Jacinto Negron appeals from the denial by the Eastern District of New York (Costantino, J.) of his motion under F.R.Crim.P. 35 to vacate as illegally imposed a sentence of ten years imprisonment and a 15-year special parole term, with the special condition that Negron be deported to Colombia, South America, upon completion of the jail sentence. The sentence was imposed after Negron pleaded guilty to the charge of distributing approximately a kilogram of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
Appellant Negron, together with five others, was charged in a three-count indictment with conspiracy to distribute, possession with intent to distribute, and the actual distribution, of cocaine. On September 3, 1975, appellant pleaded guilty to the last charge. At that time, Judge Costantino advised Negron, age 23, of the possibility of his being sentenced under the Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5005 et seq., and also explained to him the ramifications of Youth Corrections Act treatment.
On October 24, 1975 Negron appeared before the court for sentencing. His retained counsel acknowledged that Negron had one prior New York state conviction in 1972, but attempted to minimize Negron’s role in the cocaine conspiracy, calling him a “carrier for the principals.” On allocution to the court, Negron said only: “The only thing I want to do is to release the innocent ones and since we are guilty we might as well do whatever the Court desires.” Judge Costantino thereupon passed judgment on appellant.
The prosecutor then reminded the court that Negron claimed to be 23 years old and therefore eligible for Young Adult Offender treatment under 18 U.S.C. § 4209 (now § 4216).1 See United States v. Torun, 2 Cir., 537 F.2d 661, 663, n.4. Judge Costantino responded that “in view of [Negron’s] involvement in the matter before the Court and the particular part that he took in that involvement, the Court denies him Y.C.A. treatment.”
Appellant’s sole argument is that Judge Costantino denied Young Adult Offender treatment without a proper exercise of his discretion. He concedes that the judge was aware of appellant’s eligibility therefor. Appellant contends, however, that he was denied Y.C.A. treatment only because of his participation in a cocaine transaction. He argues that, therefore, the judge failed to use his discretion in denying Y.C.A. treatment.
We find this contention to be without merit. It is true that, notwithstanding the broad discretion conferred on the District Court by § 4209,2 which autho*1087rizes youthful offender treatment to a young adult offender, only where the district judge affirmatively finds that the defendant will benefit from the treatment, United States v. Torun, supra, at 665, a district judge may abuse this discretion by considering only one factor in a “fixed and mechanical” way. See United States v. Schwarz, 500 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir. 1974), where the district judge had indicated that only a specific class of persons can claim consideration under the provisions of the Act. 500 F.2d at 1352. See United States v. Kaylor, 491 F.2d 1133, 1137 (2d Cir. 1974) (en banc); United States v. Dinapoli, 519 F.2d 104 (6th Cir. 1975). We may therefore assume, without deciding, that it would be improper to deny Young Adult Offender treatment solely because defendant had been convicted of a serious felony. See Schwarz, supra, at 1351. But Judge Costantino did not base his decision on the single fact that Negron had violated 21 U.S.C. § 841. He took especial cognizance of the “particular part” that Negron played in the cocaine transaction. Nor was that his sole criterion of judgment.
Judge Costantino had read and considered the pre-sentencing report, which gave details relevant to several of the statutory criteria, before imposing sentence, cf. Stead v. United States, 531 F.2d 872 (8th Cir. 1976). He had earlier, before accepting the guilty plea, advised appellant that he was eligible for treatment under the Y.C.A. As the Supreme Court has noted in a similar context, “Once it is made clear that the sentencing judge has considered the option of treatment under the Act and rejected it, no appellate review is warranted.” Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 443, 94 S.Ct. 3042, 3053, 41 L.Ed.2d 855 (1974).
It was not necessary for the judge to make any explicit findings as long as it is clear from the record that all relevant factors were considered. Section 4209, supra, n.1; United States v. Kaylor, supra; United States v. McDonald, supra ; see Dorszynski, supra, 418 U.S. at 433-34, n.9, 94 S.Ct. 3042.3 We affirm the judgment of the District Court.
. 18 U.S.C. § 4209 provides:
“In the case of a defendant who has attained his twenty-second birthday but has not attained his twenty-sixth birthday at the time of conviction, if, after taking into consideration the previous record of the defendant as to delinquency or criminal experience, his social background, capabilities, mental and physical health, and such other factors as may be considered pertinent, the court finds that there is reasonable grounds [sic] to believe that the defendant will benefit from the treatment provided under the Federal Youth Corrections Act (18 U.S.C. Chap. 402) sentence may be imposed pursuant to the provisions of such act.”
. The District Court may weigh various factors enumerated in the statute, see note 1 supra, as well as other factors that he considers pertinent. Even if the District Court finds that there are reasonable grounds to believe that defendant would benefit, it still has discretion whether to afford Youth Adult Offender treatment. See 18 U.S.C. § 4209; United States v. McDonald, 481 F.2d 513, 515 (D.C.Cir. 1973).
. We reiterate that we need not consider the scope of the District Court’s discretion to deny Y.C.A. treatment notwithstanding an explicit finding that a defendant would benefit thereby, see Dorszynski, supra; McDonald, supra.