement of its position or evidence with respect to the allegations.”5 (Emphasis added). Only after such an investigation and before any determination as to whether there is reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice has occurred may the Commission engage in “predetermination” “settlement discussions.”6 After a finding of reasonable cause, conciliation efforts on the part of EEOC are limited to attempting to “achieve a just resolution and . obtain assurances the respondent will eliminate the unlawful employment practice and take appropriate affirmative action.”7 There are no further administrative “settlement discussions” once a finding of reasonable cause has been made, conciliation after that time going only to the remedy.
In the instant case, the controversy arose as a result of a charge filed with the EEOC by one Scott Slaughter, a black man. In his complaint, Slaughter alleged that General Electric had refused to hire him because of his race, and stated:
“Three weeks ago, I was referred to the G.E. plant in Lynchburg, Virginia for employment by David C. Cox, Asst. Job. Spec., Lynchburg Community Action Group, Inc. “I successfully completed the exams that were given and handled myself well during the interviews. After-wards, I was told that I would be notified as to when I should come for the physical exam.
“Before I was notified to report for the physical, Mr. Frank Faggiano, Emp. Specialist at G.E. called Mr. Cox in reference to other referrals; and during the conversation Mr. Faggiano asked Mr. Cox if
*376I were a Black Panther. (Mr. Cox will verify this).
“After I had taken the physical, Mr. Fag-giano said he couldn’t hire me because I have Hay Fever.
“I served in the USMC from 1960 to 1967, during which time I spent 13 months in Viet Nam. (With Hay Fever). After I was discharged ‘Honorably’ I worked in a factory in California. (With Hay Fever). “I feel that I was denied a job at G.E. because I’m black and because of Here-say, [sic] which Mr. Gaggiano failed to confront me with.”
Nowhere in his complaint did Slaughter allege facts which could in any way imply that the employment practices of General Electric unlawfully discriminated against women. The sole basis for Slaughter’s charge was his claim that GE had denied him employment due to his race.8
Subsequent to the filing of the complaint, in the words above quoted, the director of the EEOC’s Washington area office investigated GE’s hiring practices. At that time, and in accordance with the Commission’s regulations, GE was afforded the opportunity to submit a statement of its position and any evidence which it had regarding Slaughter’s allegations. Based upon this investigation and the evidence submitted by GE, the area director issued certain findings of fact. These findings made no mention of sex discrimination nor did they allude to it. The Commission, upon its subsequent review of these findings, concluded that race was not a factor in GE’s refusal to hire Slaughter. The EEOC added to the director’s findings of fact, however, by including the following:
“10. As part of its hiring procedure Respondent utilizes two different sets of test [sic] for male and female applicants. Male applicants are administered three tests — Wonderlic, Numerical (Arithmetic), and Mechanical Comprehension. Female applicants are administered two— Wonderlic and Peg Board (Manual Dexterity).
“11. Respondent’s written hiring policy reads in part: ‘The only test for prospective female assembly operators that we assign any great weight to is the peg board (manual dexterity). In the instance of male candidates, mechanical comprehension and arithmetic ability are given some weight.’ ”
Based upon these additional findings, the Commission, without affording GE an opportunity to refute, explain, or offer evidence with respect to them as it had done in the case of Slaughter’s original allegations of racial discrimination, conclusively found that there was reasonable cause to believe that the appellee had unlawfully discriminated against women, white as well as black, in violation of Title VII.
Thus, without any complaint having been filed alleging sex discrimination in hiring; without any notice having been given GE regarding “the date, place and circumstances” of the alleged sex discrimination; without GE having been “offered an opportunity to submit a statement of its position or evidence with respect to the allegation”; and without any “settlement discussions” having been entered into; the EEOC conclusively found that there was reasonable cause to believe that GE was engaging in unlawful employment practices respecting sex, not race. It was then too late for GE to refute the charge or offer evidence with respect to it, or even settle it; all it could do was enter into conciliation discussions regarding the manner in which the previously found violation could best be remedied.
The majority contends that both GE and the district court attach too much importance to the charge as filed. While it concedes that “the EEOC is without jurisdic*377tion to proceed [in any case] in the absence of a valid charge,” it concludes that, once filed, a charge will support an action by the Commission for “any discrimination . developed in the course of a reasonable investigation of that charge,” regardless of any lack of notice given the employer or lack of opportunity on his part to respond. Nor does the majority mention the equally important deprivation — the denial of an opportunity to engage in the initial predetermination settlement discussions.
Not all courts, however, have approved such disregard of the EEOC regulations. And the fact that the EEOC itself is the violator of the regulation here makes cavalier an apt adjective with which to describe its conduct. In Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mutual Hosp. Inc., 522 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1975), the court concluded that the failure of the plaintiff in that action to allege sex discrimination in her charge before the EEOC precluded her from raising the issue before the district court in a Title YII action.
There, the litigation began when the plaintiff completed an EEOC charge form naming her employer as the. party which had discriminated against her. She checked the box marked “Race or Color” and made the following statement to explain what in her view constituted the “unfair thing” which had been done to her:
“I feel that I am being discriminated in the terms and conditions of my employment because of my race, Negro. I have worked for Blue Cross and Blue Shield approx, three years during which time I no problem until May, 1971 when I got my natural hairstyle. Later when I came up for promotion it was denied because my supervisor, Al Frymier, said I could never represent Blue Cross with my Afro. He also accused me of being a leader of the girls on the floor. The pressure I was working under kept me upset, therefore, I asked for a leave of absence. I was told I had to take a vacation before I could be granted a leave of absence. I was granted a week vacation and on my return I was asked to take a 90-day leave, quit, or be fired, time they said to get myself together; at the end of this time they would be able to place me on another job. A White employee who associated with me might have been denied her promotion because of her association with me.”
The court, in reviewing the facts, agreed that the rule as stated in the case of Danner v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 447 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1971), should be followed in determining the proper scope of the allegations in the complaint when compared with the original charge filed with the EEOC. The court in Danner said:
“[T]he correct rule to follow in construing EEOC charges for purposes of delineating the proper scope of a subsequent judicial inquiry is that ‘the complaint in the civil action . . . may properly encompass any . . . discrimination like or reasonably related to the allegations of the charge and growing out of such allegations.’ ” 447 F.2d at 162.
upon general principles, the court was unanimously of the view that the charge did not form a proper basis under Title VII for any complaint of discrimination on the basis of sex.
The majority here, however, relies primarily upon Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1970), in support of its position. The complainant in that case filed an original charge with the EEOC alleging certain facts and indicating in the appropriate place on the Commission form that she believed she had been discriminated against on the basis of her sex. But an amended charge, the filing of which was approved by the court, charged both discrimination by reason of sex and national origin. The EEOC concluded that there was no reasonable cause to believe that the company had discriminated because of sex, but did find cause to believe that it had engaged in discrimination based on national origin. Sanchez then brought an action in the district court against Standard for violation of Title VII. The defendant-company moved to dismiss the suit on the grounds that the allegations of discrimination on the basis of national origin had not properly been raised before the EEOC. The district *378court agreed that the original allegation against Standard was insufficient to support the complaint and dismissed the action. It found the amended complaint could not properly be treated as a predicate for the suit.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed. In so doing, it gave as its opinion that the only essential element of a timely charge is the allegation of facts contained therein. It further concluded that the charging party’s failure to attach the correct legal conclusion to the factual allegations contained in the original charge was a mere technicality and would not prevent amendment of the complaint so long as the original facts alleged supported the amended charge. If this were all before us today, I might not feel compelled to dissent, for if the facts alleged are sufficient to put the employer on notice as to the charges against him, then one may say the requirements of the EEOC’s own regulations may be satisfied. Here, however, there was no amended complaint, and the facts set forth in the complaint filed by Slaughter, a black man alleging racial discrimination, can in no way be viewed as sufficient to have put GE on notice that the Commission would also be reviewing its hiring practices as to women based on sex, not race. In essence, Slaughter states that because he was black and allegedly a member of the Black Panthers, he was denied employment. These facts may not be viewed as supporting a charge against GE alleging sex discrimination. Thus, GE could not have been put on notice, have effectively offered evidence or have submitted any statement of its position as to such matters during the investigatory stages of the proceedings. Also, the arbitrary omission of the first stage of the settlement procedure serves to accentuate the fact that GE was kept completely in the dark concerning the allegations of sex discrimination until it was presented with the EEOC’s previously determined conclusion as to reasonable cause.
The majority implies, however, that GE, having been afforded the ex post facto opportunity to enter into conciliation discussions after the EEOC’s determination of “reasonable cause,” could somehow have vindicated its rights despite the failure of the Commission to afford it a prior opportunity to be heard. Yet, EEOC’s regulations at 29 CFR § 1601.19a provide for “settlement discussions” after the preliminary investigation but before any finding of “reasonable cause.” Thus, there are two conciliatory stages provided for, one before the finding of cause and one following it. See 29 CFR § 1601.22. The first stage settlement proceedings, which provide the only meaningful opportunity to discuss allegations of discrimination, as distinguished from the remedy, were arbitrarily omitted by the EEOC. This, of course, circumvents the well-known axiom that “[ejompromises of disputed claims are favored by the courts.” Williams v. First National Bank, 216 U.S. 582, 595, 30 S.Ct. 441, 445, 54 L.Ed. 625 (1910). See also St. Louis Mining Company v. Montana Mining Co., 171 U.S. 650, 656, 19 S.Ct. 61, 43 L.Ed. 320 (1898). And this principle has been repeatedly applied to the statute here under consideration. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969), describes the “securing of voluntary compliance with the law” as being “the Act’s primary goal.” 416 F.2d at 719. That rule was also applied in Williams v. General Foods Corp., 492 F.2d 399, 405 (7th Cir. 1974), where the court affirmed dismissal of a charge against a union because the EEOC complaint had only been filed against the company. There, the court stated: “That rule [of Bowe] is equally applicable here, since even if the Unions were aware of Williams’ charges, they were denied the opportunity to participate in conciliation proceedings aimed at voluntary compliance under EEOC auspices.” In addition, the Sixth Circuit in EEOC v. McMillan Bloedel Containers, 503 F.2d 1086, 1092 (6th Cir. 1974), repeated and quoted with approval the statement in Bowe that the Act’s primary goal is the securing of voluntary compliance with the law. The action of the EEOC in this case arbitrarily deprived the company of the first and only real settlement opportunity provided for by its own regulations. This, it seems to me, is in direct conflict *379with the general policy of the law which favors settlements, and the specific primary goal of this Act, which is to secure voluntary compliance as contrasted with compliance secured after long, expensive, time-consuming, and enervating litigation, which might very well have been avoided if the EEOC had only chosen to give its own regulations a chance to work.
Moreover, I am of opinion that what is required by these regulations is more than a mere opportunity to comment, but “the reality of an opportunity to submit an effective presentation” as we said in a different context but with the same meaning in Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 503 (4th Cir. 1973). Here, GE was presented with an accomplished fact. It could not challenge the EEOC’s determination in any subsequent conciliation proceeding but could only discuss what action to take toward eliminating the previously found “unlawful employment practice.” This hardly constitutes “an opportunity to submit an effective presentation.”
Nevertheless, the majority goes on to argue that in cases such as this where the EEOC uncovers facts which indicate discriminatory acts other than those alleged in the filed charge, it should not be obliged to “cast a blind eye” or “sever those facts and the discrimination so shown from the investigation in process and file a Commissioner’s charge thereon.” I especially note that GE does not even intimate overlooking or winking at any Title VII violation coming to the attention of the Commission, and, accordingly, I must conclude that the suggestion is only a straw man, promptly decimated with facility equal to that of its creation. The Commission, or any member thereof, is always free to file a complaint alleging the date, place and circumstances of any discriminatory act or acts which it believes have taken place. After so doing, however, EEOC must afford the employer an opportunity to be heard prior to any finding of reasonable cause. The employer must be given the opportunity to show there is no cause of action, not merely to try to arrive at remedies after having been presented with previously found facts and legal conclusions of guilt.
As this court has repeatedly stated, “[a]n agency of the government must scrupulously observe rules, regulations, or procedures which it has established. When it fails to do so, its action cannot stand and courts will strike it down.” United States v. Heffner, 420 F.2d at 811. The arbitrary character of such action is in no way ameliorated by the fact that it is the EEOC rather than the Internal Revenue Service or the Selective Service which has refused to follow its own regulations. Nor is it of any moment that the summary procedures followed by the Commission may have saved “valuable administrative resources” and prevented “intolerable delay in the enforcement of rights which require a ‘timely and effective remedy’,” for the arbitrary use of executive powers, however administratively efficient, may always be viewed as more convenient and effective and thus, upon rationalization, justifiable. The Commission is, of course, free to change its regulations should it determine that its enforcement procedures are, in fact, as cumbersome, when scrupulously applied, as the majority suggests. The fact that it has not adopted regulations more to our liking is no call to impose our notions upon the Commission as to how it may allocate its administrative resources or to approve shortcuts which deprive litigants of substantial administrative rights.
I am thus of opinion the conclusion reached by the majority is irreconcilable with the long line of cases requiring strict compliance with agency regulations in enforcement proceedings.9 To GE here, the *380government is the EEOC. To the taxpayer, it is the Internal Revenue Service. To the draftee, it is the Selective Service Board. No basis exists to distinguish between them. If one agency must scrupulously obey its own regulations, others should be required to do the same. Additionally, I believe the opinion of the majority encourages litigation rather than settlement, and that the entire procedural aspect of this case as conducted by the EEOC has been essentially unfair due to the flagrant lack of notice, opportunity to be heard, and opportunity to settle. It follows that I would affirm the judgment of the district court for the reasons I have expressed here.
.In United States v. Heffner, 420 F.2d 809, 813 (4th Cir. 1970), we construed this rule which we there called the Accardi doctrine (Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 74 S.Ct. 499, 98 L.Ed. 681 (1953)) as “requirpng] reversal irrespective of whether a new trial [would] . produce the same verdict.” Application of our own rule here would require affirmance.
I do not reach the constitutional questions raised and express no opinion as to them. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Mr. Justice Brandéis concurring).
. 29 CFR § 1601.5; 29 CFR § 1601.6; 29 CFR § 1601.10.
. 29 CFR § 1601.8.
. 29 CFR § 1601.13.
. 29 CFR § 1601.14.
. 29 CFR § 1601.19a.
. 29 CFR § 1601.22.
. The majority also refers to the complaint filed by one Ford just prior to Slaughter’s complaint. That charge also referred to racial discrimination and has no relevance here since the EEOC’s finding of sex discrimination is based solely upon the record made in investigating Slaughter’s claim. The decision of the EEOC in Ford’s case, App. p, 39, makes no mention of any discrimination based on sex as does the decision in Slaughter’s case found at App. p. 43.
. See, e.g., Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 539-40, 79 S.Ct. 968, 3 L.Ed.2d 1012 (1959) (Secretary of the Interior); Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 74 S.Ct. 499, 98 L.Ed. 681 (1953) (Attorney General); Brennan v. Gilles & Cotting, Inc., 504 F.2d 1255, 1260 (4th Cir. 1974) (Secretary of Labor); United States v. Ewig Bros. Co., Inc., 502 F.2d 715, 725 (7th Cir. 1974) (Food and Drug Administration); United States exrel. Coates v. Laird, 494 F.2d 709, 711 (4th Cir. 1974) (Secretary of Defense); United States ex rel. Brooks v. Clifford, 409 F.2d 700, 706 (4th Cir. 1970) (Secretary of Defense).