United States v. John Henry Bright, Jr.

GOLDBERG, Circuit Judge

(dissenting).

John Henry Bright, Jr. appeals his conviction for bail jumping in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3150.1 Bright, who had been released pending appeal of an earlier conviction, failed to comply with a lawful order to surrender himself to a United States marshal. Bright argues, however, that the statute applies only to failure to surrender to a court, not a marshal. Alternatively, Bright argues that he was not given adequate notice of the order to surrender. Finding myself in substantial agreement with both contentions, I must dissent from the majority’s affirmance of Bright’s conviction.

I.

18 U.S.C. § 3150 imposes a penalty upon anyone who has been released pending trial or pending appeal and who “willfully fails to appear before any court or judicial officer as required”. Here Bright was ordered to appear before a marshal. He contends, quite correctly, that a marshal is neither a “court” nor a “judicial officer” under the statutory definition, and the majority agrees. The majority is content, however, to ignore the “court or judicial officer” requirement, apparently because it concludes that Congress employed words devoid of meaning in enacting the phrase. Because I do not regard second-guessing Congress as my function, particularly when the effect is to expand a criminal statute beyond its plain terms, I must dissent. I briefly sketch my analysis of the statute’s terms.

First, a marshal is not a “judicial officer” within the meaning of the statute. “Judicial officer” is defined by 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(1) as “any person or court authorized pursuant to section 3041 of this title, or the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, *480to bail or otherwise release a person before trial or sentencing or pending appeal in a court of the United States, and any judge of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia . . . A marshal is not authorized to bail or otherwise to release a person.2 The majority concedes that a marshal is not a “judicial officer” within section 3150, and every court that has considered the issue has reached the same conclusion. See United States v. Logan, 505 F.2d 35, 37 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. West, 477 F.2d 1056, 1057-58 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Wray, 369 F.Supp. 118, 125 (W.D. Mo.1973).3

The government’s attempt to bring a marshal within the statutory terms therefore rests on the facially implausible notion that a marshal is a “court.” As the majority acknowledges, the easy answer is that the statute’s plain language dictates the contrary conclusion, especially in light of the familiar principle that criminal statutes must be strictly construed. See, e. g., United States v. Bass, 405 U.S. 336, 347-48, 92 S.Ct. 515, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971).

The majority, however, seizes upon United States v. Logan, 505 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1974), which upheld a conviction for failure to surrender to a marshal. After being ordered to surrender to the court, the defendant requested and received permission to travel 750 miles to Houston to make arrangements for his family. At the defendant’s request, the court ordered him to surrender to the United States marshal rather than return to the court. Under those circumstances we held that the marshal was the court’s agent so that section 3150 was applicable to the defendant’s failure to appear.

On the other hand, in United States v. dark, 412 F.2d 885 (5th Cir. 1969) we overturned defendant’s conviction because he had been ordered to appear before a probation officer rather than before a court. Admittedly, other circumstances in dark might have called for reversal as well. It was unclear from the record whether Clark’s obligation to appear before the probation officer arose from a court order, from the conditions of his appearance bond, or from a condition imposed by the probation officer. See 412 F.2d at 886-87. Section 3150 proscribes only the failure to appear before “any court or judicial officer as required,” (emphasis added), and the proper construction of that provision may be “as required by a court order.” On that view the government’s failure to establish that Clark had been ordered by a court to appear before the probation officer at the time in question would have warranted reversal of the conviction.

It is clear from the dark opinion, however, that that was not the basis of the *481decision. We never discussed the “as required” provision. Instead, we focused on the “court or judicial officer” requirement, squarely holding that the statute was inapplicable to Clark’s conduct because a probation officer is not a “court or judicial officer.” See 412 F.2d at 888-91. For example, we said that “Clark’s failure to appear before a probation officer as ordered may have constituted a breach of a condition of his release, but certainly did not constitute a failure to appear before a court or judicial officer.” 412 F.2d at 891 (emphasis added). In attempting to characterize Clark as an “as required” decision rather than a “court or judicial officer” decision, the majority simply ignores Clark’s language. And the language in question was not dictum but squarely the basis for reversing Clark’s conviction. The Clark result establishes that probation officers to whom defendants are ordered to surrender do not invariably become agents of the court so as to come within section 3150. The majority does not suggest that there is any inherent difference between a probation officer and a marshal that would allow one but not the other to be made the court’s agent for this purpose, and Clark therefore indicates that a marshal to whom a defendant is ordered to surrender does not in all circumstances become an agent of the court. By holding that a marshal is always the court’s agent, the majority in effect overrules Clark.

Because of the surface implausibility of holding that a marshal is a “court”, and because of the requirement that criminal statutes be construed strictly, I would read Logan narrowly and take Clark at its word. I would treat a marshal as a “court” only when some unusual factor compels departure from the statute’s strict requirements. In Logan the defendant himself requested permission to surrender to a marshal in order to avoid 750 miles of unnecessary travel. In contrast, the case at bar parallels Clark in that there are no special circumstances to divert us from the explicit statutory provision that criminal penalties be imposed only for failure to surrender to a court.

Admittedly, Logan not only emphasized its unique factual setting but also contained some broad language and cited United States v. West, 477 F.2d 1056 (4th Cir. 1973). Despite the absence of special circumstances, West upheld a conviction for failure to report to a marshal. Special circumstances were present in Logan, however, and any discussion of the West situation was purely dictum.

Moreover, the majority’s result not only unduly expands Logan by ignoring Clark, but the result is wrong as an original matter. The result contravenes the legislative history, cannot be justified by the majority’s irrelevant policy argument, and most importantly undermines the salutary and heretofore unquestioned principle that criminal statutes must be strictly construed. I address each of these points in turn.

First, the majority decision to ignore the “court or judicial officer” requirement flies in the face of the legislative history. The statutory language stands in marked contrast to the previous bail jumping statute, which imposed a penalty upon anyone who “willfully faii[ed] to surrender himself” within thirty days of the forfeiture of his bail but did not specify the persons to whom a defendant was to be required to surrender. See Act of Aug. 20, 1954, ch. 772, § 1, 68 Stat. 747 (formerly codified as 18 U.S.C. § 3146).4 Because the “court or judicial officer” language was enacted as a specific amendment to an earlier statute, I do not regard the phrase as inadvertent. So clear a change in a statute’s terminology is hardly “ambiguous”, the majority’s opinion to the contrary notwithstanding. See p. 475 ante.5 Specific changes in the lan*482guage of successive statutes provide a better guide to legislative intent than such manipulate sources as floor debates and committee reports, and I can assume only that Congress meant what it said.

The majority’s result also cannot be upheld on the basis of the policy argument derived from United States v. West, supra. The West court reasoned that “an unnecessary waste of judicial time and energy would result if we were to require that each person in West’s position appear before the court itself.” I cannot accept this view.

Initially, I am not at all certain that requiring a person to appear before the court itself is “an unnecessary waste of judicial time and energy”. Courts occupy a different position in our scheme of things than do marshals. It is not unrealistic to suppose that a lay person might regard an order to surrender to a court differently than an order to surrender to a- marshal. The distinction is not born of arrogance. The robe represents moral sanctions with hierarchical heights in our governmental structure. There are overt and subtle differences between a gavel and a pistol.6 Congress might well have concluded that the seriousness of the obligation to surrender should be manifested by an order to appear in court, and that absent such a manifestation criminal penalties should not be imposed.7 The majority fails to address this possible justification for the “court or judicial officer requirement.”

More fundamentally, even if it were demonstrated that the requirement of an appearance before the court itself is an “unnecessary waste of judicial time and energy”, I would not be prepared to dispense with the requirement.8 The need to conserve judicial resources does not justify departing from the salutary principle that criminal statutes must be strictly construed. If Congress desires to impose criminal penalties for failure to surrender to a United States marshal, we should require it to use language more explicit than that of section 3150.

Indeed, the majority’s construction of this particular statute is not nearly so troublesome as its general approach to interpreting criminal statutes. That a criminal statute’s legislative history is deemed “ambiguous” hardly justifies departure from the statute’s plain terms. The principle that criminal statutes should be continually and continuously strictly construed must remain unquestioned. The majority does not attempt to mount a frontal assault on that principle. Instead, the majority announces somewhat uneasily that its “holding barely expands the literal reading of section 3150.” See p. 475 ante. One suspects that the majority’s willingness “barely” to expand this criminal statute is colored by its perhaps justifiable disdain for Bright’s conduct. But “bare expansions” of criminal statutes are unlikely to be so appealing in the run of cases. Today a statute is bent to allow an evil person to be jailed for reprehensible conduct; tomorrow the wounded strict construction principle may prove insufficient to prevent manifest injustice. I *483would adhere to principle, apply the statute’s clear terms, and reverse Bright’s conviction.

II.

Bright’s second ground for attacking his conviction is that there was insufficient evidence that his failure to appear was “willful”, as the statute requires.9 I am not as confident as the majority that Bright’s nonappearance was willful, and because the grossly mismanaged district court clerk’s office failed to send Bright notice of his obligation to surrender, I would reverse the conviction on this ground as well.

The majority correctly notes that although Bright did not have actual knowledge, actual knowledge is not required. See, e. g., United States v. Cohen, 450 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1971). As Cohen recognized,

A defendant’s failure to appear because he has purposefully engaged in a course of conduct designed to prevent him from receiving notice to appear can clearly be as “willful” as when he receives and deliberately ignores a notice to appear. See United States v. DePugh, 434 F.2d 548 (8th Cir. 1970) [cert. denied, 401 U.S. 978, 91 S.Ct. 1208, 28 L.Ed.2d 328 (1971)]; United States v. Hall, 346 F.2d 875 (2nd Cir. 1965) [cert. denied, 382 U.S. 910, 86 S.Ct. 250, 15 L.Ed.2d 161 (1965)].

450 F.2d at 1021. The majority approvingly cites this passage from Cohen but gives insufficient attention to the requirement that a defendant “purposefully” engage in conduct “designed to prevent him from receiving notice.”

In the case at bar there is some evidence in the record that would support a holding' of purposeful evasion. Bright and his wife left Texas and traveled extensively. They finally came to rest in Georgia, where they rented a house and Bright enrolled in vocational school. Bright did not provide his address to his attorney or to his Texas relatives. Bright’s apparent intention to remain outside of Texas indefinitely at an undisclosed address supports an inference that he was purposely avoiding any notice of his obligation to surrender.

Consistent with these facts, however, is a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Bright had been told by his attorney Coil that his conviction was sure to be overturned and that, at any rate, the appeal would be pending for between IV2 and 2 years. Furthermore, Coil told Bright that if the conviction were affirmed an appeal would be taken to .the United States Supreme Court. Therefore, Bright might have believed that he would not become subject to an order to surrender during the period in question. Moreover, there was undisputed evidence that Bright took steps to learn of any obligation to surrender. He frequently telephoned his mother, his wife’s mother and attorney Coil. Although Bright did not talk to Coil between the time the original conviction was affirmed and the time of the bail jumping arrest, Bright might reasonably have concluded that any developments in the case would come to the attention of his mother or his wife’s mother. Bright provided his own mother’s address on the bond; she failed to learn of the surrender order only because the notice was returned undelivered rather than being delivered to her. In addition, Bright’s wife’s mother was in frequent contact with Coil, from whom she had recently purchased a house, and Bright might have concluded that Coil would relate to her any developments in the case. The record is unclear whether Bright contacted either his own mother or his wife’s mother between the time he was ordered to surrender and the time of his arrest. Bright’s failure to disclose his Georgia address, upon which the majority places so much reliance, might have been based on the fact that leaving Texas was a violation of the bond conditions and accordingly subjected him to arrest, as he knew. See 18 U.S.C. § 3146(c). Bright’s conduct might have been “designed” to prevent his arrest for violating bond conditions, not “designed” to prevent him from receiving notice to appear. While I do not condone *484Bright’s conduct, I am not convinced it comes within the Cohen standard.

On these facts it is a close question whether the jury could reasonably have concluded that Bright’s failure to appear was willful. Certainly, the fact that Bright violated his bond by leaving Texas is not sufficient standing alone to support a finding of willfulness. Although Bright’s violation of the bond condition is to be condemned, it is not a violation of section 3150, a fact the majority acknowledges but then ignores. There is a distinction between the violation of a bond condition and failure to appear before a court. The sanctions are different and the components of the transgressions are not identical. Bright was charged with being a bail jumper, not a bond covenant breaker, and my analysis proceeds with this basic distinction in mind and in the forefront. I cannot ignore the hypothesis of innocence that Bright relocated in Georgia in reliance on his attorney’s advice that his earlier conviction would be reversed, expecting to learn of any obligation to surrender through his frequent contacts with his attorney and relatives.

My fundamental disagreement with the majority, however, does not rest on whether this hypothesis of innocence could reasonably have been rejected by the jury. I find the evidence insufficient in a more important respect. I agree with the court in United States v. DePugh, 434 F.2d 548, 551 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 978, 91 S.Ct. 1208, 28 L.Ed.2d 328 (1971), that a “reasonable interpretation of the statute would contemplate that a defendant . be given reasonable notice as to any required court appearance.” In the case at bar the government did not establish that it took reasonable steps to give Bright notice of his obligation to surrender.

Indeed, the undisputed evidence plainly established that the government failed to provide reasonable notice. At a minimum notice to the defendant’s attorney is required. Here Bright’s attorney Coil was not given notice of the order to surrender because Coil’s address was not sufficiently accessible to accord with the district court clerk’s convenience. Instead, the district court clerk’s office sent notice to Bright’s trial attorneys, who no longer represented Bright as the clerk should have known. Coil had written the district court clerk shortly after beginning his representation of Bright. The letter concerned the record on appeal, clearly indicated Coil was Bright’s attorney, and listed Coil’s address. Moreover, the Fifth Circuit transmittal letter listed Coil as Bright’s attorney. In addition, when the notice to Bright was returned undelivered, a deputy clerk telephoned one of Bright’s trial attorneys and was told that Bright was now represented by an attorney from Dallas. That attorney was Coil, as the clerk knew from the Fifth Circuit’s transmittal letter. Armed with the knowledge that Coil was from Dallas, the clerk could easily have determined his address from a telephone book or lawyer directory. Nevertheless, she made no effort to notify Coil of the surrender order. The district court clerk’s failure to notify Coil was completely inexcusable, and the majority suggests no excuse for it.

The majority, however, regards the clerk’s egregious neglect as insignificant, pointing out that the Fifth Circuit clerk notified Coil that the conviction had been affirmed. I find the majority’s reasoning unacceptable. A person released pending appeal must be given notice of the particular time when surrender is required. The Fifth Circuit notice did not say that Bright would be required to appear at all, and even if he should have known that a surrender order would be forthcoming, Bright could not have known when and where to surrender.10

*485The notice requirement that I find to be a condition precedent to a § 3150 prosecution is not a mere formality. The Court in United States v, DePugh, supra, intimated that without such a requirement the statute would be unconstitutional. The proscription of failure to appear “as required” is not unconstitutionally vague, said the court, because the giving of reasonable notice makes it clear when an appearance is “required.” Moreover, in United States v. Slater, 524 F.2d 987 (5th Cir. 1975) we read a notice requirement into a similar failure-to-appear statute on the basis of “principles of common fairness.” 524 F.2d at 990. The majority makes no attempt to deal with the Slater decision.

Even if a notice requirement is not essential to save the statute from constitutional attack, I think it reasonable to assume that Congress intended for reasonable notice to be given. The uniform practice under section 3150 accords with that view; in every reported case in which the defendant did not have actual knowledge of his obligation to surrender, notice of the particular time when surrender was required was given to the defendant’s attorney. The failure in the case at bar to provide reasonable notice appears to be totally unprecedented.

In addition to the arguments based upon constitutional overtones and statutory construction, there is another compelling reason to read a notice requirement into séction 3150. The giving of reasonable notice will reduce the possibility of erroneous section 3150 convictions. The statute proscribes only “willful” failures to appear, and the evidence on willfulness will be more reliable when the government has taken all reasonable steps to give notice.

The case at bar provides an illustration. If Coil had been notified of the order to appear, there would have been two possibilities. First, word of the order might have reached Bright, a possibility the majority discounts but cannot exclude on the basis of this record. Upon receiving notice Bright might have surrendered, thus averting the section 3150 prosecution, or he might not have surrendered, in which case the inference that his action was willful would be strong.11 Second, word of the order might not have reached Bright. In that event it would be clear that Bright placed himself beyond the reach of notice; that aspect of the willfulness issue would not be left to the jury’s speculation as it was in the actual case. Therefore, whether or not Bright would have received notice, the willfulness evidence would be more reliable and the risk of erroneous conviction would be substantially reduced.

The same will be true in every section 3150 prosecution where willfulness is an issue. The evidence of willfulness will be circumstantial; the possibility of erroneous conviction will be inescapable. I would not tolerate convictions based upon jury speculation when the speculation could be minimized by so simple a step as mailing notice to the defendant’s attorney.12 The majority *486speculates that Bright would not have received notice; it is confident enough to convict upon speculation rather than fact. On this record we cannot be certain notice would not have reached Bright, however, and I am unwilling to run this unnecessary risk of erroneous conviction.

In summary, Bright’s conviction was fatally defective because he was ordered to surrender to a marshal rather than to a court as required by the statute, and because the government failed to give him reasonable notice of his obligation to surrender. I dissent.

. 18 U.S.C. § 3150 provides in pertinent part: Whoever, having been released pursuant to this chapter, willfully fails to appear before any court or judicial officer as required, shall, subject to the provisions of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, incur a forfeiture of any security which was given or pledged for his release, and, in addition, shall, (1) if he was released in connection with [the] charge of felony, or while awaiting sentence or pending appeal or certiorari after conviction of any offense, be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both

. 18 U.S.C. § 3041 provides that a person may be released

by any .justice or judge of the United States, or by any United States magistrate, or by any chancellor, judge of a supreme or superior court, chief or first judge of common pleas, mayor of a city, justice of the peace, or other magistrate, of any state where the offender may be found .

Fed.R.Crim.P. 46 does not expand the list of persons who may release a defendant before trial or pending appeal.

That the “judicial officer” definition is written in terms of authority to bail someone may be attributable to its position in the overall statutory scheme. The definition applies not only to section 3150 but also to sections 3146 through 3149, which authorize a “judicial officer” to release a person and to impose conditions of release. We cannot, however, excise section 3150 from the statutory definition. With unmistakable clarity Congress made the definition applicable to “sections 3146-3150,” not merely to sections 3146 through 3149. See 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a).

. The “judicial officer” definition is identical in relevant respects to its predecessor. See Act of June 22, 1966, Pub.L.No. 89-465, § 3(a), 80 Stat. 216 (formerly codified as 18 U.S.C. § 3152(1)). Congress enacted a new and unrelated § 3152 in 1975, reenacting the “judicial officer” definition as part of § 3156. I read no significance into the reenactment because there is no indication in the legislative history that Congress considered or was aware of existing judicial constructions of the section. If I were to accord the reenactment any significance, however, my result would be reinforced. As indicated by the cases cited in the text, at the time the definition was reenacted the unbroken judicial construction was that marshals were not “judicial officers.”

. The change occurred in 1966.

. The change is explicated in United States v. Clark, 412 F.2d 885, 888 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1969) and Brown v. United States, 410 F.2d 212, 216 (5th Cir. 1969). The majority erroneously cites Brown for the proposition that Congress did not mean to change the statute’s meaning. Brown said only that the amended statute, like its predecessor, did not preclude forfeiture of a bond for breach of a bond condition. Brown had nothing to do with the “court or judicial officer” requirement; Brown did not mention *482that requirement; and Brown did not and could not purport to decide the issue now before the court.

. I do not denigrate the important position that a marshal holds in the Justice Department’s establishment and in our nation’s enforcement of its laws, but a marshal is not transmuted or transmogrified into a judge by operation of law. He or she may become a surrogate judge by occasional judicial fiat but not by our filling the statutory interstices with meanings wholly alien to the lexicographer’s definitions.

. That surrender orders are issued by judges manifests their seriousness to some extent. Congress might well have concluded, however, that being ordered to appear in court would have an additional effect and should be required as a prerequisite to prosecution.

. Under my result, if courts desired to conserve resources by ordering defendants to surrender to marshals, they would remain free to do so. Acceptance of my position would mean only that the section 3150 sanction would not be available. Failure to comply with an order to surrender to a marshal would still subject the defendant to arrest, see 18 U.S.C. § 3146(c), and the contempt sanction would remain available in proper circumstances. See 18 U.S.C. § 401(3). Cf. United States v. Clark, supra, 412 F.2d at 891.

. See note 1 supra.

. What I have said should not be interpreted as indicating approval of Coil’s conduct. Coil should have sought to determine whether a surrender order had been issued. Instead, Coil did nothing; he testified that he “assumed” that he would be notified if Bright were ordered to surrender. Coil understated his fault in this regard by conceding that he was “remiss” in allowing his preoccupation with other matters to prevent him from properly attending to his representation of Bright. Coil’s misfeasance does not, however, excuse the clerk’s neglect. *485The statute requires notice of the order to surrender, not merely notice of the disposition of the appeal pending which defendant had been released.

. The government argues that even if Coil had been notified, Bright would not have learned of the order until after the date upon which he was slated to appear. The record neither confirms nor contradicts this assertion. Bright did not telephone Coil during the period in question but may have telephoned his mother or his wife’s mother, to whom Coil might have relayed word of any obligation to surrender. At any rate, even if Bright would have learned of the order after the appearance date, his reaction at that time — either voluntary appearance or continued refusal to surrender — would now present the willfulness issue in a much different light.

. The majority apparently finds my reasoning persuasive, for it finds it necessary to assert that “[n]otice to Coil of the [surrender] order would have been useless.” Upon receiving notice of such an order Coil might have contacted Bright’s mother or Bright’s wife Jan’s mother, Mrs. Erwin. The record indicates the Brights frequently contacted their mothers, and although the record does not indicate the dates of these contacts, it certainly does not exclude the possibility that they occurred after the surrender order. The burden of proof on this issue should of course rest with the government, because the notice question is part of the willfulness issue, which is an element of the government’s criminal case.