(dissenting);
Essentially there is presented in this litigation the question of the extent to which, at the behest of the plaintiffs, the judicial *580branch of our constitutional government can override, or veto the exercise of, discretionary judgments made by the executive and legislative branches in connection with grants of federal funds made pursuant to the Community Facilities and Advance Land Acquisition Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3102 (1972) and the Outdoor Recreation Programs Act,. 16 U.S.C. § 4607 (1963). Obviously an abstract answer cannot be given, as it were, in a vacuum. Hence the facts essential to a resolution of this controversy must be analyzed with great particularity. In short, who are the plaintiffs, what relief do they seek, what is the legal basis for their alleged grievance, who are the defendants, what wrongs have they allegedly committed and finally wherein did the trial court commit error in the judgment appealed from?
THE PLAINTIFFS
Plaintiffs describe themselves as Black residents, respectively, of the Town of Peekskill, the City of Mount Vernon, the City of White Plains and the Town of Ossining, all in Westchester County, who (with the exception of the plaintiff Evans) express a desire to live in the Town of New Castle, also in the same County, but profess inability to do so because of New Castle’s alleged “discriminatory land use practices.” 1
THE DEFENDANTS
The defendants are James T. Lynn, as Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD); Joseph D. Monticciolo, Acting Area Director of HUD (New York); S. William Green, Regional Administrator of HUD; HUD; Douglas Carroll, as Director of Tri-State Regional Planning Commission (Tri-State); TriState; Rogers C. B. Morton, as Secretary of the Department of the Interior (Interior); James A. Watt, as Director of the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation (BOR) of Interior; and Interior.
THE COMPLAINT
The King-Greeley Sewer District Grant
The complaint, in substance, alleges that New Castle in 1969 determined to install in the Chappaqua section2 of New Castle a sanitary sewer system. For this purpose it created the King-Greeley sewer district.3 New Castle thereafter made an application to HUD for federal financing of the project.4 “HUD was specifically notified that black and Spanish-speaking persons and all other persons of low income would be denied the opportunity to benefit from Federal funding of the King-Greeley sewer project by virtue of the fact that New Castle through its housing and zoning laws prevents the development of low and moderate income housing.” (Complaint, par. 21.) Nevertheless HUD granted $358,000 for the project.
The emphasis of the complaint is on New Castle’s alleged housing, zoning and land use policies. Neither New Castle nor King-Greeley were named as defendants.5 Plaintiffs seek indirectly to obtain their objective not by a frontal attack on New Castle on the theory of unconstitutional zoning6 but *581by an oblique attack on HUD for failing, in making the sewer grant, “to affirmatively promote fair and suitable housing irrespective of race, color, creed, or national origin pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 3608(d)(5).” (Complaint, par. 36, First Cause of Action); and that HUD by the grant did “assist and encourage New Castle in its practice of racial discrimination” and denying to plaintiffs “their right to participate in the receipt of Federal benefits.” (Complaint, par. 37, Second Cause of Action.)
Plaintiffs assert that they “are Black citizens suffering from a lack of fair housing opportunity in the County in which they reside — ” (Brief, p. 23) and attribute this suffering to the agencies vested by Congress with the power to administer and allot the financial grants made available by Congress in alleging that “they [the agencies] have neglected to administer the civil rights requirements of the community development assistance programs to promote an increased supply of integrated housing (Brief, p. 23) and that “[t]he housing and land-use policies of New Castle are certainly an effective measure of the extent to which HUD and BOR have violated their independent civil rights obligations.” (Brief, p. 25.) Plaintiffs would have the judiciary focus by means of this litigation on “the specific and nationwide abdication by HUD and BOR of their statutory civil rights obligations, as reflected by their failure to engage in any meaningful civil rights-review of the New Castle applications for federal community development grants.” (Brief, p. 25.)
The Turner Swamp Grant
In 1971 New Castle proposed to acquire some 35 acres of land consisting largely of a bog or marsh area. New Castle requested Federal aid for this Open Space and Recreation project. A review was made by the requisite agencies, Tri-State, Westchester’s Department of Planning and appropriate sub-regional planning agencies and municipalities. Tri-State classified the project as “one of non-regional significance.” After an inspection by an inspector of BOR who reported that the site (“almost entirely marsh and bog”) seemed “to provide excellent wildlife habitat and the proposed impoundment should enhance this quality,” a grant (approximately one-half of the estimated cost of $115,000) was made by Interi- or. Tri-State characterized the area as “a highly suitable conservation area for use as a managed wildlife area, where a varied wildlife population already exists and needs only to be encouraged.” (Tri-State Appendix 11.)
THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
On September 13, 1973, the defendants, the Secretaries of HUD and Interior and certain Directors of various divisions thereof moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and (6), Fed.R.Civ.P. An affidavit of an Assistant United States Attorney pointed to the alleged weakness of the complaint by stating that plaintiffs made no allegation therein that either the Sewer District or the Turner Swamp would be in any way discriminatory or would not serve all residents equally “black, or white, rich or poor.”
On October 9,1973 plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction enjoining HUD from disbursing any funds for the King-Greeley sewer district and Interior from disbursing funds for the acquisition of the Turner Swamp.
The trial court, believing that it could not adequately pass upon the issues raised by both motions without a record showing what HUD and BOR had done prior to *582approving the grants, directed that the administrative files of each Department relating to the grants in question be made available to the plaintiffs and that the federal administration officials involved be produced for depositions.
Accordingly, during November 1973 the depositions of S. William Green, Regional Administrator (HUD); Gerald V. Cruise, Program Manager (HUD); Susan Alem, Resources Development Officer (HUD); Robert E. Mendoza, Metropolitan Development representative (HUD); Bernard C. Fagan, Outdoor Recreation Planner (BOR); and Maurice D. Arnold, Regional Director (BOR) were taken. Various exhibits were introduced.
Prior to decision and by letter dated March 9, 1974, New Castle and King-Greeley sought to intervene. The deposition of the plaintiff Evans was thereafter taken.
On April 5,1974, many of the key factual issues were resolved by a Stipulation of Facts entered into (by counsel) by the plaintiffs and New Castle (King-Greeley). The substance of the stipulation was that none of the plaintiffs had “looked for housing for himself or his family in the Town of New Castle”; that no plaintiff or the town of his residence had been deprived of the federal funds granted as herein described; that plaintiffs had no information to believe that non-residents of New Castle would be refused admission to the proposed park (Turner Swamp) for any reason including race, creed, color or income; that no claim is made that persons residing in the King-Greeley district will be denied use of the sewer for reasons of race, creed, color or income; and that there is no claim that the Turner Swamp area has been utilized for low or moderate multi-family housing.
Upon this stipulation and lengthy affidavits with exhibits attached, the deposition of the plaintiff Evans, New Castle and King-Greeley, joined the federal defendants’ motion to dismiss.
Tri-State had also moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), (2) and (6), an attorney affidavit accompanying the motion, stating that it was “upon grounds of sovereign immunity”. Tri-State had been formed pursuant to an Interstate Compact (New York, New Jersey and Connecticut) wherein in Article IV, sec. 3 it is declared that “It [the Commission] shall enjoy the sovereign immunity of the party states and may not be sued in any court or tribunal whatsoever; . . . ”
THE OPINION BELOW
As a preamble, in effect, to the opinion, the court noted that the plaintiffs had been “accorded a wide opportunity to make a factual determination of the New Castle applications and the civil rights enforcement procedures utilized by the federal defendants.” Equally the defendants “had an opportunity to elicit the facts concerning the interest of the plaintiffs.” The court concluded that the “legal issue of standing raised by the motions, is now cast in sharp relief against this well-developed factual background.”
The court then turned to the threshold and, in its opinion, decisive issue, i. e., “whether plaintiffs have standing to bring this suit.” Standing was then tested by “the two-pronged test” namely, have the plaintiffs suffered or will they suffer an “injury in fact” and are they “within the zone of interests protected by the relevant statute.” The court was also mindful of the necessity that “litigants maintain a personal stake in the outcome of the controversies they present.” DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 324, 94 S.Ct. 1704, 40 L.Ed.2d 164 (1974).
From the proof submitted, the court concluded that “Plaintiffs do not, and apparently cannot, allege that they will suffer any injury from the grants that have been made by the agencies,” which grants clearly insure that New Castle must not discriminatorily administer the sewer or swamp projects. (See “Assurance of Compliance” of HUD and BOR). Accordingly, the court denied plaintiffs’ motion for an injunction and dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
*583I
Before the motions were finally submitted to the court for decision, they had acquired somewhat of a hybrid character. The original government defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and (6), Fed.R.Civ.P., was supported by a five-page affidavit setting forth facts. Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction was based on two lengthy affidavits. Tri-State’s motion was supported by an affidavit and New Castle-King-Greeley’s motion by affidavits of 19 pages and 7 pages plus exhibits. The motion to dismiss thus assumed the status of a motion for summary judgment which in decision the court restricted to the issue of standing. However, only by this factual development was the court able to “cast [this issue] in sharp relief.” For purposes of appellate review, “standing” may be assumed to be the sole issue to be determined in light of all the facts developed by the trial court in aid of such determination.
II
Prior to embarking upon a discussion of how the Supreme Court has defined, and granted or denied, jurisdictional standing, it would be well to capsúlate the nature of this action in terms of plaintiffs’ objectives. First, the negative. They do not claim that they have been denied housing or land purchase in New Castle because of color. They do not seek to overturn the New Castle’s zoning ordinances as unconstitutional. They do not assert that the funds appropriated will deprive any low-cost housing project thereof. They do not claim that there are any discriminatory features in the sewer and swamp grants.
Affirmatively what they seek is to prevent HUD and BOR from using federal funds (1) for aid in constructing a sewer in a small densely populated section of the Town of New Castle where neither housing or zoning are in question because the area is already well built up on quarter and half acre plots7 which area is badly in need of sewers for reasons of health;8 and (2) from acquiring a swamp to protect the environmental quality of the area by preserving open spaces for a wildlife sanctuary and for educational purposes, the very goal and concern of so much of our current legislation.
Another pertinent inquiry at this stage is: what would be the result of success for plaintiffs in this litigation? Primarily it would be to prevent their fellow-citizens who are as much in need of sewers as they claim to be in need of housing from having sanitary sewers and a wildlife sanctuary or park, thus preserving fast-shrinking open spaces. But a far more dangerous result would be the establishment of a principle that the judgment and discretion exercised by the executive and legislative branches of government can be examined and questioned (or even overturned) by any citizen, aided by the judiciary, to determine whether the decision (such as HUD’s and BOR’s here) was to their liking. In short, all administrative agencies will have to make their decisions with the knowledge that Big Brother 9 in the guise of a private attorney-general is peering over their respective administrative shoulders.
In sum, plaintiffs, in a suit challenging only a sewer and a park, seek by an oblique *584coercive proceeding to have this court, in effect, direct HUD to provide more housing throughout the nation. This conclusion is well-illustrated by their argument that “the lack of federal administrative pressure on New Castle to encourage fair housing opportunity within its borders through local housing and community development policy directly and materially contributes to growing patterns of racial segregation in Westchester County.” (Applt’s Brief, p. 39).
In fairness to HUD and BOR they are entitled to have set forth what they did before making the grants in question. No claim is made that any project discrimination exists as to the King-Greeley or Turner Swamp projects. Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. HUD also attempted to follow the requirements of Title VIII, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., albeit the loss of the original rating sheet required reconstruction and there were differences of opinion within the Department. Furthermore, the sewer project had been approved by the appropriate County and State departments. Likewise, as to the Turner Swamp, Interior through BOR and the State Liaison Officer had rated the project as qualified for a grant.
Ill
The guiding principles of law applicable to the proper decision here are to be found in Supreme Court’s recent decision in O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974). There, as here, an injunction was sought on the basis that the defendants “have engaged in and continue to engage in, a pattern or practice of conduct ... all of which has deprived and continues to deprive plaintiffs of their constitutional rights.” The Supreme Court gave a most explicit statement as to the essentials for “standing” stating:
“Plaintiffs in the federal courts ‘must allege some threatened or actual injury resulting from some putatively illegal action before a federal court may assume jurisdiction.’ . . . There must be a ‘personal stake in the outcome’ such as to ‘assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional question.’ . . . Nor is the principle different where statutory issues are raised. . . . Abstract injury is not enough. It must be alleged that the plaintiff ‘has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury’ as the result of the challenged statute or official conduct. . . . The injury or threat of injury must be both ‘real and immediate,’ not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’ ” (pp. 493-94, 94 S.Ct. p. 675) (citations omitted).
Within the year the Supreme Court has again reaffirmed its views as to standing in United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 94 S.Ct. 2940, 41 L.Ed.2d 678 and Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 94 S.Ct. 2925, 41 L.Ed.2d 706 (both decided June 25, 1974). In these recent decisions the Court expressed its opinion as to the effect of its former (although also recent) decisions defining standing. Since these former decisions are heavily relied upon by the majority, an analysis of the June 25, 1974 decisions and some of the preceding decisions should suffice to demonstrate that the majority opinion cannot be reconciled with them.
In Schlesinger the Court “recognized the continued vitality” of Ex parte Lévitt, 302 U.S. 633, 58 S.Ct. 1, 82 L.Ed. 493 (1937) (p. 220, 94 S.Ct. 2925), and reaffirmed that decision, holding that there must be a concrete injury “actual or threatened”, namely, “a particular injury caused by the action challenged as unlawful” — in short, a “particular injury” and a “personal stake.” This concrete injury “is especially important when the relief sought produces a confrontation with one of the coordinate branches of the Government;” and “the relief sought would, in practical effect, bring about conflict with two coordinate branches.” (p. 222, 94 S.Ct. p. 2932.) What the plaintiffs seek to achieve here would indeed “distort the role of the Judiciary in its relationship to the Executive and the Legislature and open the Judiciary to an arguable charge of providing ‘government *585by injunction.’ ” (p. 222, 94 S.Ct. p. 2933). In holding that there was no citizen standing in Schlesinger, the Court noted the restrictive nature of Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970) (“private competitive injury”), and United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 93 S.Ct. 2405, 37 L.Ed.2d 254 (1973) (“individual enjoyment of certain natural resources impaired”).
In Richardson, the Court observed that there is a modern tendency to call upon the courts to solve all problems of society but adhered to the “personal stake” requirement, stating:
“As our society has become more complex, our numbers more vast, our lives more varied, and our resources more strained, citizens increasingly request the intervention of the courts on a greater variety of issues than in any period of our national development. The acceptance of new categories of judicially cognizable injury has not eliminated the basic principle that to invoke judicial power the claimant must have a ‘personal stake in the outcome,’ ... in short, something more than ‘generalized grievances,’ ...” (pp. 179-80, 94 S.Ct. p. 2948) (citations omitted).
The concern of Mr. Justice Powell regarding “the expansion of judicial power” should well be a worry here. In his concurrence he wrote:
“Relaxation of standing requirements is directly related to the expansion of judicial power. It seems to me inescapable that allowing an unrestricted taxpayer or citizen standing would significantly alter the allocation of power at the national level, with a shift away from a democratic form of government. I also believe that repeated and essentially head-on confrontations between the life-tenured branch [the judiciary] and the representative branches of government will not, in the long run, be beneficial to either.” (p. 188, 94 S.Ct. p. 2952) (footnote omitted).
It would be in the Justice’s opinion, as it is in mine, highly inconsistent “if a democracy were to permit general oversight of the elected branches of government by a nonrepresentative, and in large measure insulated, judicial branch.” (p. 188, 94 S.Ct. p. 2952) (footnote omitted). “Unrestrained standing in federal taxpayer or citizen suits would create a remarkably illogical system of judicial supervision of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government.” (p. 189, 94 S.Ct. p. 2952).
In the same vein, Mr. Justice Powell commented that “recourse to the federal courts [where the Federal Government has allegedly been unresponsive to recognize needs or serious inequities in our society] has attained an unprecedented popularity in recent decades. Those courts have often acted as a major instrument of social reform.” (p. 191, 94 S.Ct. p. 2953). But he observed “how often and how unequivocally the Court [the Supreme Court] has expressed its antipathy to efforts to convert the judiciary into an open forum for the resolution of political or ideological disputes about the performance of government.” (citing cases) (p. 192, 94 S.Ct. p. 2954).
In Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972), the Sierra Club, whose members are interested in preserving woodlands and wildlife, in contrast to the destruction of forests and the construction of broad concrete highways, sought to enjoin the building of a vast resort and amusement center, including roadways, in the Mineral King Valley in California. The District Court had granted an injunction but the Court of Appeals reversed stating among other things that “We do not believe such club concern without a showing of more direct interest can constitute standing in the legal sense sufficient to challenge the exercise of responsibilities on behalf of all the citizens by two cabinet level officials of the government acting under Congressional and Constitutional authority.” 433 F.2d 24, 30 (9th Cir. 1970).
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, writing with particular perti*586nence to the litigation before us, at page 732, 92 S.Ct. at page 1364: “Where, however, Congress has authorized public officials to perform certain functions according to law, and has provided by statute for judicial review of those actions under certain circumstances, the inquiry as to standing must begin with a determination of whether the statute in question authorizes review at the behest of the plaintiff.”
Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (Title VI) clearly evidenced its intention to limit the question of discrimination to the particular program in issue. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l. As previously mentioned, no discrimination is claimed in either program here, and thus Title VI cannot support the standing of these plaintiffs. Nor is the Civil Rights Act of 1968 any more applicable. Congress clearly stated its intent: “It is the policy of the United States to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States.” 42 U.S.C. § 3601.
The Court in Sierra Club continues with the principle that: The “injury in fact” test requires more than an injury to a cognizable interest. “It requires that the party seeking review be himself among the injured.” (p. 735, 92 S.Ct. p. 1366). The Court would deny standing to those “individuals who seek to do no more than vindicate their own value preferences through the judicial process.”
The consequences of any other result were pointed out as follows: “And if any group with a bona fide ‘special interest’ could initiate such litigation, it is difficult to perceive why any individual citizen with the same bona fide special interest would not also be entitled to do so.” (pp. 739-40, 92 S.Ct. p. 1368).
In United States v. SCRAP, supra, the Court was dealing “simply with the pleadings in which appellees alleged a specific and perceptible harm that distinguished them from other citizens who had not used the natural resources that were claimed to be affected.” (p. 689, 93 S.Ct. p. 2416) (footnote omitted). The Court could not “say on these pleadings” that injury in fact could not be proven.
But in Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 92 S.Ct. 2318, 33 L.Ed.2d 154 (1972), the respondents’ claim “simply stated, is that they disagree with the judgments made by the Executive Branch . . . .” (p. 13, 92 S.Ct. p. 2325). On this subject the Court noted that: “Carried to its logical end, this approach would have the federal courts as virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action; . (p. 15, 92 S.Ct. p. 2326). Accordingly the Court reversed a Court of Appeals decision which had reversed the District Court’s denial of an injunction and dismissal of the complaint.
IV
THE MAJORITY OPINION
Court decisions should be made with an eye to, and with due regard to, the practical consequences thereof. The consequences of the majority’s decision are that the residents of the Hamlet of Chappaqua will not have their much-needed sewer or park. And this, by court decree instigated by a group of plaintiffs who have no interest whatsoever in a King-Greeley sewer or a Turner Swamp park, neither of which projects admittedly has any discriminatory features. The majority states that “Here, then, are agencies with an affirmative duty to encourage fair housing.” However, “fair housing” is not an issue in this case (if “case” it be). To say that plaintiffs’ right to adequate housing “is invaded by grants for sewer facilities or acquisition of recreation areas in urban communities which are not so administered” is a most illogical non sequitur. Equally illogical is it to say that the allocation of funds to New Castle “contributes to the perpetuation of [plaintiffs’] living patterns in the New York metropolitan area.” $358,000 and $57,500 would scarcely suffice for a low-cost housing project.
Admitting that plaintiffs do not have “a sufficient connection with the community to or for the benefit of which the grants are made”, the majority believes that it can *587exert court coercion upon HUD and Interi- or as well as Tri-State “because one important method of enforcement of the congressional policy set forth in Title VIII is by the agencies’ administration of grants related either to housing or urban development.” They then find that the grants “are so related.”
V
TRI-STATE
Tri-State is not a federal agency. It has made its own independent appraisal of the King-Greeley sewer and Turner Swamp projects as of “non-regional significance.” Accordingly, review of the projects was referred to the Westchester County Department of Planning. It scarcely befits the role of the federal judiciary to override and supersede the judgment of Tri-State in evaluating whether a sewer in a minute area of a town and a small wildlife park are of sufficient area concern as to call for Tri-State action and reaction. I find no error in Judge Pollack’s dismissal of the complaint against Tri-State.
VI
In conclusion I cannot reconcile the majority’s holding with the Supreme Court’s decisions in Sierra Club, O’Shea, Richardson and Schlesinger, all of which support Judge Pollack’s denial of a preliminary injunction and dismissal of the complaint. Accordingly, I dissent and would affirm Judge Pollack’s order.
. Plaintiff Brooks, Jr., merely wishes to move to “safe and sanitary housing in the County which he can afford.”
. Hamlet of Chappaqua.
. King-Greeley was organized under the New York Town Law (McKinney 1965).
. The application in the name of “King-Greeley Sanitary Sewer District,” dated January 9, 1972, was submitted to HUD.
. Their presence in the case is as subsequent intervenors.
. King-Greeley has no zoning authority or powers. In Warth v. Seldin, 495 F.2d 1187 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 419 U.S. 823, 95 S.Ct. 40, 42 L.Ed.2d 47 (1974), this court was faced with a direct (not oblique, as here) attack on the zoning ordinances of the town of Penfield, a suburb of Rochester. There builders had been denied the opportunity to construct multi-family housing in Penfield. The plaintiffs claimed that Penfield’s zoning ordinances were unconstitutional because they barred low and middle income persons, especially members of racial minority groups, from residing in Penfield. After reviewing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962); Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. *581Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 90 S.Ct. 832, 25 L.Ed.2d 192 (1970); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 409 U.S. 205, 93 S.Ct. 364, 34 L.Ed.2d 415 (1972); and other cases, this court concluded that to grant injunctive relief or to make a declaration that zoning was unconstitutional upon the facts presented would be “too abstract, conjectural and hypothetical to establish an Article III case or controversy” (p. 1193) and affirmed “on the ground that appellants lack standing.” (p. 1189).
. Tri-State Appendix 4. “The area is almost entirely developed with existing residential and business uses . . . the establishment of sewers in the King-Greeley Sewer District area will not alter, or offer the opportunity to alter, the range of densities proposed for residential development, since the area is already substantially developed with single-family homes that are of good quality and have a considerable period of useful life remaining.” Letter, December 28, 1971, Commissioner of Westchester County Department of Planning to New Castle Town Engineer. Tri-State Appendix 29.
. “[T]he extension of sewers into the service area will greatly improve the environmental and public health aspects of this central area of your town . . [and is an] improvement of the highest priority, and one which should receive every favorable consideration for Federal aid.”
. G. Orwell, 1984, written in 1949 as a fantasy. Now with only nine years remaining to stave off the prophecy, the date is becoming dangerously close.