dissenting, with whom Circuit Judges BROWNING, DUNIWAY, ELY and WALLACE concur.
The Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation (“Yakimas”), invoking federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1362, brought this suit challenging the statutory and constitutional validity of the State of Washington’s assumption of criminal and civil jurisdiction over the Yakimas’ reservation lands and sought a declaration that the assumption was void, or if not void, that the assumption gave the State concurrent rather than exclusive jurisdiction. The district court rejected their contentions on a number of grounds, and the Yakimas appeal from the adverse judgment.
On appeal the Yakimas contend: The State’s assumption of jurisdiction is invalid because the State did not comply with a statutory condition precedent to assumption imposed by Congress in PL-2801 because the State did not amend her constitutional disclaimer of jurisdiction over the Yakimas, and she did not obtain tribal consent to her assumption of jurisdiction. If the State could have assumed complete jurisdiction over the Yakimas, R.C.W. § 37.12.010, the assumption of partial jurisdiction is invalid because it is unauthorized by PL-280. Even if PL-280 purported to authorize partial assumption, R.C.W. § 37.12.010 is unconstitutional as applied to the Yakimas.
The court sua sponte ordered this case en banc for the purpose of deciding whether to overrule that part of Quinault Tribe of Indians v. Gallagher (9th Cir.1966) 368 F.2d 648 (“Quinault II”), stating that PL-280 authorized Washington’s partial assumption of jurisdiction over Indian reservations. The majority of the court refuses to overrule this part of Quinault II and holds that PL-280, authorized the multiple partial assumptions at issue. In my view, the reasoning and the result of Quinault II are wrong and should be overturned. The majority’s decision to the contrary is based on a misreading of the statutory scheme, a misinterpretation of the legislative history, and some strongly worded, but factually unsupported fears about the impact of correcting our past mistakes in Quinault II. The end product is the perpetuation of some bad law, and the enforced and otherwise unnecessary confrontation with some difficult constitutional issues.2
The Quinault II issue that we took en banc was wrongly decided. Quinault II de*450cided that R.C.W. § 37.12.010 was not a partial assumption of jurisdiction because the Indians could always resolve to consent to full jurisdiction, and if the tribe did so, the Governor had to issue the statutory proclamation, which would result in jurisdiction to the full limits of Congress’ consent. R.C.W. § 37.12.010, however, is a partial assumption statute and it cannot become something else because the tribe could avoid its provisions altogether by following a different statute. But, of greater moment, a potential for consent to complete state jurisdiction is no answer to the key questions whether Congress permitted any partial assumption by a disclaimer state, like Washington, or whether Congress ever gave Washington the power to limit the Indians’ choices to complete jurisdiction that they did not want or partial jurisdiction that they did not want either.
Quinault II failed to recognize that Washington’s assumption scheme involves multiple partial assumptions: (1) assumption of jurisdiction of less than all Indians, tribes, and reservations; (2) partial territorial assumption within reservations; and (3) partial assumption of subject matter jurisdiction within reservations.
I have no difficulty in upholding the validity of reservation-by-reservation or tribe-by-tribe assumptions under PL-280, and to the extent that the majority opinion rests on that conclusion, I agree with it.3 That issue was never addressed in Quinault II. However, the second and third types of partial assumption are not valid under PL-280.
I
I start with a brief statutory sketch of Washington’s assumption schemes. In 1957, the legislature enacted chapter 240, Laws of 1957 (R.C.W. § 37.12) which allowed the Indians to request the governor to assume jurisdiction, with exceptions here not pertinent, whereupon the governor was to issue a proclamation confirming the assumption. In 1963, Washington amended her assumption statute dividing jurisdiction into two broad categories: (1) jurisdiction assumed with the consent of the affected tribes; (2) jurisdiction assumed without tribal consent. In the first category, upon tribal resolution and gubernatorial proclamation, the State would assume jurisdiction over “all Indians and all Indian territory, reservations, country, and lands of the Indian body involved to the same extent that this state exercises civil and criminal jurisdiction or both elsewhere within the state.” (R.C.W. § 37.12.020, recodified as R.C.W. § 37.12.021, Wash.Laws 1963, ch. 36) As to nonconsenting tribes, Washington assumed jurisdiction to the fullest extent permissible under PL-280 in respect of fee land, but she assumed jurisdiction as to non-fee lands (“tribal lands or allotted lands within an established Indian reservation and held in trust by the United States or subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by the United States”) only in respect of eight categories of subject matter (compulsory school attendance, public assistance, domestic relations, mental illness, juvenile delinquency, adoption proceedings, dependent children, and operation of motor vehicles upon the public streets, alleys, roads, and highways). (R.C.W. § 37.12.010.) These statutes are partial in that they authorize assumptions reservation by reservation. As to nonconsenting tribes, Washington divided fee from non-fee lands and assumed less than all subject matter jurisdiction on non-fee lands.
The majority opinion decides that Congress authorized Washington to assume *451partial geographic jurisdiction and partial subject matter jurisdiction within a single reservation. As the majority acknowledges, PL-280 does not say so; indeed, Congress did not plainly speak its mind one way or the other. We must seek congressional intent from the hints of PL-280 and its later amendments and from such congressional policies as can be identified from the legislative history.
I realize that defining congressional policy is not an easy task because Congress has never formulated a coherent policy toward Indians. It has wavered between and among federal dependence, assimilation, and autonomy. In pursuit of one policy, rather than another, and sometimes adopting antithetical policies at the same time, Congress has kept, given, and shared jurisdiction with the states over Indian affairs. The end product has been and still is confusion. However, no confusion exists on the point that history supplies no support for the majority’s conclusion that Congress intended the states to experiment with partial jurisdiction. The failure of the Department of Interior to consult with option states or with nonconsenting Indians had nothing to do with some kind of experimental proclivities in departmental or congressional minds. On the contrary, it was further evidence of departmental and congressional insensitivity toward Indians. As far as the legislative history reveals, assimilation as a means to “resolve” Indian problems was relatively strong in 1953 when PL-280 was enacted. But of greater moment were the pressures and counterpres-sures from states who wanted the benefits of total jurisdiction, from those states who were unwilling or unable to assume the burdens that assumption would entail, from those members of Congress who wanted to halt the drain on federal financial resources caused by retaining federal jurisdiction, and from others who recognized that federal thrift was not an acceptable excuse for abandoning the federal government’s fiduciary and quasi-fiduciary obligations to Indians. PL-280 was a compromise among the powerful contending state-federal forces, in which concern for the Indians, even experimentally, was not evident. In addition to the interest in money spent or saved, the primary motivation for PL-280 was the enforcement of criminal law on the reservations. The strongest single thread in the legislative history was the intent to cure “[t]he complete breakdown of law and order on many of the Indian reservations,” as Wesley D’Ewart, House Indian Affairs Subcommittee member, described the situation.4
Six states (Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin), known as the “mandatory” states, were willing to assume complete civil and criminal jurisdiction, and none of them had internal impediments to assumption. PL-280 gave consent to transfer immediately full jurisdiction to those states, with a few stated exceptions for specifically designated well-governed reservations,5 The remaining states, known as “option states,” were given the limited choice “as provided in the Act” to assume jurisdiction of “criminal offenses or civil causes, or with respect to both.”6
The majority opinion’s conclusion that Congress authorized the option states to assume patchwork jurisdiction within a single reservation is flatly contrary to its clearly evinced intent to cure the break*452down of criminal law enforcement on reservations that were not internally well governed.- The most striking departure from congressional intent is the majority’s conclusion that PL-280 authorized Washington’s partial geographic assumption within a reservation, commonly known as “checkerboarding.” The Supreme Court has noted the deleterious effects of checker-boarding upon law enforcement in an analogous situation:
“. . . [Wjhere . . . the existence or nonexistence of federal jurisdiction, depends upon the ownership of particular parcels of land, law enforcement officers operating in the area will find it necessary to search tract books in order to determine whether criminal jurisdiction over each particular offense, even though committed within the reservation, is in the State or Federal Government. Such an impractical pattern or checkerboard jurisdiction was avoided by the plain language of § 1151 and we see no justification for adopting an unwarranted construction of that language where the result would be merely to recreate confusion Congress specifically sought to avoid.” (Seymour v. Superintendent (1962) 368 U.S. 351, 358, 82 S.Ct. 424, 428, 7 L.Ed.2d 346.)
In striking down South Dakota’s 1961 statute assuming jurisdiction over highways on the reservations, the South Dakota Supreme Court cited the law enforcement quagmire created by partial geographic jurisdiction as one of the reasons why such partial assumption was inconsistent with the policy of PL-280. (In re Hankin’s Petition (S.D.Sup.Ct.1964) 125 N.W.2d 839).7
Congress did not need to run experiments to decide that checkerboarding was antithetical to effective law enforcement. Moreover, when it wanted to permit some partial assumption in circumstances that did not affect criminal law enforcement, it left no doubt about its intentions. Section 2(a) of PL-280, as amended by Act of Aug. 8,1958, Pub.L. No. 85-615, § 2, 72 Stat. 545, 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a), exempted three named reservations. Section 2(b) provided a very narrow exception to free Indian trust property from “alienation, encumbrance, or taxation.”8 The mandatory states were to take jurisdiction in “[a]ll Indian country within the State,” other than specified reservations; there is nothing to indicate the optional states were to take less. On the other hand, the 1968 amendments permit states to assume jurisdiction in the “particular Indian country or part thereof” to which the Indians consent. If Congress wished to accomplish a similar goal under PL-280, it would not have been so coy about it.
The Yakimas’ reservation is a checkerboard of fee owned and non-fee owned land. The effect of Washington’s partial territorial assumption is to combine on the *453same reservation a Washington law enforcement pattern that varies from plot to plot depending upon the state of title to the particular parcel of land. One of the major grievances of the Yakimas is that they have seriously inadequate police protection. The Yakima Reservation occupies 46.4 percent of the land encompassed by Yakima County. Reservation Yakimas constitute almost half of the rural population of the County; 80 percent of the Yakimas live in the rural lower valley of the County. No sheriff’s office exists on the reservation. Of the 29 deputy sheriffs assigned to work in the field for the County, only 2 were assigned to the reservation. The Yakima County Sheriff said that the state cannot do a good job with juveniles when it has no jurisdiction over parents and that fragmented jurisdiction hampered police work in other law enforcement areas as well.
The Yakimas have requested retrocession of state jurisdiction to enable them to return fully to federal jurisdiction with the hope of federal assistance in securing outside help and in aiding them to work out their problems within the tribal structure. The State of Washington either does not have, or declines to use resources to improve the situation, but has so far been unwilling or unable to relinquish jurisdiction. This lawsuit is a by-product of the stalemate.
The Yakimas have no effective law enforcement on their reservation.9 Washington acknowledges that reality.10 So does the majority of this court. The majority justifies its conclusion that the Yakimas must be made to bear those ills they have because this court refuses to fly to others that we know not of. “More critically,” it says, “reversal of Quinault II at this late stage [10 years], along with a new interpretation of PL-280, could lead to unfortunate law enforcement problems for thousands of native Americans.”11 The majority opinion’s statement that reversal of Quinault II would adversely affect 158,000 Indians is factually incorrect. In the first place, Qui-nault II itself has adversely affected the Yakimas, and overturning the decision will alleviate their distress. In the second, invalidating Washington’s truly unique checker-boarding would affect no more than about *45410,000 reservation Indians in Washington.12 The remaining Washington Indians would be unaffected because they live on reservations where all the land is held in tribal trust,13 have consented to full jurisdiction under the 1963 statute,14 have consented to full jurisdiction under the 1957 statute,15 or are covered by federal jurisdiction after a retrocession.16 Almost two-thirds of the affected Indians reside on the Yakima reservation and are the parties in interest in this suit.
Invalidating the Washington assumption statute under PL-280 for impermissible geographical checkerboarding would break the stalemate. Washington would be relieved of a law enforcement burden she is unwilling or unable to carry. The Yakimas would be free to negotiate with the federal government and with the State of Washington under PL-90-284.17 In the interim, the Yakimas’ own tribal officers would have authority to deal with offenses and offenders whom they now can do no more than passively observe. This interpretation would not jeopardize jurisdiction that Washington assumed under its 1957 statute, nor is there any reason to believe that jurisdiction thereafter assumed by agreement pursuant to the 1963 law would be adversely affected by invalidation under PL-280.
II
The majority opinion also errs in upholding the Washington statute against attack based upon partial subject matter assumption. Because I would strike the statute down for impermissible partial territorial assumption, I would not need to reach the partial subject matter issue. I reach the question only because the majority does so.
Congress required the mandatory states to assume complete subject matter jurisdiction. It had very little reason to require less of the option states, when and if they accepted the invitation to assume jurisdiction. But Congress had a very good reason for not permitting any state to choose the subject matter jurisdiction that it would assume. Congress knew that the states wanted the sweet but not the bitter jurisdiction over Indians.18 Authorization to *455states to make their own selections of jurisdiction could lead to the very result that Congress wanted to avoid, that is, letting the states pick only that subject matter jurisdiction from which they could derive benefit and leaving all the onerous matters to the Federal Government. Furthermore, a driving force for passing PL-280 was bringing adequate criminal law enforcement to reservations. Congress knew that in absence of full assumption by a single government, criminal law was a jungle of conflicting jurisdictional problems and fragmented administration that defied effective enforcement.19
It is unnecessary, however, to decide whether, before 1968, Congress gave any leeway to option states to assume jurisdiction selectively. It would be enough to decide a much narrower question: Did Congress authorize Washington to assume some but not all of the jurisdiction relating to criminal offenses, adult and juvenile? The simple answer to that question is “no.”
Although there is arguable textual support in section 7 for dividing civil and criminal subject matter jurisdiction (“criminal offenses or civil causes of action, or with respect to both”), the same language and that of section 6 (“civil and criminal jurisdiction”) supplies strong textual support for the inference that Congress had no intention of permitting a state to assume pieces of the whole criminal or civil packages.
The 1968 amendments, in contrast, unmistakably permit piecemeal assumption of jurisdiction. (See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 1321(a): “jurisdiction over any or all [criminal] offenses . . ..”) Representative Aspinall on the floor of the House stated that this aspect of the 1968 bill was a change in the law. (114 Cong.Rec. 9615 (1968).) Although this statement is not weighty by itself, it is an additional indication that this reading of PL-280 is correct.20
*456Invalidation on this ground would also have an impact short of the majority’s fears. The only states, in addition to Washington, asserting partial subject matter jurisdiction are Arizona, Idaho, and New Mexico.21 Arizona has extended jurisdiction only over air and water pollution matters.22 Frustration of this assumption will cause minimal law enforcement or civil problems for either Arizona or Indians on reservations in that state.
Idaho’s assumption is similar to Washington’s in the subjects covered, but contains one crucial difference.23 The Idaho jurisdiction is shared with tribal courts as it is concurrent with them.24 It is unclear that invalidation would have any adverse impact because tribal court structures are performing the task now. Finally, the legality of New Mexico’s assumption will remain unaffected as it has attempted to assert jurisdiction on statutory bases other than PL-280.25 Invalidation does not prevent the states and tribes from negotiating a structure which will operate to the benefit of both. Although I do not know whether Indians in Idaho are experiencing similar problems to those of the Yakimas, invalidation of partial subject matter assumptions would not throw the administration of justice to reservation residents into chaos.
The majority opinion rests on unsound law, and on fears, not facts. The result is a perpetuation of ills forced upon the Yaki-mas that benefits no one.
I would reverse, invalidating the Washington statute, and set the Yakimas and Washington free from statutory bonds that chafe them both.
. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588-90; “PL-280.”
. The constitutional issues must be resolved by the original panel following remand by the court en banc.
. The exception of well-governed reservations from total assumption of jurisdiction in mandatory states is entirely consistent with the overriding concern of Congress to cure the breakdown in criminal law enforcement on the reservations. (The excepted reservations were Red Lake Reservation in Minnesota, Warm Springs Reservation in Oregon, and Menominee Reservation in Wisconsin.) Congress’ attention was focused for this purpose reservation by reservation, rather than state by state. The genesis of PL-280 was in individual state by state bills, which at first did not include any exceptions. See Hearings on H.R. 459, H.R. 3235, and H.R. 3624 Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the House Comm, on Interior and Insular Affairs on State Legal Jurisdiction in Indian Country, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 11 (1952).
. Id. at 16.
. Other exceptions, not pertinent here, related to trust lands and some federal treaty, contractual and statutory obligations. PL-280 § 2(b).
. The option states divide into two groups, those states with constitutional disclaimers of jurisdiction over Indians, and all other states. Section 6 of PL-280 permits disclaimer states to amend their constitutions to allow jurisdiction. Section 6 has been read as an alternative to section 7 which originally applied to “any other States.” I interpret section 7 as applying to all states other than the mandatory states; i.e,, it is the general provision allowing assumption, and section 6 applies only if it is necessary to remove state constitutional impediments. The 1968 amendments, wherein section 6 was left intact as 25 U.S.C. § 1324 while section 7 — now 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321, 1322 — was changed to read “any State,” reinforces this view.
. “It seems to us that this legislation does not tend to accomplish or promote the congressional purposes of Public Law 280. To the contrary, it would proliferate the law enforcement authorities in Indian country by adding the state as another entity with geographically limited jurisdiction where the Federal and Tribal courts already operate, each with limited subject matter jurisdiction. Moreover, it makes inescapable the checkerboard jurisdiction condemned in Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351, 82 S.Ct. 424, 7 L.Ed.2d 346 .. ..” (In re Hankin’s Petition (S.D.Sup.Ct.1964) 125 N.W.2d 839, 842-43.)
. 18 U.S.C. § 1162:
“(b) Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of any real or personal property, including water rights, belonging to any Indian tribe, band, or community that is held in trust by the United States or is subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by the United States; or shall authorize regulation of the use of such property in a manner inconsistent with any Federal treaty, agreement, or statute or with any regulation made pursuant thereto; or shall deprive any Indian tribe, band, or community of any right, privilege, or immunity afforded under Federal treaty, agreement, or statute with respect to hunting, trapping, or fishing or the control, licensing, or regulation thereof.”
. A default in state enforcement has created a situation that the tribal police are powerless to control because they lack jurisdiction.
"Tribal police officers were outspoken about the quality of law enforcement. Their greatest complaints concerned juvenile problems. One officer reported, ‘The juvenile situation is sad. There is one juvenile officer who covers three or four counties. He seldom comes to the reservation and when he does he just scolds the kids and lets them off. The kids laugh in his face and then they laugh in my face because they know we cannot do a thing with them. . . . ’ Others made the same complaint and lamented that there was no action taken by the local authorities on juvenile problems. ‘Sheriff’s Officers release kids without holding them or doing anything. When we call them they come too late if they even bother to show up. We are getting a real hard time from kids who know we have no jurisdiction over them. Half of the time we don’t let on that we have no authority over them because they would run wild.’
“Other officers reported, ‘State and County authorities do not enforce the laws. The problem has become worse since the state took over. The kids know we have no authority and make it hard for us. State officials will not even go onto deeded property where Indian families live, even though they have authority to do so. The tribal police have to go there when the situation seems desperate . . ,("The Impact of Public Law 280 upon the Administration of Criminal Justice on Indian Reservations,” in 1 National American Indian Court Judges Ass'n., Justice and the American Indian 9 (1974) (survey of Washington Indians) [Hereinafter cited as “Indian Court Judges Survey”].)
. “Although the State assumed jurisdiction over major crimes and juvenile delinquency on reservations, counties have not been provided with resources to effectively assume the responsibilities of patrol, apprehension and investigation of offenses committed on reservations . .” (Jd. at 7, quoting State of Washington, Comprehensive Plan for Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, January 1 — December 31, 1973, at 109.)
. Majority opinion, supra, at p. 445.
. TABLE I
Washington Indian Reservations
Total Population 19,362
Number subject to partial geographic and partial subject matter jurisdiction under ’63 act (checkerboarding) 9,697
Numbér subject only to partial subject matter jurisdiction under ’63 act 985
Number consenting to full jurisdiction under ’63 act 5,758
Number consentng to full jurisdiction under ’57 act 2,647
[495 subject to criminal jurisdiction only] Number over which jurisdiction retroceded in accordance with PL 90-284 275
Source: Indian Court Judges Survey, supra note 9, at App.C.
The reservations subject to checkerboard jurisdiction include Hoh (60), Kalispel (167), Lower Elwha (250), Lummi (1,225), Nooksack (370), Puyallup (450), Quinault (1,200), and Yakima (5,975) reservations.
. This group includes the Makah (805), Port Gamble (165), and Shoalwater (15) reservations. Id
. This group includes the Colville (5,350) and Muckelshoot (408) reservations. Id
. This group is composed of the Chehalis (116), Nisqually (85), Quileute (450), Skokomish (386), Squaxin (165), Swinomish (495) (criminal jurisdiction only), and Tulalip (950) reservations. Id
. Port Madison reservation.
. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-23.
This result would also be more consistent with the present federal policy of Indian self-determination. See Comment, “The Indian Battle for Self-Determination,” 58 Calif.L. Rev. 445, 461-63 (1970). It is an example of wooden legalism to misinterpret PL-280 so as to conflict with present policy. Fortunately, it has long been the usual experience that “[t]he federal judiciary . . . has attempted to mitigate the impact of fluctuating congressional policies.” Id at 446.
. See Goldberg, “Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction Over Reservation Indians,” 22 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 535, 555 (1975).
This article has meticulously collected and analyzed the legislative history of PL-280. The majority, supra, at note 4, cites this article for the proposition that the legislative history does not definitely indicate whether partial subject matter jurisdiction was within the intent of PL-280. However, the majority then goes on to ignore the subsequent analysis in the article which concluded that such jurisdiction is invalid.
. It still is. E.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152, 1153, 1162(c); 25 U.S.C. § 1321. See also, United States v. Cleveland (9th Cir.1974) 503 F.2d 1067; In re Carmen’s Petition (N.D.Cal.1958) 165 F.Supp. 942, aff’d sub nom. Dickson v. Carmen (9th Cir.1959) 270 F.2d 809; Davis, “Criminal Jurisdiction over Indian Country in Arizona,” 1 Ariz.L.Rev. 62 (1959); Goldberg, supra note 18, at 541.
. See also, Statement of Arthur Lazarus, Jr. (an attorney representing six tribes) in Hearing on H.R. 15419 and Related Bills Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the House Comm, on Interior & Insular Affairs, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 116 (1968) (“One of the major objections to Public Law 280 is its ‘all or nothing’ approach, requiring States to assume all jurisdiction on Indian reservations if any jurisdiction is desired.”); Letter from Warren Christopher, Dep, Att’y Gen., to Rep. Wayne N. Aspinall, Mar, 29, 1968, id. at 28. But see, Letter from Harry R. Anderson, Ass’t Sec. of the Interior, to Rep. Wayne N. Aspinall, id. at 25.
Evaluating legislative history to determine congressional intent can sometimes be an exercise in nuance. Although the Court has indicated what material is relevant to the determination, little guidance concerning weighting has been attempted. E.g., Galvan v. Press (1954) 347 U.S. 522, 74 S.Ct. 737, 98 L.Ed. 911 (memorandum inserted in Congressional Record by sponsor); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Corp. (1951) 341 U.S. 384, 394-95, 71 S.Ct. 745, 95 L.Ed. 1035 (statement by sponsor during presentation on floor of Senate for vote); United States v. C.I.O. (1948) 335 U.S. 106, 113-21 (congressional discussion); Helvering v. Griffiths (1943) 318 U.S. 371, 63 S.Ct. 636, 87 L.Ed. 843 (legal opinions relied on by committee and sponsors); Harrison v. Northern Trust Co. (1943) 317 U.S. 476, 63 S.Ct. 361, 87 L.Ed. 407 (reports of congressional committees). Here the inquiry is even more obscured because we must look to the history of subsequent legislation to divine the intent of the earlier enactment. Mattz v. Arnett (1973) 412 U.S. 481, 505 n.25, 93 S.Ct. 2245, 2258, 37 L.Ed.2d 92 (“Although subsequent legislation usually is not entitled to much weight in construing earlier statutes, , , . it is not always without significance. See Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S., at 356-57, 82 S.Ct. 424,’’).
Nevertheless, the intent of the 1968 amendments is relevant and reasonably certain enough to add support to the view that partial subject matter jurisdiction is inconsistent with the intent of PL-280. Representative Aspinall was Chairman of the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee which reported out the bill. His remarks were the only representation as to what the bill was intended to accomplish. The sponsors (Reps. Cunningham & Denney and Sen. Ervin) made no remarks. When weighed against a conflicting view expressed in the opinion of the Assistant Secretary of the Interior, an opinion contradicted by counsel representing some tribes and implicitly contradicted by the Deputy Attorney General, the pronouncement on the floor of the House should control. Cf. Schwegmann Bros. v. Cal*456vert Corp., supra, 341 U.S. at 394-95, 71 S.Ct. 745 (expression of fear in minority report of Senate Committee not authoritative guide to construction of legislation).
. Indian Court Judges Survey, supra note 9, at 25-26.
. Id. at 91.
. Id. at 95.
. Id.
. Id. at 91-92.